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By critically assessing the discourse, intent and teleology of the United Nations Charter when 
the text of the instrument was being finalised in 1945, this thesis argues that the majority of 
WKHZRUOG¶VVWDWHVJDWKHUHGat the UN Conference on International Organisation in San 
Francisco were aware of the fact that the core provisions of the treaty were being dictated by 
the five permanent members of the Security Council. Nevertheless, these states accepted the 
Charter in its current form in return for the promise of a more democratic UN in the future. 
This qualified acceptance was manifested in Article 109 of the Charter and, more 
specifically, in WKDWDUWLFOH¶V paragraph 3, which provided for a facilitated Charter review in 
WHQ\HDUV¶WLPH  
Recognising that globalisation has outpaced fragmented state-centric global governance, and 
that world-wide threats in areas such as the violation of human rights, climate change, armed 
conflicts, and the use of conventional and nuclear weapons continue to exist, this thesis 
argues that elusive global governance and its instrument of international law are, in the 
absence of a global government, ill-equipped to deal effectively with these borderless 
problems. 
Bridging the governmental gap, however, the UN Security Council, with its monopoly on the 
use of force in order to maintain ³SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´ under Chapter VII of the Charter, has 
demonstrated erratic and unplanned competencies. In fact, in the past 25 years, the Council 
has deployed its auto-interpreted expanded powers in the diverse areas of court-making, law-
making, defining criminality and sanctioning non-state actors as criminals. It has even 
involved itself in the settlement of tort claims, awarding damages to individuals and 
corporations. The Council has, in effect, emerged at the apex of the legal order and has 
shown its capacity to legislate globally. 
The founders, when drafting the Charter, were aware of the democratic and legitimacy 
deficiencies of the Council and, in order to redress them, and to apply the experiences learned 
during WKH81¶VILUVW\HDUVRIRSHUDWLRQ, provided for a revisions process, including the 
holding of a Charter review conference, as enshrined in Article 109. 
Why the UN has never in its 70-year history held such a review conference, and whether 
paragraph 3 of Article 109²neglected by researchers and politicians²is still in force, are at 
the core of this WKHVLV¶V analysis. It will be argued that, if such a review conference is 
convened now, it would most likely trigger the process of UN constitutionalisation, and thus 
help transform the UN, so it can ultimately fulfil the objectives set out in the Charter¶V
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Peace Requires Justice, 
   Justice Requires Law, 
Law Requires Government, 
World Peace Requires World Government 
This simple logic for the global rule of law and, more specifically, the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court was the basis of a message that I had the opportunity 
to deliver personally to Senator George McGovern. The year was 1984. The venue was the 
National Convention of the US Democratic Party, being convened in San Francisco. The 
Democrats were deciding whom to elect on their ticket to run in the presidential race against 
the incumbent Republican President, Ronald Reagan. I was then a recent university graduate 
working in the field of computers and systems engineering. As a side interest, and as a 
volunteer, I was a member of a group of activists affiliated with two different NGOs with 
common goals: the mostly US-based Campaign for United Nations Reform, and the more 
international World Federalist Movement. 
What we were advocating was ³ZRUOGSHDFHWKURXJKZRUOGODZ´0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\ZHKDGD
14-point plan for the democratisation and strengthening of the UN. This plan included 
democratisation of the Security Council, a permanent peacekeeping force, a permanent 
international criminal court, and a non-state-dependent source of funds for the UN.  
xix 
 
Our hope, with the help of Senator McGovern, was to enshrine some of our ideals within the 
Democratic Party platform. Senator McGovern was the Democratic presidential nominee 
who, in 1972, had lost to Richard Nixon (the year of the Watergate Scandal that ultimately 
toppled Nixon). Senator McGovern, together with a couple of Democratic Congressmen who 
DOVRJHQXLQHO\EHOLHYHGLQWKH³ZRUOG3HDFHWKURXJKZRUOGODZ´REMHFWLYHZHUHRXU
sympathisers and one of the few political conduits that we had at the Convention. 
Thirty years have now passed. Of our 14-point UN reform plan, only one item has come to 
fruition: the International Criminal Court²albeit that the ICC deals only with large-scale 
international crimes and is unable to exercise universal jurisdiction. Senator McGovern has 
passed away. The Campaign for UN Reform has ceased to exist. The World Federalist 
Movement has become more conservative and, with its limited resources, now has narrower, 
more focused objectives, being mostly an 1*2V¶FRDOLWLRQFRQYHQRUIRUWKH,&&DQG53$V
for me, after a long absence involved in the business world, and after undertaking a five-year 
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The use or threat of use of coercion (by such means as bombs, tanks, missiles, drones, and the 
threat of use of weapons of mass destructions) as a way of resolving conflicts under the 
current international legal order, or²more arbitrarily²in the name of justice, religion, or 
democracy, is commonly deployed by states and non-state actors in daily global affairs. 
Seven decades ago, the United Nations was created primarily with the mission of providing 
global security and the pacific resolution of conflicts. Its main organ, the Security Council 
(SC), was entrusted with this mission, and was intended to be the exclusive broker of global 
conflicts and the enforcer of peace. 
The SC has generally failed in its mandate of maintaining peace and security (Section 1.2). 
On the other hand, it has, since the beginning of the new millennium, increasingly carved out 
a new role for itself: as auto-interpreter of the Charter, and as the law-making and the quasi-
government of the global system. 
When I started my research on Council reforms five years ago, I was seeking answers to the 
following questions: In view of the unsuccessful UN reform attempts, why does the UN 
3 
 
Charter seem to be frozen? Why, despite a Charter review and revision process enshrined in 
Article 109 ± which refers to D³JHQHUDO´UHYLHZFRQIHUHQFH ± has the UN never in its history 
conducted such a review? More specifically, whatever happened to paragraph 3 of Article 
109? According to its legislative history, the paragraph sought to impose a 10-year expiration 
date on the supremacy and special privileges conferred on the permanent five members (P5) 
of the SC by the 1945 Charter. Finally, taking account of the fact that the absence of 
constitutionalisation appears to be the major deficit in global governance, if such a Charter 
review were to be held, could it trigger the process of transforming and constitutionalising the 
UN and international law?  
The thesis is in three parts. Part I concentrates on global governance and the role of the UN, 
focusing on WKH81¶VPRVWSRZHrful organ, the Security Council. I then examine the newly 
practised (since the 1990s) law-making, court-making, and legislative functions of the 
Council, showing that the Council, regardless of the original intent of the Charter and the 
intra/ultra vires argument presented below, assumed under Chapter VII a quasi-governmental 
function. I further demonstrate that this quasi-world governmental role affects not only 
sovereign states but in certain instances applies also to individuals, and that this has a direct 
effect on non-state actors and citizens globally. 
In order to discover the original intent of the Charter, Part II examines the teleology and 
legislative history of the treaty, particularly in respect of the veto and the superior status 
accorded to the P5. Furthermore, in Part II, by examining the original sources relating to 
execution (operation) of Article 109(3), from 1955 until 2015, I consider the status of 
paragraph 3: are its provisions obsolete or do they still have legal force. If the latter, have 
these provisions been violated? 
4 
 
Part III focuses on the legal and constitutionalisation aspects of the Charter. First, the 
legitimacy of the Charter is critically reviewed, and then the good faith performance of 
Article 109(3) is assessed. The last chapter in Part III is devoted to normative issues and 
through that lens conceptualises the constitutionalisation of the UN and international law.  
With paragraph 3 having particular significance both when it was drafted and when it was 
implemented in 1955, and with UN Reform at a gridlock, the last chapter ends with an 
assessment of the legal means of activating the review, together with an examination of the 
dynamics of such a review conference. In particular, if the review were to take place, would it 
trigger a constitutional moment? 
It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the field of international law in several areas. In 
Part I, some readers might find the shortcomings of global governance and the ³fuzzy´ 
international law concepts introduced²with the Council as global adjudicator and 
legislator²convincing and critical. However, there I have essentially drawn on the work of 
others, and perhaps expanded and reformulated their ideas to fit the thesis. One exception is 
P\IRFXVRQWKH&RXQFLO¶VUROHDV, essentially, a tax collector in the creation of the UN 
Compensation Commission (UNCC) in regard to Iraq (Section 3.6). According to the analysis 
presented, it seems that, for roughly a quarter of a century, the UNCC has adversely affected 
the Iraqi people. In retrospect, it appears to have been a contributing factor in the perpetual 
turmoil that Iraq has suffered since the First Gulf War. 
My substantive and original contribution to the field of international law and UN law, 
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First, in rediscovering the intent and possible effects of Article 109(3), WKH³SURPLVHG´
Charter review, and in demonstrating its legal force. The neglect of this subject can be 
attributed to the scarcity of resources on the topic. Those that do exist refer to secondary 
sources that can be traced back to the same three or four American scholars of the 1950s and 
1960s, who, enveloped in their Cold War-era beliefs of a fixed bi-polar world and an 
immutable Charter, prematurely declared paragraph 3 to be obsolete (Section 7.8). However, 
by examining the 22 volumes of UNCIO documents² fully compiled and released to the 
public more than seven years after the end of the San Francisco Conference, but still a library 
rarity and difficult to access in their entirety²I was able to assess the legislative history of 
paragraph 3. Again, I relied on original UN sources to trace the operation of the paragraph in 
1955, as well as searching for any related topic or activity in regard to the paragraph for the 
following 60 years, up to 2015. This year-by-year research was dictated partly by a lack of 
other sources and partly to ensure authenticity in interpretation. Consequently, my finding 
that the paragraph has been partially breached (by the P5) but is still legally in force 
represents both an important (re)discovery and a challenge to those legal scholars, policy 
makers and politicians who have neglected this topic and its applicability to UN reform on 
the assumption that the paragraph is in fact obsolete. 
The second original feature of this thesis relates to the legitimacy of the UN Charter at the 
time of its conclusion (Section 8.3). In investigating the reasons for the acceptance of the 
Yalta formula (governing SC voting procedures) dictated by the P5, I examine the impact that 
the global conflicts of 1945 had on treaty-making activities²before, during and after the 
Conference. I concluded that the majority of the UN founding states at San Francisco were 
subject to the influence of the P5 and thus were not acting independently in matters of foreign 
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policy when they concluded the Charter. Some of these states were in fact under direct 
military occupation (friendly or otherwise) or subject to the colonial rule of the P5 and 
therefore acted under duress. This critical question of the Charter¶VOHJLWLPDF\ is further 
exacerbated by what appears to be a previously undetected fact: that the US, being the first 
state to ratify the UN Charter, deposited its ratification instrument in the short space of time 
separating the two atomic bombings of Japan, on the 6 and 9 of August 1945.  
This sequence of events (Section 8.4.4), which took place within a 72-hour period, involved a 
powerful state formally registering its ratification of the UN instrument (with its collective 
security implications) between two extremely coercive displays of force. This was followed 
by an avalanche of other state ratifications, and may indeed have been a violation of the law 
of treaties in terms of securing the final consent of other states to the UN Charter (Section 
8.4.4). 
The third original contribution relates to the perceived invincibility and irreversibility of the 
P5 veto (Section 9.4). While assessing the feasibility of a review conference to revise the 
Charter, I observed that, in regard to all the three previous significant amendments to the 
Charter, one or more of the P5 had cast a negative vote, presumably vetoing the amendment. 
However, because of the two-phase process envisioned in Articles 108 and 109 for adopting 
and then later ratifying the amendments, and the typical two-year period between these two 
steps, in all three cases the P5 initial veto had, in effect, been overruled. This neglected 
finding appears to be linked to the P5 executive JRYHUQPHQWV¶UHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLUYRWH, or, 
in the case of the more democratic P5 states, because of a shift in decision-making as regards 
the ratification procedure from their executive to their legislative branches and parliaments. 
In either case, the earlier negative vote was overruled and the Charter amendment was in fact 
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ratified. In other words, it appears that the veto, in cases where it counts the most²in 
situations involving Charter revisions²may not be invincible after all.  
Lastly, in view of the above findings, I address the question of whether, by reconstructing 
Article 109(3), the UN can reinvent itself towards constitutionalisation. 
1.2 Governing the World: Government, Governance or Anarchy?  
The substantive question for students, academics and practitioners of international law, as 
well as global policymakers, politicians, and inquisitive world citizens, is: ³How is the world 
governed?´Since the governed are governed by rules, regulations and laws, in this section, in 
the international context, I will use the terms international law and global governance 
interchangeably.  
David Kennedy, in his article RQ³7KH0\VWHU\RI*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH´HOHJDQWO\UHIOHFWVon 
³KRZOLWWOHZHLQIDFWNQRZDERXWKRZZHDUHJRYHUQHG´1 Similarly, the primary assumption 
of most international relations scholars, including Alexander Wendt, is that there is no 
effective global order and that, fundamentally, the state of the world is based on anarchy and, 
therefore, what states can make of it.2  
Of course, for the traditional public international lawyer, there is a world order, consisting of 
domestic laws and international laws, with the latter comprising laws among nations, based 
                                                 
1
 (D. Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance 2009): 28. 
2
 In regard to global anarchy, ³WKHVWDUWLQJSRLQW´IRUPDQ\,5VFKRODUVDQGSROLF\PDNHUVLVWKHDQDUFKLFVWDWe of 
the world, with anarchy essentially being defined as the absence of a world state or a global supranational 
institution that has the monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion and is able to enforce international rules and 
agreements. (Verbeek 2011): 195. For a seminal work by Wendt on IR and anarchy, see (Wendt, Anarchy is 




on instruments such as treaties, and relying on customary international law (CIL), with the 
cardinal principle in this order being states as sovereign equals.3  
For scholars such as Francis Fukuyama, who believe that democratic legitimacy can never 
transcend the nation-state (Fukuyama claims that this is true at least for Americans), global 
order is still possible.4 In fact, as Anne Marie Slaughter argues in her book The New World 
Order, that order already exists. Slaughter expands on this idea and, in her later works, 
expresses the belief that international law and governance is an organic patchwork of 
domestic laws and international institutions, with protocols and regulatory controls that 
function well but only if they are complied with. Moreover, she argues that, with the 
emergence of a ³global community of courts´, this order is also providing for global 
jurisprudence and adjudication.5 
Adopting the critical law theory approach to international law, with its focus on ³ZK\´ and 
³KRZ´ rather than on ³ZKDW´ law is, it can be seen that law is not neutral or value free. 
Therefore, in the international context, if there is such a global order, the critical approach 
reveals a fundamental and omnipresent law and power relationship that makes international 
law inseparable from international politics, hence making international law essentially the 
instrument of the powerful.  
In a similar fashion, many realists and rationalists, recognising the marginalisation of 
international law in the anarchic realm of international relations, put a higher weight on 
VWDWHV¶UHODWLYHSRZHUVDQGon their pursuit of self-interest. Seen through this lens, 
                                                 
3
 On states as sovereigns and equals, which is a classic international law (IL) concept, see, for example: Hans 
.HOVHQ³The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization´Yale 
Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 2: 207-220. 
4
 (Fukuyama 2002): A17. See also (Glennon 2003-2004): 97. 
5
 (Slaughter, The New World Order 2004). See also (Rajkovic 2012): 29-30. 
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international law decisions are based on ³transaction costs´ and benefits. On this view, states 
(especially the powerful ones) by and large base their decisions on the analysis and 
management of the cost-benefit of the consequences of their actions, which in turn dictates 
whether or not they choose to comply with a particular international law.6 
What of international institutions and organisations (IOs)? What part do they play in 
international law and governance? The most universal of these international organisations 
(both in terms of membership and scope), the UN, considered this subject in 2006, through its 
specialised International Law Commission (ILC), which then produced its latest, most 
authoritative report on the status of international law: Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. The ILC 
report, and other scholarly commentaries based on it, tell us that we have a fragmented 
international law, with consequential conflicts in norms and jurisdictions, leading to legal 
indeterminacy. This hints at a dysfunctional global governance.7 
Many legal scholars of different orientations take problems inherent in international law to 
mean that international law is not ³UHDO´ODZ, at least as we experience it in our national 
models of jurisprudence. It is asserted that international law is not based on the concept of 
democracy (the global populous and the demos, or, in its multi-state form, ³demoi-cracy´), 
                                                 
6
 For IL as an instrument of the powerful, see (Nijman 2011): 71-77 and 90-91. See also (Cryer, Hervey and 
Sokhi-Bulley 2011): 59-60 and 71-73. For the argument that IL, as it stands, is not legalistic and is not intended 
to achieve a set of values or goals but is rather a tool for states to gauge the cost-benefit of their different 
foreign-policy decisions, see (Goldsmith and Posner 2005). See also (Nijman 2011): 75. 
7
 (Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the Internatlioanl Law Commission 2006). On 
legal indeterminacy, see (Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law- 20 Years Later 2009). On conflict of 
norms, see (Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules 
of Intnernational Law 2003). For aQRSSRVLQJYLHZWR,/IUDJPHQWDWLRQZKHUH³FRQYHUJHQFH´LVFODLPHGVHH




and that there is insufficient transparency, accountability and legitimacy in law-making. 
Moreover, it is generally believed that international law significantly lacks adjudication and 
enforcement powers.8 
Adopting this non-law view, and taking into account the critical and transaction-cost 
approaches, we can infer that we do not in fact enjoy global governance, but, at best, are 
subject to international hegemony, and, at worst, global anarchy.9 
Indeed, with the exception of some trade laws and regimes, and global regulatory and 
administrative laws, it appears that global governance has failed²at least in terms of 
substantive issues, such as global democracy, fundamental rights, prevention of armed 
                                                 
8
 $OHJDOWKHRUHWLFDODUJXPHQWGRXEWLQJ,/DVD³OHJDOV\VWHP´LVIRXQGLQ+/$+DUW¶VThe Concept of Law 
(second edition, 1994). Hart describes the legal system as having both primary rules, which are essentially rules 
of conduct, and secondary rules, which are power-conferring rules and all rules other than primary ones. The 
secondary rules govern the primary rules and have three main components: rules of recognition (determinacy), 
rules for adjudication, and rules of change (how to change the law). Hart characterises IL as primitive, since it 
lacks the secondary rules component. See also (Payandeh, The Concept of International Law in the 
Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart 2011): 969-977. For Hans Morgenthau¶VYLHZVRQWKHQH[XVRI,/DQGSROLWLFV
and on the UN being essentially the international government of the P5 super-powers, see his classic book 
Politics Among Nations (7th edition, 2005). See also (Liste 2011). Eric Posner argues that perils of global 
legalism EHVLHJHJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHDQGDUHWKHRXWFRPHRIWKH³LGHDOLVWEHOLHIWKDWODZFDQEHHIIHFWLYHHYHQLQ
WKHDEVHQFHRIOHJLWLPDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVRIJRYHUQDQFH´(Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism 2009). For a 
summary of some of the doctrines referred to here, see Wade Mansell and Karen Openshaw (Mansell and 
Openshaw, International Law: A Critical Introduction 2013): 234-237. Mansell and Openshaw also cover some 
other perspectives on IL, such as the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL). Ibid: 11-14. 
On the constitutional and the democratic deficiency of current IL, see Chapter 9. 
9
 Hegemonic International Law (HIL), according to Detlev Vagts and Jose Alvarez, is characterised by IL 
indeterminacy, which benefits the super-SRZHUVKHJHPRQVDQGLVPDQLIHVWHGLQWKHKHJHPRQV¶IDLOXUHWR
participate in treaties (or to circumvent existing treaties by the creation of new ones) or by a lack of submission 
to global forms of dispute settlement (Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers 2005): 199-216. See 
also (Vagts, Hegemonic International Law 2001). Special privileges granted to hegemons in certain treaties, 
such as the P5 privileges in respect of the SC, make those international organisations or organs instruments for 
KHJHPRQVDQGWKHLU³EHVWOLWWOHKHOSHU´LELG 
,QIDFWWKHVHKHJHPRQV¶SULYLOHJHVHLWKHUWDNHGLUHFW effect through treaties, as with the preferential voting 
structures at the UN, World Bank and IMF, or may be conferred in a more indirect way, through implicit or 
H[SOLFLWOLQNDJHVLQVXEVHTXHQWWUHDWLHVIRUH[DPSOHWKH6&¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLVWDQGVSHFLDOrelationship with the 
IAEA, NPT, and ICC treaties.  
On global anarchy, see n 2 above. 
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conflicts, nuclear disarmament, global poverty, and global warming. Furthermore, in the area 
of international peace and security, it has failed miserably.10 
In conclusion, may I suggest the following: ³JOREDO governance´ is not about how, in the 
absence of formal government, such governance is ³ZRUNLQJ´WRVROYHWKHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVRI
globalisation, or is addressing the lingering substantive global issues, such as protection of 
fundamental rightVRUSURWHFWLRQRIWKHHDUWK¶VHQYLURQPHQW; nor is it about ending armed 
conflicts and outlawing war; but is rather about how it LV³QRWZRUNLQJ´to eradicate or solve 
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 Despite the formation of the UN and other multinational security arrangements, hundreds of international 
armed conflicts have taken place since 1945, claiming millions of lives. A partial summary of violent conflicts 
that occurred while this chapter was being researched and written, during June and July 2014, follows. In 
Afghanistan, despite the scheduled departure of the US and the UK by the end of 2014, and after more than 12 
years since the invasion of the country by the US and their NATO allies, the conflict is still ongoing. In Iraq, 
-XQHVDZWKHPLOLWDU\VXFFHVVHVRIWKH,VODPLF6WDWHRI,UDTDQG6\ULD,6,6ZKLFKFDSWXUHG,UDT¶VVHFRQG
largest city, Mosul. Iraq has become the battle ground for multinational, state and non-state combatants, with the 
2014 year-to-date monthly average of deaths reported reaching 1,000, most of these civilians. The UN reported 
in July 2014 that Syria, in its first three years of civil war, had already reached 170,000 deaths, again mostly 
civilian²and the conflict continues, causing the displacement of millions of refugees. Over the same two-month 
SHULRGWKHRQJRLQJ8NUDLQHFLYLOZDUFODLPHGKXQGUHGVRIFLYLOLDQDQGFRPEDWDQWV¶OLYHVIn one incident alone, 
on 17 July 2014, the shooting-down of a Malaysian civilian plane over Ukrainian airspace led to all 298 
passengers and crew being killed. Also in July, in Libya, in one day alone, 59 deaths were reported, mostly in 
the battle between the different factions seeking to take control of Tripoli Airport.  
 
Over the same period, North Korea threatened to use nuclear weapons against its adversaries, and the armed 
conflicts in Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Yemen, and the Democratic 
5HSXEOLFRI&RQJR'5&FRQWLQXHG7KHODWWHUFRQIOLFWGXEEHG³$IULFD¶V:RUOG:DU´KDVODVWHGIRUILYH\HDUV
and is in fact a proxy war between Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe on the one side, supporting the government 
forces, and, on the other, the rebels, backed by Uganda and Rwanda. Another catastrophic armed conflict that 
once again erupted (in July 2014) involved the Israeli invasion of Gaza, which, up until 28 July, had taken close 
to 1,100 lives, mostly Palestinian civilians, including over 200 Palestinian children. It has also inflicted 
GHYDVWDWLQJHFRQRPLFDQGPDWHULDOORVVDQGKDUGVKLSRQ*D]D¶VFLWL]HQV2QWKH,VUDHOLVLGHVROGLHUVGLHG 
 
This list is by no means exhaustive nor is it atypical. The creation of the UN at the end of World War II was 
supposed to put an end to international violent conflicts, but this has not been the case. The last 70 years have 
witnessed a substantial deficiency in global governance relating to peace and security, despite the existence of 
the UN, NATO, NPT, African Union, Arab League, OSCE and other related security regimes and governances, 
which, individually and collectively, have been unable to prevent these catastrophic deaths, injuries, 
displacements and losses, and the associated material and environmental destruction. 
(Information on the above conflicts was gathered from various news sources: in particular, the Guardian, over 
the period June and July of 2014, with the exception of the multi-state character of the DRC conflict, which was 
reported by the BBC: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13283212 , accessed 28 July 2014. 
)RUDYLHZRIVHFXULW\JRYHUQDQFH³PDOIXQFWLRQ´VHH(Hale, Held and Kevin 2013): 84-112. 
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global problems, and is, at best, reduced to administering and managing their negative 
effects. In that sense, global governance is not a mystery but perhaps more of a myth. 
1.3 Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Global Governance 
Constitutionalisation: the Terms of Reference 
Can we constitutionalise global governance? Is having a constitution the same as 
constitutionalisation? What do we mean by international (global) law and UN 
constitutionalisation?  
First, it is necessary to start with a definition of global governance. From a strictly legal 
perspective, it seems global governance refers to the existing, fragmented state of 
international law: the various corpuses of, for example, international, public, criminal, 
humanitarian and economic law, including their lex specialis varieties, such as the specialised 
ICC regime, or the law of the sea (UNCLOS), as well as self-contained regimes, such as the 
trade laws of the WTO.  
In the universal application of global governance, we have UN law, particularly that of the 
Security Council, generating hard law in its precedent-setting legislative and criminal-law-
making role (to be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). We also have the mostly soft and 
regulatory laws of the UN system¶V other organs and associated international organisations, 
via their declarations, conventions, and legal regimes.  
Global governance also includes global administrative and regulatory laws, which, regardless 
of whether universal or not, continue to proliferate and, directly or indirectly, are increasingly 
impacting upon individuals, corporations and other non-state actors.11 I will not go so far as 
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 The administrative and regulatory rule-making powers of international organisations, largely within the UN 




high-level intergovernmental organisations, such as the G-8 and G-20, unless they are 
published and made transparent (possibly a wishful assumption).12 Last, but not least, we 
should be mindful of the law emanating from traditional international law sources, and 
therefore part of global governance, as mentioned in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, 
including customary International law and judicial decisions.  
Attempts to define global governance in the legal context become further convoluted when 
trying to determine how such rules are made, who has the power to make them, how they are 
adjudicated, what compliance mechanisms exist, and how they may be enforced. This 
opacity, either intentional or just unresolved, leads to a substantial democratic deficit and 
indeterminacy in international law and global governance.13  
                                                 
rules, whether legally binding hard laws, or so-called soft law, and whether for the public good (such as the 
WHO regulations) or regulating private interest (such as some of the World Bank and IMF rules), are 
increasingly impacting non-state actors and are, by and large, followed uncontested by the weaker states. 
(Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers 2005): 244-257. 
12
 For global decision-making in a mode of inter-state oligarchyVHH$QQH3HWHUV¶DUJXPHQW in (Peters, Dual 
Democracy 2011): 286-294. On the shortcomings of the G-7 and G-8 type of governance, see (Weiss and 
Thakur, Global Governance and the UN, an Unfinished Journey 2010): 192-193. 
13
 For a more recent view on the fragmentation of IL and its indeterminacy, see (Koskenniemi, The Politics of 
International Law- 20 Years Later 2009). On the democratic deficit of global governance, see (Peters, Dual 
Democracy 2011): 267. For the argument that in fact this fragmentation of IL and its indeterminacy is 
LQWHQWLRQDODQGLVDWRROIRUSRZHUIXOVWDWHV¶KHJHPRQ\VHH(\DO%HQYHQLVWLDQG*HRUJH'RZQVLQThe Empire's 
New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law. Benvenisti and Downs argue that: 
 
Powerful states labor to maintain and even actively promote fragmentation because it enables them to 
preserve their dominance in an era in which hierarchy is increasingly viewed as illegitimate, and to 
opportunistically break the rules without seriously jeopardising the system they have created. 
« 
[B]y suggesting the absence of design and obscuring the role of intentionality, fragmentation frees 
powerful states from having to assume responsibility for the shortcomings of a global legal system that 
they themselves have played the major role in creating. The result is a regulatory order that reflects the 
interests of the powerful that they alone can alter. 




Examples of international law indeterminacy can be found in some environmental cases, 
where at least three legal regimes²the WTO, UNCLOS, and the Multi Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) ²can all claim to exercise some form of jurisdiction.14  
Owing to the absence of hierarchy and judicial review in international law, this fuzzy legal 
logic applies even in areas where exclusive and universal competencies are claimed. This is 
particularly evident in the case of the Security Council, which presumably has exclusive 
powers to deal with global peace and security issues (Chapter 3, especially Section 3.7).  
In the case of SC decisions, indeterminacy is more intertwined with the democratic deficit of 
the Council (in terms of representation and the inequality of its members) and is particularly 
problematic in so far as any member of the P5 can defy a decision reached by a majority of 
the other member states by exercising its veto power. For example, in relation to life-and-
death situations, such as whether a military intervention constitutes self-defence under Article 
51, or amounts to unlawful aggression, or in situations where responsibility-to-protect (R2P) 
or humanitarian-type intervention and prevention need to be triggered, the Council has been 
acting erratically or not at all.15  
Since global governance lacks a hierarchical structure, and given the indeterminacy of its 
procedures and outcomes, not to mention the opacity of how its rules are made, how it 
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 For an example of the World Trade Organisation, a trade regime, making judgments on environmental issues, 
see the Shrimp-Turtle case (United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 1998). 
See also (Ulfstein, The International Judiciary 2011): 140.  
15
 The humanitarian intervention and R2P doctrines are explained in n 102 below.  
On Council efficacy in these matters, while this chapter was being written, on 21August 2014, the outgoing UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, in her last report to the SC, formally criticised the P5 for 
their behaviour: "Short-term geopolitical considerations and national interest, narrowly defined, have repeatedly 
taken precedence over intolerable human suffering and grave breaches of²and long-term threats to²
international peace and security". Pillay further told the Council, in her final briefing after six years in the role: 
"I firmly believe that greater responsiveness by this council would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives"; 




operates, and how it is held accountable, it is not surprising that the concept eludes precise 
definition.  
Consequently, rather than ponder the difficulty of providing an agreed definition of global 
governance, and notwithstanding the wide usage of the term since the 1990s by politicians, 
technocrats and academics (but not by the average citizen),16 I will present below my selected 
definition²from among the array of the wide and the wild²for the purposes of this thesis.  
Accepting, therefore, that global governance LVD³P\VWHU\´ and lacks a common definition, I 
select Richard Weiss and Ramesh ThDNXU¶Vencapsulation as one of the better ones, 
encompassing both international law and international relations. They define global 
governance as:17 
[T]he sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-
border relations between states, citizens, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations and the market. 
In spite of the generality and ambiguity associated with the concept of global governance²in 
terms of its actors, agencies, and legality, and notwithstanding the fact that it means different 
things to different people²this international law and international relations phenomenon 
does at least have one critical common denominator. As expressed by Nobel Economics 
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 On the elusiveness of global governance as a concept when it first began to emerge in the early 1990s, see 
(Rosenau 1992):2. On it still being, by and large, illusory, see (Klabbers, Setting the Scene 2011): 5. 
17
 (Weiss and Thakur, Global Governance and the UN, an Unfinished Journey 2010): 31-32. 
The different definitions and understandings of global governance have proliferated wildly. Benedict Kingsbury 
et al, in Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Classification and Rankings, define the concept 
VLPSO\DV³JRYHUQDQFHEH\RQGDVLQJOHVWDWH´, DQGDUJXHWKDW³LQGLFDWRUVDQGRWKHUTXDQWLWDWLYHZD\VRI
represeQWLQJVRFLDOSKHQRPHQDFDQVHUYHDVWHFKQRORJLHVRIJRYHUQDQFH´. For example, ³PLOLWDU\DFWLRQ´FDQEH




Laureate Joseph Stiglitz this is, ³XQIRUWXQDWHO\´, global governance ³without global 
government´.18  
Joseph Weiler adds to this common understanding with the observation that in fact global 
governance is characterised not only as ³without government´ but also ³without the 
governed´This, he notes, makes it challenging to legitimise and democratise this type of 
governance, since ³democracy presumes demos and presumes existence of government´19 
In view of this democratic deficit, and given the known negative effects of globalisation, can 
we regulate and put a leash on this ³XQIRUWXQDWH´ global governance?  
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 One of the earlier works suggesting that global governance can function reasonably well without a 
government was James Rosenau and Ernst-2WWR&]HPSLH¶V Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics, published in 1992. In it, Rosenau and Czempie argue that governance does not 
UHTXLUH³OHJDOFRPSHWHQFH´DQGWKDW³JRYHUQPHQWVH[HUFLVHUXOH´ZKHUHDV³JRYHUQDQFHXVHVSRZHU´7KHUHIRUH
in global governance, exertion of power, balance of power, and deterrence become important elements in 
making governance work. As an example, they cite the mutual deterrence of the Cold War era and the role of 
1$72DVDV\VWHPRI³JRYHUQDQFHSDUH[FHOOHQFH´ (Czempie 1992): 250-251.  
 
Joseph Stiglitz, on the other hand, recognises that globalisation (free trade and the removal of barriers) has 
occurred before in world history: in particular, in the Europe and US of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, prior to World War I (see (Rodrik 2011): 24-46). Stiglitz, in Globalization and its Discontents, cites 
WKH86H[SHULHQFHDVDVXFFHVVZLWKWKH86IHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VDFWLYHLQWHUYHQWLRQUHJXODWLRQDQG
management of nineteenth-century inter-state free trade at the domestic level (analogous to the global) having 
strengthened both the US economy (relative to the rest of the world) and the federal system itself. In short, 
Stiglitz characterises the current shortcomings of global governance as follows: 
 
Today, with the continuing decline in transportation and communication costs, and the reduction of 
man-made barriers to the flow of goods, services, and capital (though there remains serious barriers to 
the free flow of labor), we have DSURFHVVRIµJOREDOL]DWLRQ¶ analogous to the earlier processes in which 
national economies were formed. Unfortunately, we have no world government, accountable to the 
people of every country, to oversee the globalization process in a fashion comparable to the way 
national governments guided the nationalization process. Instead, we have a system that might be 
called global governance without global government «[Emphasis in original]; (Stiglitz 2003): 21-22.  
  
Although global governance is generally understood not to function under the command and control of 
governments, Dani Rodrick, in The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can't 
Coexist, reminds us that when global governance was unable to prevent the economic crash of 2008, some 
governments did have a role to play, and it was the intervention of governments that finally came to the rescue. 
(Rodrik 2011): 207-)RUWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHUHLVLQIDFWD³UHVXUJHQFH´LQWKHLGHDRIZRUOGJRYHUQPHQW
see Campbell Craig, The Resurgent Idea of World Government, see (Campell 2010): 397-408. 
19
 (Weiler, Geology of International Law ± Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy 2004): 560. 
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International law constitutionalisation might be the answer. This could transform global 
governance²whatever that is²into good governance. And, in addition, it might provide the 
NLQGRIXQLYHUVDOIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV¶SURWHFWLRQDQGFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\ZKLFKIRUPWKH
normative constructs of this thesis, and that could signal an end to armed conflict: the 
promised but as yet unfulfilled goal of the United Nations. 
Since the term constitutionalism is, according to Nicholas Tsagourias, value loaded, and with 
the term and its derivatives EHLQJ³DWWKHDSH[RISROLWLFDODQGOHJDODHVWKHWLFVRUYLUWXHV´20 
what then is meant by constitutionalism and constitutionalisation, particularly in the 
international context?  
Although constitutionalism is the ideology and the driving factor in the constitutionalisation 
process, to conceptualise the latter we must first make a distinction, recognising that the 
existence of a written constitution does not necessarily mean that the normative and structural 
concepts of constitutionalisation have been addressed or realised.21  
In fact, while most states possess a written document called a constitution as the embodiment 
of the overarching legal order (with the written form being preferred for the sake of 
transparency), there can be such an order and constitutionalisation without a written 
instrument, as is the case in the UK.  
At the multinational level, the same can be presumed of the EU, where, DIWHU³7KH7UHDW\
Establishing a Constitution for Europe´ZDVGHIHDWHGPRVWRIWKHPDLQIHDWXUHVRIWKat 
                                                 
20
 (Tsagourias 2007): 1. 
21
 (Besson 2009): 385-386. See also, (Tsagourias 2007): 2-3. In the case of international organisations, some 
IOs, such as the ILO, ITU and UNESCO, without necessarily possessing any constitutional elements or 
objectives, formally name their statutes ³FRQVWLWXWLRQV´)RUDQH[DPSOHRIDQDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQLQZULWWHQ
IRUPZLWKRXWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQVHH$OH[0DJDLVD¶VDQDO\VLVRI=LPEDEZH (Magaisa 2010): 52, 58-59. 
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constitution were incorporated into the existing and new treaties, essentially giving them the 
same functionality.22 But then some criticise the EU, that the European Union ³constitution´, 
while in the 8QLRQ¶V aspirations and perhaps informal agenda, however, as being 
insufficiently grounded in constitutionalism.23  
To avoid circularity, and to provide a basic understanding of, and a link to, these derivatives 
of the constitutional terms in the international context, and to provide the basis to this thesis, I 
propose the following definition: 
Constitutionalisation is the process by which the ideals of constitutionalism are 
translated into a constitution, as the supreme legal order, with the necessary 
structure, primary rules, and secondary rules and procedures to achieve those 
constitutional ideals, and, further, guarantee its adaptability and dynamism. 
The primary and the secondary rules mentioned above essentially follow H.L.A Hart¶V
concept of law covered earlier. 
That said, the international constitution must have a supranational architecture 
accommodating multi-level governments with vertical and horizontal relationships, 
incorporating the cardinal sovereignty-sharing principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and 
                                                 
22
 (Tsagourias 2007): 2-3. See also (Walker, Reframing EU Constitutionalism 2009): 149. 
23
 (Tsagourias 2007): 2-3. See also Joseph Weiler, European Neo-constitutionalism: In Search of the 
Foundations of the European Constitutional Order; Ibid: Note 5. 
19 
 
direct effect,24 with its ultimate subjects being natural persons (³we the peoples´), 
safeguarded by the legal protection of judicial review.25  
The global constitution should not only be constructing the normative and axiological values 
prescribed by constitutionalism, such as the protection of universal and fundamental rights, 
but should DOVREHVHQVLWLYHWRFKDQJHDQG³FRQWLQXRXVO\UHDGSROLWLFR-OHJDOVSDFHV´26  
                                                 
24
 In the EU, subsidiarity refers to when the union should intervene, based on the political philosophy of self-
JRYHUQPHQWDQGLQNHHSLQJZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHRI(8PHPEHUVWDWHVLQWKH7UHDW\SUHDPEOHRIEHLQJ³UHVROYHG
to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are 
WDNHQDVFORVHO\DVSRVVLEOHWRWKHFLWL]HQVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHSULQFLSOHRIVXEVLGLDULW\´ (EUR-Lex 2015): 
Treaty Preamble, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN . The principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality are primarily defined in Article 5 of the EU Treaty. Ibid. See also: 
http://www.europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/2/3/2/?all=1 . According to Chalmers, Davies and Monti, 
subsidiarity has two central logics: first, that the supranational government should not intrude on national, 
regional and local political and cultural identities. In the EU context, the principle is therefore directed at 
³SROLFLQJDQGOLPLWLQJWKHUHDFKDQGOHYHOVRI(8OHJLVODWLRQ´,QFRPPRQZith most federalism models, the 
second logic is concerned with the mediation of the relationship between federal-supranational and local 
JRYHUQPHQWV,QRWKHUZRUGV³ZKHQLWLVDSSURSULDWHIRUWKHFHQWUDOIHGHUDODXWKRULWLHVWRLQWHUYHQHDQGZKHQLW
is noW´(Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2010): 361-365. The proportionality principle, in a multi-government 
structure, simply requires that the scope of action applied by the EU, or supranational government, in order to 
achieve a desired goal should be proportional and should ³not exceed´WKDWZKLFKLVQHFHVVDU\WRDFKLHYHWKH
objective. See Chapter 9, Section 9.2. 7KHFRQFHSWRI³GLUHFWHIIHFW´DVLWKDVHYROYHGLQ(8MXULVSUXGHQFHLV
touched on in Section 9.2 and n 25 below. 
25
 On the (8IRXQGDWLRQDOSHULRGDQGLWV³SUH-IHGHUDO´DQG³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ´VWDJHVVHH-RVHSK:HLOHU¶V
1991 seminal work The Transformation of Europe. Of particular relevance is his discussion of the cardinal 
constitutional rules potentially applicable in any supranational setting, such as the doctrines of Direct Effect, 
Supremacy, Implied Powers, Human Rights and Judicial Review. It should be noted, however, that the European 
experience and the evolution of its constitution has, from the outset, been more driven by judicial 
constitutionalism rather than treaty provisions. (Weiler, The Transformation of Europe 1991): 2403- 243. See 
also (Walker, Reframing EU Constitutionalism 2009): 149-176. On the institutionalisation of IL and the 
construction of the international legal system as a constitution, see (Paulus 2009): 69-73. On the empowerment 
of individuals and the globalisation of citizenship in international constitutionalisation, see (Peters, Dual 
Democracy 2011): 297-)RUDQ³EJIL Talk!´GHEDWHRQ³WUDQVODWLRQ´RIVRPHRIWKHGRPHVWLFODZFRQFHSWV
into international constitutionalisation, see (Ulfstein, Empowerment and Constitutional Control 2010). On 
³FRVPRSROLWDQLVP´LGHDOVRIPXOWL-level citizenship and a world parliament, see (Held 2010): 101, 116, 239-252. 
26
 (Tsagourias 2007) : 3. According to WeilerFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLVµDQLQWHOOHFWXDOFRQVWUXFWE\ZKLFKRQHFDQ
DVVLJQPHDQLQJWRRUHYHQFRQVWLWXWHWKDWZKLFKLVREVHUYHG¶LELGQ,QWKHVHDEVWUDFWWHUPVNeil Walker, in 
his article on EU and WTO constitutionalism, discusses some of the shortcomings attributed to non-state legal 
entities, such as legitimacy, democratic deficiency, accountability, equality and security. In general terms, he 
defines constitutionalism as an idea that ³VHHNVWRSURYLGHDQRUJDQizing framework of practical reasoning for 
WKHDSSOLFDWLRQDQGEDODQFLQJRIWKHSDUWLFXODUSROLWLFDOYDOXHV´(Walker, The EU and the WTO: 
Constitutionalism in a New Key 2001): 33. Walker also points out that the process and achievement of 




In setting the terms of reference for this thesis, I should clarify that, in referring to 
international or UN constitutionalisation, I am not prescribing a centralised unitary world 
state. As with the existing models of multi-constitutional states with multi-level governments, 
the ultimate global constitution will take away from states some of their sovereignty, granting 
them in exchange collective global rights. As a result, the constitutional model could draw on 
the experience of federal states²such as Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Switzerland and 
the US ²or on that of a less integrated but still supranational structure, such as the European 
Union.27 
According to Samantha Besson, constitutions are RIWZRW\SHV³WKLQ´and ³WKLFN´The ³WKLQ
constitution is an ensemble of secondary rules that organise the law-making institutions and 
SURFHVVHVLQDJLYHQOHJDORUGHU´ Besson further explains that a thin constitution, in her 
opinion, implies DQ\³DXWRQRPRXVOHJDORUGHU´with secondary rules of self-maintaining 
procedural clauses for change, such as revisions and amendments. A ³WKLFN´FRQVWLWXWLRQ for 
Besson, being comprised RI³VXSHULRU legal norms´, is a thin one to which substantive or 
³PDWHULDO´ elements have been added. 28 Therefore, a thick constitution would always contain 
the material elements, such as separation of powers, checks and balances, the rule of law, 
judicial review, democracy and the protection of fundamental rights. 
                                                 
27
 The sovereignty-sharing hierarchical structure suggested here, whether in a federal or in a less integrated 
supranational setting, may take a more domestically acceptable political turn. See, for example, Kalypso 
Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States 




VXEVLGLDULW\´PRGHOLQJOREDOJRYHUQDQFH(Nicolaidis and Howse, The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels 
of Governance in the United States and The European Union 2002): 476-479. 
28
 (Besson 2009): 385-386. See also (Tsagourias 2007): 2. 
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This recognises that constitutionalisation, as Mattias Kumm refers to it, is a cognitive process 
DQGD³FRVPRSROLWDQSDUDGLJP´,29 or, as Koskenniemi describes it, D³PLQGVHW´.30 Above, I 
was not attempting to give an exact definition of the term and its derivatives. Rather, the 
global or UN constitutionalisation that I refer to in this thesis is a ³thick´ constitution (in 
writing, for the sake of transparency and precision), which defines an autonomous legal order 
establishing a hierarchy of norms, and having the necessary structure and processes to 
guarantee the protection of the substantive constitutional attributes mentioned earlier as 
³PDWHULDO´.  
1.4 International Law Constitutionalisation and the Role of the United 
Nations: UN Constitutionalisation 
At this juncture, it will be useful to conceptualise some of the key principles and 
characteristics of international law were it to undergo a process of constitutionalisation and 
compare this with the current situation. A constitutionalised public international law would, 
in addition to the material elements outlined above, most likely remedy, in design or function, 
some of the fuzzy or unenforceable concepts in the current international legal regime. For 
example, jus cogens norms (peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is 
permitted),31 and which constitute erga omnes obligations ³toward all´ states,32 would 
                                                 
29
 (Kumm 2009): 320-323. 
30
 (Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and 
Globalization 2007): 9. 
31
 (Brownlie 1998): 517. For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that peremptory norms certainly exist in 
positive international law. However, jurists are in agreement that jus cogens obligations are not precisely 
defined or categorised. Ibid. These higher obligations have not been defined or enumerated in the VCLT, or by 
WKH,&-DOWKRXJK³SHUHPSWRU\UXOHV basically pursue a deterrent effect´(Cassese, International Law 2005): 209. 
,QIDFWWKH,&-KDVFDUHIXOO\DYRLGHGSURQRXQFLQJRQWKHPDWWHURUKDVXVHG³HOXVLYHODQJXDJH´ZKHQUHIHUULQJ
to peremptory norms. Ibid. 
32
 The erga omnes and jus cogens concepts appear to be two sides of the same coin, since jus cogens norms are 
DSSOLFDEOHWRDOOVWDWHVDQG³IORZ´LQWRerga omnes obligations (or rights). However, M. Cherif Bassiouni argues 
that such a circular depiction is too simplistic. In citing the ICJ Barcelona Traction case, Bassiouni argues that, 
in spite of occasional attempts, the ICJ has failed to define precisely what meaning it attaches to the phrase 
³REOLJDWLRQVRIDVWDWHWRZDUGVWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO community as a whole.´ Bassiouni further argues that: 
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become superfluous, since any supreme and compelling norm would be codified and included 
within the constitution.33  
Similarly, another fuzzy principle of current international law that might be expected to 
disappear is customary international law. In domestic legal orders, customs are often adopted 
and codified into existing laws.34 With the generally accepted principle of equality before the 
law, the old concept of derogations and exceptionalism will, most likely, also disappear (for 
example, there would be no longer long lists of reservations at the end of a treaty, by which 
states unilaterally exempt themselves from parts of the law). 
Further, since constitutionalisation will elevate the legal status of peoples vis-à-vis states, 
perhaps the governance model will²DOWKRXJKLQLWLDOO\IRXQGHGRQVWDWHV¶FRQsent²
ultimately adopt a more egalitarian and majoritarian decision-making process (probably 
involving a qualified majority of states and populations). It will, therefore, be independent of 
the consent of any single state. 35 In fact, this HPSRZHUPHQWRIWKHVWDWHV¶FLWL]HQV at the 
supranational level was exactly what the US and the EU experienced in their constitutional 
³PRPHQWV´DQG history. 
Another continuing problem that constitutionalised international law might help to alleviate is 
the de-constitutionalisation of states¶ domestic constitutions, which are increasingly affected 
                                                 
 
The relationship between jus cogens and obligation erga omnes was never clearly articulated by the 
PCIJ and the ICJ, nor did the jurisprudence of either court explicitly articulate how a given norm 
becomes jus cogens, or why and when it becomes erga omnes and what consequences derive from this. 
 
 (Bassiouni 1996):72-73. 
33
 (Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, Epilogue: Debate on EJIL Talk! Blog 2011): 393.  
34
 (Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community 2011): 159-161. 
35
 Ibid; see also (Klabbers, The Genre of Constitutionalization? And Constitutionalization and Law-making 





by current global governance issues. This phenomenon stems from the fact that some of the 
international law decisions that affect individuals and impact on domestic legislation, such as 
trade, health, labour and economic regulations and agreements (not to mention the legislative 
decisions of the SC, discussed in the next two chapters), frequently have a negative impact on 
the democratic processes of domestic and municipal law-making. Unless based on a formal 
treaty²which, according to most domestic constitutions, normally requires formal 
parliamentary ratification²these rules are usually made as international agreements solely by 
the VWDWHV¶H[HFXWLYHEUDQFKHV, and therefore do not require their parliamentV¶ ratification or 
their ciWL]HQV¶consent.  
Consequently, these laws (externally imported rules) are often made in circumvention of, and 
contrary to, WKHVWDWHV¶GRPHVWLF constitutional principles.36 In a federal or supranational 
model of world governance, these decisions would be made in a global parliamentarian 
setting, or would at least incorporate remedies such as universal judicial recourse, which 
would provide for more direct effect and therefore offer compensatory measures to domestic 
de-constitutionalisation.37 
Constitutionalisation would also avoid the perceived perils of global governance and 
international law, which are largely associated with the current absence of a global 
government, being instead designed to govern in a responsible and accountable manner. 
Therefore, in addition to the benefits mentioned above, perhaps a constitutionalised 
                                                 
36
 The impinging of global governance on domestic constitutional systems will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapters 3 and 9. For D³)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV´ periodical view of the subject, see The War of Law: How New 
International Law Undermines Democratic Sovereignty in (Kyl, Feith and Fonte 2013). 
37
 )RUWKH³FRPSHQVDWRU\´HIIHFWthat post-constitutionalised IL will have on domestic constitutions, see Anne 
Peters (Peters, Dual Democracy 2011): 295, 296 and 347. 
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international law could address the current opacity of a global governance seemingly guided 
by an invisible hand. 
Thus, to make global governance more transparent, prone to determinacy, democratic, 
accountable, and ultimately more just, is it feasible to opt for its constitutionalisation, either 
by creating a new global government institution or perhaps by constitutionalising one of the 
existing international organisations?  
Assuming that a constitutionalised global governance is desirable, how might this be 
achieved? Would it be possible to hold a global constitutional convention, where every state 
would send its visionary representatives, who, after some months or years, might draft a 
world constitution? 
Recent history tells us that, unless there is a major global calamity, such as another world 
war, or a sudden environmental apocalypse, or perhaps even a limited nuclear war, we cannot 
expect urgent global action in the convening of conferences similar to that which led to the 
creation of the League of Nations or the UN. Therefore, without global calamities, one cannot 
expect a new constitutionalised legal order to be invented from scratch.  
Such a scenario is neither foreseeable, nor, because of its dire preconditions, desirable. 
Consequently, are there any substantial and higher legally-ordered international organisations 
already in existence, covering the largest number of states and affecting the largest 
populations of the world, from which we can take WKDWDJHQF\¶V main core component and 
build on it to make such a constitutional transformation? 
In fact, the answer depends on our degree of conviction that, in the current international law 
regime, there is no hierarchy and no one law or rule that is superior to the others. However, 
25 
 
what about the UN and LWV$UWLFOH³VXSUHPDF\FODXVH´? (Chapter 3, Section 3.1, 
especially n 112). 
We also know that some of the international legal regimes are more legally-developed and 
effective than others, as is apparent, for example, in comparing the WTO with human rights 
regimes. Is it then not possible to take the most legally sophisticated and effective of these 
international organisations and gradually constitutionalise it until it becomes the optimal 
global constitutional agent?  
Could the WTO, a relatively effective self-contained regime,38 which some argue can be 
constitutionalised, be the catalyst, or perhaps the platform, for even further 
constitutionalisation, so that it becomes the global governance institution?39  
John Jackson reminds us that 90 per cent of international law is related to international 
economic law.40 With its legal regime overseeing a large volume of international trade, and 
with its powerful Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the WTO has already become a 
central hub in many of the overlapping international law corpuses, so SHUKDSVWKH³EXFN´ 
could stop there.  
Soon after the transformation of the General Agreement on Tariffs on Trade (GATT) into the 
WTO, the new organisation became a forum for settling cases beyond mere trade law 
disputes. In its role as a linchpin in global trade, it has taken the opportunity to link other 
rights to its free trade rules and rights. The WTO regime, E\VLPSO\DOORZLQJ³H[FHSWLRQV´WR
                                                 
38
 (Simma and Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in Ineternational Law 2006). 
39
 For the argument that functional treaties can go beyond their original scope and become rights-based, see 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann  (Petersmann, International Trade Law, Human Rights, and the Customary 
International Law Rules on Treaty Interpretation 2009): 69-90. 
40
 (J. Jackson 1995): 596. 
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some of LWVUXOHVDQG³HQDEOLQJ´VRPHRWKHUUXOHV, has allowed its member states to take 
unilateral and multilateral measures at both the domestic and international level to promote 
and protect human, labour and environmental rights.41  
The WTO¶V success in enforcing non-trade rights has led Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann to call for 
the expansion and formal ³ULJKWVEDVHG´FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPRIthe WTO. Furthermore, 
Deborah Cass suggests that this ³MXGLFLDOQRUPJHQHUDWLRQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´RIthe WTO 
could eventually lead to something bigger²as was the case with the transformation of the 
European Community into the EU.42  
However, few liken WTO constitutionalism to domestic or global constitutionalism.43 The 
WTO has been successful in protecting and effectively enforcing some of the ³other´ rules of 
the fragmented international law system where enforcement has been difficult or non-
existent, in such fundamental areas as health and labour rights and the environment. 
However, being primarily a trade regime, the WTO cannot be expected to regulate or to 
adjudicate on international criminal law, or handle collective security situations and armed 
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 The evolution of the WTO dispute settlement system to expand its competency in the constitutional 
direction²from the rigid, free-trade-only interpretations that characterised its earlier years, such as in the US-
Tuna-Dolphin case, to encompass other rights in IL²is evident in its later adjudications. Examples include the 
EC-Asbestos and US-Gambling cases, in which the non-trade domestic policies of the member states, 
encompassing such areas as environmental and human rights, as well as other laws and forums in IL, were taken 
into consideration by the Court. (Howse 2009): 42-45)RUDJHQHUDOGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH:72¶VUROHDVDOLPLWHG
harmoniser of conflicting norms in current IL, as well as more details on the above DSB cases, see my LLM 
essay, Conflicting Norms in a World of Fragmented International Law and the Role of World Trade 
Organization: Constitutionalization or Linkage Facilitation? (Sharei, Conflicting Norms in a World of 
Fragmented International Law and the Role of World Trade Organization: Constitutionalization or Linkage 
Facilitation? 2010). 
42
 (Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights 2000): 22. See also (Cass 2005): 49. 
For a counter-argument, see Philip Alston: http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/13/4/1562.pdf, last accessed 29 October 
2014.   
43
 (Cass 2005): 49, 203; and, (McGinnis and Movsesian 2000): 514. 
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conflicts. Nor can it be expected to have power over the more than 30 states which are not 
members of the organisation.  
There is but one other prominent and self-contained regime that possesses dispute settlement 
and enforcement mechanisms, enjoys almost universal membership, and has a charter that is 
general enough to conform most closely to a quasi-world constitution which can be 
considered a candidate for international constitutionalisation. 
This thesis proposes that to counter the negative effects of globalisation, and to protect global 
FLWL]HQV¶ fundamental rights, as well as to elevate peoples¶ sovereignty at the global level 
(global democracy), constitutionalisation of global governance is necessary. I would also 
argue (and as my research illustrates) that the United Nations already possesses some features 
of quasi-world government. These are present both in the UN Charter and its architecture, 
and can also be observed in the way that the UN operates in practice. It is, therefore, the most 
appropriate of the international organisations to be transformed and constitutionalised.  
Some aspects of the UN Charter point WRWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶Vability to function as the supreme 
layer of global governance, and perhaps its usefulness in this respect. These characteristics 
include its supranationality (Chapter 3, especially Section 3.7), its legal supremacy over other 
treaties, and its universality, reinforced by the SC¶Vtendency over the past two decades to 
adopt an increasingly legislative and adjudicative role. The specific Charter provisions that 
enable some of these quasi-world-government features, together with actual UN practice 
(regardless of whether this is sanctioned by the Charter or not) are discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 8. The intra/ultra vires debate is mostly presented in Chapter 3. 
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Bardo Fassbender and some other UN scholars argue that the Charter as it currently stands 
already amounts to a constitution for the world.44 Michael Doyle, citing the fact that the UN 
is a legal personality independent of any single state, with no option for state withdrawal, and 
pointing to the Charter¶V specific supranational wording, argues that both legally and in 
practice, the UN is already a supranational institution.45 In this regard, examples of 
supranational references in the Charter can be found in Articles 2(6), 24(1), 25, 48(1) and 
103, as explained in Chapter 3, especially Section 3.7. 
However, as pointed out earlier, the existence, or the writing, of a constitution for an 
international organisation does not necessarily make it constitutionalised.46 
The principal features of constitutionalisation, and the way in which these are used in the 
context of UN constitutionalisation in this thesis, include the following: democracy (or 
³GHPRL-FUDF\´RIthe world citizenry in the context of international multi-level governance), 
protection of fundamental rights, separation of powers, and the due process of law, always 
under the rule of law, including global adjudication and legal review.  
With this focus on UN Constitutionalisation throughout this research, the following 
phenomena are analysed: the UN Charter as a treaty, DQGWKHIDFWWKDWLWLVRIWKH³JHQHUDO´
type; the IRXQGHUV¶ intent and the legitimacy of the Charter; and the concepts of supra-
nationality, expanded capacity, and transformation, as they pertain to the UN Charter and the 
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 On the UN Charter as a constitution, see, among others (Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the 
Constitution of the International Community (Legal Aspects of International Organization) 2009); see also, in 
the context of international constitutionalisation, (Fassbender, Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on 
the Place of the UN Charter in the International Legal Order 2009): 133-147. On some of the supranational 
features of the UN, see (Doyle, The UN Charter -- A Global Constitution? 2009): 113-116, 131; and (Schwindt 
2000). See also (Corner 2010): 97-99; and (Paulus 2009):69-70, 76. 
45
 (Doyle, A Global Constitution? The Struggle over the UN Charter 2010): 2-23. 
46
 See n 21 above. 
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international legal system. An elaboration of the concepts of constitutionalisation as they may 
apply to the transformation of the UN, DQGWKHOHJDOVWUDWHJLHVWRWULJJHUWKH³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
PRPHQW´are presented in Chapter 9, the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
1.5 Research Methodology and Chapter Structure 
Michel Foucault is reported to have said: ³Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain 
the same.´47 Similarly, in respect of the theoretical approach of this thesis, do not ask what 
methodology I have used, and why I have changed my approach in different chapters. Not 
being a believer in adopting a single methodology in conducting legal or international 
relations research, I have adopted the approach of dynamically employing different 
methodologies²as seem to fit best²to analyse a chapter topic or the subject at hand. 
That said, in the chapter introductions that follow, anGXVLQJ³WKHRU\´³PHWKRGRORJ\´ and 
³DSSURDFK´V\QRQ\PRXVO\48 I will identify the methodological approaches for those chapters 
or parts of the thesis.  
The thesis is in three parts. Part I, Global Governance and the Role of the United Nations, 
consists of the first three chapters (inclusive of this one). 
The next two chapters in the thesis highlight the role of the SC in global governance. Chapter 
2 examines the SC¶s role as court-maker and global adjudicator, while Chapter 3 focuses on 
the global legislative functions of the SC. These Council mandates include criminalisation 
resolutions (which have a legislative effect) and the sanctions-listing of individuals, 
corporations and other entities that are exclusively non-state actors. In addition, the &RXQFLO¶V 
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 Foucault, M., the Archaeology of Knowledge, in (Cryer, Hervey and Sokhi-Bulley 2011): n 125. 
48
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abstract resolutions are examined: that is, resolutions that are not specific to any particular 
situation or named state, but nevertheless have some effect²for example, in relation to the 
movement of goods, peoples, and money²on world citizens. Further, Council decisions that 
resemble domestic tort legislation, taxing and redistributing wealth, where the primary 
beneficiaries are multinational corporations, individuals and other non-state actors, are 
examined. These new interpretations of WKH6&¶Vcompetencies, regardless of being 
intra/ultra vires, reveal the Council to be the closest (unplanned, but nevertheless de facto) 
global legislator with universal jurisdiction.  
As far as methodology is concerned, the above two chapters draw on the realism school of 
international relations and on critical legal theory. 
Part II, The UN Charter: Teleological and Original Intent, consists of Chapters 4 to 7, and, 
through the lens of legal positivism, examines the legislative history of the UN Charter in 
connection with the 6&¶V powers, structure and voting procedures. The Charter¶s revision 
scenarios and its mutation trigger are also addressed. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the San 
Francisco Conference. First, the anti-veto rebellion in response to the Yalta formula dictated 
by the sponsoring governments is considered. The compromise reached was to provide for 
the probable revision of the Charter within a maximum of 10 years in order to make the UN, 
and particularly the Council, more equal and democratic. This original intent and the promise 
of San Francisco were embodied in Article 109(3) of the Charter, which calls for a special 
review conference.   
Chapter 6 focuses on the near paralysis of the SC when the UN began to operate, examining 
the procedural attempts to correct its structural problem. It was recognised by a majority of 
states, including the P5 (and the US in particular), that the Charter needed amending. The 
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chapter also recounts the attempts of earlier years to carry out a review of the Charter by 
invoking Article 109(1) ²which provides for a general rather than special review of the 
Charter. The differences between paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of Article 109 in terms of 
convening a Charter review (both symbolically and in effect) is made clearer in the legislative 
history section, contained in Chapters 4 to 7. 
Following the same legal positivist and legislative history approach, Chapter 7 examines the 
1955 General Assembly Resolution 992(X) and its related SC resolution invoking Article 
109(3). The chapter focuses on the work of the Arrangements Committee, created by this 
resolution, to convene the review.  
Chapter 7 also covers WKH³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO´GLVFXVVLRQV and the member sWDWHV¶LQWHQW prior to 
and during the adoption of Resolution 992(X). By examining the fact that the Arrangements 
Committee KDVEHHQ³NHSWLQEHLQJ´EXWremains dormant, and the fact that the UN has never 
in its history held a review conference²in defiance of the spirit of the paragraph and the 
intention of the founders²the chapter concludes that the provisions of Article 109(3) have 
effectively been breached.  
Part III, Legal and Constitutional Aspects, contains the last two chapters of the thesis, 
Chapters 8 and 9, and adopts the legal critical approach. Chapter 8 is a substantive chapter on 
the legal aspects of the UN Charter and its Article 109 review and revision process. The 
chapter first critically examines the characteristics and the type of the UN Charter49 and its 
apparent multi-functionality. The legitimacy of the Charter as a treaty is then examined while 
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it was in the process of being negotiated and concluded. Applying the rules of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), as a codification of customary international law, 
reveals serious flaws in the conclusion of the Charter. The legitimacy issue and the failure to 
perform in good faith the review and possible reform of the Charter envisioned in Article 
109(3), resulting in that provision being partially breached and not fully implemented, is 
considered. The chapter ends with the question of whether a new UN-type global governance 
treaty should be concluded, or whether the existing UN Charter should be reformed and 
constitutionalised. 
Taking into account the fact that the existing UN and its Charter are accepted as legitimate by 
a great majority of its member states, and the fact that the UN is WKHRQO\³JHQHUDO-purpose´ 
international organisation that can claim universal jurisdiction, LQWKHWKHVLV¶VILQDOFKDSWHU
Chapter 9, I argue for revision of the Charter in the direction of its constitutionalisation. A 
constitutionalised UN, as the major component and agent of global governance, enjoying 
universality and situated at the apex of the international legal hierarchy, could then address 
some of globalisation¶s shortcomings and borderless global problems, as well as effectively 
maintaining global peace and security, always under the rule of law. Thus, and in harmony 
with the majority of the IRXQGHUV¶ZLVKHVsuch constitutionalisation could then transform the 
dysfunctional UN, enabling it to function properly, particularly in the areas of human rights 
and peace and security. 
The feasibility of the constitutional path, given the fear of the veto and its potential to torpedo 
any proposed Charter changes (when they face P5 ratification), is examined in the last 
chapter. The potential of overturning vetoes in respect of Charter revisions and amendments 
is discussed, particularly by considering past cases that in fact had such an outcome. 
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Chapter 9 is therefore a prescriptive chapter. The chapter adopts a functionalist approach as 
to what the 81¶VJHQHUDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOIHDWXUHVVKRXOGEH and in regard to the best legal 
strategy for implementing the letter and the spirit of paragraph 3, by re-starting the work of 
the Arrangements Committee, and therefore convening the review of the Charter, which 
would most likely trigger the mutation. The end result may then be a new UN construct. 
As to methodology, the last chapter incorporates both functionalist and constructivist 
approaches.50 Or perhaps the methodology follows the newly devised DQG³PRGHUQ´
constitutionalism approach, as described by Robert Cryer et al.51 
An alternative way of approaching this thesis is to view it as an examination of the 
constitutionalisation of the UN as a question of law, and the execution and performance of 
Article 109(3) as a law question. 
Policy recommendations are not in the scope of this thesis. However, the last chapter, if only 
conceptually and in abstract terms, touches upon some of the desired constitutional features 
and characteristics of a transformed UN.  
The need for UN reform is literally as old as the UN itself (in fact, it predates it, as will be 
seen in the chapters on WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V founding). In that respect, the policy research and 
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recommendations for the UN¶V transformation is a work in progress, and is mostly left to 
others as a collective effort.  
However, I have attempted in this thesis to reiterate and expand on the perhaps not-so-new 
critical role of the UN in global governance, as well as conducting first-hand research in 
analysing raw UN data, rediscovering old facts so far neglected by most research efforts. The 
reconstruction of my findings, in providing new legal grounds, should be able to serve as the 
basis for future research, and will also be of use to leaders and policymakers perhaps as a 
game-changer in taking the bold steps required to achieve the much-needed 













As explained in the previous chapter, what has come to be known as global governance lacks 
a hierarchical legal structure. It has neither a world legislature nor a global administrator. It 
has no separation of powers and no formal adjudicative system with global jurisdiction. How, 
thenFDQRXU³LQWHUQDWLRQDOcriminalisation DQGDGMXGLFDWLRQ´ZRUN" To what extent do 
practices of global law exceed the conventional doctrine of international law? 
The Security Council was not intended to legislate or adjudicate. However, after almost five 
decades of existence, soon after the end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s, the UN seemed 
to mutate²with its most powerful organ, the Council, assuming with great speed and agility 
a new role for itself as adjudicator and legislator for the world.52 
These unforeseen SC powers are examined in this chapter and the next. This chapter 
considers WKH&RXQFLO¶VUROHDVDGMXGLFDWRU maker of international criminal law, global 
SURVHFXWRUDQGFUHDWRURILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOFRXUWV,WDOVRUHYLHZVWKH&RXQFLO¶Vrole as 
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enforcer in bringing international criminals to justice. In carrying out these functions, the 
Council not only intrudes upon the domain of domestic courts and jurisdictions, but also 
interferes in the workings of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ²by invoking Articles 
13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute, which confer on it referral and deferral powers in respect 
of the Court. As will be explained later in this chapter (especially in Section 2.3), this SC 
³VWRS-and-VWDUW´ utilisation of the ICC has occurred since the Court began to function, even 
though the majority of the P5 are not themselves parties to the Rome Statute. This raises an 
intriJXLQJFDVHRIWKH³SRZHURIOHJDOLW\´ 53 as an instrument in international politics.  
Chapter 3 IRFXVHVRQWKH³OHJLVODWLYH´IXQFWLRQVRIWKHSC, which have also been apparent 
since the end of the Cold War, and have blurred with its adjudicative function.  
7KH&RXQFLO¶V³OHJLVODWLRQ´RIWHQLQYROYHVGHILQLQJWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGQDWXUHRI
international crimes²the types of acts and transactions considered criminal, and the 
identification of individuals, corporations and non-state actors as criminals or potential 
criminals. Thus, in the case of the SC, we have an organ made up of only 15 member states 
that has begun carrying out both legislative and judicial functions in global governance. But, 
in doing so, is the SC actually acting ultra vires? 
I argue in the next chapter that the Council may, in fact, not be acting ultra vires²that, 
although this was not the original intent, the Council has indeed in practice expanded its 
powers and competency. 
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These newly exercised SC powers were presumably granted in Article 24(1) and Article 25 of 
WKH&KDUWHUDVZHOODVWKURXJKDQHZDQG³DXWR-LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´RI&KDSWHU9,,RIWKH&KDUWHU
This is especially the case in relation to Article 48(1) and Article 41, which enable the 
Council to create intHUQDWLRQDOODZVLQWKHQDPHRI³SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´ that in turn affect 
domestic laws and impact on LQGLYLGXDOV¶rights, including freedom of movement, due 
process and property rights, instantly and universally. These legislations, created through 
Council resolutions, do not seem to have been isolated cases, but rather have been used 
continually over the past 20 years, particularly after 9/11. 
:LWKWKH81&KDUWHU¶V³VXSUHPDF\´FODXVH$UWLFOHWKH&KDSWHU9,, Council 
resolutions become powerful enactments, with binding effect on all states. They are not 
subject to opt-out or derogation, and they are incontestable, even while often infringing upon 
domestic constitutions. 
No domestic court has VRIDUFKDOOHQJHGWKH&RXQFLO¶VJOREDOOHJLVODWLYHSRZHUV,Qfact, in 
the landmark case of Kadi, the ECJ did not dispute the SC¶VFRPSHWHQF\RULWV5HVROXWLRQ
EXWUDWKHURYHUUXOHGWKH&RXUWRI)LUVW,QVWDQFH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIKRZWKHUHVROXWLRQVKRXOG
be implemented. The judgment essentially required the lower court to reconsider the 
³&RPPXQLW\PHDVXUHWRJLYHHIIHFWWRVXFKDUHVROXWLRQ´(&-Kadi: 2008, Para. 288).54 
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While SC legislation is not made consensually by all states or democratically, it is 
nevertheless, by virtue of Chapter VII, both binding and non-derogable. Therefore, 
constitutionalising the UN Charter may provide protection from the SC¶VLQIULQJHPHQWRI
fundamental rights and provide the type of judicial review often granted in domestic 
constitutions. This constitutional deficit of the UN Charter is the subject of the last chapter.  
2.2 Security Council: The Court Maker and the Prosecutor Global 
The 1990s witnessed two major developments in international law and global governance²
the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 and the birth of the ICC, which 
originated from the Rome Statute, and was opened for signature in 1998. Whereas the UN 
was framed primarily by the three victor countries of World War II, there was extensive 
member-state participation in the creation of the WTO and the ICC every step of the way, 
with equal sovereignty and no weighted voting. In the case of the ICC, even the NGOs, albeit 
with no voting privilege, had an active, official and participatory role in the creation of the 
Rome Statute. Thus, to some degree, the will of the peoples of the world, as expressed by 
lobbying bodies, was reflected in the making of the ICC.55  
Both the WTO and the ICC benefited from previous UN work in their domains, and, in the 
case of the ICC, its birth can be traced to GA resolutions. However, both are independent 
international organisations, separate from the UN. Nonetheless, in the case of the ICC, this 
                                                 
Both Kadi-I and Kadi-II were essentially about fundamental rights, and particularly the judicial protection of 
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independence from the UN and the SC is less apparent and more contentious. Although the 
Council has no links to the WTO and does not pursue international economic and 
environmental crimes, on the other hand, the Council has the option and has pursued other 
international criminals at the International Criminal Court, by intervening LQWKH,&&¶V 
jurisdiction, utilising the enabling referral and deferral clauses of the ICC statute, which are 
explained later. 
However, at this point it suffices to observe that the main judicial body of the UN, according 
to the Charter, is the International Court of Justice. With the ICJ¶V jurisdiction not being 
compulsory and generally requiring voluntary submission of cases by contending states, 
historically there has been little interaction between the Council and the ICJ. Although the 
&RXQFLOFDQDVNWKH:RUOG&RXUWIRUDQ³DGYLVRU\RSLQLRQ´LWKDVGRQHVo only once in the 
past 70 years, in the 1970 South Africa in Namibia case.56 
With the Council having no ³UHIHUUDO´W\SHFDSDFLW\in respect of the ICJ, and the World 
Court having no judicial review mandate over the SC, the interaction between the Council 
and the ICJ has been minimal.57 
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This chapter will therefore focus on the SC¶VDGMXGLFDWive role in relation to aspects of 
international criminal and humanitarian law involving non-state actors, where the Council, 
through auto-interpretation of the Charter, has at times assumed competency in the 
adjudication of international crimes. This is even though, for the last decade or so, it is the 
ICC that is presumed to be the main agency mandated to deal with these cases. However, as 
will be seen below, after nearly 14 years in operation, the jurisdiction and competence of the 
ICC continues to be significantly manipulated and affected by the Council and its permanent 
members. 
What is the legal relationship between the ICC and the UN? What was the spirit behind the 
inFOXVLRQRIWKH³GHIHUUDO´DQG³UHIHUUDO´FODXVHVLQWKH5RPH6WDWXWH"&DQWKHSC define the 
,&&¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ",VWKH81, or its most powerful organ, the Council, providing financial 
and enforcement support to the cases it refers to the ICC? What role do the permanent 
members, and particularly the US (as the most powerful of the P5), play in legitimising the 
ICC? Is the Council making international criminal law, as well as adjudicating it? If the 
answer to the last question is in the affirmative, does the Council in fact have the power to do 
so?  
In attempting to answer these questions, I will first investigate the role of the SC as the 
adjudicator of international criminal law, by citing examples of the ad hoc, wide-ranging and 
powerful courts and tribunals set up by the SC since the 1990s. This practice seems to have 
continued even after the ICC became operational, in 2002. 
I will then examine the role of the Council via its interventions in the workings of the ICC²
the only permanent international criminal law court²and the seemingly precarious 
relationship between the two organisations. I will also assess ZKHWKHUWKH&RXQFLO¶VILQDQFLDO
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and enforcement support to its own commissioned courts and tribunals is comparable to that 
which it extends to the ICC for Council-referred cases. 
Furthermore, through an evaluation of several SC resolutions, I will reveal the manipulative 
behaviour of three of the most powerful permanent members (P3) of the Council: China, 
Russia and the US. These states selectively refer cases to the ICC, through the Council, when 
it suits them, while striving to remain beyond its jurisdiction themselves. The referral of the 
Darfur situation in 2005 and the Libya situation in 2011 will be assessed to illustrate that, in 
effect, while the US, Russia and China are not member states and do not formally recognise 
the Rome Statute and its rule of law, they nevertheless make use of the Court to refer other 
non-member states¶ criminals for prosecution. This interplay between the P3 and the ICC has 
arguably delegitimised both the Council and the Court.  
This analysis of three interventions by ICC non-member states (and Council permanent 
members) LQWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQwould be incomplete without an assessment of the 
unique role of the US, as the most powerful of the P5, which is contained in the last section 
of the chapter. It is observed there how the US manipulates the ICC in exercising its self-
serving SC powers, undermining the &RXUW¶Vcompetency²in particular, by excluding US 
leaders and nationals from WKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFtion. This US exclusionism has been further 
pursued through bilateral legal agreements with other states to exclude US nationals from the 
ICC¶V jurisdiction.  
To pose the broader question relevant to this global governance thesis: is the SC empowered 
by the UN Charter to perform these quasi-global-government functions, or is the Council 
acting ultra vires? At the conclusion of the next chapter, I evaluate WKH&RXQFLO¶Vadjudicative 
and legislative functions together (since they are related), and conclude that, if not by design, 
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then in fact and in practice, the SC is acting within its powers, and that, regardless of the intra 
vires or ultra vires arguments, the central issue with the quasi -global-government functions 
of the SC is the legitimacy of its actions, in view of the democratic and constitutional deficit 
of the UN. 
Although not by original intent, the Charter of the UN has given the SC not only executive 
powers, but also, explicitly or implicitly, broad powers that allow the Council to assert new 
interpretations of² and to enforce² the ³SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´provisions of Chapter VII, 
acquiring quasi-world government functions in the process. The Charter Articles 24(1) and 
25, and the Chapter VII measures, particularly Articles 41 and 48, empower the Council to 
make international criminal law, to create courts, to adjudicate and to enforce decisions, and 
to act as the global prosecutor of international criminals, whether these be individuals, 
corporations, or other non-state actors.  
This chapter and the next will demonstrate that, with these auto-interpretations of the Charter, 
the Council has, in the past, enacted global legislation, and has even taxed nations, collecting 
and distributing the funds (as discussed in Chapter 3), and has the potential to do so in the 
future. Therefore, when the SC acts in these global law-making capacities, it impacts on 
international treaties, modifies domestic laws, impinges on domestic constitutions, and often 
intrudes on the domestic protection of fundamental rights. 
2.2.1 From Belgrade to Beirut 
From the inception of the UN, and throughout almost the first 50 years of its existence, the 
Council had no direct criminal-prosecution and adjudicative functions. However, from the 
early 1990s and the end of the Cold War onwards, the Council has been involved in several 
international criminal court-creating activities, arising from various conflict situations.  
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These ad hoc courts and tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), established in 1994, were essentially set up with the purpose of bringing to justice 
the perpetrators of major war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but were 
always limited to a particular conflict and geographic location.58 
The main characteristic of these ad hoc courts was their broad judicial and enforcement 
powers. These powers are conferred not by an international constitution or treaty, but by 
means of the &RXQFLO¶VGHFLVLRQVDepending on the particular conflict, the Council has 
dynamically defined its competence and jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. In fact, the 
Tadic decision held that the SC is not acting ultra vires in creating these types of court. The 
Court has authority to define its own jurisdiction and create its own appellate function, and 
WKXVWKHVHFRXUWVDUHLQHIIHFWD³subsidiary´ of the Council.59 
It was expected that, after the creation of a permanent international criminal court, the 
Council would leave the dispensing of international criminal justice to the ICC. However, the 
intermittent creation of ad hoc courts and tribunals has continued. In 2002, the UN and the 
government of Sierra Leone created the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)²the same 
year that the ICC began to operate. The SCSL Court, dealing with issues arising from the 
civil war in Sierra Leone²primarily atrocities committed under the regime of the former 
president Charles Taylor²continued its work for 11 years, until 2013. The Court can trace its 
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origins to the Council, to SC Resolution 1315 (2000), but was in fact created and became 
operational two years later, in January 2002.60 
In view of the fact that the ICC Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 
2002, perhaps the main rationale for the Council not referring the situation in Sierra Leone to 
the ICC at that time was that most of the crimes it was concerned with were committed 
before 2002, and therefoUHSUHFHGHGWKH,&&¶VFRPSHWence.61  
However, the Council¶VSUDFWLFHRI creating courts did not appear to cease, notwithstanding 
the existence of the ICC. SC Resolution 1664 of 2006, and a follow-up resolution, SC 
Resolution 1757 (2007) created, in effect, another ad hoc court, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL), in response to the 2005 bombing of Beirut that killed 22 people, including 
the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri.62 This raises the question of why the 
Council did not refer the case to the ICC. After all, the event and the crimes committed 
occurred a few years after the ICC had become operational. And the crimes in question 
apparently complied with the ³DIWHU´DGPLVVLELOLW\FULWHULDRIWKH,&&, and could have 
been ³UHIHUUHG´to it by the Council. 
The STL, a so-called ³hybrid court´, was supposed to be based in Lebanon, and to take into 
consideration the domestic criminal laws of that country.63 However, the creation of this 
tribunal, independent of the ICC, seemed unnecessary for two reasons. First, the STL, 
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although it has an office in Beirut, has its chambers located, and is headquartered, in the 
Netherlands, where the ICC is located. Secondly, the complementarity principle of the Rome 
Statute²both in general terms and, more specifically, in Article 17²already takes into 
account domestic investigation and prosecution procedures. 64 Therefore, the fact that the ICC 
could have taken into account /HEDQRQ¶V domestic laws, as well as the fact that both courts 
are situated in the Hague, appears to have made the creation of another ad hoc court as a 
subsidiary of the SC redundant.  
In the absence of any convincing legal reason IRUWKH67/¶VFUHDWLRQ as a separate tribunal, 
one political explanation may be the fact that it has jurisdiction over terrorist attacks in 
Lebanon committed since 2005. Some P5 members may have believed that if the Lebanon 
situation had been referred to the ICC, then the Court would have enjoyed jurisdiction in 
respect of Israeli war crimes committed during the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in the 
summer of 2006. This outcome was not desired by some P5 members, especially the US.65 
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2.3 The Council and the ICC: the SC Referrals and Deferrals 
The only permanent international criminal court which is independent of the UN system, and 
is intended to be universal and permanent is, of course, the ICC, which has been operating 
since 2002. The GA and its International Law Commission (ILC), a few proactive member 
states, and the P5 all had important roles in the creation of the Court and its mandate.66 
During the years of negotiations leading up to the Rome Statute, the framers found it 
QHFHVVDU\WRFRPSURPLVHZLWKWKH&RXQFLOWRREWDLQWKH&RXQFLO¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHSURSRVHG
ICC as a legitimate and permanent international criminal court, and probably the only body 
of its kind. The compromise with the initially objecting members of the P5 that led to the 
finalisation and adoption of the Statue in 1998 in Rome was that the Council would ³UHIHU´
cases to the ICC and would not create ad hoc courts provided the Council could suspend ICC 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQVRUFRXUWSURFHHGLQJVE\LQYRNLQJ³GHIHUUDO´RIDFDVH67 This authority granted 
to the Council WRVXVSHQGDFDVHSUHVXPDEO\LQWKHVSLULWRI³peace and sHFXULW\´FDQLQ
effect happen for any reason and for any case. Both the referral and the deferral scenarios had 
to be decided by a majority vote of the SC (with the omnipresence of the P5 veto), and, with 
regard to deferrals, the freezing of a case can be for a period of one year, which, according to 
Article 16 of the Statute, can be renewed annually without limitation.  
These referral and deferral loopholes built into the Rome Statute clearly permitted and 
UHLQIRUFHGWKH&RXQFLO¶VFRQWLQXHGUROHDVD³pseudo´ international criminal law-maker. The 
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referral cases, based on Article 13(b) of the Statute, in which a situation has been referred to 
the ICC by the SC under Chapter VII, allows the Court to expand its jurisdiction related to 
one or more of the subject crimes in accordance with Article 5 of the Statute.68 Furthermore, 
Article 16 of the Statute allows another type of Council intervention: under Chapter VII, the 
SC can intervene and request the Court to suspend prosecution or investigation of a case 
(whether referred initially by the SC or not) and thus cause the case to be deferred for a year, 
with unlimited renewals.69  
The 6&¶VDELOLW\WRUHIHUFDVHVZDVFRQVLGHUHG ³SRVLWLYH´DQGKHOSIXOLQH[SDQGLQJWKH,&&¶V 
jurisdiction and legitimacy. On the other hand, its power of deferral was considered 
disruptive to WKH,&&¶VIXQFWLRQLQJDQGZas expected to be rarely, if ever, used by the 
Council. So far, iQWKH,&&¶V14-year history, the SC has exercised both its deferral and 
referral powers twice each, as will be discussed in later sections. In all four cases, the SC¶V
motives and the legitimacy of the intervention have been questionable, with the competence 
and legitimacy of the ICC also arguably undermined. 
2.3.1 SC Resolutions 1422 and 1487 Deferrals²the Peacekeepers¶ Exemption 
and the ICC Jurisdictional Interventions 
Although the drafters of the Rome Statute expected the referral of cases to occur frequently 
but the power of deferral to be used sparingly, the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 1422, 
a deferral, just two weeks after the Rome Statute entered into force, in July 2002. Resolution 
1422 was a wide-encompassing deferral.70 This so-called peace-NHHSHUV¶H[FHSWLRQ resolution 
under Chapter VII made a general request to the ICC, with Paragraph 1 stating that the SC: 71 
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Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the 
ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a 
contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating 
to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month 
period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or 
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise 
 
In other words, the resolution exempted officials and military personnel of non-state parties 
to the Rome Statute (which at the time mostly encompassed US staff and military personnel 
active in different UN military operations, including in a number of Middle Eastern and 
Eastern European countries) from ICC investigation and prosecution, and thus placed them 
³DERYHWKHODZ´, even if temporarily.72 
Several fundamental criticisms can be made of Resolution 1422. First, it seems that the SC 
manipulated the principle of aut dedere aut judicare by failing to give the opportunity to a 
state in which a crime took place to detain and prosecute the suspect.73 Furthermore, the 
,&&¶Vcomplementarity principle envisages the Court exercising its jurisdiction in cases 
where a state is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute and apply aut dedere aut judicare, 
not a third state (the VWDWHRIWKHDOOHJHGFULPLQDO¶VQDWLRQDOLW\ Secondly, the resolution 
directly challenges the ICC¶V jurisdiction and competency in an abstract and general manner, 
without referring to a specific instance or a case of conflict, thereby threatening the ICC¶V 
legitimacy as a whole. Finally, these pre-emptive decisions of the Council on judicial matters 
had not been foreseen or granted explicitly in the UN Charter, nor had they been exercised in 
respect of the 81¶VRZQjudicial organ, the ICJ.74 
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A year later, in 2003, the US pushed through Resolution 1487, which, in effect, renewed 
Resolution 7KH&RXQFLO¶VDGRSWLRQRIResolution 1487 did not, however, enjoy 
unanimous support, and faced some opposition and debate on the grounds that Resolution 
1422 undermined the application of the ³UXOHRIODZ´$IHZ&RXQFLOPHPEHUVDEVWDLQHG
including permanent member France.75 However, the following year, in 2004, the US was 
unable to garner support for the renewal of Resolution 1422 for a third year. In view of the 
Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the revelation of other fundamental rights abuses committed 
by the US military in Iraq, the US abandoned its attempt to attract support for a further 
resolution extending the life of the deferral. Consequently, the deferral¶s general and global 
exemption IRUWKH³SHDFH-NHHSHUV´ZDVORVW76 
2.3.2 SC Resolutions 1593 and 1970 Referrals²to Deliver Justice or R2P 
Council Style? 
Throughout WKH,&&¶V14-year history, the SC has referred cases to the Court on only two 
occasions. The first involved the situation in Darfur, which was referred to the ICC for 
investigation and prosecution under Resolution 1593, adopted in 2005, with permanent 
members the US and China abstaining. This occurred after years of inaction by the SC in the 
face of Sudanese atrocities in Darfur. The reason for the delay was mostly attributable to 
&KLQD¶VRLOLQWHUHVWLQ6XGDQDQGto the 86¶Vpreference for an ad hoc tribunal under the SC¶V
control (Section 2.3.3). The final compromise resolution contained two paragraphs that seem 
to be out of place, indicating that the US and the other two P3 powers had made sure that 
strings were attached to their ICC referral.77  
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The first paragraph was in the preamble to the resolution, and acknowledged the bilateral 
agreements that the US had been aggressively pursuing since the inception of the ICC. These 
bilateral agreements essentially bypassed WKH&RXUW¶Vpotential jurisdiction over US nationals. 
The preamble to Resolution 1593E\³WDNLQJQRWe of the existence of agreements referred to 
LQ$UWLFOHRIWKH5RPH6WDWXWH´LPSOLHVWKDWWKH,&&, in accepting the referral by the 
SC, also acknowledges the effect of the US¶V bilateral agreements.78 This US tactic of 
circumventing the ICC¶V jurisdiction is further explained in Section 2.3.3. 
The second, paragraph 6, explicitly and more generally undermined the jurisdiction of the 
ICC in exercising responsibility over foreign troops and personnel of non-state parties in 
Sudan,79 with the SC deciding: 
that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State 
outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all 
alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established 
or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction 
has been expressly waived by that contributing State 
Therefore, in accepting this referral, the ICC also had to accept the US¶V bilateral agreements, 
as well as the exemption of nationals of certain states from its jurisdiction, including those of 
the P3 (the US, China and Russia).  
The referral lacks two other vitally important features that would have ensured its 
effectiveness. First, Resolution 1593 does not contain any enforcement provisions²the 
Council provides no assistance in tracking down 6XGDQ¶VSUHVLGHQW, Omar Al-Bashir, and his 
collaborators, or in executing arrest warrants. Secondly, the Resolution explicitly disclaims 
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responsibility for the expenses associated with the investigation, prosecution and 
administrative costs related to the referral, recognising, under Paragraph 7:80 
that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses 
related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be 
borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the 
Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily 
Thus, the financial burden of investigation and prosecution, which in these cases typically 
runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, is shifted from the UN and the Council to the ICC.81 
The second referral occurred in 2011, and concerned the uprising in Libya. Under Resolution 
1970, the SC referred the Libyan situation to the ICC. While, six years earlier, Resolution 
1953, relating to Sudan, had been the subject of extensive debate and some opposition in the 
Council, Resolution 1970 was adopted unanimously. Although Appendixes 1 and 2 of the 
resolution specifically named some individuals as suspected criminals (mostly family 
members of Moammar Gadhafi and their collaborators), Articles 4 to 8 of the Resolution 
referred the situation in Libya to the ICC.82 
As in the case of the Darfur referral, Article 6 of Resolution 1970 exempts members of the 
military, non-military personnel, and former and current officials of the non-member states of 
the ICC, from WKH&RXUW¶Vjurisdiction. Moreover, Article 8 of the resolution has identical text 




 For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a typical SC-created ad hoc international criminal 
court, disclosed in its 2011 annual report to the UN actual H[SHQGLWXUHVRI86PLOOLRQDQGUHTXHVWHG¼
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to that of Article 7 of the Darfur resolution, disclaiming responsibility for the costs associated 
with the referral.83 
7KHVLPLODULWLHVEHWZHHQWKH&RXQFLO¶V'DUIXUDQG/LE\DQreferrals seem to signify a pattern. 
Both send cases to the ICC were without any planned Council cooperation or financial 
assistance. Furthermore, the Council offered no enforcement support, which the Court 
desperately needed for its investigations and prosecutions, particularly in these type of 
conflicts where the alleged perpetrators live in ICC non-member states.84 
As well as these two cases that the SC successfully managed to refer to the ICC, there have 
been other, unsuccessful attempts, which have been vetoed by one or more of the P5. The 
most recent attempt, in May 2014, which related to the Syrian uprising and civil war, met 
with negative votes from both China and Russia.85 
In retrospect, almost 10 years after the Darfur referral and five years after the Libyan one, it 
seems that the adjudicative impact of both these referrals has been ineffective. The lack of 
enforcement and material support by the Council in pursuing the Darfur case has meant that, 
since 2009, the ICC arrest warrants for Omar Al-Bashir and others have gone unheeded.86 
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 The SC referral of the Darfur situation occurred a few years earlier, in 2005 (SC Res. 1503), but the ICC 
arrest warrant for President Omar Al-Bashir was issued in March 2009, with seven counts of crimes against 




As for the Libyan referral case, many of the main indictees sought by the ICC are now dead, 
including Moammar Gadhafi and one of his sons, who appear to have been summarily 
executed while prisoners of war. And although the new Libyan government has not become a 
party to the Rome Statute, it has interfered with and obstructed ICC investigations in Libya. 
In fact, in June 2012, the Libyan government arrested the ICC investigator and her staff as 
alleged spies.87 
In both of these referral cases, it seems that the ICC¶V efforts in applying the law were 
hindered rather than helped by the Council. This was owing to the half-hearted support 
provided by the Council: in particular, the inclusion of explicit clauses in the relevant 
resolutions exempting non-member state nationals from the ICC¶V jurisdiction; the lack of 
funding; and the refusal to help with enforcement. This failure to conduct proper 
investigations, execute arrest warrants, or extradite suspects has meant that neither of the two 
referred cases has gone to trial. These cases demonstrate that the Council¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK 
the ICC is political, P3-centric and problematic, thereby significantly hindering the ,&&¶V
mission of delivering universal international criminal justice. 
The main legal objection raised here is that the spirit of Article 13(b) and Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute did not envisage Council interventions having conditions attached (such as the 
competency and jurisdictional restrictions discussed above). These articles simply allow the 
SC either to refer DQHZFDVHEDVHGRQWKH&RXUW¶VFRPSHWHQF\RU, in the case of deferral, to 
defer an existing situation. However, given WKH&RXQFLO¶VSUDFWLFHRIDWWDFKLQJFRQGLWLRQVWR
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its interventions, it has, in effect, arbitrarily altered the jurisdictional aspects of the Rome 
Statute.88 
2.3.3 The US and the ICC: The Rule of Law or Not? 
As mentioned in the previous section, the two deferral cases adopted by the Council after the 
ICC¶V creation in the early 2000s were primarily driven by the US in its attempts to exclude 
its nationals from the ICC¶Vjurisdiction, consequently undermining the Court. Therefore, an 
analysis of the relationship between the SC and the ICC will be incomplete unless the role of 
the most powerful of the P5, the US, is taken into account. 
As of December 2015, the Rome Statute had 139 signatories and 123 ratifications. Ironically, 
while the US, Russia and China are the most important political and military powers of the 
permanent members at the Council, they are not state parties to the Statute.89 
Historically, following the GA resolution requesting the International Law Commission to 
carry out the preparatory work for the creation of a permanent international criminal court, 
and during the early stages of the development of the Statute, the US was an active 
participant in the negotiations and was supportive of the project. However, after it became 
clear that most non-permanent member states (particularly India and Mexico) did not wish 
the Court to be controlled by the Council, and wanted it to be independent,90 US policy 
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changed, with it adopting a more antagonistic stance. Even when President Clinton, during 
his last days in office, on 31 December 2000, signed the Rome Statute, it was with the 
reservation that: ³,ZLOOQRWDQGGRQRWUHFRPPHnd that my successor submit the treaty to the 
6HQDWHIRUDGYLFHDQGFRQVHQWXQWLORXUIXQGDPHQWDOFRQFHUQVDUHVDWLVILHG´91  
John Cerone, having carried out a discourse analysis of the 86¶Vpolitical attitude toward the 
ICC, assesses as variable the interest of the US in an international criminal court and 
dependent on leadership changes in the country. In general, however, Cerone concludes that 
US leaders and officials are opposed to ceding jurisdiction and authority to an independent 
international court. They want the Court to be linked to the Council, so that they can always 
apply their veto privilege to prevent an unwanted prosecution being directed towards them or 
one of their allies.92 Although China and Russia share the US¶VIHDUV in respect of one of their 
leaders or service members being put on trial by an international criminal court, it is the US 
that has been the most reactive and aggressive in its attempts to undermine the ICC¶V 
authority. 
The 86¶Vundermining of the ICC¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ began only a few days after the Rome Statute 
had come into force, on 1 July 2002. In the same month, Resolution 1422 was adopted. 
Introduced by the US, the resolution provided for the exemption of WKH86¶V and other non-
member states¶ peacekeeping ³RIILFLDOVDQGSHUVRQQHO´IURPWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH,&&,Q
fact, the US had threatened to cease all its peacekeeping operations at the time had the 
resolution not been adopted.93  
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The US also embarked upon the more aggressive and highly controversial strategy of 
entering into bilateral agreements with other states: in essence, preventing the transfer of US 
nationals to the ICC, even if the party to the bilateral agreement was an ICC member state. In 
this respect, the US relied on Article 98 of the Rome Statute²which states WKDWWKH³Court 
may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements´94²as a possible escape 
clause. This has exempted US officials and personnel from the ICC¶V jurisdiction, further 
undermining the Court. In fact, by June 2005, the US had, by offering carrots and sticks² 
including the making of financial or military aid conditional upon the signing of bilateral 
agreements²succeeded in concluding over 100 of these bilateral agreements.95  
In a joint opinion, international law professors James Crawford, Philippe Sands and Ralph 
Wilde challenged the legal validity of these US bilateral agreements, concluding:96 
[I] t is our opinion that the language of Article 98(2) of the ICC Statute does not 
permit a State party to enter into an agreement which provides for the return to a 
WKLUG6WDWHRIDQ\SHUVRQZKRFDQQRWREMHFWLYHO\EHWUHDWHGDVKDYLQJEHHQµVHQW¶E\
the State. ,W¶VDOVRRXURSLQLRQWKDWWKHREMHFWDQG purpose of the ICC Statute 
precludes a State Party from entering into an agreement the purpose or effect of 
which may lead to impunity. 
The US, in resisting the ICC¶V jurisdiction over its nationals²manifested both in its bilateral 
agreements and in SC resolutions such as 1422, 1487, 1593 and 1970²has successfully 
SURWHFWHGLWV³SDVWDQGFXUUHQWRIILFLDOVDQGSHUVRQQHO´IURPWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQThis 
two-pronged strategy appeared to be working well. But, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, and the controversies and allegations surrounding treatment of prisoners at 
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Guantanamo Bay, the 86¶VDJJUHVVLYe campaign against the Court faded and lost support in 
the Council. The US¶V attempt, in 2004, to renew the Resolution 1422 deferral for a third year 
failed. The strategy of pursuing bilateral agreements has also petered out in more recent 
years. Confronted by opposition from allies, in late 2006, President George W Bush waived 
some of the penalties associated with the bilateral immunity agreements, and in recent years 
the conclusion of such agreements with other states has slowed considerably.97  
The US¶VQHZ strategy²seemingly encountering no objection, and in harmony with the 
policy of its P3 colleagues towards the Court²has changed in recent years with regard to 
diluting the competence of the ICC. Instead of pushing for a generic deferral resolution, the 
US has taken the opportunity to add to any peacekeeping or other relevant resolution it 
favours the necessary riders to satisfy its objective of limiting the ICC¶V jurisdiction. One of 
the earliest examples of WKH86¶Vpursuit of this strategy relates to Resolution 1497, dealing 
with the situation in Liberia. Paragraph 7 of the resolution effectively bypassed the ICC¶V 
jurisdiction, by guaranteeing ³H[FOXVLve jurisdiction of the contributing State for all alleged 
DFWV´.98 Nigel White has described WKLVUHVROXWLRQDVWKH³H[FOXVLYHMXULVGLFWLRQUHVROXWLRQ´
and has warned that, should Resolution 1497 be regarded as setting a precedent, then it might 
KDYHD³SHUPDQHQWHIIHFW´,99 and be employed in subsequent peacekeeping-related 
resolutions. If this were to be the case, it would result in the ICC being permanently excluded 
from exercising jurisdiction over the officials and personnel of the P3 states. In fact, the US, 
Russia and China now seem to have arrived at a common policy in respect of referrals. As 
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evidenced in the two resolutions relating to Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011), the P3 powers 
have effectively decided, when adopting a resolution to refer a case to the ICC, to impose an 
³H[FOXVLYHMXULVGLFWLRQ´FODXVH that removes their own nationals from the purview of the 
Court, thereby undermining the ,&&¶Vjurisdiction and competency.100  
Although US policy has become less aggressive towards the ICC in more recent years, its 
general approach to international criminal justice indicates that it is still in favour of setting 
up ad hoc courts and tribunals under the supervision of the SC.101 However, in conclusion, 
and taking into account that ³GHIHUUDO´FDVHVare dormant for now, the US¶V policy in relation 
to the ICC can be summarised as involving one of the following three responses.  
The first is adopted when there is international pressure to do something about the atrocities 
being perpetrated in a crisis situation, and when the US and the other permanent members are 
in agreement that action should be taken. The relevant SC resolution will then be passed, with 
members of the P5 either voting in its favour or manifesting their tacit approval by 
abstaining. In these situations, and in order at least to pay lip service to the R2P doctrine,102 
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 For example, paragraph 6 of S/RES/1593 (2005), on the Darfur referral, records the SC as having decided: 
that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which 
is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions« 
(UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/1593. The resolution also refers to Article 98(2) of the 
5RPH6WDWXWHUHJDUGLQJWKHH[HPSWLRQRIFHUWDLQVWDWHV¶FLWL]HQVIURP,&&MXULVGLFWLRQYLDWKHFRQFOXVLRQRI
bilateral DJUHHPHQWV,ELG)RUDVLPLODU³exclusive jurisdiction´FODXVHLQWKHUHVROXWLRQUHIHUULQJWKH/LE\DQ
situation in 2011, see (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/1970, paragraph 6. 
101
 (Cerone 2007): 314. 
102
 The humanitarian intervention and R2P doctrines, which challenge notions of traditional state sovereignty in 
order to prevent grave human-rights violations, developed in response to the genocides that took place in 
Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s, and had gained traction by the time of the 2005 UN World Summit. 
According to the Summits Outcome Document, heads of state XQDQLPRXVO\DIILUPHGWKDW³HDFKLQGLYLGXDO6WDWH
has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity,´thereby mentioning four particular international crimes whose commission would constitute a legal 
ground on which state sovereignty could be challenged. It was therefore affirmed that, when a state is 
³PDQLIHVWO\IDLOLQJ´WRSURWHFWLWVSRSXODWLRQIURPthese four specific crimes, then the international community 
should in response take collective action, authorised by the ³Security Council and in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations´. 
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the 86¶Vstrategy has been to refer cases to the ICC. For example, the Darfur situation was 
referred to the Court in 2005, although without the provision of any enforcement or financial 
support, and with no follow-up action or resulting trial, and this state of affairs has persisted 
for the past 10 years.103 
The second response is deployed if referring a situation to the ICC will lend some legitimacy 
to a military intervention (possibly involving regime change) contemplated by the US and its 
NATO allies. In such a case, a formal ICC referral or attempted referral will be made by the 
SC. Examples include the successful referral of the Libyan situation in 2011, and the 
unsuccessful attempt to refer the Syrian situation in 2012.104  
                                                 
(General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015): A/RES/61/1, paragraphs 138-140. See also: 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/index.shtml .  
For critical views of R2P, highlighting its ambiguities and possible misuse, see (Focarelli 2008); 





86ZDVLQLWLDOO\RSSRVHGWRWKH6&¶VGUDIWUHVROXWLRQRQWKH'DUIXUVLWXDWLRQLQ2005, and threatened to veto it. 
+RZHYHUDIWHUWKHDGGLWLRQRIWKH³H[FOXVLYHMXULVGLFWLRQ´ULGHUWRWKHUHVROXWLRQWKH86abstained from the 
vote, thereby allowing its adoption. See (Schabas 2009): 170, 473. Also, (Ugarte 2012). 
As to the resolution referring the Libyan situation in 2011; and under the auspices of R2P, the US and the rest of 
the P5 voted in favour. (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/1970 (2011). 
There was also the subsequent adoption of Res. 1973 (also in 2011) and its UHODWHG³QR-IO\]RQH´provision, from 
which China and Russia abstained. See above: S/RES/1973. 
 
These provisions, under Chapter VII, were later made use of by the US and its NATO allies to carry out aerial 
bombings in Libya and to arm rebels in the country. This was followed by the ultimate objective of regime 
change. This event led Russia and China to reject the draft resolution introduced in 2012 on the referral of the 
Syrian situation, with its primary focus on the ousting of Bashar Al-Assad. 
 
The imbalance and inconsistency in SC referrals to the ICC can be characterised as selective justice, with 
Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch (HRW) noting: ³:KHQLWFRPHVWR,&&UHferrals, the United States, 




 For a discussion of the application of the R2P doctrine to the Libyan conflict, its legality, and the regime 
change that was carried out, see (Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in 
Libya 2012). For the perspective of the states threatened by regime change and by the decisions of the SC and 
related ICC referrals, see, in the case of Sudan, Omar Al-%DVKLU³&RQIOLFWLQ'DUIXULVP\UHVSRQVLELOLW\
and, with UHVSHFWWR/LE\DIURP,UDQ¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ('US Seeks Regime Change in Libya' 2011). 
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After the Libyan referral, concerned mostly with the Gadhafi family, and following the 
regime change that took place in the country, the US appeared to lose interest in supporting 
WKH,&&¶VDttempts to assume jurisdiction over the former regime¶V alleged perpetrators of 
international crimes from the new Libyan authorities.105 In the similar situation of Syria, the 
US failed in its attempt, in 2014, to refer the situation to the ICC, mostly with the object of 
achieving regime change.106 
The third response has been prompted by situations in which the US has been motivated and 
genuinely interested in bringing about prosecutions. In such cases, it prefers to set up ad hoc 
courts that are subsidiaries of the SC, where permanent-member privileges apply. The latest 
example of this is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (described in Section 2.2.1). 
Intriguingly, although the US does not formally recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC and its 
role in the global rule of law, in the two types of cases detailed above in which it has referred 
situations to the Court, this has resulted in the ICC being used as an instrument of US power 
(Section 2.1). And, where courts have been created as subsidiaries of the Council, this has 
simply rendered the ICC irrelevant. What, however, all three responses have in common is 
that the US has ensured it retains exclusive jurisdiction over all its nationals and officials, 
e[HPSWLQJWKHPIURPWKH,&&¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ. 
Now that the SC¶V adjudicative role, and the way in which this has been subject to the 
influence of the &RXQFLO¶VP5²especially the US²has been examined, the focus in the next 
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 See: http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=libya; and also (Guardian 2012). 
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3.1 Security Council: The Lawmaker and the Legislator Global 
The traditional sources of international law referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute² 
including treaties and customary international law supported by opinio juris²do not include 
decisions of the UN or any of its organs. If two or more states KDYHZDQWHGµKDUG¶ law to 
govern their relations, then this has typically been based on the consent of the states 
concerned, and crystallised in the form of a treaty. 
When the 81¶VCharter was finalised in San Francisco in 1945, the principal purposes of the 
new organisation were limited in scope, and did not include any lawmaking capacity.107 
Furthermore, WKHPLVVLRQRIWKH81¶Vmost powerful organ, the SC, was to suppress state 
aggression DQGPDLQWDLQ³SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´IRULWVVRYHUHLJQPHPEHUVWDWHV 
However, from the beginning of the 81¶VRSHUDWLRQ²and in the absence of a world 
government²the Charter empowered the GA and some other UN organs, as well as 
conventions sponsored by them, to generate international law:108 at least in the form of µsoft¶ 
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 However, the potential of the SC to act as a global legislator, judge, and enforcer combined was raised by 
VRPHVWDWHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDWWKH6DQ)UDQFLVFR&RQIHUHQFHDQd the Big-¶VSURSRVDOUHJDUGLQJWKHVWUXFWXUHRI
the SC and the use of the veto by permanent members met with opposition. The Netherlands delegation, for 
example, raised such an objection (UNCIO - Volume XI: Commission III, Security Council 1945): 328. For 
further details, see Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
108
 )RURQHRIWKHHDUOLHUZRUNVRQWKLVWRSLFVHH5RVDO\Q+LJJLQV³Development of International Law Through 
Political Organs of the United Nations´GHDOLQJLQSDUWLFXODUZLWKWhe creation of law by means of SC 
resolutions (Higgins 1963). 
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law for the GA, and case law for the ICJ. However, the SC²the only UN organ that can 
enforce its decisions and wage war²has, in the last two decades, adopted decisions that are 
binding on all UN member states. In doing so, it has acted as a de facto global lawmaker, 
creating ³hard´ law²and, under Chapter VII, this is as hard as international law gets. 
Jose Alvarez has detected this transformation in the &RXQFLO¶Vrole: 109 
7KH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶VSUDFWLFHRYHUWLPHKDVGUDPDWLFDOO\WUDQVIRUPHG&KDSWHUV9,
and VII of the Charter. We now know that the Council can take action neither 
authorized by Chapter VI nor anWLFLSDWHGLQ&KDSWHU9,,LQFOXGLQJµ&RQWUDFWLQJRXW¶
the use of force without relying on either the Military Staff Committee or Article 47 or 
Article 43 agreements; creating other institutional bodies capable of taking direct 
legally binding action on states or individuals (such as ad hoc independent war 
crimes tribunals, a UN Compensation Commission, or a boundary demarcation 
body); LPSRVLQJµVPDUWVDQFWLRQV¶GLUHFWO\RQLQGLYLGXDOVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQV; or, 
requiring states to limit their access to weapons without recourse to treaty.  
Before examining the details of some of the above SC mandates mentioned by Alvarez, and 
considering some of the &RXQFLO¶VPRUHUHFHQWGHFLVLRQVDIIHFWLQJLQGLYLGXDOFLWL]HQVDQG
non-state actors globally²all of which seems to be of D³pseudo´ legislative nature²let us 
briefly examine the Charter articles that might empower the SC to act in this way. The last 
section of this chapter will then discuss in more detail whether the SC is in fact acting intra or 
ultra vires.  
The UN Charter¶VSURYLVLRQV covering the VFRSHRIWKH&RXQFLO¶VSRZHUVappear under the 
heading ³)XQFWLRQVDQG3RZHUV´They are very brief (214 words in total) and are contained 
in three articles:110 
[Security Council]  FUNCTIONS AND POWERS 
Article 24 
                                                 
109
 (Alvarez, Legal Perspectives 2008): 59-61. See also (Boyle and Chinkin 2007): 7-10, 110; and (Szasz 2002): 
901-905. 
110
 (Charter of the United Nations 1945-2015): Chapter V; Articles 24-26 (emphases added). 
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1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.  
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the 
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, 
VIII, and XII. 
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to 
the General Assembly for its consideration. 
Article 25 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. 
Article 26 
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and 
security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic 
resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be 
submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for 
the regulation of armaments. 
Relying on the text of the Charter, one hopes to find more specific details RIWKH&RXQFLO¶V
³)XQFWLRQVDQG3RZHUV´LQ&KDSWHUV9,9,,9,,,DQG;,,DVindicated in Article 24(2). 
However, with Chapters VI and VII primarily FRQFHUQHGZLWK³means and measures´ for the 
pacific or non-pacific settlement of disputes; Chapter VIII dealing with ³UHJLRQDO
DUUDQJHPHQWV´ZLWKSC decisions nevertheless being superior); and Chapter XII devoted to 
WKH³7UXVWHHVKLS6\VWHP,´ZKLFKLVQRZREVROHWHZHDUHback to a vague Charter definition 
RIWKH&RXQFLO¶V³IXQFWLRQVDQGSRZHUV´ 
In contrast, sWDWHV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQGWKH binding nature of SC decisions on UN member 
states, seem to be more precisely defined. 
Article 24(1) is significant in this context, since it confers upon the SC ³SULPDU\
UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´, and further confirms 
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that all the member states have delegated their decision-making powers within the scope of 
WKH&RXQFLO¶VDFWLYLWLHVWRWKHSC. In doing so, the member sWDWHV³agree that in carrying out 
its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf´)XUWKHUPRUH
this delegation of decision-making to the Council in the realm of its activities is made by all 
³0HPEHUV´ 
With the exception of Kosovo, Palestine, Taiwan, and a few small enclave nations with 
undetermined nationhood status, this delegation of powers is practically universal.111 These 
universal Council mandates further become binding upon the member states where, by virtue 
of Article 25, all WKHPHPEHUVWDWHV³DJUHH to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council´ 
Given that all the ZRUOG¶Vsovereign states are delegating their powers to the Council, and that 
SC decisions have binding effect, who then decides what constitutes a ³WKUHDWWRWKHSHDFH´
or what situation TXDOLILHVDVD³EUHDFK´RIWKHSHDFH" 
According to Chapter VII, Article 39, these determinations and decisions are within the 
exclusive competence of the SC. Furthermore, Articles 24(1) and 25, cited above, 
complement this jurisdictional aspect by giving the SC the necessary delegation of powers 
from the states, and also reinforce the binding effects of WKH&RXQFLO¶Vdecisions by requesting 
the states WR³FDUU\RXW´its decisions.  
Moreover, the so-called UN Charter supremacy clause, contained in Article 103 of the 
Charter, ensures that the decisions of the Council, in case of a conflict of norms or 
jurisdictions (perhaps with the exception of jus cogens norms), take precedence over any 
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treaty or other international obligation that a member state may have. Under these 
circumstances, the member sWDWHV¶³REOLJDWLRQVXQGHUWKHSUHVHQW&KDUWHUVKDOOSUHYDLO´112 
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 7KURXJKRXWWKH81¶VKLVWRU\WKHRYHUDUFKLQJQDWXUHRI$UWLFOHDQGLWVDELOLW\WRRYHUULGHVWDWHV¶RWKHU
treaty or customs obligations has been a topic of discussion, and its supremacy has generally been confirmed by 
WKH*$¶VLegal Committee (the 6th committee), the ILC, and by the ICJ. In the ICJ case Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, the Court ruled that the Charter, as a result of Article 103, constitutes a higher source of law and 
hence took precedence over any regional arrangements affecting the US and Nicaragua. It stated: 
Furthermore, it is also important always to bear in mind that all regional, bilateral and even 
multilateral arrangements that the Parties to this case may have made, touching on the issue of 
settlement of disputes or the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, must be made always 
subject to the provisions of Article 103 RIWKH&KDUWHU« 
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 1984): ICJ Reports 1984, p. 438, Para. 102. 
 
ILC reports have also adopted this view: see (Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-6 (on 
Article 103), 1979-1984)6HHDOVRWKH,/&¶VStudy Group on Fragmentation, commentaries on Article 103, 
(Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-10 (on Article 103), 2000-2009).  
0RUHRYHUWKHVXSUHPDF\RI$UWLFOHRYHUVWDWHV¶RWKHUREOLJDWLRQVLVERWKUHIHUUHGWRLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHDQGLV
evident in Council practice. One example is the Iranian nuclear programme. SC resolutions ordered Iran to halt 
its nuclear-enrichment programme, even though Iran, as a signatory to the NPT Treaty, has, under Article IV of 
WKDWWUHDW\WKH³inalienable right´ WRHQULFKXUDQLXPDQGSURGXFHQXFOHDUHQHUJ\IRU³peaceful purposes´)RUDQ
example of one of the earlier resolutions on Iran implying that the decisions of the SC took priority over the 
obligations contained in the NPT, see Res. 1696 of 2006. (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): 
S/RES/1696 (2006). 
 
The overarching nature of Council decisions was also referred to in the ICJ Lockerbie case in 1998. In that case, 
involving Libya and the US, the question was whether SC decisions took precedence over the provisions of the 
Montreal ConveQWLRQ7KH&RQYHQWLRQ¶V³5XOHVIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO&DUULDJHE\$LU´ specified, among other 
matters, where the perpetrators of criminal acts involving air incidents should be tried. The Court ruled that it 
KDGMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUWKHFDVHGHVSLWHWKH86¶VDUJXment that, by virtue of Articles 25 and 103, the UN Charter 
trumped the Convention, with the implication that the ICJ was acting ultra vires. However, the Court established 
its jurisdiction on the ground that the Libyan suit was filed in March 1992, before the date of the two related 
Council resolutions on Libya. In fact, the ICJ president at the time, Judge Schwebel, stated in his dissenting 
opinion: 
To engraft upon the Charter regime a power of judicial review would not be a development but a 
departure justified neither by Charter terms nor by customary international law nor by the general 
principles of law. It would entail the Court giving judgment over an absentee, the Security Council, 
contrary to fundamental judicial principles. It could give rise to the question, is a holding by the Court 
that the Council has acted ultra vires a holding which of itself is ultra vires? 
(Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION Arising From: The 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) 1998), 
Judgment Summary: 25-28. Subsequently, as a result of an agreement reached by Libya, the UK and the US in 
WKHFDVHZDVGLVFRQWLQXHGDQGUHPRYHGIURPWKH,&-¶VGRFNHW 
 
For a more recent discussion of Article 103 and SC decisions as they relate to regional human rights 
conventions, in the EU context, see The Application of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the 
European Courts: the Quest for Regime Compatibility on Fundamental Rights (Istrefi 2012-2013). For a more 
critical view of Article 103 and the supremacy clause, see Hierarchy in International Law, the Place of Human 
Rights, (De Wet and Vidmar 2012). See also The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter 
(Liivoja 2008).  
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Below, I examine this new auto-interpretation of the Charter, which has unlHDVKHGWKH6&¶V
power as a global lawmaker, in light of the following facts: (1) the SC represents an 
authoritative source of law, and WKH&KDUWHULVQRWVSHFLILFDERXWZKDWFRQVWLWXWHV³SHDFHDQG
VHFXULW\´RULWV³EUHDFK´the SC enjoys significant leeway in what it may do to maintain 
³SHDFH and VHFXULW\´DQGVLQFHWKHHQGRIWKH&ROGWar, which has resulted in greater 
ideological harmony among the P5 members, and a less frequent use of the veto, a new 
phenomenon has emerged: Council decisions that have a legislative effect. 
3.2 The 1990s and the SC Embarking on Quasi-Legislative and 
Lawmaking Acts: Criminalisation and its Regulations, Financial 
Settlements for Individuals and Corporations, Sanctions on Individuals 
and Non-State Actors, and Fighting AIDS  
In addition to the unleashing of the adjudicative powers of the Council described in the 
previous chapter, WKH6&¶VJOREDOJRYHUQDQFH competency also seemed to have expanded 
significantly by the end of the last century, beginning with Resolution 687 of 1991 (regarding 
the ceasefire in the First Iraq War). The resolution was one of the lengthiest LQWKH&RXQFLO¶V
history up until that point, consisting of over 3,600 words, with the preamble followed by 34 
measures enumerated in as many paragraphs.113  
Resolution 687, proprio motu and without any judgment being issued by a court, decided that 
Iraq had violated international law, determined the boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait, and 
devised an arms-control regime for Iraq²requiring not only the destruction of any weapons 
of mass destruction that might exist, but also calling for the destruction of weapons that were 
not banned by any treaty that Iraq was party to. Other unprecedented measures (discussed 
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 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/687. 
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later in this chapter) were also mandated, which directly impacted on individuals and 
corporations: DUDGLFDOGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH&RXQFLO¶VW\SLFDOGHDOLQJVZLWKVRYHUHLJQVWDWHV. 
Combating the tyrannical rule of the then leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was clearly one 
PRWLYDWLRQIRUWKH&RXQFLO¶VDFWLRQV+Rwever, the resolution went further, containing many 
measures that broadly impinged on Iraq¶V sovereignty, and which also had a wide-ranging 
economic impact on its people²all without recourse to judicial review. 
One measure, set out in paragraph 16, and unpUHFHGHQWHGLQWKH81¶VKLVWRU\PDGHIraq 
financially liable for a wide array of damage and loss²and not only to states, but also to 
individuals and corporations:114 Under it, the SC: 
Reaffirm[ed] that Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 
2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable 
under international law for any direct loss, damage²including environmental 
damage and the depletion of natural resources²or injury to foreign Governments, 
nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait [Emphases added.] 
ConsequentlyQRWRQO\.XZDLWDQGWKH.XZDLWLVEXWDOVRRWKHU³IRUHLJQJRYHUQPHQWV
QDWLRQDOVDQGFRUSRUDWLRQV´EHFDPHWKHSRWHQWLDOEHQHILFLDULHVRIWKH war reparations. 
However, since the resolution did not specify a lump-sum figure to be paid by Iraq to Kuwait, 
and as the Council had authorised multiple states and, presumably, many individuals and 
corporations to file for compensation, what independent court or arbitration panel would have 
the authority to assess the damages, administer claims, and distribute the funds? 
Under paragraph 18 of the resolution, the Council appointed itself to the role, having: 115 
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 Ibid: paragraph16. 
115
 Ibid: paragraph 18. 
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Decide[d]  also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within 
paragraph 16 and to establish a commission that will administer the fund. 
The P5 all had an interest (financial or otherwise) in this provision. The first sentence of 
paragraph 16 (honouring prior debts) ensured that Russia would recover its money from 
Soviet-era loans (mostly for the sale of military equipment). As for the US and the UK, the 
resolution ensured recovery of some or all of their war expenses, as well as their oil-company 
losses in Kuwait. It would also seem that France and China must have envisaged some form 
of economic gain (or at least the recuperation of losses) for them to have adopted the precise 
wording of the resolution. In fact, in the case of China, more than 10,000 Chinese workers 
and nationals later filed for compensation once the Commission was set up.116 
7KH6&¶VVXEVLGLDU\WKH81&RPSHQVDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQ81&&FUHDWHGLQ*HQHYDWR
implement paragraph 18 of the resolution, has now been operating for over 20 years. It has 
taxed the Iraqi state and its people (currently at the rate of five per cent of their oil export 
revenue), and has, from this fund, distributed billions of dollars to hundreds of thousands of 
individuals from dozens of countries, as well as redistributing funds to hundreds of corporate 
beneficiaries. An analysis of the UNCC as both an administrator of this fund and as a quasi-
civil court will be covered in more detail later in the chapter by way of a case study of the 
6&¶VQHZO\DGRSWHGOHJLVODWLYHIXQFWLRQV. 
Resolution 687, the so-cDOOHG³PRWKHURIDOOUHVROXWLRQV´ ²also described as an instance of 
WKH3¶V ³KHJHPRQLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´²imposed other harsh measures on Iraq that can only 
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 In the case of China and France, their interest in obtaining compensation in respect of the First Gulf War 
appears to be less marked than that of the other P5 powers. However, 10,198 Chinese workers and nationals 
filed claims in the individuals Category ³A´ Claims and, after the UNCC was set up, 118 French corporations 
filed for corporate &DWHJRU\³(´&ODLPV (France was ranked seventh in that category). (United Nations 
Compensation Commission 1991-2013). For Category A, see http://www.uncc.ch/claims/a_claims.htm; and for 
Category E, see http://www.uncc.ch/claims/e_claims.htm. Both accessed 22 April 2013. For more information 
on claims and payments initiated by this resolution, see Table 1 in this chapter. 
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be characterised as a form of selective justice.117 For example, paragraph 14 states the 
&RXQFLO¶VJRDORI³establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass 
destruction´ (WMD). In trying to achieve this objective, the Council subjected Iraq to 
LQWUXVLYHDQG³XQFRQGLWLRQDO´measures relating to the destruction of WMD, as well as the 
destruction of some Iraqi non-WMD weapons (in paragraphs 8 to 13). This stands in contrast 
to previous declarations by the GA, and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) review conference declarations on a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the 
Middle East inclusive of all Middle Eastern states, including its only nuclear-weapons state, 
Israel.118 
The Council carried out other unprecedented quasi-legislative actions in the decade 
immediately preceding the new millennium. It began to introduce ³WDUJHWHG´RU³VPDUW´
sanctions, as opposed to the state-wide sanctions implemented in previous decades. Previous 
SC resolutions of this type had mostly imposed arms embargos or general trade and economic 
sanctions against a particular state, and had been used sparingly. They were first used against 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1966 (Resolution 232), and later examples included the 
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 )RUD³KHJHPRQLF´YLHZRI5HVVHH-RVH$OYDUH]Hegemonic International Law Revisited (Alvarez, 
Hegemonic International Law Revisited 2003): 884-886. For a general discussion of the resolution, see Paul 
Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating (Szasz 2002); and Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple 
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 7KH*$¶VSXVKIRUDMideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) has been ongoing since the 1970s. 
First proposed by Iran, and adopted by a GA resolution in 1974, the creation of a MENWFZ was supported by 
Egypt and other states in subsequent GA resolutions, and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the NPT in the 1990s. The IAEA general conference, has, since 1991, been passing annual resolutions on 
³WKH$SSOLFDWLRQRI,$($VDIHJXDUGVLQWKH0LGGOH East´DVDQHFHVVDU\VWHSWRZDUGVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDn 
MENWFZ in the region. The NPT review conferences, starting in 1995, have also been calling for an 
MENWFZ. In fact, the indefinite extension of the treaty at the NPT conference in 1995 was mostly attributed to 
the NPT consensus and will in establishing the MENWFZ. For a chronology of these events, see the Arms 
Control Association website: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz, accessed 10 August 2013. The 
last NPT five-year review conference, held in 2010, which the author attended as an observer, resulted in the 
final outcome document calling for a regional conference on an MENWFZ, to include Israel, which was to be 
held by 2012. This conference, owing to the non-participation of Israel, has not yet been convened. 
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sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990, following the First Gulf War (Resolution 661) and the 
first round of Libyan sanctions, in 1992 (Resolution 748), in connection with the Lockerbie 
incident.119  
In the 1990s, however, the Council began targeting individuals and then corporations and 
other non-state actors. The first of this new generation of sanctions was introduced in relation 
to the conflict in Somalia and Eritrea by means of Resolution 751 in 1992. Subsequent 
resolutions led to a sanctions list being compiled in respect of Somalia in Resolution 1844 
(2008). A year later, sanctions were imposed on the military junta in Haiti, in Resolution 841 
(1993), and the following year a companion resolution, Resolution 917 (1994), awarded the 
841 Committee²established under the first resolution²the additional task of compiling a 
list of individuals that were to be sanctioned.120 
In 1993, in relation to the Angolan civil war, SC sanctions were again adopted in respect of 
non-state actors: namely, officials of the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) and their families. Resolution 864 (1993) explicitly targeted individuals and 
corporations as the subject of its sanctions. Although the previously mentioned Council 
resolutions on Somalia and Haiti eventually led to subsequent resolutions that established 
listing committees, Resolution 864 on Angola was the first to incorporate the creation of the 
listing committee as part of its text.121 
In paragraphs 20 and 21 of Resolution 864 DQGWKURXJKWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIWKHUHVROXWLRQ¶V
mandated sanctions committee), the Council ordered the nullification of certain agreements 
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 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/232, 661 and 748. 
120
 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/751, 841, 917 and 1844. 
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 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/864 (1993). 
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and contracts applicable to specified individuals and entities in connection with the situation 
in Angola. It also called upon member states to implement proceedings and prosecute the 
violators specified in the resolution. Under these paragraphs, the SC:122 
Call[ed]  upon all States, and all international organizations, to act strictly in 
accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the 
existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international 
agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the 
date of adoption of this resolution 
Call[ed]  upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the 
measures imposed by this resolution and WRLPSRVHDSSURSULDWHSHQDOWLHV« 
In 1999, there was yet another resolution adopted by the Council which affected individuals 
and non-state actors: Resolution 1267, which established a Taliban/Al Qaeda sanctions 
regime after the Kenya and Tanzania US Embassy bombings.123 This resolution and its 
derivatives (in which Osama bin Laden was listed as a global criminal, and which in turn may 
have been the precursor to 9/11) for the first time created a long list, with the added 
significance that it was not related to a specific state, and affected many individuals, 
corporations and NGOs from multiple states. The 1267 Committee created by that resolution, 
and complemented by several other resolutions since, has evolved into a robust global and 
OHJDOO\ELQGLQJVDQFWLRQVUHJLPH,WVG\QDPLF³OLVW´DIWHU\Hars, continues to be 
updated.124 
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 For an enumeration of some of these sanctions committees, started as subsidiaries of the SC in the 1990s and 
2000s, see (Sands and Klein 2009): 40. For a general discussion of how to combat the democratic deficit of 
some of the legislative and adjudicative decisions of the SC, see Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in 
the UN Security Council: Bringing down the Deliberative Deficit (Jonstone 2008): 275-308. 
124
 The targeted list created by the 1267 Committee in 1999 has, as at 2012, been the subject of 10 resolutions: 
1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 
1989 (2011) and 2083 (2012), which, over the years, have modified the sanctions regime. Subsequently, for 
political reasons, an Al-Qaeda sanctions list was created separate from that for the Taliban, as is discussed later 
in the chapter. See http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/, accessed 19 July 2013. 
73 
 
The more substantive, legislative-type resolutions of the Council that have created global 
criminal law are discussed below. These resolutions work in a more general and abstract way, 
without a specific target list, such as Resolution 1373, mentioned in the next section, and 
have wide-ranging implications when implemented at the national level. First, however, one 
more atypical and bold decision of the SC is examined: one related to the problem of global 
health and pandemics.  
At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, there were other innovative 
decisions and resolutions issued by the SC which illustrate that, if the UN is motivated to do 
so, and if the P5 are in agreement, certain colossal worldwide problems, such as those 
relating to the environment, poverty and health, can be tackled globally. 
In July 2000, the Council adopted Resolution 7KH&RXQFLOZDV³Geeply concerned´ at 
the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and by the severity of the crisis in Africa in particular. 
7KH&RXQFLOVWUHVVHG³that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to 
stability and security.´7KHUHIRUHWKH&RXQFLOUHTXHVWHG ³WKH6HFUHWDU\-General to take 
further steps towards the provision of training for peacekeeping personnel on issues related to 
preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and to continue the further development of pre-
deployment orientation and ongoing training for all peacekeeping personnel on these issues.´
)LQDOO\WKH&RXQFLOLQVWUXFWHG³81$,'6WRFRQWLnue to strengthen its cooperation with 
interested Member States to further develop its country profiles in order to reflect best 
SUDFWLFHVDQGFRXQWULHV¶SROLFLHVRQ+,9$,'6SUHYHQWLRQHGXFDWLRQWHVWLQJcounselling and 
WUHDWPHQW´125 
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74 
 
Although the resolution can be considered lacklustre in terms of committing resources (other 
than support for the UNAIDS agency), it does support and encourage educational and 
informational cooperation in combating HIV/AIDS. The major significance of this resolution 
is the fact that, for the first time, the Council is making a connection EHWZHHQJOREDO³VWDELOLW\
DQGVHFXULW\´DQGDKHDOWKPDWWHU, thus creating a precedent in Council decisions as to the 
possibility of making future linkages of this type. 
3.3 The 2000s: the SecuULW\&RXQFLO³6WDUWV/HJLVODWLQJ´ 
³The Security Council Starts Legislating´ is in fact the title of an article by Paul Szasz, 
published in the American Journal of International Law in 2002.126 This was one of the first 
in a series of articles and scholarly works published soon after the adoption of Resolution 
1373 (immediately following the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy and the terrorist 
attacks on the US mainland). 
Paul Szasz, regrettably, died in the same year in which he submitted the draft of his article 
and before it was published. But his seminal work was expanded in later years by, among 
others, Jose Alvarez, Martti Koskenniemi, Luis Martinez and Kim Scheppele. These authors 
suggested that the SC had entered a new phase in making global law. Alvarez, in particular, 
expands his analysis of the subject further by pointing to the hegemonic effect of the 
&RXQFLO¶VGHFLVLRQVDQGWKHcollective hegemonic powers of the P5.127 
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 The works of the scholars mentioned above are expanded and referenced later in this chapter and can also be 
found in the bibliography. For examples of the role of the SC as an agent of ³KHJHPRQLFLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´, see 
Jose Alvarez (Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited 2003). See also Detlev Vagts (Vagts, 
Hegemonic International Law 2001).  
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In the first decade of the new millennium, there were two SC resolutions that particularly 
stood out as legislative acts. 
3.4 SC Resolutions 1373 and 1540: Global Legislation DQG6WDWHV¶
Compliance  
In less than three weeks after the 9/11 terror attack, with the tragedy preoccupying most 
SROLWLFLDQV¶PLQGVResolution 1373 (2001), adopted under Chapter VII, directly defined 
terrorism-related criminal offenses (without defining ³WHUURULVP´LWVHOIIRUDOOWKHZRUOG¶V
citizens. This resolution, applicable to all the countries of WKHZRUOG³decides that all States 
shall ... prohibit theiUQDWLRQDOVRUDQ\SHUVRQVDQGHQWLWLHVZLWKLQWKHLUWHUULWRULHV´ from 
FRPPLWWLQJ³WHUURULVW´DFWV)XUWKHUPRUHWKHUHVROXWLRQFRPPDQGVDOOWKHmember states to 
modify their domestic laws and penal codes, so that ³VXFKWHUURULVWDFWVDUHHVWDEOLVKHGDV
seULRXVFULPLQDORIIHQFHVLQGRPHVWLFODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV´128 Under Chapter VII, and by 
virtue of Article 25, this resolution was binding on all member states. And, in view of Article 
2(6), it was applicable even to non-member states, and therefore of universal effect.129 
Most previous SC resolutions contained, in their operative paragraphs, ZRUGVVXFKDV³FDOOV
XSRQ´RU³XUJHV´ZKHQDGGUHVVLQJWKHmember states. However, this resolution uses the more 
GLUHFWDQGFRPSXOVRU\WHUP³VKDOO´LQLWVRSHUDWLve paragraphs, and is addressed to ³DOO
VWDWHV´130 
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 For a discourse analysis of the text of the resolution, see (Szasz 2002): 902. 
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In another significant departure from previous SC resolutions, Resolution 1373 is not linked 
to a particular incident. AlthouJKWKHUHVROXWLRQ¶VSUHDPEOH references 9/11, the situation 
being addressed is a generalised one, not related to a specific state or region, but global in 
scale, and has no implied completion date or time limit associated with it.131 As a result, the 
UHVROXWLRQ¶VHIIHFW is, in the absence of a corresponding cancelling or modifying SC 
resolution²which could be vetoed by a permanent member²perpetual.132 
Resolution 1373 also established a monitoring regime, creating the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC) to assist and monitor the domestic implementation of the resolution. The 
&7&¶VPDLQREMHFWLYHLVWR³Friminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in 
domestic law and bring violators to justice´.133 
7KHUHVROXWLRQ¶VODQJXDJHLVFHUWDLQO\KLJKO\GHPDQGLQJ. It impinges on the domestic legal 
systems of UN member states, and constitutes a direct attempt by the Council to govern the 
global community. The resolution has obligatory and globally mandated wording: for 
example, exhorting members to ³SURKLELWWKHLUQDWLRQDOV´IURPFHUWDLQ³DFWLYLWLHV´DQGWR
³FULPLQDOL]H´WKRVHDFWLYLWLHV, DQGWR³IUHH]HZLWKRXWGHOD\IXQGVDQGRWKHUILQDQFLDODVVHWV´
RIFHUWDLQLQGLYLGXDOVDQGWR³HQVXUHWKDWDQ\SHUVRQZKRSDUWLFLSDWHV´LQWKRVHDFWLYLWLHVis 




 In fact, after 13 years, and at the time of writing, the Counter-Terrorism Committee set up by the resolution 




x criminalise the financing of terrorism; 
x freeze without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism; 
x deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups; 
x suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists; 
x share information with other governments on any groups practising or planning terrorist acts; 
x cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of 
those involved in such acts; and 
x criminalise active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law, and bring violators to justice. 








action on the part of the SC and its willingness to apply this resolution to its own domestic 
laws and comply have been remarkable. Regionally and collectively, the EU, within a few 
months, came up with an implementation plan for the main operative paragraphs of 
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 The relevant sections of the two paragraphs of Res. 1373 are reproduced below: 
7KH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO«Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations« 
 
1. Decides that all States shall: 
              (a)  Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;  
 (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their 
nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge 
that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;  
(c) Freeze without  delay  funds  and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who 
commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist 
acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities 
acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or 
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated 
persons and entities; 
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, 
financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or 
indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the 
commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and 
of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons; 
 
2. Decides also that all States shall: 
« 
 
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or 
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and 
ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are 
established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the 
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;  
« 
 
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on 
issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, 
forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents; « 




Resolution 1373.135 The EU also devised the Community-wide European Arrest Warrant 
initiative.136 The African Union, the OAS, the OSCE, and the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) all, to varying degrees, took similar action to implement the 
Resolution 1373 mandates.137 
At the national level, the US, in addition to enacting the Patriot Act, rushed through its 
legislative process the ratification and adoption of the 1999 Convention on the Financing of 
Terrorism, as did many other countries.138 Many states weOFRPHGWKH&7&¶VWHFKQLFDO
assistance and adopted CTC recommendations, in all or in part, in implementing Resolution 
1373 and its subsequent resolutions.139 The CTC Global Survey reported that, as of 2007, 88 
states had taken positive steps to implement Resolution 1373 and its follow-up measure, 
Resolution 1624 (2005). These states did this primarily by modifying their domestic criminal 
laws and financial and banking laws, as well as by taking appropriate measures in regard to 
border controls.140 Furthermore, by 2006, all the UN member states (at the time, 191 states) 
had at least submitted a first report on their implementation action plan for Resolution 
1373,141 thereby ensuring that this first global legislative act had a substantial effect, and one 
that continues to this day. 
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 (Szasz 2002): 903. It should also be noted that Res. 1373, which was being advanced primarily as a US 
foreign-policy objective at the SC, was actually an attempt by the US to implement at the international level 
some of the Patriot Act¶V components. 
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 In fact, there were a number of SC-adopted resolutions that followed 1373: for example, Res. 1377 (2001) 
and Res. 1624 (2005), which reinfRUFHGWKH&7&¶VIXQFWLRQVDQGRIIHUHGPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQDQGWHFKQLFDO
assistance on implementing the resolution.  
140
 See CTC Global Survey Report, S/2008/29, and its paragraph (2) for information on the number of states 
complying. See also the related S/2012/16 Council report (Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) 2013). 
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 (Jonstone 2008): 286. 
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A second SC resolution that I consider a further form of global legislation is Resolution 1540 
(2004). Again, the resolution is general (not related to a specific incident) and is directed not 
only to states, but primarily towards individuals, corporations and other non-state actors, and 
has no expiry date.142  
Adopted on 28 April 2004, Resolution 1540 decided, with binding effect, that all member 
states:143 
«Vhall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State 
actor to [sic] manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or their means of delivery, in particular for 
terrorist purposes « 
The resolution was inspired by the discovery of Pakistani scientist AbGXO4DGHHU.KDQ¶V
network, involved in the sale of components and technology relevant to nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, the resolution was applicable not only to nuclear weapons, but also to all other 
WMD, such as chemical, biological and radiological weapons. 
:KHQDGGUHVVLQJ³DOO6WDWHV´WKHUHVROXWLRQ, in three of its operative paragraphs, uses the 
FRPSXOVRU\WHUP³VKDOO´ to provide for its legislative measures² as in: ³shall adopt and 
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor´IUom engaging in 
certain activities.144 TheVHDFWLYLWLHVDUHJHQHUDOO\GHILQHGDVWKH³production, use, storage or 
transport´RI:0'-related or dual-use materials.145 
The resolution then attempts to put in place the ³DSSURSULDWHHIIHFWLYHERUGHUFRQWUROVDQGODZ 
HQIRUFHPHQWHIIRUWVWRGHWHFWGHWHU´DQGSUHYHQWthe ³H[SRUWWUDQVLWWUDQV-shipment and re-
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H[SRUW´RIFHUWDLQPDWHULDOV. The resolution also mandates the implementation of ³DSSURSULDWH
ODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV´, and the placing of ³FRQWUROVRQSURYLGLQJIXnds and services related to 
such export and trans-VKLSPHQWVXFKDVILQDQFLQJDQGWUDQVSRUWLQJ´UHODWHGWRWKH
unauthorised activities. The resolution envisages enforcing these measures by ³HVWDEOLVKLQJ
end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for 
violations of such export control laws and regulations´)XUWKHUPRUHWKH&RXQFLOPDQGDWHV
³that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce 
appropriate effective laws´ prohibiting any non-state actor from engaging in the defined types 
of activities, and therefore criminalising those activities in their domestic penal codes.146 
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 The full text of the relevant operative paragraphs of Res. 1540 reads as follows: 
 
7KH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO«Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
 
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to 
develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and 
their means of delivery; 
 
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce 
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to [sic] manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for 
terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an 
accomplice, assist or finance them; 
 
3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by 
establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:  
 
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, 
use, storage or transport; 
(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;  
(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, 
prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and 
brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with 
international law; 
 
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls 
over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-
export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as 
financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; 





Paragraph 4 of the resolution creates a monitoring committee, the 1540 Committee, as a 
subsidiary of the SC, similar to the CTC Committee formed by Resolution 1373. In 
common with the CTC, the 1540 Committee is engaged in providing technical 
assistance, workshops and consultations to member states to facilitate their domestic 
implementation of the resolution, as well as carrying out monitoring activities, and 
reporting on the progress PDGHLQWKHUHVROXWLRQ¶VJOREDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQInitially, the 
&RPPLWWHH¶VZRUNZDVVXSSRVHGWREHFRPSOHWHGLQWZR\HDUVHowever, as this was 
not feasible, the period was initially extended in successive two-year extensions. 
Finally, in Resolution 1977 (2011), it was extended for a period of 10 years, to 2021.147  
Resolution 1540, like Resolution 1373, was adopted unanimously by the Council. 
However, with Resolution ¶VOHJLVODtive effects fully apparent since its introduction 
three years earlier, the SC debate concerning Resolution 1540 was more contentious, 
and its adoption took months rather than days. A week before its adoption, on 22 April 
2004, the Council, at the insistence of many member states, held an ³open meeting´, 
inviting non-Council members to participate in the discussions related to the draft 
resolution. The letters submitted, and the verbatim discussions at the meeting, reveal 
that the majority of member-state participants were aware that the Council was in fact 
taking further legislative action that would impinge on their domestic legal systems, and 
                                                 
4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no 
longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which 
will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the 
implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six 
months from the adoption of this resolution  to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to 
LPSOHPHQWWKLVUHVROXWLRQ« 
 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/1540 (2004). 
147
 For creation of the 1540 Committee, see paragraph 4 RI65(6LELG)RUWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VVFRSHRI
activities and the extension of its work until 2021, see (Security Council, The 1540 Committee 2013). 
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that it was essentially making international law and bypassing treaties, all with the 
adoption of a single SC resolution. 
At the open meeting, Mr. Arias of Spain, noting the similarity of the resolution to a 
multilateral treaty, suggested that the resolution ³EHDGRSWHGE\FRQVHQVXVDQGDIWHU
consultation with non-PHPEHUVRIWKH&RXQFLO´. Mr. Akram of Pakistan, objecting to 
WKHIDFWWKDW³>W@KHUHDUHJUDYHLPSOLFDWLRQVWRWKLVHIIRUWE\WKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLOWR
impose obligations on States, which their Governments and sovereign legislatures have 
not freely accepted,´IXUWKHUVWDWHG148  
Pakistan believes that the first question is whether the Security Council 
has the right to assume the role of prescribing legislative action by 
Member States. The existing treaties, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), already prescribe most of the 
legislation that would cover proliferation by both State and non-state 
actors. 
Of the states that were SUHVHQWDWWKH³RSHQPHHWLQJ´more than a dozen presented their 
views, including Algeria, Angola, Canada, India, Indonesia, Iran, New Zealand, Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa and Switzerland²some speaking in favour and some against the 
resolution. However, almost all recognised the legislative nature of the resolution. Perhaps 
6LQJDSRUH¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYH Mr. Mahbubani, summarised most effectively why the P5 (of 
course, the permanent members were in agreement concerning the resolution, otherwise any 
one of them could have vetoed it) and states such as Singapore favour this type of global 
lawmaking:149 
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83 
 
Singapore understands many of the concerns expressed here in this 
debate by some of the other delegations. For example, they question 
whether the Security Council can assume the role of treaty-making or of 
legislating rules for Member States. We agree that a multilateral treaty 
regime would be ideal. But multilateral negotiations could take years, 
and time is not on our side. 
The current status of the global implementation of Resolution 1540, including the member 
sWDWHV¶FRPSOLDQFHUHFRUGVLVUHJXODUO\SUHVHQWHG in the 1540 Committee report. The 2010 
report, the last report available that contains extensive detail, includes data up to 2009, and 
indicates that nearly160 member states have complied by at least submitting their progress 
and status reports to the Committee. Furthermore, without giving a specific figure, the report 
VWDWHVWKDW³the number of States reporting to have implemented legislative measures to 
penalise the involvement of non-state actors in prohibited weapons of mass destruction 
proliferation activities has grown considerably since the adoption of Res. 1540.´In summary, 
the Committee reports positive steps taken by member states in compliance with the 
resolution.150The &RPPLWWHH¶V2011 report highlights the fact that up to 140 member states 
have already adopted domestic legislative measures to implement Resolution 1540.151  
                                                 
150
 (Security Council Report 2013): S/2010/52 (2010), paragraph 3. With regard to the transparency of the two 
Committees, my examination of the reports of the CTC Committee and those of the 1540 Committee, as well as 
SC publicly available resources on the subject, have revealed a trend of increasing opacity. In the two 
FRPPLWWHHV¶UHSRUWLQJWKHUHVHHPVWREHDQLQWHQWLRQDOGHSDUWXUHIURPWKHLUSDVWSUDFWLFHV6LQFHWKH
reports have increasingly become vaguer as far as quantifying compliance information is concerned, or in the 
naming or identifying of specific activities of member states. 
151
 Posted reports of the Committee: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/reports-and-briefings/committee-
reports.shtml. According to the last available report of the Committee (2011), available online as of December 
2015, 140 states have implemented domestic legal frameworks in compliance with the Res. 1540. See: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/579. Both accessed 27 December 2015. 
84 
 
3.5 Security Council: Legislating Sanctions Regimes and Listing 
Criminals 
In the first 45 years of its existence, between 1945 and 1990, the SC applied sanctions only 
twice: in respect of Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. However, starting with the 
1990 SC general trade embargo on Iraq (Resolution 661), the Council has become proactive 
in the matter of sanctions and has passed dozens of resolutions imposing sanctions on 
different states in different continents. In fact, in the 25-year period between 1990 and 2015, 
the SC, in addition to the general trade and financial embargo it placed on Iraq, has passed a 
number of resolutions mandating ³VPDUW´VDQFWLRQVwhich have been ³WDUJHWHG´DQGDPRXQW
to 29 in total, an average of more than one per year. These 29 ³WDUJHWHG´UHJLPHVKDYH
VXEVHTXHQWO\FUHDWHG³OLVWLQJ´FRPPLWWHHV2IWKHVHFRPPLWWHHVKDYHFRPSOHWHGWKHLU
mission and have been terminated. Another 16 are active and remained as functional 
sanctions regimes as at the end of 2015.152 
Article 41 of the Charter empowers the SC to use non-military interventions against a state. 
Since the end of the Cold War, this article has also been subject to further interpretation, 
thereby altering the &RXQFLO¶VIXQFWLRQVas prescribed in the Charter. The result has been to 
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 In addition to the 29 targeted sanctions in this 25-year period, there were also three sanctions of the general 
type, applying to Iraq, Haiti and Yugoslavia. The 13 active Committees and sanction regimes, as at the end of 
February 2013, are related to the following resolutions: Res. 751 (1992) and Res. 1907 (2009) (Somalia and 
Eritrea); Res. 1267 (1999) and Res. 1989 (2011) (Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities); Res. 1518 
(2003) (Iraq); Res. 1521 (2003) (Liberia); Res. 1533 (2004) (Democratic Republic of the Congo); Res. 1572 
(2004) (Côte d'Ivoire); Res. 1591 (2005) (Sudan); Res. 1636 (2005) (Lebanon); Res. 1718 (2006) (North 
Korea); Res. 1737 (2006) (Iran); Res. 1970 (2011) (Libya); Res. 1988 (2011) (Afghanistan and Taliban, with the 
SC hiving off the Taliban section of the 1267 Committee in 2011); Res. 2048 (2012) (Guinea-Bissau); Res. 
2127 (2013) (Central African Republic); Res. 2140 (2014) (Yemen); and Res. 2206 (2015) (South Sudan). See 
(UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 1990-2015). See also: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/; and 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/terminated-sanctions; both accessed 5 January 2016. Also see 
(Cortright, Lopez and Gerber-Stellingwerf 2008): 349-352.  
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H[SDQGWKH&RXQFLO¶VPLVVLRQDQGVFRSHRIFRPSHWHQF\IDUEH\RQGthat of sovereign states, as 
envisioned by the framers of the Charter. 
In response to the prolonged suffering that SC sanctions inflicted on the Iraqi people over the 
13 years from 1990 to 2003 (the SC later tried to alleviate this misery by allowing the 
FRQWURYHUVLDODQGPLVPDQDJHG³RLOIRUIRRGSURJUDPme´, the Council developed the doctrine 
RI³WDUJHWHG´RU³VPDUW´VDQFWLRQVInstead of applying indiscriminate and comprehensive 
economic and trade embargos on a state, with the humanitarian implications this entailed for 
the general population, the idea was to use targeted sanctions against specific commodities, 
products or transactions, and, more importantly, against specific individuals and corporations 
deemed responsible for the wrongful acts. Consequently, the general and comprehensive 
sanctions of the type mandated in Iraq, Haiti and Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995 gave 
ZD\WR³VPDUW´VDQFWLRQV, with a list of individuals, corporations and other non-state actors as 
their targets.  
7KHILUVWRIWKHVH³VPDUW´VDQFWLRQVaccompanied by the establishment of a committee to 
prepare and maintain a list, as well as to monitor the implementation and progress of the 
sanctions regime, was applied in respect of the situation in Sierra Leone under Resolution 
1132 (1997). The most recent one was instituted at the end of 2015, under Resolution 2206, 
and concerns the situation in South Sudan.153 
Structurally, a sanctions committee set up as a result of one of these SC resolutions is 
typically a Council subsidiary with its own staff and resources. Functionally, these 
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 (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 1990-2015): The 2206 Committee. See also: 




FRPPLWWHHVKDYH³OLVW´PDLQWHQDQFHWDVNVLQFOXGLQJOLVting and de-listing), offer technical 
assistance, and monitor the progress of domestic legal implementations, prosecutions and 
general compliance with the sanctions resolutions. Furthermore, subsequent Council 
resolutions that might affect the regime, and additions and modifications to the lists, are 
consolidated in the original committee set up for that state or situation.  
For example, there have been four SC resolutions in respect of Iran in relation to its nuclear 
programme, the first being Resolution 1737 (2006) and the most recent being Resolution 
1929 (2010). However, the sanctions committee set up by the first resolution became the 
consolidating committee for the subsequent resolutions as well. Therefore, the 1737 
Committee, taking its name from, and being set up under, the first resolution, became the 
focal point for the other four related resolutions that end with Resolution 1929 (2010). Its 
latest list has been updated to include individuals, corporations, and goods and transactions 
that are the subjects of sanctions that have been added or modified since the original 1737 
&RPPLWWHH¶V list was released.154 
There are, however, three sanctions committees that are not related to a particular situation or 
state, but instead concentrate on a particular topic and are more general in nature. The most 
notorious of these sanctions regimes is the 1267 Committee, created by Resolution 1267 
(1999), mentioned above, and which relates to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, having been set up 
after the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.155 
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 The two other sanctions resolutions related to Iran were Res. 1747 (2007) and Res. 1803 (2008). See the 
1737 Committee website: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/. 
155
 The other two subject-related and general sanctions committees are the CTC Committee on terrorism, created 
after 9/11, and the 1540 Committee that relates to the proliferation of WMD. Unlike the 1267 Committee, these 
WZRFRPPLWWHHVGRQRWPDLQWDLQD³OLVW´DQGWKHLUSULPDU\IXQFWLRQLVWRRYHUVHHRQa global scale, the national 
implementation of their provisions, providing compliance assistance, as well as monitoring activities. 
Furthermore, in 2011, the Taliban section of the list of the consolidated 1267 Committee was separated out and, 
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When it was introduced in 1999, Resolution 1267 was unprecedented, in that it was not state-
centric, but rather linked to an undefined category of criminal activity: namely, terrorism. 
And, similar to some RIWKH&RXQFLO¶Vother legislative-type resolutions, the compulsory 
language of ³DOO6WDWHVVKDOO´in its operative paragraphs commands the member states to 
implement WKHUHVROXWLRQ¶VSURYLVLRQV in their domestic legal systems and to cooperate fully 
with the resolution-created apparatus²the 1267 Committee.  
Resolution 1267 and the other ³OLVWLQJ´ sanctions-regime resolutions of this type devised by 
the Council are distinguishable from the general and abstract type of SC sanctions 
resolutions, such as Resolutions 1373 and 1540, mentioned in the previous section. The 
former type, in addition to specifying the criminal activity targeted, also supplies a list of 
criminals, whereas the latter type (exemplified by 1373 and 1540) defines only the criminal 
activity and specifies the appropriate minimum measures or sanctions applicable to that 
activity. No list is provided, and the identification of individuals, corporations or other non-
state actors as criminals is left primarily to the states or subsequent SC determination. 
However, in both cases, the Council is, in effect, PDNLQJ³LQVWDQW´LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZand in 
both cases ³DOO6WDWHV´DUHERXQGE\LWVGHFLVLRQVJOREDOO\156²although, in practice, the state-
specific and the listing-type of resolution impacts certain states or regions more than others. 
As far as non-VWDWHDFWRUVDUHFRQFHUQHGKRZHYHUWKHVH³OLVWLQJ´UHJLPHVLQVWDQWO\DQG
                                                 
under Res. 1988 (2011), a separate list and sanctions regime for Afghanistan and the Taliban was created. On 
that same day, the SC also adopted Res. 1989 (2011), formally creating an Al-Qaeda-specific list with tougher 
sanctions. See (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 1990-2015). The reason for splitting the 1267 
Committee and its related list into two was apparently owing to US/NATO and Afghan government policy. The 
idea was to enable the Council to strengthen the Al-Qaeda sanctions while at the same time leaving the door 
open for a more lenient approach to the Taliban in the event of a rapprochement between the Taliban and the US 




Hegemonic International Law Revisited 2003). 
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globally criminalise certain individuals, corporations and NGOs²usually in a list embedded 
in or annexed as part of the sanctions resolution or delegated to a committee to compile.  
Moreover, in addition to the highly questionable legitimacy of the SC acting as prosecutor or 
judge to devise the selection criteria and to criminalise certain individuals or organisations, 
this targeting of individuals and non-state actors is usually performed disregarding the due 
process of law.157 
One of the reasons why the 1267 Committee has become notorious in the international legal 
community and subject to so much scholarly debate, and why its list has been challenged in 
national DQGUHJLRQDOFRXUWVLVWKHUHVROXWLRQ¶Vwide scope, as well as the large number of 
individuals and legal persons it impinges on. In its almost 15 years of existence, the 
Committee has targeted several hundred individuals and over a hundred corporations and 
NGOs as being criminals or potentially engaging in criminal activities. The identified 
individuals are citizens or residents of, or corporations domiciled in, dozens of states around 
the world. The Committee, as of March 2013, still had over 200 individuals and over 100 
corporations and NGOs on its dynamic list. In contrast, one of the later sanctions resolutions, 
Resolution 2048, adopted in 2012, had a relatively small global impact. It created the 2048 
Committee, and lists only 11 individuals, all from Guinea-Bissau.158 
                                                 
157
 See (Jonstone 2008): 295-296; and also (Malone 2008): 128. The importance of following due process, given 
the possibility of the Council making mistakes, is illustrated, for example, by the Madrid train bombing of 2004. 
The bombing killed nearly 200 people, and the SC initially, in its Res. 1530 (2004), wrongly named the Basque 
dissident group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna as the perpetrators. (Boulden 2008): 429-434.  
158
 (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 1990-2015): the 1267 Committee and the 2048 Committee: 




As of December 2015, and pursuant to Resolution 2253 (17 December 2015), the so-called 
³,VODPLF6WDWH´WDUJHWHGOLVWZDVDGGHGWRWKH file of the 1267 Committee, and the new list 
was renamed the ³,6,/'D¶HVKDQG$O-4DLGD6DQFWLRQV/LVW´. As of 5 January 2016, the 
new list contained the names of 243 individuals and 74 corporations and organisations.159 
Numerous criticisms of the 1267 Committee and its sanctions regime have been made: for 
H[DPSOHLWVRSDTXHPHWKRGRI³OLVWLQJ´DQGWKHIDFWWKat the individuals or the entities being 
listed cannot object to such listing²either directly or through a lawyer. In addition, the 
process of providing listed individuals with notice of their listing is slow and cumbersome. 
More significantly, there is no FOHDUDQGFRQFUHWHZD\RI³GH-OLVWLQJ´DQGWKHUHLVQR
appropriate appellate body to provide judicial review.160 Furthermore, Resolution 1624 
(2005) added WKH³LQFLWHPHQWWRFRPPLWDFWVRIWHUURULVP´WRWKHOLVWRIFULPLQDODFWLYLWLHV
under the 1267 CommitWHH¶VFRPSHWHQF\This made it easier to target certain individuals or 
                                                 
159
 On Council Res. 2253 (2015), see: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12168.doc.htm. On the new combined 
1267 ³,6,/'D¶HVKDQG$O-4DLGD6DQFWLRQV/LVW´, see: 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list. Both accessed 5 January 2016. 
160
 %DUULQJD&RXQFLOUHVROXWLRQ³GH-OLVWLQJ´ZDVDOPRVWQRQ-H[LVWHQWLQWKHHDUOLHU\HDUVRIWKHVH³OLVWLQJ´
committees. The criticism from states, NGOs and even the UN Secretariat at the World Summit of 2005 caused 
WKH&RXQFLOWRUHVSRQGWRVRPHH[WHQWZLWKWKHDGRSWLRQRI5HV7KLVUHVROXWLRQFUHDWHGD³IRFDO
SRLQW´IRUUHFHLYLQJGH-listing petitions from three different sources: the SC sanctions regimes, the states, and 
individuals on the list. However, the caveat for individual petitioners is that their appeal must still be handled at 
the intergovernmental level: that is, their case must be accepted by either the state of their birth or the state that 
originally put them on the list. Furthermore, this de-listing petition can only be submitted within 90 days of the 
original listing, and the de-listing would still need to be approved by the sanctions committee members, who are 
selected by the 15-member SC (in other words, it is still subject to veto). See (Martinez 2008): 355; see also 
(Jonstone 2008): 294-296. With regard to making de-listing fairer (either in function or appearance), the Council 
created an Office of the OPEXGVSHUVRQXQGHU5HVDVDQ³LQGHSHQGHQW´ERG\WRUHYLHZWKHGH-
OLVWLQJFDVHVRIWKH&RPPLWWHH,WIXUWKHUH[SDQGHGWKH2PEXGVSHUVRQ¶VPDQGDWHDIWHU5HVDV
UHODWHGWRWKH³$O-4DHGD/LVW´+RZHYHUZKLOHWKH2PEXGVSHUVRQPD\ be independent in his or her 
recommendations to the Committee to de-list an individual or entity, ultimately the Ombudsperson is not 
independent as regards the de-listing itself. If a single SC member objects, the decision will be referred to the 
Council, where a P5 member can then veto the recommendation. (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): 
S/RES/1989 (2011), paragraph 23. See also (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 1990-2015): 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/. Therefore, a permanent member, such as the US or China, which may 
KDYHSODFHGDQLQGLYLGXDORUHQWLW\RQWKH³OLVW´FDQSUHYHQWWKH2PEXGVSHUVRQWKH&RPPLWWHHRUHYHQ the rest 
of the Council members, even if they are in agreement about the matter, from de-listing that individual or entity.  
90 
 
groups²again, without due process of law²since, for example, belonging to a particular 
religious group might be deemed sufficient for someone to be added to the list.161 
Despite the widespread criticism of Resolution 1267²ranging from the objections of states 
and domestic courts, to the ECJ challenging the contents of the list and the implementation of 
WKH&RXQFLO¶VPDQGDWH²the 1267 Committee is still operating. Currently, it has over 350 
individuals and non-state actors on its sanctions and prosecution list.162 The Committee, in 
conjunction with the CTC Committee, continues to monitor, and to provide assistance with, 
the implementation of its regime globally, and in December 2012 the Council extended the 
&RPPLWWHH¶VPDQGDWHE\DQRWKHUPRQWKV163 
As mentioned above, the 1267 Committee is not the only one of its kind. In fact, by the end 
of February 2013, there were 13 such active sanction regimes with ³OLVWLQJV´DQGVWDQGLQJ
committees. Another significant list is the 1737 &RPPLWWHHRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUDFWLYLW\ZLWK
nearly 40 individuals and 80 corporations sanctioned (some of which are multinationals with 
national registrations ranging from Belgium to Malaysia).164  
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 (Jonstone 2008): 296. 
162
 (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 1990-2015): The 1267 Committee: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/; accessed 10 March 2013. 
163
 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/2083 (2012). 
164
 (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 1990-2015); 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/index.shtml.The Taliban list is another long one, maintained by the 1988 
Committee, the sibling of the 1267 Committee. It was created by Res.1988 (2011), when the Council decided to 
break up the consolidated list. The 1988 Committee list, as at the end of February 2013, included over 130 
individuals and entities in its list: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/list.shtml. Both accessed 10 March 
2013. According to my estimate, from 1999 until the end of 2015, based on the 29 listing committees which 
were or are still active, the nXPEHURILQGLYLGXDOVDQGHQWLWLHVZKLFKKDYHEHHQ³WDUJHWHG´E\WKH&RXQFLOKDV
easily surpassed the 1,000 mark: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/un-sc-consolidated-list. Under Res. 
UHODWLQJWRWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUVLWXDWLRQWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VIXQFWLRQVZHUHSURYLGHGFHUWDLQ
conditions were met, due to be terminated, possibly in 2016: 




The combined lists of these 13 current sanctions regimes has the effect of labelling hundreds 
of individuals, business entities and NGOs as international criminals. They face prosecution 
and penalties ranging from immediate travel bans to the immediate freezing of their assets 
and stoppage of their financial transactions. Furthermore, their cases can be referred to 
domestic courts (and, in certain instances, to the ICC) for additional prosecution. 
As to the role of the SC in these targeted sanctions regimes, and regardless of the original 
intent behind them²whether to fight terrorism, or prevent genocide, or stop the proliferation 
of WMD²the effect, from a global governance perspective, has been the same. The Council 
is, with binding effect, criminalising individuals and organisations, and making laws with 
non-state actors as its subjects. This is affecting all member states, and is profoundly 
affecting VWDWHV¶GRPHVWLFOHJDOV\VWHPVDQGWKHLUFLWL]HQV¶ULJKWV 
3.6 7KH&RXQFLO¶V5ROHDV7D[&ROOHFWRUDQG&ODLPV3URFHVVRUthe Case 
of the UN Compensation Commission 
This section considers the role of a SC subsidiary, the United Nations Compensation 
Commission (UNCC), by way of a FDVHVWXG\,WH[DPLQHVWKH&RXQFLO¶VYDU\LQg competency 
and its role in global governance through the adoption of measures that have the same effect 
as the legislation of national governments. I specifically examine the &RXQFLO¶VWRUW
legislation competency, by virtue of which a section of the global population is taxed based 
on certain criteria. After operational and administrative costs have been withheld, the income 
collected is awarded (according to certain compensation criteria) to another section of the 
global population²primarily non-state actors, in this case individuals and corporations. 
The SC created the UNCC after the conflict commonly known as the First Persian Gulf War 
of 1990 to 1991 (not including the Iraq±Iran war, which preceded it). After Saddam 
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+XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPHDQGWKH,UDTLVZHUHGHIHDWHGthe Council created the UNCC under 
Resolution 687 (1991), and then IXUWKHUGHILQHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRPSHWHQF\DQGVFRSHin 
Resolution 692 (1991).165 
However, upon closer examination, it is apparent that the two resolutions that created the 
UNCC and the functions delegated to it did not result in a typical war reparations act. There 
were no winner and loser states at the negotiating table, and there was no peace treaty made 
between Iraq and the other warring states. In fact, since it was a Council-authorised war 
under Chapter VII, Resolution 678 (1990), and based on 81PHPEHUVWDWHV¶delegation of 
war-making powers to the Council (Articles 24, 25 and 42), the belligerents can be regarded 
as a single member state, Iraq, on the one side, and the SC, on behalf of all the member states, 
including Kuwait, on the other. Furthermore, unlike a reparations treaty, a set amount of 
reparations was not agreed in advance, and no direct payments from the losing state (Iraq) 
were to be made to the winning state (Kuwait), the government of which would, typically, 
decide how to distribute the fund domestically.166 
As far as the &RXQFLO¶VFRPSHWHQF\LQWKHVHFDVHV is concerned, according to Article 36 of the 
UN Charter, WKH&RXQFLOLVHPSRZHUHGWRGHFLGHRQ³PHWKRGVRIDGMXVWPHQW´LQFRQIOLFW
situations. However, Article 36 does not define what is meant by ³DGMXVWPHQW´IRUH[DPSOH, 
whether this relates to borders, financial recompense, or to some other type of adjustment) or 
under what circumstances it is applicable. Further, Article 48, under Chapter VII, grants the 
                                                 
165
 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/687 and S/RES/692. See also: 
http://www.uncc.ch/home; and (Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited 2003): 885-886. In December 
2015, the UNCC temporarily suspended collection of the 5 per cent of Iraqi oil income because of the internal 
civil war and the partition of the country by the so-called Islamic State: 
http://www.uncc.ch/sites/default/files/attachments/80%20close.pdf; accessed 21 December 2015. Furthermore, 
some of the award compensation details referred to later in this section seemed to have been blocked and were 







involvement in financial settlements in a conflict situation, including the establishment of the 
Compensation Commission, did not, at first glance, seem outlandish. 
According to the 81&&¶VRIILFLDOZHEVLWHthe Commission was established to settle losses 
arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, dealing with compensation owed not only to the 
government of Kuwait, but also to other governments and international organisations, and 
even to corporations and individuals. Furthermore, in addition to being formally a subsidiary 
of the SC, the Commission seemed to have had a mixed mission, as suggested by the 
following comment from the then UN Secretary-General:167 
The Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties 
appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of 
examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing payments and 
resolving disputed claims; it is only in this last respect that a quasi-judicial function 
may be involved. 
Therefore, the UNCC is claimed to be a political organ and not an arbitration tribunal. Its 
funding was to come from the taxation of Iraqi oil exports. In the 1990s, these were taxed at a 
hefty 30 per cent under WKH³RLO-for-IRRG´SURJUDPme (Resolution 705, 1991). As a result, 
almost one-third of ,UDT¶Voil revenue was diverted from food or medical purchases to be 
allocated to the UNCC. Subsequently, the percentage of oil income withheld was reduced to 
25 per cent, and was then further reduced, after almost a decade, to 5 per cent at the end of 
the Second Gulf War (under Resolution 1483, 2003). 
                                                 
167
 (United Nations Compensation Commission 1991-2013): Introduction, Governing Council, Press Release, 
and Claims web pages; accessed 1 March 2013. The UNCC website does not mention the name of the SG cited. 
+RZHYHUDWWKHWLPHRIWKH81&&¶VFUHDWLRQLQWKH6*ZDVJavier Pérez de Cuéllar, followed, a few 
months later, in January 1992, by SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Council¶V collection of 5 per cent of Iraqi oil revenue has been, as 
of 2014, temporarily suspended, owing to the ³,VODPLF6WDWH´VLWXDWLRQ. However, according 
to the available data for 2013, the latest distribution to claimants was made in January 2013, 
and involved the payment of US$1.3 billion to two unspecified corporate claimants. This 
brings the total distribution of funds up to that date to a staggering US$40.1 billion. Based on 
the last two payments (in July 2012 and January 2013), totalling US$2.6 billion, and made to 
six claimants, the annualised amount was equivalent to ,UDT¶Vthen average monthly income 
of approximately US$216 million per month.168 According to World Bank data from 2011 
EHIRUH³,VODPLF6WDWH´KDGRYHUUXQWKHFRXQWUy), Iraq had a population of 32 million, with a 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of only US$4,640²which, after Yemen, makes Iraq 
the poorest nation in the Middle East. In comparison, Kuwait, the main beneficiary of UNCC 
funds, had, in the same year, a GNI per capita figure of US$48,900. Similarly, in the US²the 
main military force behind both Iraq wars and also a recipient of UNCC disbursements² 
GNI per capita in 2011 was US$48,600. Based on these GNI figures, therefore, average 
Americans or Kuwaitis had more than 10 times (1,000 per cent) more income than their Iraqi 
counterparts. In other words, under the 6&¶Vmanagement and enforcement, the UNCC has, at 
a proportionally high rate, been reallocating funds from a poor country to richer ones, under 
the guise of war damages.169 
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 For the total compensation approved and awarded, see the UNCC site: http://www.uncc.ch/ataglance.htm; 













The UNCC, with its headquarters in Geneva, and approximately 300 employees, is now in its 
third decade of existence. It has sorted its claimants into four general categories: individuals, 
corporations, international organisations, and national governments. Its governing council 
and decisions are controlled by, and reflect, SC membership; therefore, the P5 have a 
permanent presence RQWKH81&&¶VJRYHUQLQJFRXQFLO. However, the P5 have agreed not to 
use their veto privilege in respect RIWKH81&&¶V decisions, including the approval of claims. 
According to its rules of procedure, decisions are based on a majority of 9 of the 15 Council 
PHPEHUV¶IDvourable votes. However, according to UNCC governance records, the 
understanding, and the usual practice at the UNCC, has been for all its decisions to be made 
by consensus, which implies that the P5 have not really forfeited their veto. The sessions are 
³FORVHGWRWKHSXEOLF´DQGQRQ-member states of the SC, including Iraq, have access only to 
the plenary sessions of the UNCC.170 
The proponents of the Council-created UNCC label it a great success. Francis McGovern 
states that the hallmark of the UNCC is its eIILFLHQF\DQG³SUDJPDWLVP´DQGfurther 
comments that: ³E\Ddapting the processes to the claims, rather than vice versa, the UNCC 
KDVEHFRPHDPRGHRIµURXJKMXVWLFH¶WKDWZLOOKDYHORQJODVWLQJSUHFHGHQWLDOLPSDFW´171 The 
UNCC website, which refers to the 1.54 million claims it has processed, declares its 
accomplishment as a first, stating that ³Whe resolution of such a significant number of claims 
                                                 
for US data, see: http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states; and for Iraq data, see: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq All accessed 19 April 2013. 
170
 (United Nations Compensation Commission 1991-2013): http://www.uncc.ch/governin.htm; accessed 26 
July 2013. See also (McGovern 2009) and (Lim 2000). 
171
 (McGovern 2009)0F*RYHUQGHILQHV³URXJKMXVWLFH´DV³WKHSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQIDLUness 
DQGHIILFLHQF\´,QWKH81&&FRQWH[W0F*RYHUQLVLQIDYRXURIefficiency. Ibid: 172. 
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with such a large asserted value over such a short period has no precedent in the history of 
international claims resolution.´172 
Critics of the UNCC primarily view it from the point of view of most Iraqis, who, in the 
space of one generation, have witnessed three major Persian Gulf wars, starting with the 
eight-year Iraq±Iran War in the 1980s, which caused tremendous loss of life and major 
economic destruction on both sides. During this first Persian Gulf war, Iraqis had to live 
XQGHU6DGGDP¶VLOOHJLWLPDWHDQGXQGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQPHQW which had massacred its Shiite 
population and used chemical weapons against its own Kurdish minority, resulting in the loss 
of many Iraqi lives and great economic damage. Then there were the two other devastating 
Gulf wars, in 1990 and 2003, against mostly US and UK armed forces, which also resulted in 
severe loss of life and substantial infrastructural and economic damage to the country. The 
,UDTLV¶hardship was further exacerbated by over a decade of crippling UN sanctions. Despite 
these decades of war, with the Iraqi economy devastated and its infrastructure destroyed, Iraq 
has had to pay²and is still paying²billions of dollars to the UNCC as war damages. These 
retribution payments have now stretched over a quarter of a century, from 1991 to the 
present.  
David Caron calls this Council-created financial obligation placed on ,UDTDQ³RGLRXVGHEW´
and has declared it to be void ab initio.173 Jose $OYDUH]UHPLQGVXVWKDW³WKHLQternational 
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 (United Nations Compensation Commission 1991-2013): http://www.uncc.ch/ataglance.htm; accessed 14 
April 2013. 
173
 (Caron 2004): 139. With regard to odious debt and the repudiation of Iraqi debt accumulated under Saddam 
Hussein (as suggested by Caron), Wade Mansell and Karen Openshaw remind us that no state has so far been 
able to use the odious debt argument successfully to entirely disclaim its debts. Odious debt, basically defined as 
DVRYHUHLJQGHEWEHLQJDFTXLUHGZLWKRXWWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VFRQVHQWDQGQRWIRULWVEHQHILWDQGZLWKWKHFUHGLWRU
aware of these facts when advancing the loan proceeds, does clearly apply to the Iraqi debts accumulated during 
the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein, who mostly used them to fund his army and various wars. However, 




community has resisted the idea that states (as such) or peoples (as collective) are capable of 
FRPPLWWLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV´,QSDUWLFXODUKHFLWHVWKHfact that the ILC debated and 
XOWLPDWHO\UHMHFWHGDSURYLVLRQRQ³VWDWHFULPHV´DVSDUt of its codification of rules governing 
state responsibility.174  
A further issue with regard to the 6&¶Vnorms of conduct in this type of situation relates to the 
&RXQFLO¶VORJLFDQGPRWLYHVin not establishing similar compensation commissions in respect 
of other conflicts during the same era. For example, only two years before the First Gulf War, 
the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran (in which Saddam Hussein had used chemical 
weapons, and was generally considered to be the aggressor) had come to an end. With 
hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, Iran alone had claimed US$150 billion in 
Iraqi-inflicted war damages.175 Similarly, in the same year as the First Gulf War, war broke 
out in the former Yugoslavia, causing the SC, acting under its Chapter VII powers, to 
intervene with sanctions and other measures. It was estimated that, in the Bosnia region of the 
conflict alone, war damages attributed to the aggressor state of Serbia amounted to 
approximately US$50 billion.176 
Neither of these wars, nor any other conflict during this period in which the SC intervened, or 
adopted resolutions in relation to, prompted the Council to set up compensation commissions 
for the purpose of collecting, administering and distributing war damages. Nor did the 
                                                 
repudiate but to consider the loans as voidable rather than void ab initio. (Mansell and Openshaw, Suturing the 
Open Veins of Ecuador: Debt, Default and Democracy 2009): 150, 161-164, 167, 184-185. 
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financial compensation for victims of those other wars.  
Yet another criticism of the UNCC is the fact that it is the sole entity empowered to decide²
without any appellate process or judicial review²which individuals, corporations and 
governments qualify as legitimate claimants and how much they should each receive in 
financial settlement. Given this concentration of power, and the fact that it appears to be a 
self-contained regime, how has the UNCC fared, and what impact have its decisions had on 
those subject to its authority? 177  
Table 1 below sets out the results of a quantitative analysis, based on information taken from 
UNCC posted records as at 24 January 2013, on the distribution of funds between state and 
non-state actors. It leads to a revealing observation: the primary beneficiaries of this SC 
organisation are overwhelmingly²both in terms of numbers and total amounts received²not 
sovereign states but non-state actors. Furthermore, within this non-state category, the gap 
between, on the one hand, the several dozen corporations that have received large 
compensation for war damages and, on the other, the hundreds of thousands of individuals 
who sustained injuries, or lost family members, or suffered economic damage seems to be 
greatly out of proportion.   
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 In spite of the fact that the UNCC is controlled by the membership of the SC and their appointees, it seems to 
be behaving as a self-contained regime in Geneva, and its decisions are usually final. However, on occasions, it 
seems that its parent, the SC in New York, has acted as an appellate body. One example involved the proposed 
distribution of approximately US$16 billion to two governments, a debate that resulted in a deadlock in Geneva 
for over 90 days in 2000. The case was then referred to New York, where the Council, this time with more 
muscle from the P5 (who, as in Geneva, enjoy a privileged position vis-à-vis the other members), ultimately 




UNCC Claims and Payments * 
(As of 24 January 2013. Since 2014, the payment of claims EHFDXVHRIWKH³,6,6´VLWXDWLRQ
have been temporarily suspended) 
 
















10,343 3,348,902,861 3,347,980,604 0 
Individuals±all 
others categories 
 (A, B, C) 
1,528,886 8,348,843,912 8,308,631,151 0 
Corporations±oil 
companies 
 (Cat. E1) 
67 21,522,047,546 9,175,022,476 12,339,324,488 
Corporations±all 
others categories 
(E2, E3, E4, E/F) 
 
4,038 5,086,789,174 5,085,977,124      1,841,509 
Governments and 
IOs categories 
(F1, F2, F3, F4) 
285 14,076,773,222 14,074,817,116 0 
Total 1,543,619 52,383,356,715 39,992,428,471 12,341,165,997 
 
x Source: UNCC website178 
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 The data in this table are mainly extUDFWHGIURPWKH³VWDWXV´SDJHhttp://www.uncc.ch/status.htm and the 
YDULRXVSDJHVLQWKH³FODLPV´VHFWLRQRIWKH81&&ZHEVLWHaccessed 3 March 2013. See (United Nations 
Compensation Commission 1991-2013). It should be noted that, based on a UNCC governing council decision 
in 2014 (renewed in 2015), the UNCC had temporarily suspended collection of the 5 per cent tax on Iraqi oil 
income because of the internal civil war and the partition of the country by the so-called ³Islamic 6WDWH´
http://www.uncc.ch/sites/default/files/attachments/80%20close.pdf. Further, some of the award compensation 
details referenced in this Table and section, available in 2013, seem to have been removed since then, and are no 
longer accessible on the official site. Last accessed 21 December 2015. 
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Table 1 Notes: 
x Based on the above data, in terms of average claims awarded per instance, it seems 
that the lowest sums were paid to the 1.5 million individuals (Categories A, B, and C) 
who received US$5,460 per person. The highest average recipients were the oil 
companies, with the 67 oil companies receiving over US$21 billion, or an average of 
US$321 million per corporation. 
 
x Of the almost 1.5 million individual applicants, 31,868 of them were related to the 
.XZDLWL³%HGRXLQV´, receiving a fixed amount of US$2,500 per person. 
 
x Of the Category D claimants (individuals claiming US$100,000 or more), by far the 
number one ranked were the Kuwaitis (approximately 50 per cent of claims). 
However, ranked numbers 4 and 5 in in this category were the citizens of the P5 UK 
and US, with 383 and 317 claims respectively. 
 
x In the LQGLYLGXDOV¶ categories, the highest number of citizens filing claims from a 
single P5 state, in Category A, were from China, with 10,198 claims.  
 
x Despite the fact that neither Iraq nor Kuwait had diplomatic relations with Israel at the 
relevant time, there were 102 LQGLYLGXDOV¶ claims in Category B from Israel. 
 
x There were 43 member states¶ governments and six international organisations that 
applied through Category F (F1-F4). 
 
x Category E/F, relating WR³H[SRUWJXDUDQWHHV´KDGDWRWDODZDUGRIUS$311,000. In 
this table that figure has been DGGHGWRWKH³&RUSRUDWLRQ-all oWKHUV´FDWHJRU\ 
 
x An individual, corporate, or state applicant was able to file multiple claims in 
different but related categories. 
 
x The figure in the ³2XWVWDQGLQJDZDUGDPRXQWV´ column may not match a simple 
deduction of the ³1HW&RPSHQVDWLRQ3DLG´FROXPQILJXUHIURPWKH³$ZDUGHG´
column figure. This may be because of sums that remain unclaimed, or the subsequent 





Turning from the question of whether the UNCC should ever have been allocated the task of 
collecting revenue from Iraq and distributing it to others, and whether in fact this work should 
have been entrusted to a court or tribunal, I now resume P\FULWLFDOH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKH6&¶V
role in global governance. 
It appears that, regardless of WKHSROLWLFVWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGWKHHIILFDF\RIWKH81&&¶VIXQGV
collection and distribution process²and whether this LVGHOLYHULQJMXVWLFH³URXJKMXVWLFH´RU
no justice at all²one point is clear: the 15-member SC, with the collective will of the P5, has 
created a global legislative act. A 5 per cent oil tax has been levied on the income of a section 
of the global population²namely, the Iraqi people²as a result of its dictatorial 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VZDURQ.XZDLW7KHELOOLRQVRIGROODUVJHQHUDWHGKDYHEHHQGLVWULEXWHGWR
hundreds of thousands of people, hundreds of corporations, and dozens of member-state 
governments, as well as paying the overheads and the administrative costs of the organisation 
set up to carry out this distribution. 
To draw a parallel with domestic models of governance, it is useful to examine a US Act of 
Congress adopted at about the same time as the establishment of the UNCC. This was the 
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) of 1990, which created a compensation 
commission that awarded US$1.1 billion to approximately 25,000 applicants. These 
applicants, the residents of designated US states, were exposed to nuclear radiation during 
nuclear testing at the time of the Cold War. In another compensation case, 10 years later, in 
2002, the US Congress created the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, which 
distributed US$7 billion to 7,403 claimants. 179 
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 Both these US Congressional Acts delegated the work of handling and awarding these claims to the US 
Department of Justice (DOJ), with the DOJ incorporating some schemes of judicial review in its claims 
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Adopting the global governance lens, it seems that, in the case of tort compensation, the SC 
has been able to act, in the global realm, in a manner similar to the US Congress and other 
national legislatures. SC Resolutions 687 and 692, of 1991, in effect created global legislation 
under Chapter VII, which remains in existence after more than two decades, and is still 
creating obligations, as well as conferring privileges on member states, and benefiting 
individuals, corporations and other non-state actors.  
3.7 Conclusion: SC Acting Ultra Vires or Constitutional Deficiency? 
Before determining whether the 6&¶Vlegislative role is intra vires or ultra vires, it is 
necessary to elaborate briefly on whether a more appropriate term for the type of Council 
actions examined in this Chapter is quasi-legislation rather than legislation²the term I have 
chosen to use. 
But first, what is the definition of international or global legislation? Having found it difficult 
to find one in the scholarship, I offer the following definition: 
Global legislation is the act or process of making and enacting laws globally, by a 
global authority, regulating the activities of, and otherwise affecting globally, 
persons, corporations, non-governmental organisations, and other legal persons, to 
be implemented by one, more than one, or all states through their domestic legal and 
legislative processes, nationally and universally. 
 Although a formal definition of global legislation has little in the way of precedent, and is 
not commonly encountered, the use of the term global or international legislation has 
                                                 
processing. For further information on these compensation programmes, visit the websites of the US Congress 
and the DOJ. In regard to RECA (42 U.S.C. 2210, adopted on 5 October 1990), see (Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Act (RECA) 1990-2013). On the 9/11 compensation, see (The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund (VCF) 2001-2013). See also (McGovern 2009): 190-191. 
103 
 
become, LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH&RXQFLO¶VJHQHUDODQGDEVWUDFWGHFLVLRQV since Resolution 1373 
on terrorism in 2001, increasingly common. 
Talmon points out that, in the public international law literature, the term has been used for 
some time now, mostly in relation to treaty lawmaking, as well as the lawmaking of 
international organisations. For example, Krzysztof Skubiszewski uses the term in 
International Legislation, in 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1255 (Rudolf 
Bernhardt ed. 1995). Talmon also cites a list of other commentators using the term, some of 
which I have also referenced in this chapter. 180 
The important political development at the global governance level was when the member 
states themselves observed this new phenomenon and started using the term international or 
global legislation in their discourse. In fact, the SC President, Gunter Pleuger of Germany, in 
his press conference of 2 April 2004 on the draft of Resolution 1540, asked the member states 
to study the document FDUHIXOO\³EHFDXVHWKHGUDIWZRXOGDVN0HPEHU6WDWHVWRGHYHORSDORW
RIQHZOHJLVODWLRQ´. He further said that it would EH³WKHILUVWPDMRUVWHSWRZDUGVKDYLQJWKH
6HFXULW\&RXQFLOOHJLVODWHIRUWKHUHVWRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶PHPEHUVKLS´.181 
In the public discussion that followed on the draft of the ³DEVWUDFW´Resolution 1540 on WMD 
non-proliferation, some non-SC members were invited to express their views, and a 
significant number of sWDWHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VXEVWDQWLYHDUJXPHQWFHQWHUHGRQWKHGUDIW
rHVROXWLRQ¶Vlegislative effect. Those favouring the resolution included 6SDLQ¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
who H[SUHVVHGKLVYLHZWKDW³since the Council is legislating for the entire international 
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 (Talmon 2005): 176. 
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3KLOLSSLQHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHMr. Baja, made the same observation, calling for a wider 
participation of member states, other than just the SC members themselves, in the vote on the 
resolution:183 
Those who are bound should be heard. This is an essential element of a transparent 
and democratic process, and is best to proceed on a resolution that demands 
legislative actions and executive measures from the 191 Members of the United 
Nations.  
Meanwhile, other states, while not being opposed to the resolution in its intent and principle, 
were concerned about the increase in the frequency of this type of legislative measure on the 
part of the Council. For example, Mr. Nambiar of India expressed KLVFRXQWU\¶Vconcern over 
³the increasing tendency of the Council in relatively recent years to assume new and wider 
powers of legislation on behalf of the international community, with its resolutions binding 
on all States.´184  
,QIDFWPRVWRIWKHVXEVWDQWLYHSDUWRIWKHGHEDWHDWWKH³SXEOLF´PHHWLQJZDVconcerned not 
with whether the SC, by introducing resolution 1540, was acting ultra vires, but rather with 
the high impact and the many ramifications that this type of Council law-making has on both 
domestic laws and existing treaties. For example, both Iran and New Zealand, fully aware of 
the instant legislative and universally binding character of the measures proposed by the 
Council, and precisely in recognition of these characteristics, formed two opposing views of 
the resolution.  
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 (Security Council Report 2013): S/PV.4950: 7. 
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Iran was concerned that this resolution might introduce, almost immediately, a new non-
proliferation law and regime. Iran was also worried about how this Council legislation would 
LQWHUDFWRURYHUODSZLWKWKHH[LVWLQJ:0'WUHDWLHV)RUWKHVHUHDVRQV,UDQ¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYH
Mr. Danesh-Yazdi, was opposed to the proposed new regime, pointing to the deficiency of 
the proposed resolution LQQRWDGGUHVVLQJ³WKHOLQNDJHEHWZHHQQRQ-proliferation and 
GLVDUPDPHQW´185 
In contrast, the view of New Zealand, as represented by Mr. MacKay, was that, by means of 
this resolution, a fast-tracked and universal treaty was being introduced, and, precisely for 
those reasons, his country was in favour of the resolution, so that it could serve as a quick 
³VWRSJDSPHDVXUH´Mr. MacKay further commented:186 
[W]e place importance on the fact that the draft resolution would also impose 
restraints on those States that have deliberately chosen to stand outside the major 
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties to which most States, including my own, 
have committed themselves. This is a major gap that the draft resolution can begin to 
fill. 
Consequently, following the open meeting with the non-members, when the Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 four days later, it was unequivocal to the member 
states that global legislation had been enacted. 
3.7.1 Is the SC Acting Ultra Vires? 
Those arguing that the adjudicative and legislative functions of the SC exhibited in the last 
two decades are ultra vires primarily base their argument on the purposes and the principles 
of the UN, and the fact that Article 1(1) of the UN Charter requires the actions of the UN to 
EH³LQFRQIRUPLW\ZLWKWKHSULQFLSOHVRIMXVWLFHDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´ They also point to 
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Chapter V, Articles 24 to 26 of the Charter, defining the scope and powers of the SC, as 
further limiting the powers of the Council. 187 
More specifically, the ultra vires FDPSDUJXHVWKDWWKH&RXQFLO¶VPLVVLRQLVGHILQHGLQ$UWLFOH
ZKLFKVWDWHVWKDWWKH³the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations´DQGIXUWKHUWKDW³>W@he specific powers granted to the 
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, 
and XII´7KXVWKH\contend that the powers of the Council are regulated and that its primary 
PLVVLRQLVWKH³PDLQWHQDQFHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOpeace and security´188 They believe that this 
implies a ³global SROLFLQJ´and executive function, not a judicial or legislative one.  
Nigel White and Robert Cryer argue that the SC, in respect of some of its adjudicative 
functions, such as the ICC deferral cases, was acting ultra vires.189 With regard to the 
legislative issue, Matthew Happold, in reference to Resolution 1373, points to the fact that 
WKHUHVROXWLRQZDVRID³JHQHUDO´QDWXUHDQG³DEVWUDFW´DQGDUJXHVWKDW³WKH&RXQFLOFDQRQO\
H[HUFLVHLWV&KDSWHU9,,SRZHUVLQUHVSRQVHWRVSHFLILFVLWXDWLRQVRUFRQGXFW´7KHUHIRUHLQ
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 Chapters I, V-VIII, and XII, and Articles 1, and 24-26, of the Charter, (Charter of the United Nations, 1945-
2015)6HHDOVR-XGJH:HHUDPDQWU\¶VGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQLQWKHLockerbie case: 
But does this mean that the Security Council discharges its variegated functions free of all limitations, 
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the peoples of the United Nations to establish conditions under which respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. Article 1 (1) sets out as 
one of the Purposes of the United Nations that it is "to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". [Emphasis added] 
(Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident 
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 1992), ICJ Reports 1992, Request for the 
indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, at 61: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/89/7229.pdf. 
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 Ibid. See also (Martínez 2008): 344. 
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 This commentary was related to Res. 1422 (2002), the ICC deferral decision (White and Cryer 2009): 469. 
See also (Condorelli and Villapando 2002): 647. 
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adopting Resolution 1373, the Council acted ultra vires. Furthermore, Happold argues that 
this type of resROXWLRQZDVXQSUHFHGHQWHGDQGXQOLNHWKH&RXQFLO¶VSDVWSUDFWLFHVDQG
customs.190 
Yet others, in spite of their concerns about the Council adopting the role of international 
legislator, and the implications and effects of this, argue that the Council is, in fact, acting 
intra vires. These scholars primarily point to the wide-ranging, general and unspecified 
powers granted to the SC by the Charter in furtherance of its mission of maintaining 
³international SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´ 
Ian Johnstone, for example, ³IURPDVWULFWO\OHJDOSHUVSHFWLYH´while acknowledging that the 
SC LVSULPDULO\DQ³H[HFXWLYHERG\´, ZLWKWKHSULQFLSDOIXQFWLRQRI³FULVLVPDQDJHPHQW´
nevertheless, by referring to Chapter V, Articles 24 and 25, and Chapter VII, believes that 
³QRHYLGHQWOegal rule prohibits [the SC] from acting in a legislative or quasi-judicial 
PDQQHU´191  
Another argument that the Council is acting intra vires is the fact that all UN member states, 
in Article 24(1), have delegated their rights to the SC so that the Council can fulfil its peace 
DQGVHFXULW\GXWLHVDQGKDYHDJUHHGWKDW³WKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLODFWVRQWKHLUEHKDOI´
Furthermore, the Council¶V decisions are binding on member states, since, under Article 25, 
all the sWDWHV³DJUHHWRDFFHSWDQGFDUU\RXWWKHGHFLsions RIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO´ 
The fact that Council decisions are obligatory and binding on all states, or sometimes only on 
some states, is based on the SC¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQ7KLVH[FOXVLYH&RXQFLOFRPSHWHQF\ for 
deciding measures for non-P5 states is reinforced in Article 48(1) of Chapter VII, which 
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 (Jonstone 2008): 299. On states conferring powers on the SC, see also (Sarooshi 2007): 21-25 and 59. 
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states WKDW³>W@KHaction required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the 
United Nations or by some of them as the Security Council may determine.´192 
Moreover, Paul Szasz cites Article 2(6) of the Charter, which states: ³The Organization shall 
ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these 
Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security´7KLVLPSOLHVWKDWHYHQVWDWHVQRWIRUPDOO\DGPLWWHGWRWKH81PXVWconform to its 
wishes, and therefore points to the universality of the SC¶V Chapter VII decisions.193  
7KH&RXQFLO¶s authority to act as the ZRUOG¶Vpoliceman, taking military action if necessary, 
has been well known since 1945. However, what non-military measures are DWWKH&RXQFLO¶V
disposal, and what are its other competencies? 
In fact, the Council can avail itself of a wide range of options. Article 41 of Chapter VII lists 
a number of measures available to the Council short of military action, including economic 
ones. However, more generally, and more powerfully, the article provides WKDWWKH³Security 
Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed 
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures.´194 Does this imply that the SC can take whatever measure it deems 
necessary? 
To summarise, SC decisions are binding and apply globally. They do not need to involve 
military action. And, in the case of non-military decisions, in any situation under Chapter VII, 
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encompassing any measures that the Council deems appropriate.  
One question still remains. During peacetime, and in cases of non-military aggression, what 
constitutes a ³WKUHDWWRWKHSHDFH´triggering, under Article 39, the CoXQFLO¶VQRQ-military 
(and possibly legislative) measures?  
Stefan Talmon has analysed this question. He concludes that the Council, at least over the 
past two decades, has interpreted Article 39 of the Charter in relation to a ³WKUHDWWRWKH
SHDFH´as extending to ³QRQ-PLOLWDU\VRXUFHV´DVZHOODVDUPHGFRQIOLFWVConsequently, 
economic threats, humanitarian and human rights violations, international terrorism, threats 
to the environment, health pandemics and WMD proliferation can all be interpreted as a 
³WKUHDWWRWKHSHDFH´195 
In fact, in the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, the Court addressed the same issue. 
The Court interpreted Article 39 in essentially a political way, stating that ³WKHµWKUHDWWRWKH
SHDFH¶[was] PRUHRIDSROLWLFDOFRQFHSW´With judicial support for this political 
interpretation of the article, the Council has a great deal of leeway in determining what 
constitutes a ³WKUHDW´LQ³international SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´VLWXDWLRQV196  Furthermore, the 
&RXQFLO¶VDELOLW\WRdetermine the scope of its competency in lawmaking (which has a 
binding effect) was confirmed as early as 1971, in the ,&-¶V Namibia Advisory Opinion. The 
SC KDGGHFODUHG6RXWK$IULFD¶VRFFXSDWLRQRI1DPLELD³LOOHJDO´, and had asked all states to 
recognise this fact. In its advisory opinion, in which, in essence, the ICJ was examining the 
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 (Talmon 2005): 175-193. 
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 Ibid: 180-181. See also Tadic (PROSECUTOR V. DUSKO TADIC a/k/a "DULE", Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 1995): paragraph 29. 
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³OHJDOFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUsWDWHV´ of the South African occupation, the Court referred to the 
SC¶VGHFLVLRQVDQGGHWHUPLQDWLRQV²albeit in general terms²DV³REOLJDWLRQ>V@´IRUDOOstates 
DQG³ELQGLQJ´197 
3.7.2 Constitutional Deficit 
Throughout these last two chapters, the focus has been on the global governance role of the 
SC, or rather its (unplanned) global government role. It has been seen that this role 
encompasses adjudicative and court-making functions; legislative functions (commanding 
WKDW³DOO6WDWHVVKDOO´ comply with SC decisions); criminalising functions (targeting certain 
individuals for prosecution in domestic legal systems); and even acting as a global treasurer 
and administrator in respect of Iraq, collecting and distributing funds by way of 
compensation. All these functions would seem to be legally permissible, given the 6&¶Vwide 
competency in maintaining ³international SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´HPEHGGHGLQ Chapters I, V, VI 
and VII of the Charter, and hence to be intra vires. This is further reinforced by WKH&RXQFLO¶V
RZQEURDG³DXWR-LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´RIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWcan trigger its intervention to 
maintain ³international peace anGVHFXULW\´Moreover, the Council is the source of its own 
legal powers to decide and implement whatever means and measures necessary, even of an 
adjudicative and general legislative nature, to ensure peace and maintain security. This all 
makes the SC the only truly global actor with the potential for universal lawmaking.  
                                                 
197
 (Boyle and Chinkin 2007): 110. See also (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 1971): 1971 
ICJ Reports 16. Paragraph 3 of the Namibia Advisory Opinion specifically commands non-member states, as 
ZHOODVPHPEHUVWDWHVWRIROORZWKH&RXQFLO¶VGHFLVLRQhttp://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/53/5597.pdf .  
$PRUHUHFHQW,&-DGYLVRU\RSLQLRQWKDWDOVRFUHDWHVREOLJDWLRQVIRU³DOOVWDWHV´LVLegal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004. See: http://www.icj-





However, the real question regarding these types of SC decisions is not whether the Council 
is acting intra or ultra vires, or whether right or wrong decisions are being made²for 
example, whether the individuals listed by the 1260 Committee really are criminals; or 
whether the continuing compensation awarded to multinational corporations by the UNCC is 
greatly disproportional to that which has been paid to individual victims of the Iraq±Kuwait 
war of over two decades ago; or whether the staggering amount of funds and the accelerated 
means by which they were collected from the Iraqis (nearly a quarter of whom live below the 
poverty line and were themselves victims of war) is fair.198 But rather, the narrower and the 
legally more pertinent question is the legitimacy of the Council acting as a quasi-global 
government, combining powers of legislative, judicial and executive roles. A further 
important issue is the applicability of the rule of law to the &RXQFLO¶VGHFLVLRQV 
From the global governance and the global government perspective discussed in Chapter 1, 
there are five fundamental problems with the SC acting as a world legislator and adjudicator, 
stemming from its democratic and constitutional deficit. 
The first two problems are internal, arising from the 81¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGconstitutional 
framework. The other three are external, and reflect the impact of Council decisions on 
GRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZVDVZHOODVRQLQGLYLGXDOV¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\DFNnowledged 
fundamental rights.  
                                                 
198According to 2013 World Bank reports, 22.9 per cent of the Iraqi population was living below the national 
poverty line (according to the last available data, for 2007). See: http://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq; 
accessed 8 August 2013. During the sanction years, it is likely that this figure was substantially higher. 
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First, there is the question of the SC¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGLWVGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLWSince the San 
Francisco Conference of 1945, the Council has been notorious for being under-representative 
and undemocratic. Consequently, it has been the subject of many UN reform debates.199  
In terms of the number of states, the SC is under-representative, since, at any given time, 15 
of the 193 member states, or less than 8 per cent of the current membership of the UN, are 
represented on the Council. The SC is also under-representative in terms of world population. 
Notwithstanding the population of P5 member China, unless the elected 10 members of the 
Council are the 10 most populous nations, or those nations are given permanent seats, 
demographically the Council will always represent less than 50 per cent of the global 
population.200 
In fact, the P5 plus the current 10 non-permanent members comprising the SC in 2013 
represented less than one-third of the global population.201 This under-representation, both in 
WHUPVRIWKHZRUOG¶VSopulation and the number of states, coupled with the voting privileges 
and the permanent seats granted to the P5, causes a severe democratic deficiency. This in turn 
raises the question of legitimacy for the ZRUOG¶Vmost powerful organ, which has the potential 
to act, and has acted before, as a quasi-world government. 
Second, the SC lacks separation of powers. The Council is the only UN organ with 
enforcement powers. In fact, under Chapter VII, the Council can enforce its decisions not 
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 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIVWDWHVFKDOOHQJLQJWKH6&¶VGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLWHYHQZKHQWKH&KDUWHUZDVEHLQJGUDZQ
up, see Chapter 4. 
200According to my calculations, based on available world population statistics for 2012, only when the 10 most 
populous states in the world (including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Japan) are elected 
PHPEHUVRIWKH6&RQO\WKHQZRXOGWKH&RXQFLOUHSUHVHQWDSSUR[LPDWHO\SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQ
See: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats8.htm. See also the UN population statistics available at: 
http://esa.un.org/wpp/. Both accessed 15 March 2013. 
201
 The 10 non-permanent members of the SC, in 2013, were: Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Guatemala, 
Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Rwanda and Togo. See: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/; accessed 1 August 2013. 
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only by military means but also through economic and other non-military measures. This 
ODWWHUHQIRUFHPHQWPHFKDQLVPLVWKHSULPDU\VRXUFHRIWKH&RXQFLO¶VOHJLVODWLYHDQG
lawmaking competency, including global court-making and prosecution competency. In 
addition, by setting up subsidiaries (such as international criminal courts and tribunals, the 
UNCC, and the sanctions regimes and committees), the SC has shown that it possesses great 
executive and administrative leeway, as well as the authority to unleash military firepower 
enabling motivated or hegemonic member states to enter into a legal war. This makes the SC 
a self-contained regime, with tremendous global concentration of powers, and, in effect, a 
quasi-world government. The institutional design of the Council is in fact reminiscent of the 
classical violation of the separation of powers feared by constitutional lawyers: the dreaded 
phenomenon of the lawmaker, policeman, judge and executioner being one and the same. 
This concentration of power is avoided in all democratic-state governments and constitutions, 
and is the fundamental principle and premise of the rule of law. 
Third, the SC¶VODZPDNLQJLPSLQJHVRQGRPHVWLFOHJDOV\VWHPV,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRIthe 
Council¶V legislative Resolutions 1373 and 1540 has had a wide impact on the domestic legal 
systems of states. It requires changes to their domestic legislation and penal codes, court 
systems, and the process and administration of law enforcement. Furthermore, the impact on 
various laws is not limited to domestic criminal legislation. It also includes, among other 
areas, commercial laws concerned with export, re-export, warehousing, inspection, and 
shipment rules, as well as immigration laws, visa rules, and border controls. Its domino effect 
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extends even to the various regulatory agencies, such as those overseeing banking rules and 
financial institutions.202 
Fourth, SC lawmaking may impinge upon and short-circuit existing international law and 
treaties.  
For example, Resolution 1373 had an immediate impact on the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.203 This Convention had been adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1999, and was opened for signature a year later, but was failing to 
attract many national endorsements. However, with Resolution ¶V exhortation to adopt 
the Convention, in just a few months its adoption was fast-tracked, and it was in force by 
April 2002, six months after Resolution 1373 was passed. Unfortunately, neither the 
&RQYHQWLRQQRUWKHUHVROXWLRQKDGFODULILHGDQGGHILQHG³LQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUURULVP´,QHIIHFW
Resolution 1373 had globally criminalisHG³WHUURULVP´ZLWKRXWGHILQLQJLW, thus legitimising 
prosecution of essentially undefined criminal acts.204 This bypassed previous attempts at the 
global level to agree on a definition of terrorism, and led to some state governments, when 
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 In implementing the resolution, some states bypassed their domestic legal procedures, which normally 
provide for greater scrutiny of proposed legislation, and so undermined their own legal systems and 
constitutions. There were even some governments that, during the domestic implementation phase, went beyond 
WKH&RXQFLO¶VPDQGDWHXVLQJWKHUHVROXWLRQDVDSUHWH[WWRGHQRXQFHWKHLUSROLWLFDORSSRQHQWVDVterrorists. Some 
H[DPSOHVRIWKHVWDWHV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHUHVROXWLRQDQGLWV manipulation for political purposes, or its 
impediment of the domestic legal process, occurred in France, Ethiopia, Romania, Russia and Thailand. 
(Scheppele 2011): 8-11. 
203
 UN Treaty Collection: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
11&chapter=18&lang=en; accessed 1 Aug 2013. 
204
 In fact, three years after the adoption of Res. 1373, in Res. 1566 (2004), the Council attempted to associate 
terrorism with some specific types of criminal activity, mentioned in paragraph 3 of the resolution. However, 
viewing paragraph 3 of Res. 1566 as an authoritative definition by the Council of international terrorism has a 
ramification. It indicates that the SC has bypassed the terrorism conventions and treaties, and has legally enacted 
its own definition of international criminal acts without the usual consent of states, as required in international 
law as currently perceived. (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/1566 (2004). 
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implementing the &RXQFLO¶Vhasty decision²and under its cover²to manipulate its intent 
and abuse their political opposition by labelling them terrorists.205 
As far as existing international law and treaties are concerned, Resolution 1540 also created a 
conflict of norms, as well as possible administrative confusion, overlap and redundancy in 
respect of the existing WMD treaties. These treaties include: the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, and 
on their Destruction (CWC); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction (BWC); and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In 
effect, Resolution 1540 bypassed and possibly undermined these existing WMD regimes.206 
Fifth, SC laws impinge upon fundamental rights, often incorporated into the constitutions or 
the legal systems of member states. The SC laws derogate from, and possibly undermine, 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶fundamental rights. One area in which WKH&RXQFLO¶VOHJLVOative and other 
decisions, as they relate to individuals, have the potential to result in domestic-law 
derogations is in WKH³OLVWLQJ´process, which disregards the due process of law. Another 
example is the case of the UNCC, which is essentially issuing tort judgments, without any 
mechanism for judicial review, or even an appeal process. And this is in spite of the fact that 
the UN system and the SC, as its most powerful organ, should²according to the 81¶VRZQ
principles, enshrined in its Charter and in various GA resolutions and proclamations²be the 
                                                 
205
 For example, among others, the governments of Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand and Yemen implemented 
Res. 1373 in their domestic laws in ways which were more aimed at eliminating political opposition rather than 
eliminating international terrorism. See (Scheppele 2011): 8-13. 
206
 In fact, in the public SC session prior to the adoption of Res. 1540, many states were fully aware of the 
possible impact or the modifying effects of the resolution on the existing WMD treaties. These states included 
Iran and New Zealand, which presented arguments mentioned earlier in this chapter. For statements by other 
states, indicating their full awareness of this fact²including Algeria, Brazil, Pakistan, Syria and the UK²see 
WKH&RXQFLO¶Vpublic report (Security Council Report 2013): S/PV.4950 (2004). 
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guardians of these rights. However, the Council¶VOHJLVODWLYHDQGother decisions directly 
affecting fundamental rights mostly crisscross domestic laws, international treaties, and the 
81¶VRZQVWDWXWHVDQG81-sponsored conventions, often violating rather than protecting 
them. 
By criminalising certain individuals: for example, by publishing a list of perpetrators and 
expecting all sWDWHV¶GRPHVWLFOHJDOV\VWHPVWRIUHH]HWKRVHLQGLYLGXDOV¶DVVHWVWREDQWKHm 
from travelling, and to send them for prosecution simultaneously violates a number of those 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶universally accepted human rights. These include the right to property, 
economics rights, freedom of movement rights, and, procedurally, the right to judicial review 
and due process of law.  
In the case of the existing multiple SC sanctions committees and regimes, those listed 
individuals, corporations, or NGOs being targeted by the Council have been denied the right 
of representation and counsel. Only a state can intervene on their behalf, and, even then, the 
15-member SC is ultimately the only organ that can remove them from the list. Moreover, if 
the alleged criminal is listed by a P5 member, which has the power to veto any Council 
decision unilaterally and without its consent, then that individual is already condemned 
without a hearing.207 
As a result, innocent individuals, not trusting the CouncLO¶VDGMXGLFDWLve process, and afraid to 
give themselves up because of inadequacies in the protection of basic and procedural rights, 
can find themselves in the position of being a perpetual criminal suspect. If, for example, a 
list of criminals is embedded in a Council resolution, and a discrepancy is brought to light as 
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 Of the 13 SC listing committees in existence at the end of 2013, only one has some formal de-listing process, 
with an Office of Ombudsperson. See Section 3.5 above.  
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a result of subsequent investigation (similar to the case in Sudan, where the actual 
investigations and findings of the ICC produced a somewhat different list of indictees), there 
is no due process or procedure by which those individuals initially included on the Council¶V 
list can be removed. This casting-in-stone effect can only be reversed by a subsequent SC 
resolution, which a permanent member can, of course, veto, thereby permanently keeping the 
individual on the accused list, with all the restrictions on his or her rights that this entails.208 
Council decisions affecting individuals and non-state actors are not limited to criminal 
activities but also extend to civil ones. The unprecedented case in which Council decisions 
KDYHGLUHFWO\LPSDFWHGSHRSOHV¶FLYLODQGfundamental rights is that of Iraq, with 35 million 
Iraqis affected. After three devastating wars and years of economic sanctions, with the Iraqi 
population¶s GNI being the second lowest in the Middle East, and nearly a quarter of Iraqis 
living close to the poverty line, the Council nevertheless made the decision to tax Iraq¶s oil 
revenues.  
At the rate of more than US$200 million dollars per month, the Council has effectively been 
collecting income from Iraqi citizens and redistributing it largely to unidentified transnational 
oil corporations. Although temporarily suspended, because of the current civil war in Iraq, 
technically this taxation continues, more than two decades after the end of the Kuwait±Iraq 
conflict. The consequences of this decision, implemented through WKH&RXQFLO¶Vsubsidiary, 
the UNCC in Geneva²with its lack of transparency, closed-door settlement sessions, and 
absence of judicial review²have undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the economic, health 
and educational rights of the average Iraqi citizen. However, the principal question here is not 
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 For just such a case of discrepancy, between individuals listed by the Sanctions Committee and the ICC-
listed indictees, see (Ugarte 2012): Annex-1. 
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whether this compensation should have been awarded, or at what rate, but whether a qualified 
court independent of the Council, where both the Iraqis and the claimants could have 
presented their cases, with the right of judicial review, should instead have been the forum in 
which this huge financial reallocation took place. 
Talmon and Szasz, among others, suggest that these newly found powers of the Council have 
a positive side and may be put to good use, and can potentially be employed to deal with 
global problems, such as environmental pollution, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and 
global health pandemics. In such cases, the Council can create laws swiftly that apply 
universally. Some even suggest that the Council could set up courts to prosecute those 
accused of committing crimes in these areas. 
However, others argue that these legislative and adjudicative roles of the Council, exhibited 
since the end of the Cold WDUDUHVLJQVRIDQ³iPSHULDO´SC. In fact, Detlev Vagts and Jose 
Alvarez have described this as ³hegemonic international law´ RUWKH³FROOHFWLYHKHJHPRQ\´
of the P5, perhaps suggesting a new body of international law.209 
Ultimately, the Council has the potential to act either as a good global legislator or a bad 
global dictator. However, without constitutionalising the fundamental rights in the Charter, 
and democratising and legitimisLQJWKH81¶VOHJLVODWLYH and global governance role, the SC, 
as demonstrated in the recent past, is likely to continue to intrude on domestic legal systems 
and existing international law corpuses and regimes, as well as infringing JOREDOFLWL]HQV¶
fundamental rights.  
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In critically examining the mission and scope of the UN Charter, particularly in relation to the 
SC, WKH81¶VOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\LV paramount in establishing the original intent of the treaty. 
Indeed, both the 1969 VCLT and customary international law put great emphasis on the 
foundational work of a treaty as one of the formal guides to be used in subsequently 
interpreting the provisions of that treaty, and determining its good faith performance. 
Consequently, the next three chapters are mostly empirical, reviewing the events of San 
Francisco with the aim of extracting relevant legislative facts, particularly with regard to the 
S&¶VVWUXFWXUHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQYRWLQJSURFHGXUHVDQGLWVPHFKDQLVPIRr mutation.  
The data are primarily extracted from the official 22-volume United Nations Conference on 
International Organization (UNCIO) documents, which, although publicly available, have 
not to date been accessible electronically, with the full set difficult to consult, not being a 
typical university-library resource. It is notable, however, that the UNCIO documents were 
compiled and made available (as a complete and fully indexed set) to member states and the 
public starting in 1953, eight years after the San Francisco Conference, and as part of GA 
resolution 992(X) of 1955, dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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Perhaps this lack of easy access is one of the reasons why most researchers rely on secondary 
sources in relation to UNCIO data, SULPDULO\UHO\LQJRQRWKHUV¶ZRUN, produced mostly by 
American authors of the 1950s and 1960s, who often adopted an uncritical perspective and 
whose views were conditioned by the Cold War. The purpose of the legislative history 
chapters of this thesis, therefore, based on an analysis of the archived data, is to reflect the 
neglected letter and spirit of the UN Charter at the time of its formulation, particularly in 
respect of the Security Council.  
The discussions of the Big-3 (the US, the UK and the USSR) during World War II on the 
design of the UN and the new global order pivoted on the SC. Agreeing on the voting 
procedures for the Council was indeed one of their most difficult decisions. Subsequently, 
securing the endorsement of the other states on this issue was to prove even more 
problematic.  
The voting privileges of the SC¶V ³permanent members´ were the subject of inconclusive 
discussions at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944. They were later finalised and agreed upon at the last 
face-to-face meeting between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill during the Yalta Conference of 
February 1945: only two months before the Dumbarton Oaks proposed statutes (DO) were to 
be presented to the other states at San Francisco for discussion and adoption. 
In this chapter, I will first discuss the Yalta formula and the variations in the concept of the 
veto, as well as the final Big-3 voting-procedure agreement reached before the San Francisco 
Conference. I will then review the reaction and opposition of the weaker states (small and 
medium powers) to the unequal sovereign rights that the major powers had awarded 
themselves on the SC. The majority of states opposed the veto, and this opposition 
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culminated in an anti-veto bloc of countries challenging the Big-¶VPRGHORISRZHU
distribution, thereby jeopardising the DO scheme for the new global governance organisation.  
Next, I will examine the countermeasures employed by the major powers to retain the veto 
without compromising its extent or effect. The tactics used by the P5, particularly the Big-3, 
included, in addition to the accepted norms of lobbying and public relations, soft and hard 
forms of coercion, together with the exertion of pressure on countries within their sphere of 
influence.  
Further, the sponsoring states, and particularly the US, capitalised on procedural matters in 
their handling of the conference¶V organisation²determining the appointment of chairs to 
important committees, selecting agenda items, imposing time constraints, and taking 
advantage of other factors that gave them control over the procedural legitimisation of the 
Conference.  
While the specifics of the permanent mHPEHUV¶DFWLRQVin influencing the contents of the UN 
Charter are primarily covered in Chapters 4 and 5, the legality of those actions is examined in 
Chapter 8.  
The arguments at the Conference in respect of the SC voting rights issue that took place in 
the committees, and the final outcome of the constitutional battle over the permanent 
members¶ statutory supremacy are covered in Chapter 5.  
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4.2 The Yalta Formula 
Contrary to popular understanding of the veto210 DVEHLQJDVVRFLDWHGZLWK5XVVLD¶VGHPDQGV
and the Big-3 Conference in Yalta, in fact, by the time of the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations, 
all three World War II victors sought the veto power in its most robust form, allowing any 
one of them to prevent joint economic and military sanctions they did not approve of or that 
were directed against them. The extent and scope of the veto and its variations²such as those 
regarding procedural matters, investigative discussion and pacific settlement of disputes²
were the subject of disagreement and discussions.  
President Roosevelt and the US State Department were concerned not to involve the US in a 
war to which it had not willingly committed as a result of a UN collective-action decision. 
With memories still fresh of the US Congress having refused to ratify the charter of the 
League of Nations, Roosevelt did not want to alienate Congress from its war-making powers 
and therefore risk non-ratification of the new treaty. In fact, as will be seen in Chapters 4 to 6, 
top congressional leaders from both of the US¶VPDLQ political parties were invited and 
played prominent roles at the San Francisco Conference. 
Stalin and his delegation, on the other hand, viewing the USSR as the only sovereign 
communist regime at the time, regarded the veto as vital. It appears that Stalin did not want to 
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 The term ³veto´ was generally accepted and widely used throughout the Conference. At the beginning of the 
UNCIO Conference, the UK, France and, in particular, the US were sensitive about the use of the term, and 
instead preferred to use words such as unanimity, affirmation or concurrence to convey if a non-procedural, 
substantive SC decision was adopted or not. For example, Senator Tom Connally, in one of the committee 
PHHWLQJVGLVFXVVLQJWKH&RXQFLOYRWLQJSURFHGXUHVVSHFLILFDOO\DGYLVHGDJDLQVWWKHXVHRIWKH³XJO\´WHUPYHWR
1HYHUWKHOHVV³YHWR´EHFDPHDZLGHO\Xsed term both within and outside the Conference. Dr. Evatt of Australia, 
LQRQHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ,,,PHHWLQJVRQWKHVXEMHFWRIWKH6&GHILQHGWKHJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHGWHUPVRI³YHWR´
DQGWKH³YHWRULJKW´RIWKHSHUPDQHQWPHPEHUVZKLFKLIXVHGDOORZHGDny single P5 member to block a 
majority decision at the Council. (UNCIO - Volume XI: Commission III, Security Council 1945): 122, 335.  
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sit on a Council dominated by capitalists, who one day might declare war on communism and 
the Soviet Union without the USSR being able to prevent this.  
As to the UK delegation and Prime Minister Churchill, Britain still had a large empire to 
preserve; they needed to be able to stop the Council from taking any collective action against, 
or otherwise interfering with, these imperial interests. Further, Churchill, recognising the 
enormous military contribution that the US and the USSR had made to winning the war²and 
the fact that the UK now probably ranked below both of them in terms of military strength²
was opting for the same privileges as the two bigger powers.  
Against this realpolitik backdrop, the Big-3 started the first round of Dumbarton Oaks 
negotiations in August 1944. The Republic of China, the fourth agreed-upon permanent 
member, was intentionally excluded from the first round, while France, another potential 
member of the club, was not even invited to the conference.211  
Once they began to discuss the SC and its voting procedures, the Big-3 were indecisive. The 
US did not want the veto to be exercised for procedural matters, investigative missions, or 
items that fell under the pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter VIII Section A of DO), and in 
those circumstances the US felt that a simple majority vote was sufficient. The UK suggested 
that, on all items under Chapter VIII of the DO, only the veto right of a permanent member 
that was party to the conflict should be revoked and not allowed.212  
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 The second round of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which occurred immediately after the completion of 
the first round, was conducted by the US, the UK and China. The USSR, reasoning that it had not declared war 
on Japan at that time, had asked itself to be excluded from the second round of talks. There were no substantive 
additions or changes to the agreements in the second round, and basically the statutes agreed by the Big-3 in the 
first round were reviewed with the Chinese delegation in September of 1944. 
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Meanwhile, the Soviet negotiator, Andrei Gromyko, announced that his instructions were that 
the veto privilege should apply to all SC decisions, even procedural ones.213 Hence, the 
Soviet position would have meant that, without unanimity, even the ordinary business of the 
Council²VXFKDVDSSURYLQJGHOHJDWHV¶FUHGHQWLDOVRUGHFLGLQJZKDWLWHPVFRXOGEHSXWRQWKH
SC agenda²would grind to a standstill. In view of the complications regarding the CouQFLO¶V
voting procedures, the multiplicity of topics needing decisions, and the lack of consensus, the 
delegates decided to complete the other tasks related to constituting the new organisation at 
the DO Conference, and leave the important decision about the veto to a later conference and 
to their bosses, the Big-3 leaders, to deal with.  
President Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met in February of 1945 at the Crimea Conference, 
which, being held in the city of Yalta, also came to be known as the Yalta Conference. The 
Big-3 intended to resolve the remaining issues from Dumbarton Oaks and to finalise the 
formation of their vision of a new world governance organisation before it was presented to 
the rest of the world.  
The few remaining issues were resolved, such as the USSR¶V demand for admitting Soviet 
proxy states as separate member states to the new UN. This was settled by the compromise 
that only two additional states, Ukraine and Belarus, both under Soviet domination, would be 
admitted as separate states in addition to the Soviet Union. Stalin also satisfied the US¶V 
                                                 
binding on its member states, because, unlike the UN, member states were not obliged to participate in 
sanctions. The League, learning by experience, was applying more amendments to its constitution, and the 
League Assembly was moving away from unanimity to qualified majority voting on many questions. For 
example, the admission of new states required a two-thirds majority of the Assembly only; unlike the UN, where 
the permDQHQWPHPEHUVFDQYHWRDQHZPHPEHUVWDWH¶Vadmission. See (Sands and Klein 2009): 10±12. 
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demand to enter the war against Japan, by agreeing to declare war on Japan three months 
after the surrender of Germany. 
In Yalta, there was further affirmation, and the final adoption, of the Dumbarton Oaks 
statutory text for the new organisation. The last remaining issue from Dumbarton Oaks²the 
voting procedures of the SC²was also settled with relative ease. The Soviets showed 
flexibility and dropped their demand for a veto of procedural matters, and all three powers 
agreed to keep the veto for substantive cases, such as economic and military sanctions and 
interventions.214 Lastly, it was decided that, as the work was complete, the proposed Charter 
could be announced to the world. In addition, it was agreed that the venue for the convocation 
conference, where other nations would be persuaded to accept the Charter, and where its 
signing would take place, would be the US.  
The final text of the voting procedures for the SC agreed by the Big-3 leaders came to be 
known as the Yalta formula. It was presented to the San Francisco delegates in Section C as 
proposed at the Crimea Conference and was incorporated into Chapter VI (Security Council) 
of Dumbarton Oaks. It read as follows:215 
SECTION C. VOTING 
1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an 
affirmative vote of seven members. 
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 (Bosco 2009): 29±31. See also (Wilcox 1945). As will be seen later, this hasty adoption of the Yalta formula, 
without much deliberation, proved problematic during the San Francisco Conference²for example, in 
FRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKH³TXHVWLRQV´UDLVHGE\WKHanti-veto bloc, which the Big-3, in spite of taking 
approximately two weeks of Conference time to respond to, were unable to answer specifically or even agree 
among themselves on what the answers should be. 
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 (UNCIO - Volume III: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Comments and Proposed Amendments 1945): 10. 
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3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an 
affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent 
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the 
second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute 
should abstain from voting.  
4.3 The Anti-veto Uprising at San Francisco 
When the Yalta formula was announced prior to the San Francisco Conference, the medium 
and smaller powers¶ reaction to it was slow in forming. At first glance, the voting rule 
seemed majoritarian and more advanced than that of the League of Nations, where, in most 
cases, the unanimity of the member states and consensus was the rule. 216 However, upon 
closer examination, it became apparent that the liberal majority rule was only for insignificant 
matters, and obvious from the concurrency requirement that any of the P5 could block a UN 
collective security decision, thus rendering the SC ineffective. Worse yet, the smaller powers 
realised that a P5 member, or one of its proxy states, could potentially be the aggressor, but 
could, because of its privileged status, veto any UN actions against it, so that the permanent 
members would effectively stand above the law. 
Dissension and opposition to the veto was being voiced, overtly and covertly, by many of the 
weaker states, particularly the Latin American states, which were more distanced from the 
war and therefore had fewer urgent war-related items to deal with and more freedom to 
elaborate on the proposed Charter. This dissension was picked up by the US State 
Department diplomatically, as well as through intelligence and espionage channels.217 
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from voting. (Sands and Klein 2009): 10±12. 
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 Stephen Schlesinger, in Act of Creation, based on US government sources that were later formally released, 
has a revealing discussion of US espionage activity in relation to the delegates and states, both prior to and 
during the Conference. Before the Conference, for example, &KLOH¶VIRUHLJQPLQLVWHUH[SUHVVLQJ&KLOH¶V
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By the time the UNCIO had started in San Francisco on 25 April 1945, the great majority of 
the Independent States218 invited to the Conference, as well as even some of the countries 
under the sphere of influence of the P5, had individually formed their opposition to the veto, 
but not necessarily as a group or bloc. As the Conference started, what these states lacked in 
coalition and unity they more than made up for by the blunt expression of their opposition. 
However, as will be seen later in this chapter and in Chapter 5, because of the 
countermeasures adopted by the P5 durLQJWKHWZRPRQWKV¶GXUDWLRQRIWKH conference, 
articulation of this opposition became diluted, and the hopes of these states shifted more to 
having good faith in the permanent members, and hoping for more concrete changes in future 
revisions to the Charter.  
In their analysis of some of the political and legal issues inherent in under-representation on 
the SC, the unequal voting rights of its members, and the overall democratic deficit on the 
Council, some of the best arguments were put forth by the contesting states themselves.  
                                                 
UHVHUYDWLRQWKDWWKHSURSRVHG6&VWUXFWXUH³ZRXOGSXWWKHSHUPDQHQWPHPEHUVRIWKH&RXQFLODERYHWKHODZ
ZKLFKZLOOJRYHUQDOOQDWLRQV´VHWRXWWRVHHNVRPHIULHQGO\QDWLRQV¶DGYLFH7KH86JDLQHG knowledge of the 
fact that at least the following states responded: Costa Rica, Cuba, Italy, Switzerland and the Vatican, and that 
WKH\VKDUHG&KLOH¶VFRQFHUQ$QRWKHURIWKHVHGLSORPDWLFLQWHUFHSWVUHSRUWHGE\WKH86$UP\RSHUDWLRQNQRZQ
as Magic Diplomatic Summaries, ZDVUHODWHGWR7XUNH\¶VFRQFHUQVDQGGLSORPDWLFGLVFXVVLRQVZLWK)UDQFHSULRU
to the Conference. Turkey had argued that the set-XSEHLQJSURSRVHG³VHHPHGGHVWLQHGWRPDNHODZIXOWKH
projects of the large powers against the small²with the system of voting in the Security Council ensuring them 
LPSXQLW\´(Schlesinger 2003): 94, 100±101. In fact, some of this formal and informal feedback on the Yalta 
formula compiled by the US was probably one of the main reaVRQVIRUWKH86¶VSURDFWLYHDFWLQLQWURGXFLQJ
right before the Conference, the Charter review amendment provisions to the DO. A Charter amendment 
procedure was already part of the DO proposal, but a Charter review suggested a more wholesale, rather than 
piecemeal, approach to revising the Charter and was not included. 
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 Independent States at the Conference are generally defined as those that did not have P5 direct military 
presence on their territories or were not a colony, or under the political/economic sphere of influence, of the P5. 
The Independent States, as well as the States Under Influence, are set out, with further explanations of these 
terms, in Table 2 of Chapter 8. 
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The general opposition to the veto was well expressed by Peter Fraser, the New Zealand 
Prime Minister. In one of the earlier sessions of the plenary meetings of the Conference, he 
VWDWHGKLVJRYHUQPHQW¶VYLHZDVIROORZV219 
The veto which can be exercised by one of the great powers, both in regard to itself 
and other nations, is unfair and indefensible and may, if retained and exercised, be 
destructive not only to the main purposes of the International Organization but to the 
Organization itself. For instance, under the existing provisions one of the five 
permanent members which may clearly be an aggressor can use its power of veto to 
prevent its own condemnation, or even its designation as an aggressor. 
« 
But what about the veto which can be exercised by one of the permanent powers on 
the Security Council in respect to aggression by other nations? Surely the inclusion of 
this particular form of veto has been unintentional. I believe that it was never 
intended that a great power should be entrusted with the right of veto in regard to the 
aggression of a small power. 
« 
For instance, one small power may be an aggressor against another small power, but 
one of the great powers can even veto the matter being made a subject for 
consideration by the Security Council.  
« 
If a great power could cast a cloak of protection over a small aggressor power by the 
exercise of the right of veto, then the work of the Security Council would be reduced 
to complete futility. 
(FXDGRU¶VMinister of Foreign Affairs, Camilo Enriquez, in objecting to the limited 
representation on the Council, said: 220 
It would be highly plausible to increase the number of members of the Security 
Council, granting a numerically superior representation to small states in order to 
strengthen that organ, situating its roots in universal public opinion and with due 
respect to the system of proportion of representation. 
Concerning the voting arrangement in the Council, an earnest analysis leads us to 
declare it inacceptable [sic]  that the majority required for decisions concerning 
questions other than those of procedure, that is the most important ones, should 
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include the vote of all permanent members since this is equivalent to breaking the 
principle of juridical equality among states, reducing those who have no permanent 
seats to a deplorable and unjust condition of inferiority and, even more deplorably, to 
provoke the collapse of the functions of the Council in the not impossible case that 
any one of its permanent members should wish to interfere with its smooth running. 
In such a strange situation, we would have not an association of states, but the 
almighty will of a single state against the consensus of the others, that is, an 
undeniable example of anarchy within a seemingly internationally organized world.  
Iran, which was under the occupation of the Allied forces, and whose king, Reza Shah 
Pahlavi, was forced by the allies to abdicate in favour of his son, was going through a 
political transition at this time. Nevertheless, Iran had managed to send a delegation under the 
leadership of the ex-Justice Minister, Mustafa Adle. The Iranian delegation presented to the 
Conference a proposed amendment for a numerical increase in the member states represented 
on the SC, as well as a provision that Council decisions be based on a qualified majority, 
thereby eliminating the veto.221 
The Foreign Minister of Venezuela, Caracciolo Para-Perez, in addition to emphasising the 
role of inter-American and regional organisations as agents in conflict management, also 
stressed the sovereign equality of states. Para-Perez, hoping to devise a way in due course for 
the adaptation of the Yalta formula in the direction of sovereign equality, said in San 
)UDQFLVFR³WKDWWKHIRUPXODDGRSWHGKHUHZLOOEHDEOHWRIROORZDWLPHO\HYROXWLRQWRZDUG
procedures that will be more democratic and represent better the community of natioQV´222 
6\ULD¶V3ULPH0LQLVWHU)DULV$O-Khouri, while emphasising the equality of nations and 
advocating a wider scope and jurisdiction for the proposed ICJ, also warned about the 
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difficulties in enacting future amendments. He appealed to other states not to leave needed 
VWDWXWRU\HQKDQFHPHQWVWRWKHIXWXUHDQGWR³GRRXUEHVWQRZWRHODERUDWHD&KDUWHUZKLFK
ZLOOOLYHORQJ´223 
The Vice-PUHPLHURI$XVWUDOLD)UDQFLV)RUGHLQSURPRWLQJWKH³UXOHRIODZ´, and adopting 
the position that the Charter should be a ³ZRUNDEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQ´SURSRVHGDgreater role for 
the GA, compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and changes in the configuration of the SC. He 
DOVRVWDWHG$XVWUDOLD¶VRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH³rights´ of the permanent members. In his speech to 
the plenary, while criticising these rights in general, Forde stated: ³2QHRIWKHVHULJKWVLVWKH
so-called veto power. The term veto LVQRWDOWRJHWKHUDKDSS\RQH´+LVREMHFWLRQZDV
particularly in relation to the use of the veto in cases where the party to the dispute was not 
one of the permanent members. In a similar vein to Peter Fraser of New Zealand, Forde said: 
³:HWKLQNDPLVWDNHKDVEHHQPDGHDQGWKDWDOOWKHSRZHUVFRQFHUQHGVKRXOGEHUHDG\WR
FRUUHFWLWDWWKLV&RQIHUHQFH´224 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Badawi Pasha, like many other critics of the 
Council, favoured expanded representation and qualified-majority voting on the Council. 
Badawi Pasha, who later became an ICJ judge, had a critical view of the adjudicative 
implications of the P5 veto, objecting to the world order scheme proposed by the Big-3. At 
the opening plenary, he remarked:225 
Permitting any power great or small to sit both as judge and jury in its own case does 
not, in our opinion, contribute to build world-wide confidence so necessary to the 
success of a plan for world order. 
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The delegate from Uruguay, similar to many of the other state participants, recommended 
universal and compulsory jurisdiction for the ICJ, as well as a guaranteed seat for the Latin 
American bloc of nations on the SC, together with liberalisDWLRQRIWKH&RXQFLO¶VYRWLQJ
V\VWHP-RVH6HUUDWR8UXJXD\¶V)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV0LQLVWHULQH[SUHVVLQJKLVFRXQWU\¶V
SRVLWLRQWKDWDQ\DFFHSWDQFHRI'XPEDUWRQ2DNV¶SULYLOHJHGVWDWXWRU\ULJKWVJUDQWHGWRWKH35 
should be only temporary, at the opening session of the plenary stated: 226 
In the present circumstance, however, Uruguay accepts, as a transitory situation, that 
the four Great Powers « should be assured seats on the Council, but not indefinitely 
and only for a period which may be judged advisable, say eight or ten years, for 
example. 
By the end of the first week of the Conference, the anti-veto movement in San Francisco was 
gaining momentum, with many countries having formally submitted amendment proposals on 
the topic of the SC and its legal structure and voting procedures. These states²such as 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and 
Venezuela²in addition to the ones mentioned earlier, numbered 20 in total, comprising 
almost one-half of the original Conference invitees. By formally submitting amendments and 
proposals, these states were actively seeking to correct the democratic deficit of the 
Council.227 In the first seven days of the Conference, in addition to the initial 20 countries, 
the representatives of Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Liberia, New Zealand, 
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 The full list of the 20 states that submitted amendments to Chapter VI of Dumbarton Oaks (Security Council 
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Comments and Proposed Amendments 1945): 665.  
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Syria, Panama and Peru also spoke against the veto or objected to the legal structure of the 
SC and the statutory rights of its permanent members.228  
Strikingly, France, which, after Dumbarton Oaks, with the sponsorship of the UK, was 
offered the fifth permanent seat on the Council, submitted its own amendment at the 
beginning of the Conference to limit the use of the veto. The French policy at the start of the 
Conference was to attend as a regular member state. As such, France was unsure of the 
fairness and effectiveness of the proposed Council and, wanting to side with the smaller 
powers, submitted its own amendment to the DO in the direction of liberalising the 
Council.229 
As the Conference progressed, more objections and alterations to the constitutive structure of 
the Council were submitted. Some states for the first time, and some in addition to what they 
had already submitted, were making arguments for introducing motions at the Conference to 
eliminate or modify the proposed rights of the permanent members. Countries such as Brazil, 
Canada, Cuba, the Netherlands, Colombia, and India were among them. 
The Latin American countries, which had already developed a bloc approach to the regional 
issues, were by then developing a common agenda to fight the veto. The opposition to the DO 
proposal on the subject of P5 privileges became more organised and united.  




documents printed in 1945 and supplemented in 1955. The empirical information in this chapter is primarily 
compiled from Volumes I±III, VI±VII and XI of the UNCIO documents, listed in the Sources Used. 
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 (UNCIO - Volume III: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Comments and Proposed Amendments 1945): 665. See 
also (Schlesinger 2003): 101±102. Later on, after France had agreed to be the fifth permanent member, it 
withdrew its amendment proposal on limiting the use of the veto and fully backed the Yalta formula. 
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The Attorney General and Minister of External Affairs of Australia, Herbert Evatt, emerged 
as the spokesman and leader of the countries opposing the SC voting procedures.230 This 
opposition from small and medium powers to the Security Council part of the DO as the 
Conference progressed posed a real threat to the sponsoring Big-3 in their scheme to devise a 
post-war global governance plan. 
Meanwhile, the anti-veto opposition strategy evolved primarily along two fronts. In this two-
pronged approach, one strategy was to tackle the permanent member privileges and the veto 
head-on in Commission III and its related Committee 1, referred to at the Conference as 
Committee III/1- Security Council Structure and Procedures. The second strategy was to 
make alterations to the DO to make future Charter amendments, revisions and withdrawals 
easier. All these topics were the subject of another committee, under the heading General 
Provisions of Commission I and its Technical Committee 2 (I/2). 
According to the proposed DO statutes, even future Charter amendments required the 
concurrence of the permanent members, and therefore could be vetoed by any one of them. 
Moreover, the proposed DO treaty had no withdrawal clause. Therefore, the opposition, as 
part of a fall-back strategy, was opting for amendments to the DO to make Charter 
amendments easier in the future, or, if all else failed, to at least have the option to withdraw 
from the organisation altogether. The subject-matter of these last two items fell under 
Commission I (the General Provisions) and Committee 2, referred to at the conference as 
Committee I/2-Membership, Amendment, and Secretariat. Therefore, the constitutional 
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battlefront in opposing the P5 was primarily drawn in two places: Committee I/2 and 
Committee III/1, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
In the meantime, the P5 had other existing and potential means to combat the challenge to 
their statutory supremacy.  
4.4 Dictating the Formula: Preventive Measures Before and Outside the 
Conference 
On the substantive (as opposed to procedural) decisions of the SC, the Big-3 were steadfast in 
holding to the veto. The US, the UK and the Soviets, out of self-interest, as well as for 
domestic consumption, had already come to their decision at Yalta, and for them the right of 
veto was not subject to negotiation. However, they had to deal with the small-power 
insurgency in San Francisco, as well as finish the task they had failed to complete at Yalta. 
President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, in their enthusiasm and 
rush to reach an agreement in Yalta, had left many questions on the scope and the 
applicability of the veto unresolved. For example, what constituted procedural matters? Was 
a preliminary question on determination of a question being procedural itself subject to the 
veto? If a permanent member abstained or was absent when a vote was taken, did that 
constitute a lack of concurrence and therefore a veto? Did the veto apply to the election of the 
Secretary-General? These were some of the many ambiguities that the Yalta formula gave 
rise to.  
As will be seen in the next chapter, the attempts by the smaller powers at the Conference to 
modify or eliminate the veto in the DO proposal ultimately proved futile. The Section C SC 
voting procedures of Dumbarton Oaks were, in essence, transferred unchanged to the UN 
Charter. Despite overwhelming opposition from other states, this was possible as a result of 
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certain actions on the part of the Big-3, both before and during the Conference, that were 
undertaken either in concert or individually.  
The steps taken by the permanent members, and particularly the Big-3, to influence the 
outcome of the Conference can be grouped into two categories.  
The first category includes the precautionary measures taken prior to and outside the 
Conference, and extends to the realpolitik of the wartime situation as this mitigated 
opposition to the Yalta formula. 
The second consists of a number of actions carried out during the conference itself by the 
permanent members, particularly the US, in order to quell the opposition and to ensure 
mePEHUVWDWHV¶DFFHSWDQFHRIWKHSURSRVHGOHJDOVWUXFWXUHRIWKHSC. 
Before the Conference, the P5, especially the Big-3, took the preventive measures detailed 
below to ensure that the proposed UN Charter was successfully adopted. 
4.4.1 Selective Conference Participation by Limiting Member States 
From the outset, the American framers ideal was that the UN would be a global organisation 
and not just a multi-state or regional pact. However, many sovereign states were intentionally 
excluded from the San Francisco Conference, including the ³HQHP\´VWDWHV and so-called 
³IDVFLVW´VWDWHVas well as any state whose participation was seriously objected to by one of 
the Big-3. Therefore, a large number of European countries, including Germany, Italy, 
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Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland, were 
excluded.231  
Moreover, states that were admitted in the midst of the conference, such as Argentina (whose 
participation was opposed by the USSR) or Poland (whose participation the US objected to), 
were only admitted after contentious debate and questioning of their regimes¶ legitimacy. For 
these countries, winning a formal seat at the Conference was their main goal, with their aim 
primarily being to win recognition and acceptance in the UN community rather than to 
critically challenge the DO proposal.232 
Another large part of the world not invited to the Conference was made up of the numerous 
colonies in Asia and Africa. Although both the US and the Soviet Union had maintained an 
anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance between the two world wars, with the UK as their 
third partner, sensitivity over the subject of the British Empire led to most colonial states 
being excluded. No colonies were invited from the South and East Asian continents, with the 
exception of Lebanon, India, the Philippines, and Syria. Consequently, Asian colonies such 
as Burma, Cambodia, Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam were excluded (see Table 2).  
From the African continent, only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the racist regime of the Union 
of South Africa were invited. In contrast, states such as Libya, Congo, Ghana, Morocco, 
                                                 
231
 Denmark was admitted to the Conference after it was liberated, and thus after the Conference had already 
begun. (United Nations Yearbook 1946-1947): 10. During the conference, Denmark acknowledged its 
obligation to the Allies for its liberation and voted in almost complete alignment with the Big-¶VSRVLWLRQVRQ
the committees relating to the SC and the amendments sections of the charter. As for Poland, it was actually 
admitted to the Conference at its conclusion. It was, however, permitted to sign the Charter as one of the 51 
original state signatories at the Conference.  
232
 Ibid; and see n 243 below. 
139 
 
Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and many others were excluded (see 
absence of these states/colonies in Table 2). 
4.4.2 Ensuring Conference Participation of States under the Big-¶V6SKHUHRI
Influence 
As will be shown in more detail in Chapter 8 and Table 2, the number of states invited to the 
San Francisco Conference that were categorised as Independent State participants was less 
than half of the total number of participants. 
In other words, more than half of the 50 states participating in the Conference, excluding the 
P5, were either militarily, economically, or politically dependent on the P5. This group 
included states such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, the Philippines 
Commonwealth, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, the Ukraine Soviet Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet 
Republic, the Netherlands, Panama, Greece, Liberia, Ethiopia and Poland. The majority of 
these states had very large contingents of Allied troops on their soil. Most of these regimes 
were in government transition. Some were carry-overs from resistance movements and not 
necessarily democratically elected, and some were either directly installed by one of the Big-
3 or dependent on the Allies for support. Therefore, when push came to shove, the Big-3 
could exercise a great deal of leverage over these states. As will be seen in the case of the 
Philippines, for example, its opposition to the veto in the early part of the conference changed 
as a result of the Big-¶VSUHVVXUHWKHUHDIWHUVXSSRUWLQJWKH<DOWDIRUPXOD for the rest of the 
conference.233 
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4.4.3 Show of Force and Coercion 
Syria was represented in San Francisco as an independent state and as a member of the newly 
formed Arab League. Charles de GaulleWRUHDVVHUW)UDQFH¶VFRORQLDOUXOHRYHU6\ULD used 
military force to intervene in Syrian affairs in May 1945. The bloody suppression of the 
uprising that followed left close to 1,000 Syrians dead.234 This incident, in the very midst of 
the Conference, sent a frightening message not only to Syria but also to Lebanon, the Arab 
League, and the rest of the ex-colonies, French or otherwise, that the old colonial powers, 
formerly preoccupied with the war, were now making a comeback after WKHZDU¶VHQGLQ
Europe. This event, which was covered extensively both inside and outside the Conference 
by news media, certainly had an impact on the Arab League countries, and perhaps other 
Asian and African ex-colonies present in San Francisco, and on their perception of the UN 
and their role in its formation. For these countries, the prospect of being recognised as 
independent states at the UN, although involving subordination to the SC, was a better 
alternative²and the Charter as a whole a more enticing prospect²than the rule of their ex-
colonial masters.  
Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, whose delegates had spoken in favour of the liberalisation of the 
SC¶V structure at the beginning of the Conference, became submissive, their discourse 
shifting towards alignment with the Big-3¶V position after the French military intervention in 
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Syria. These countries no longer pursued proposals and amendments in opposition to the veto 
within the two committees.235  
Another instance of intimidation and coercion being employed by the Conference sponsors 
and France concerned the Philippines Commonwealth, which had large contingents of US 
military forces on its land and a special ³commonwealth´ relationship with the US.  
General Carlos Romulo, chair of the Philippines¶ delegation, had suggested a more liberal 
and equitable design for the SC.236 However, the policy of the 3KLOLSSLQHV¶Gelegates towards 
the Yalta formula, and their opposition to the veto, changed in the midst of the conference. 
Many years later, General Romulo revealed that he was approached by the US delegation 
privately and was given a clear signal that a Filipino challenge to the 3¶V supremacy on the 
&RXQFLOZDV³QRWDSSUHFLDWHG´237 
Yet another case of use of force or threat of use of force involved the Big-3¶V interference in 
Iran. The Imperial State of Iran, which, at the beginning of World War II, had declared its 
neutrality, was invaded by Allied forces in 1941. The objectives of the invasion, carried out 
by mostly Russian and British troops, were to make IrDQ¶VWUDQVSRUWDWLRQDQGUDLOV\VWHPV
available to the Allied forces, creating a southern supply line from the Persian Gulf to the 
6RYLHW&DVSLDQ6HDUHJLRQ7RZDUGVWKHHQGRIWKHZDU,UDQ¶Vgreat fear was that British and 
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Soviet troops would not leave the country after the conflict ended. Following German\¶V 
surrender during the second week of the Conference, and throughout WKH&RQIHUHQFH¶V two 
PRQWKV¶GXUDWLRQWKH,UDQLDQV¶QLJKWPDUHbegan to come true: Soviet troops and agents 
overstayed in the country embarked on subversive activities with ,UDQ¶V communists and 
began to turn the northwest Iranian region of Azerbaijan into a semi-autonomous communist 
state with the object of breaking it away from the Iranian homeland.  
In San Francisco, the Iranians had three main demands, submitted as amendments to the DO: 
expanding representation at the SC and eliminating the veto, pushing for the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, and incorporating enabling territorial integrity clauses in the Charter. 
The latter request related to their concern over the presence of Allied forces on their territory. 
Towards the end of the Conference, however, they had also become more timid, and in the 
case of their amendment proposal in Commission III/1, on SC voting, although they did not 
technically withdraw the amendment, they stopped pursuing their proposal for 
democratisation of the Council.238 Iran, too, was realising that a UN organisation with a 
defective SC and Charter was better than no organisation at all. 
As for the Soviet Bloc and the rapidly advancing Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, Stalin, as 
one of the most infamous dictators of the twentieth century, must have been able to exercise 
total influence over his puppet regimes in the communist countries present at San Francisco, 
such as Byelorussian SSR, Ukraine SSR and Czechoslovakia. Undoubtedly, therefore, Stalin 
could count on these states to vote in any way he wished. 
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This 1945 race for domination of territories, sovereign or otherwise, between the capitalist 
West and the communist East, under the guise of liberation from the enemy, was no secret. 
The race that had been started by the Big-3 after the German surrender and armistice on 8 
May, and the formal end of the war in Europe, to assert their political or military domination 
over Europe, as well as over other regions of the world, and which had now been joined by 
France, was not necessarily deliberately aimed at affecting the outcome of the UN Charter. 
However, this rapid and disturbing unravelling of events confronted the smaller powers at 
San Francisco with a stark reality²that the superpower rivalry and supremacy of the war 
would continue after its end. This realisation had a great impact on the medium and small 
powers during the course of the Conference, as they began to perceive that the Charter being 
formulated would probably reflect the realpolitik of the time, and that this would be the case 
for at least a few years. 
This realisation aOVRDIIHFWHG1HZ=HDODQG¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIthe Charter. Peter Fraser, in his 
fiery speech at the opening plenary in April, had condemned the veto, and said that it was so 
XQDFFHSWDEOHWKDWLWPXVWEHD³PLVWDNH´DGYRFDWLQJPRWLRQVWRFRPEDWLW%XW, by the end of 
the Conference in June, he abstained from the vote on the Yalta formula when it was put 
forward by the sponsoring governments, thereby indirectly aiding its adoption. This 
abstention, similar to that of PDQ\RWKHUVWDWHVZDVPRWLYDWHGE\WKHSHUPDQHQWPHPEHUV¶
promise of a Charter review and revisions in the future, but the decision also reflected 
realpolitik considerations on the part of Prime Minister Fraser. It would seem that New 
Zealand, after being called upon by the British and the US, in the midst of the Conference, to 
use its troops in Trieste as part of the race to get there before the Yugoslavs and the 
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communists had, like many other states opposing the P5¶V supremacy on the Council, given 
in to the Big-¶Vview of how collective security should be conducted.239  
This ³boots on the ground´ and use-of-force situation that lasted throughout the UNCIO and 
up to the completion of the required ratifications in October of 1945 certainly had a profound 
impact on the conclusion of the UN Charter. This intentional or inadvertent application of 
coercion by the P5 while the Charter negotiations were being conducted, and the legality of 
it, are covered in more detail in Chapter 8. 
4.5 Dictating the Formula: Countermeasures within the Conference 
The rapidly developing international events prior to the Conference, and the use of force or 
the threat of use of force by the Big-3 and France in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
during the Conference, had a direct or indirect impact on the policies and the voting 
behaviour of the states from these regions. The anti-veto fever of the affected states was 
subsiding.  
The P5, however, had to somehow quell the anti-veto opposition of states from other regions 
of the world: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and most of the Latin American and Caribbean 
states that were opposed to the formula, and whose lands were not located in the theatre of 
war, and hence did not feel the military might of the Big-3¶VSUHVHQFHat home. 
With the arrival during the second week of the Conference of V.M. Molotov, the Soviet 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Big-3 and the Republic of China (P4) began their almost 
daily ³after-the-meeting´ meetings. The purpose of these meetings, held privately in a hotel 
penthouse, was for the sponsoring P4 governments to discuss the important issues of the 
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conference, how to steer them, and how to handle their own and other countries¶ proposed 
amendments without jeopardising the fundamentals of what they had agreed at Dumbarton 
Oaks and Yalta.240 
Of the 24 amendments adopted by the P4 as their joint amendments to the Conference, with 
0RORWRY¶VFRQFXUUHQFHRQHrelated to amending the DO proposal to provide for a Charter 
review provision. As will be seen in Chapter 5, this amendment suggested that the provision 
was different from the regular charter amendment provision already offered at Dumbarton 
Oaks, in that it was intended not to change one or two provisions but to apply to a series of 
possible enhancements and changes to be considered together at a Charter review conference. 
This provision, initiated by the US, was designed mostly to appease the veto opposition that 
had been sensed prior to the conference and was now, by the second week, more visible. The 
Charter review amendment sponsored by the P4, however, did not mention a periodic 
timetable or a fixed date for the review conference, and required a qualified majority to hold 
it. 
The P5 had to make sure that the ZHDNHUVWDWHV¶ uprising did not threaten the successful 
completion of the Conference. Therefore, in addition to this conciliatory provision, the P5 
employed other countermeasures at the Conference to quell the anti-veto opposition, as 
described below.  
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4.5.1 Dictating the Charter by Procedural Legitimisation 
The Big-3 and the Republic of China, as sponsoring states, had laid down the Conference¶V 
rules, which gave them a number of procedural advantages: 
x The Big-3, and particularly the US, controlled the Conference¶V organisation, logistics 
and services. The location, timing, and duration of the Conference were decided by 
the Big-3, and all Conference services and costs, including logistics, accommodation, 
transportation, translations, duplications and publications, were provided by the host, 
the US. 
x The two most important committees, the Executive Committee and the Steering 
Committee, were appointed and chaired by the US, with Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius being the chairman of both. These two powerful committees set the agenda, 
GHFLGHGRQYRWLQJDQGSURFHGXUDOLVVXHVDQGQRPLQDWHGWKHFRQIHUHQFH¶VIRXU
commission and 12 technical committee chairs. The secretary general of the 
Conference, Alger Hiss, was also from the US State Department.241  
x The Big-3 had agreed in advance that any change to DO statutes in San Francisco was 
subject to their concurrence: in other words, the Big-3 could veto and in effect kill any 
proposed amendment. However, the P4 had informally decided that, on most 
questions, should the smaller nations muster a two-thirds vote, they would refrain 
from using their veto.242  
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As will be seen later, however, on substantive issues, such as the Yalta formula or the 
Charter amendment and review debate, the permanent members would declare in 
advance their uncompromising position on a question or an amendment proposal 
before it was put forward for a vote. In the case of the Yalta formula, the Big-3 even 
threatened the participating states with the prospect of them going home without a 
Charter. In the insecure age of war that still prevailed, at the Conference the smaller 
powers would back down and either accept the Big-3 offer or give in to a lesser 
agreement.  
x At Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, adopting the proposed world organisDWLRQ¶VVWDWXWHV
effectively needed the agreement of only three states²the US, the UK and the USSR. 
At the San Francisco Conference, however, voting procedures required any new 
additions or alternative amendments to the DO and its Yalta formula component to be 
carried with a two-thirds majority. Therefore, based on the 50 member-state 
conference participants, and assuming they were present and voting, a two-thirds 
majority required 34 votes for a statutory change to be adopted, whereas, for the bulk 
of the Charter, already decided and presented as the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal at the 
beginning of the Conference, only three affirmative votes were necessary. This 
favoured the constitutional wishes of the US, the UK and the USSR for a world 
organization by a factor of almost ten to one. 243  
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x The Big-3 also employed the tactic of divide and conquer. Generally, the conference 
committees were open to all member states. Most of the substantive questions, such as 
the Yalta formula or charter amendments and charter review, however, would be 
assigned to subcommittees. The subcommittees, unlike the committees, were not open 
to all participating states and were generally limited to 15 members only, of which 
five had to be the permanent members. Thus, in subcommittee discussions and 
decisions, the P5 ensured themselves of one-third representation, a larger proportional 
representation among the 50 states participating in the conference.244 
All of the above made it more likely that the permanent members would be able to include 
their desired provisions and statutes in the Charter, while also ensuring that RWKHUVWDWHV¶
acceptance of the DO proposals, with minimum change, was procedurally legitimised.  
4.5.2 France Becomes the Fifth Permanent Member 
At the beginning of the conference, France had refused to be the fifth permanent member and 
one of the five sponsoring states. Upset at not being invited to any of the preliminary 
negotiations and, in particular, to the Dumbarton Oaks and Crimean Conferences, France had 
refused to formally accept the fifth seat among the permanent members as allocated by the 
Big-3.245 Arriving at San Francisco, )UDQFH¶Vpolicy towards its participation in the UN 
seemed somewhat confused and contradictory. At the outset, its preference appeared to have 
been to participate as a regular member state and side with the smaller and medium powers. 
France had, in fact, introduced an amendment to reduce the scope of the applicability of the 
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veto, and the French Minister of Foreign affairs, Georges Bidault, in his speech to the 
opening plenary, explained the fallacy of calling any state other than the permanent members 
small, and criticised the veto power, which he hoped would eventually be dispensed with:246 
Justice is another word we must reinstate in all its loftiness²justice in keeping with 
international democracy, that is to say, justice which gives full recognition to the 
rights of all countries, including those which do not come under the generally 
recognized term of great powers²a point I would particularly stress. 
I am not convinced that every possible consideration has been given to the nations 
called the small powers²I do not know why they are called small, for it may happen 
that they are not, either by their past or by their population, or by the ideal they mean 
to serve. In any case, it is a fact that the proposals made at the Conference allow for a 
dominant share to be granted to the great Powers, of which, I again repeat, France is 
one. 
This privilege was decided upon in our absence. What was called the veto of the great 
powers is certainly not in keeping with the legal ideal, which we do not despair, will 
someday be established by common accord between peoples. 
In the second week of the Conference, on 3 May 1945, France formally asked the sponsoring 
states if could be one of the permanent members of the Council, and was subsequently 
accepted as the fifth member of the P5. From that point onward, France was in favour of the 
P4¶V joint stance on any UN SC-related matters, including the Yalta formula, and therefore 
later withdrew its proposed amendment in relation to limiting the scope of the veto.247 
With France joining the P5, the Big-3 had co-opted a significant international power, dealing 
a blow to the veto opposition bloc, which had lost one of its potentially most influential 
partners.  
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Some of the techniques used by the Big-3 to persuade other states to accept its DO proposal 
and the Yalta formula probably fall under the category of public relations, and did not deviate 
from acceptable legislative lobbying norms: for example, the UK gathering its Dominions 
immediately before the Conference in London and LWV³sales talk´ to the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and India.248 
In the case of the US, choosing to locate the Conference in the ³EHDXWLIXO´FLW\RI6DQ
Francisco, on the west coast of the US, required the great majority of the delegates, their 
consultants, and their entourages travelling thousands of extra miles. This journey across the 
US of three to four days by train for some delegates, and of multiple stops and many hours of 
flight for others, was apparently intended to enable the heads of state to see the size and the 
greatness of the US, while also presumably giving the VIP delegates ample time to 
contemplate the world organisation and who would be entrusted with running it. 
In addition to the trip and accommodation costs being fully paid for by the US government, 
there were many side events at the Conference organised by the host country. Some of these 
were intended to impress the participants with the military might and sacrifices of the US, 
such as showing off the latest US Air Force planes or visiting the military cemetery in south 
San Francisco, where young US servicemen from the Pacific battlefield were being buried. 
Others were aimed at just showing off the greatness of the city, or were intended to entertain: 
a visit to the Golden Gate Bridge, sightseeing and shopping trips, films at the UN cinema, 
with two showings of mostly Hollywood glamour films up to the midnight hour, and nightly 






news bulletins. These side events were as much about being a good host as demonstrating to 
the smaller nations and delegates of war-torn countries that the US was powerful, rich and 
caring.249 
However, in addition to these public relations and lobbying techniques, the Big-3 also used, 
both before and during the Conference, other measures in order to ensure the acceptance of 
the Charter that, in varying degrees, qualify as coercive. 
In Section 4.3 above it was mentioned that the US government was, to a large extent, spying 
on high-level delegates and their staff. To what extent the information gathered through these 
covert operations was used by the US to influence the outcome of the Conference is not clear, 
but the mere practice of espionage was unacceptable and in violation of the rules of any 
conference. 
There were also overt and public exhibitions of power and of the Big-¶VUHVROYHWRNHHSthe 
permanent-member privileges and the veto. These demonstrations of power made it clear 
that, without these privileges, the Big-3 would literally destroy the proposed Charter, and 
there would be no UN. In addition to the newspaper headlines, editorials and radio interviews 
that, by and large, reflected the US government¶V view of the necessity of the Yalta formula, 
and which were subject to wartime-censorship rules, these public displays of power, two of 
which are cited below, were intended to undermine the anti-veto lobby at San Francisco. 
4.5.4 Cocktail with Molotov and the Connally Act 
During his short stay at the Conference, after the Soviets had finalised with the US, the UK 
and China what DO amendments they would allow to the final Charter, and just before he left 
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for Moscow, Molotov held an important, well-attended news briefing. In a soft but very 
assertive manner, he emphasised the unanimity of the permanent members on the veto issue 
and the uncompromising nature of the Yalta formula. This strong ³take-it-or-leave-it´ Soviet 
stance on the issue was echoed a few days later by Andrei Gromyko in a speech at the 
American±Russian Institute in San Francisco, to an audience of five hundred people, as well 
as during the reception that followed.250 
A more dramatic, and probably psychologically more important, blow to the anti-veto 
opposition at the conference was delivered by Texas Senator Tom Connally, chair of the US 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the US representative to Commission III/1. The 
Conference closure was delayed twice, primarily because of deadlock over the Council 
voting provisions that were being discussed by the Committee. Senator Connally vividly 
recalled his actions before a crucial committee vote on the veto:251 
Then standing before the assembled delegates with a copy of the charter draft in my 
hands, I made the final plea. µ<RXPD\JRKRPHIURP6DQ)UDQFLVFR²LI\RXZLVK¶,
FDXWLRQHGWKHGHOHJDWHV¶DQGUHSRUWWKDW\RXKDYHGHIHDWHd the veto. µ<HV¶,ZHQWRQ
µ<ou can say you defeated the veto « But you can also VD\µWHWRUHXSWKHFKDUWHU¶ 
At that point, I sweepingly ripped the charter draft in my hands to shreds and flung 
the scraps with disgust on the table. The delegates fell silent, while I stared 
belligerently at one face after another. 
6HQDWRU&RQQDOO\¶VGUDPDWLc act occurred at the place and time where it counted most, at the 
Committee III/1 meeting during the last working days of the conference in June, just before 
the vote on Australia¶V DPHQGPHQWWRWHVWWKHGHOHJDWHV¶UHVROYHLQFRQIURQWLQJWKHP5¶Vveto 
power.  
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By the second week in San Francisco, the anti-veto rebellion had amassed a clear majority of 
more than 30 States,252 which had submitted more than 20 amendments or proposals to 
eliminate or modify the P5¶VSULYLOHJHVDQGWKHLUSURSRVed Yalta formula. But, by the second 
month of the conference, the anti-veto opposition was cracking. The legitimate and 
illegitimate methods used by the permanent members to subdue WKHPDMRULW\VWDWHV¶
opposition, coupled with their uncompromising stand on the Yalta formula, made the weaker 
VWDWHV¶quest for equality futile. It had become clear to all the states represented at San 
Francisco that, on the substantive SC section, the Conference was about dictation rather than 
negotiation.  
However, since both sides were seeking a new world order and global governance, and were 
striving for a world Charter, the question was how much of a statutory concession and 
compromise each side was willing to make in the last remaining days of the Conference. 
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In continuation of the discussion of the constitutional battle over the 3¶VSHUPDQHQW
membership of the SC and their special voting privileges, this chapter recounts the statutory 
debate for the proposed UN Charter.  
Drawing on the original UNCIO documents, meeting summaries and rapporteur reports, I 
will use this chapter to set out the core arguments for and against the SC¶V structure, 
especially the Yalta formula. Particular attention is paid to points and arguments that have 
proved valid throughout WKH81¶Valmost seven decades of existence. Although the battle to 
correct the democratic deficiencies of the Council by the weaker states in San Francisco was 
lost, these VWDWHV¶ contingency plans and efforts to give the formula a temporary effect will be 
examined.  
In this Plan B attempt, with only a few days remaining until the end of the Conference, a 
breakthrough was made and a great compromise reached. The statutory promise made by the 
P5 in response to the majority opposition to the veto was that, after 10 years, the Charter 
would be reviewed and the Yalta formula would be subject to change, removal or 
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confirmation. The confidence of both sides in the effectiveness of this change and review 
process, inspired by the more than twenty-seven amendments to the US Constitution, was so 
high that the related resolution was almost unanimously adopted. The compromise was 
embodied in paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Charter, which promised a special review of 
the Charter after a 10-year period, with a one-time, simple majority vote in favour of it being 
held.  
This statutory promise was particularly attractive to the weaker states because, with the 
concurrence and support of the P5, the promise was initiated and fully supported by the most 
powerful P5 state, the US. 
The objective of Chapters 4 and 5, therefore, is by means of legislative history to establish the 
original intent of the majority of Conference participants concerning the structure of the 
Council and the limited and temporary nature of the veto. It also seeks to establish the 
objectives and the intentions of the P5 and the weaker states, and the agreement reached 
between them, concerning the Charter review and revision process. The compromise 
agreement reached at the Conference²the San Francisco promise²was enshrined in Article 
109 of the Charter. Particular attention will be paid to the letter and the spirit of paragraph 3 
of Article 109, so as to assess its good faith performance in later chapters. 
5.2 Battle over Permanent Five Supremacy²the Veto Fight on Two 
Fronts 
Commission III Committee 1 (Committee III/1) was where the main debate and the battle for 
P5 Charter supremacy took place. At Committee III/1, Security Council Structure and 
Procedures, the P5 privileges were being tackled head-on by the anti-veto bloc. In parallel, 
the smaller powers had devised contingency plans aimed at reducing the effect of the veto or 
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its longevity²the topics of another committee. Should the veto remain, the weaker states 
were striving to ensure that they could revise the Charter at a later date or enable themselves 
to withdraw from the organisation altogether. The topics of Charter amendments, revisions 
and withdrawal all fell under general provisions and were the task of Commission I 
Committee 2 (Committee I/2), to be discussed in later sections. Together, these two 
Committees became the legislative battlegrounds for challenging the 3¶V supremacy. 
Although the majority of the anti-veto camp was made up of Latin American countries, Dr. 
Evatt, Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs of Australia, had become the de 
facto leader of the opposition. In the Security Council Structures and Procedures, Committee 
(III/1), Dr. Evatt had to contend with Senator Tom Connally of the US, who was the primary 
spokesman for the P5, as well as the Chair of the powerful US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 
The main argument employed by the Big-3 to justify the formula was that they had made 
great sacrifices during the war, and that they, together with China and France, were the best 
equipped and most prepared to commit troops in order to keep the peace anywhere on the 
globe. And, since they were expected to commit the troops needed for these global peace-
keeping missions, in a standing army, as proposed by the Military Staff Committee under the 
SC, the P5 claimed a right to special privileges in the Council.  
Russian delegate Andrei Gromyko put the following argument in favour of the permanency 
of the permanent members:253 
«WRJLYHSHUPDQHQWVHDWVLQWKH&RXQFLOWRILYHJUHDWSRZHUVLVLQUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKH
obvious fact that the Security Council can possess sufficient means and forces 
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necessary for the maintenance of peace only if it permanently includes those countries 
which have sufficient resources in men and material necessary for the successful and 
effective fulfillment of its duties. 
The French delegates, after they had formally accepted the permanent seat at the Council, 
were more specific on the 3¶V promise of setting up a permanent UN military force. Joseph 
Paul-Boncour, the former French Prime Minister, elaborated on the role of the Military Staff 
Committee as an organ of the SC, explaining at the Conference:254 
«$QLQWHUQDWLRQDOIRUFHLVto be formed and placed at the disposal of the Security 
&RXQFLOLQRUGHUWRLQVXUHUHVSHFWIRULWVGHFLVLRQ« An international Military Staff 
Committee will draw up plans for employing this collective force under an 
international command to be determined if and when occasion arises. 
In this way, the international Organization will no longer be unarmed against 
violence. 7KHIRUFHIXOLGHDRIRXUZULWHU3DVFDOZLOOQRORQJHUEHEHOLHGµVWUHQJWK
without justice is tyrannical, and justice without strength is a PRFNHU\¶ 
When Committee III/1 commenced work, it was already confronted with 21 amendments by 
20 states related to Chapter VI of Dumbarton Oaks²the SC. Most of these amendments were 
related to the composition and the enlargement of the SC, as well as to alterations in its 
proposed voting procedures in Section C, to do away with or limit the P5¶s voting 
privileges.255 
%\WKHVHFRQGZHHNRIWKH&RQIHUHQFHWKHQXPEHURIFRXQWULHVRSSRVLQJWKH&RXQFLO¶V
composition and its voting procedures was snowballing and had grown to 30 states²the 
overwhelming majority of the states invited to the Conference.256 
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News from the Conference was leaking out, and the media were quick to pick up on the scope 
and nature of the debate, as well as the extent of the ZHDNHUVWDWHV¶ discontent. The general 
public in some countries, particularly in the US, was beginning to comprehend the exclusive 
and unequal nature of the SC¶VVWUXFWXUH, the most powerful organ of the proposed 
organisation.257 In particular, for Conference delegates, their governments, and the general 
public, the spotlight was now on the veto.  
Furthermore, US intelligence DQGWKH86$UP\¶Vmagic operation was intercepting the 
delegates¶ DQGRWKHUVWDWHV¶LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQVEHIRUHDQGGXULQJWKH
conference, revealing the large number of states discontented with the veto, and the wide 
scope of that discontent.258  
By the third week of the Conference, the greater part of the P4 after-hours meetings at the 
Fairmont Hotel penthouse was dedicated to how to combat the VPDOOHUSRZHUV¶FKDOlenge to 
their supremacy. The Big-3 head delegates were asking their national leaders for advice and 
help. The Conference President, US Secretary of State Stettinius, was keeping President 
Truman informed and, having communicated the grave state of affairs at the Conference and 
the possibility of failure in San Francisco, requested 3UHVLGHQW7UXPDQ¶VSHUVRQDO
intervention with foreign leaders in quelling the anti-veto opposition.259 
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The Big-3, having had some reservations and differing views on the veto at the outset, had, 
by the middle of the Conference, reconciled and reaffirmed their uncompromising stance on 
the veto question. They became unwilling to grant even minor concessions on limiting the 
applicability of the veto or on allowing a more liberal interpretation of the formula.  
By the middle of the Conference, the persuasions, coercions, and other methods mentioned in 
the previous chapter were being applied by the P5 in full force. The dramatic world events 
that took place during those eight weeks of the Conference, and the uncertainties and anxiety 
they created for the weaker states, helped turn the psychological tide in favour of the P5 and 
their demand for special powers in return for the promise of global peace and governance.  
GerPDQ\¶V surrender on 7 May 1945 coincided with the second week of the Conference. The 
rapidity of the Soviet and communist expansion into Eastern Europe caused many of the 
European heads of state and high-level delegations to depart quickly from the Conference in 
order to stabilise their immediate domestic situations. With the Soviet and communist 
expansion westwards, many Western European states represented in San Francisco needed 
the US and the UK on their side as a counterbalance to the Soviet push, and therefore 
softened their anti-veto stance, hoping for some sort of collective security arrangement. As 
for Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Stalin did not, of course, have to worry about the 
voting behaviour of their self-installed regimes, such as the Byelorussian and Ukrainian 
SSRs. 
The French invasion of Syria, which occurred as the Conference was taking place, not only 
shook the Arab League countries present in San Francisco but also sent a sobering message 
about the rule of force and the might of the past colonisers to all the current and ex-colonial 
states, a few of which were selectively invited to the Conference. For these states, basic 
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human rights and the implied anticolonial text of the Charter, as well as the creation of the 
Trusteeship Council &KDSWHU;,,RIWKH&KDUWHULVGHGLFDWHGWRWKH³,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UXVWHHVKLS
6\VWHP´, were of more immediate importance than the long-term potential dangers of the 
veto. Towards the end, these states abandoned their anti-veto stance. 
Countries such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Ethiopia, which at the beginning of the 
Conference had submitted amendments or had spoken against the veto, switched sides and 
were willing to accept the SC and its voting procedures package offered by Dumbarton Oaks. 
In the case of the Philippines, which was the only Eastern Asian state (other than the P5 
China) invited to the Conference, the war with Japan was continuing, and the possibility of a 
resurgent Japanese threat was troubling its delegation. Therefore, with the US message to the 
Philippines¶ chief delegate, General Romulo, WKDWWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶anti-veto stance was not 
acceptable, the Philippines softened its position and accepted the formula.260  
As to Latin American states, the US in addition to trying to influence the position of the 
countries under its military and economic might, used the influence and services of Nelson 
Rockefeller to deal with the large contingent of Latin American states opposing the veto. 
Unlike the other continents, such as Asia or Africa, the AmericDQFRQWLQHQW¶VVWDWHVZHUH
almost fully represented at the Conference. Based on an analysis of the verbatim records of 
the plenary sessions and the formal amendments proposal to the DO mentioned in Chapter 4, 
it seems a great majority of the 19 Latin American countries present in San Francisco were 
opposed to the representation scheme on the Council and the Yalta formula of Chapter VI of 
Dumbarton Oaks.  
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The great wealth of the Rockefeller family was legendary at the time, and Nelson Rockefeller 
had extensive business ventures in Latin America, as well as personal relationships with some 
of its leaders. Although not part of the formal US delegation to San Francisco, Nelson 
Rockefeller was present as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Inter-American Affairs. 
During the Conference, he arranged for frequent individual and group meetings, 
entertainment and side events with the Latin American delegates. In addition to acting in his 
official capacity, Rockefeller, with both political and business motivations, was attempting to 
exert some of his personal and financial leverage to influence the Latin American votes.261 
Against this backdrop, the 9th meeting of Committee III/1, on 17 May, debated the question 
of the veto to a standstill. Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand raised a series of questions 
and potential situations concerning the applicability of the veto, which the UK and US 
GHOHJDWHV¶UHVSRQVHVKDGQRWFODULILHG. Furthermore, contradictory answers given by the P5 on 
some of the questions raised were indicative of a disagreement among them, adding to the 
confusion.  
At the same time, delegates from other states were asking additional critical legal questions 
on the veto. For example, Eelco van Kleffens, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
pointed out the legal dilemma inherent in the formula, whereby the SC KDG³TXDVL-MXGLFLDO´
functions in its jurisdiction for pacific settlement of disputes DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPH³H[HFXWLYH´
powers to enforce them. Thus, without any alterations to the formula, particularly in cases 
where a member of the P5 was party to a dispute, the Netherlands delegate pointed out that 
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³the guarantee of the elementary impartiality that should characterise any quasi- judicial 
decision by the Council seems to fail´262 
At that stage, the Committee decided to create a subcommittee to elaborate and clarify the 
formula-related questions. Furthermore, the US delegate and chair of the Committee, Senator 
Connally, as is mentioned later in the chapter, set the terms of reference and indicated that the 
proposed subcommittee would not be able to decide or recommend changes to the veto, but 
could only clarify questions and provide interpretation and answers in respect of the 
situations where the veto would apply.  
5.3 The Twenty-Three Questions and the Power of the Formula 
The committee created to test the power of the formula and measure its scope and 
applicability was called Technical Subcommittee B. Subcommittee III/1/B met on 19 May 
and gave itself two days to prepare the list of questions. By 22 May, the subcommittee had 
compiled a list of 23 questions addressed to the sponsoring governments for clarifications and 
answers.263 Some of the questions raised were as follows (numbers below correspond to the 
question numbers as originally presented):264  
(3) If the attention of the Security Council is called to the existence of a dispute, or a 
situation which may give rise to a dispute, would the veto be applicable to a decision 
of the Security Council to exercise its power to investigate the dispute or situation? 
(9) Would the veto be applicable to a decision of the Security Council, at any stage of 
a dispute, to recommend to the parties appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment? 
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(10) Would the veto be applicable to a decision of the Security Council under the first 
sentence of this paragraph [referrals to ICJ]  that a dispute is of a justiciable 
character? 
(13) Would the veto be applicable to a decision of the Security Council to refer to the 
International Court of Justice a legal Question connected with a non-Justiciable 
dispute? 
(16) Would the veto be applicable to a decision of the Security Council that it 
determined the existence of any threat to the peace, etc.? 
(19) In case a decision has to be taken as to whether a certain point is a procedural 
matter, is that preliminary question to be considered in itself as a procedural matter 
or is the veto applicable to such preliminary question?  
(20) If a motion is moved in the Security Council on a matter, other than a matter of 
procedure, under the general words in paragraph 3 [the Yalta formula] , would the 
abstention from voting of any one of the permanent members of the Security Council 
have the same effect as a negative vote by that member in preventing the Security 
Council from reaching a decision on the matter? 
(21) If one of the permanent members of the Security Council is a party to a dispute, 
and in conformity with the proviso to paragraph 3 [Yalta formula section referring to 
Pacific Settlement cases] has abstained from voting on a motion on a matter, other 
than a matter of procedure, would its mere abstention prevent the Security Council 
from reaching a decision on the matter? 
(22) In case a decision has to be made under Chapter VIII, Section A, or under the 
second sentence of Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 1, [reference to Pacific 
Settlement and Regional Arrangements sections]  will a permanent member of the 
Council be entitled to participate in a vote on the question whether that permanent 
member is itself a party to the dispute or not?265 
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Days passed without a response from the would-be permanent powers. In the meantime, all 
discussions in the subcommittee and Committee III/1 were suspended and the deadline for 
the completion of the Conference had to be extended. 
It took the sponsoring states more than 16 days to respond to the ZHDNHUVWDWHV¶ memorandum 
on the list of questions. Their 7 June Joint Declaration of "Statement by the Delegations of 
the Four Sponsoring Governments on the Voting Procedure in the Security Council" avoided 
addressing the specific questions raised, and instead had generic comments with some 
examples that were not related to the questions asked.  
Some of the comments made by the P4 in their joint declaration were, for example, how 
unlikely it would be for the veto to be exercised by any permanent member on any question; 
that the Yalta formula was already an improvement on WKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV¶YRWLQJ
procedures at the League Council, the decisions of which were based on the unanimity of its 
members, with each member state having had the right of veto; and the fact that if all the non-
permanent members of the Council acted in unison they could also enjoy a veto and, in effect, 
be the sixth permanent member. The only question the P4 actually addressed was question 
19, where they clarified that permanent members would have the power to veto whether a 
question raised before the Council was procedural or substantive.266 
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Sub-committee III/1/B concluded its work, therefore, without accomplishing its mission of 
clarifying the voting procedures in the Council. When the subcommittee report was given to 
its parent, Committee III/1, Dr. Evatt of Australia and other delegates, expressing their 
dissatisfaction with the P4¶V response, asked the Committee to specifically register in its 
records that the sponsoring governments¶ response was not adopted by the Committee. 
Meanwhile, valuable time reaching a mutually acceptable compromise on the formula was 
lost, and the US government, as the host of the Conference, was pushing for its closure, 
which was already delayed primarily because of the SC voting questions. 
Senator Connally, presenting the US¶V view to the Committee that the US and the Big-3 were 
fully committed to the formula and that there was essentially no room for compromise, and 
that time was running out, told the delegates that they had to make up their mind to adopt the 
veto or go home.267 
The rapid international developments at the end of the war, during the months of April, May, 
and June of 1945, coincided with the timing of the Conference, and the pressure to conclude 
the Conference in June, coupled with the persuasion, coercion and procedural limitations 
exerted by the P5, practically brought the anti-veto drive to a stop.  
Given the choice of no Charter, or having a world organisation with a birth defect²what 
Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand and some others dubbed WKH³HYLOveto´VHHbelow) 
²the states were, one-by-one, opting for the latter.  
The last-ditch effort by the anti-veto camp to test the will and the level of commitment of 
their constituents was recommended by Australia.  
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Dr. Evatt and the die-hard anti-veto states agreed, on 12 June 1945, with the permanent 
members at Committee III/1, to put the Australian amendment, as a test amendment, to a 
vote. Should the Australian amendment, which essentially took away the veto right on the 
pacific settlement of disputes, be adopted, the plan was then to put forward other sWDWHV¶
amendments that were more liberal and in many or all cases would eliminate the veto entirely 
and put the voting rights of the P5 in equality with the rights of the others. Should the 
Australian amendment fail to get adopted, then the Committee would, without discussion of 
any other amendments, directly put the formula to a vote. 
At the 19th meeting of Committee III/1, on June 12, the Australian amendment was put to a 
vote. The amendment failed, with 10 in favour, 20 against, and 15 abstentions.268  
The countries voting in favour were: Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Panama.  
Among approximately 30 countries that had either presented amendments, made proposals, 
or had spoken against the Dumbarton Oaks proposal on the composition and voting 
procedures of the SC, only the above 10 states directly challenged the permanent members 
and the Big-¶Vformula. With Prime Minister Fraser having described the formula as an 
³HYLO´YRWLQJV\VWHPDQGWKH0H[LFDQGHOHJDWHVhaving remarked that what the Big-3 
proposed was D³ZRUOGRUGHULQZKLFKWKHPLFHFRXOGEHVWDPped out but in which the lion 
ZRXOGQRWEHUHVWUDLQHG´269this group of countries was steadfast in its belief that the proposed 
SC was under-representative, undemocratic, and, as Eelco van Kleffens, Foreign Minister of 
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the Netherlands, described LWD³TXDVL-MXGLFLDO´RUJDQWKDWPL[HVthe jury, the judge and the 
executioner.270  
As to the group of countries that gave in to the pressure exerted by the P5 and, despite their 
true wishes, made sure the Australian motion did not pass, 15 of those states still registered 
their discontent by abstaining. The common view of the abstaining states, such as Argentina, 
Belgium, Canada, Greece, Syria, Turkey and Venezuela, was perhaps best expressed by 
,QGLD¶VFKLHIGelegate, Mr. Ramaswami MudaliarDVVWDWHGLQ,QGLD¶V abstention opinion:271 
It should be stressed that during the debate [SC voting] the representatives of the 
sponsoring powers made it clear that they were neither prepared to accept any 
modification to the Yalta formula, nor to agree to a more liberal interpretation 
thereof than that contained in their Joint Declaration of June 7, 1945, that any 
unfavorable action of the Committee on the voting formula would imperil the whole 
work of the Conference. It was on this understanding that many of the delegations 
voted for or abstained from voting against the Yalta formula. 
 Ramaswami Mudaliar also noted that, by agreeing to the formula, they were also agreeing to 
a period of 10 years as the expiration date on the veto. His understanding was based on 
several proposals that were put forward on putting time-limits on the veto that would make 
the formula subject to re-evaluation at a future review conference, which was the subject of 
the parallel Committee I/2. The Indian delegate elaborated on his understanding, which was 
shared by many of the 15 states which had also abstained, by stating: 272  
On that understanding, my country was prepared to agree to the Yalta formula over a 
period. And I made my position clear, and that of my country clear²and I believe 
several other countries did the same in the course of those discussion²that while 
they were prepared to agree to the Yalta formula over the next ten years, it would be a 
very proper proposition on their part to urge that the whole position should be 
reexamined, de nouveau, without prejudice, and without commitments either of one 
kind or another, at the end of that period. That naturally took us to a consideration of 
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the amendment sections and on what conditions amendment of the Charter may be 
proposed. And we felt that if this unanimity rule were not to be applied at the end of 
ten years to any proposal regarding the amendment of the Charter, we could safely, 
and with good conscience and with complete trust and confidence in the five great 
powers, agree to the complete Yalta formula during the intervening period of ten 
years. 
The 20 states which voted against the motion²in addition to the P5 and the countries they 
directly dominated, such as the Soviet Bloc states²included some of the states that were 
anti-veto at the beginning of the Conference but, towards the end, completely reversed their 
stance. One example was the Philippine Commonwealth, which, as mentioned previously, 
was ordered by the US to align itself with US policies at the Conference. Another example is 
Lebanon, which, after the French renewed colonial activities in the Middle East, also aligned 
itself with the Big-3¶V stance at the Conference. The Lebanese delegate, after declaring his 
support for the formula, gave the following explanation at the Committee:273 
[S]ince his country was a small one it felt that its only guarantee of independence and 
freedom from aggression lay in a successful international organization. Though the 
ULJKWRIµYHWR¶was an evil his delegation accepted it, because the alternative was a 
thousand times worse. 
Another typical instance of opposing the Australian amendment while expressing support for 
the anti-veto camp was that of Denmark, which, similar to many other states in Europe with 
Allied troops on its soil, felt obliged to support the Big-3¶V wishes. 
Based on the report of the &RPPLWWHH¶V5DSSRUWHXU'HQPDUN¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKHformula is 
recorded as follows:274 
The liberation of Denmark had been made possible by their [Big-3]  collaboration. 
Her fate in the future is dependent upon it. Although there were limitations in the 
Charter, Denmark would take a realistic view. He believed that the Delegation of 
                                                 
273
 (UNCIO - Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions 1945): 486. 
274
 Ibid: 488. 
169 
 
Denmark could best contribute to a speedy conclusion of the Conference by voting for 
the proposal as it stood. 
After the Australian amendment was voted down, as most of the other sWDWHV¶SURSRVHG
amendments to the formula were not withdrawn, those remaining in the queue were 
procedurally up for debate and vote. However, with the Committee understanding that other 
sWDWHV¶DPHQGPHQWVLQWKHTXHXHZould be ignored as a consequence of a no vote on the 
Australian amendment, the Committee immediately moved to put the Section C Council 
voting procedures of DO, as it was originally proposed by the Big-3, to a vote at its next 
meeting on 13 June.  
The UK urged the delegates to vote in favour of the text of Section C as is, or risk the world 
VOLGLQJLQWRWKH³GDUNDJHV´. The UK delegate, in his pitch in favour of the formula, warned of 
³$UPDJHGGRQ´LIWKH81ZDVQRWHVWDEOLVKHGDVSURSRVHGE\WKH3275 
Without that unanimity [veto] , all countries, large and small would fall victims to the 
establishment of gigantic rival blocs which might clash in some future Armageddon. 
Cooperation among the great powers was the only escape from this peril; nothing 
else was of comparable importance« If the Committee desired to see a world 
Organization established, it would approve the voting provisions as they now stood. 
The main veto legitimiser and spokesman for the P5 at the Conference, Senator Connally, on 
behalf of the US delegation, reiterated that the veto was what President Roosevelt and the US 
wanted; it had been presented at Yalta, the Big-3 had adopted it, and the proposal was later 
agreed to by China and France. Therefore, with P5 unanimity on the subject, there was no 
room for debate. Connally then reassured the weaker states that, as the Big-3 had guided the 
world to victory, they would do the same in the future to keep the peace. According to the 
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5DSSRUWHXU¶VUHSRUW6HQDWRU&RQQDOO\DOVRmentioned time limitations and the urgency with 
which the Committee needed to make up its mind:276 
He reminded the Committee that the Conference had been in session for 8 weeks and 
that the British Delegate in the previous meeting had asserted that the sponsoring 
governments and France had gone as far they could go with respect to the voting 
procedure in the Security Council. He asked if delegates could face public opinion at 
home if they reported that they had killed the veto but had also killed the Charter.  
Senator Connally¶VILQDO act in support of the veto, just before the Australian amendment was 
put to a vote, was in fact very dramatic and had a profound effect on the outcome of both the 
rejection of the amendment and the adoption of the formula the following day. As observers 
have reported, and Senator Connally has described in his own memoires, the Senator 
³EHOOLJHUHQWO\´ORRNHG the delegates in the eye DWWKH&RPPLWWHHZKLOH³WHDULQJWKH &KDUWHU´, 
essentially giving them no choice but to accept the Yalta formula or go home and report that 
³:HWRUHXSWKHFKDUWHU´277 
This exhibition of threat and belligerence on the part of Senator Connally was very effective 
in communicating the US¶VERWWRPOLQH and was a display of force that perhaps the delegates 
might have expected from the Soviet Union, but not from the US²the host, principal creator 
and sponsor of the proposed global governance organisation. 
Many of the states in San Francisco looked to the US for global leadership, and the global 
lHDGHU¶VILQDOZRUGRQWKe legitimacy of the decisions of the SC had been uttered. 
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When the formula was put to a vote on 13 June 1945, just a few days before the finalisation 
of the statutory part of the conference, it was adopted. Paragraph 3 of Section C, the part 
related to the veto, was adopted by a roll-call: 30 in favour, 2 opposed, and 15 abstentions.278 
Before analysing the vote in terms of the opinion of the states which were in favour, as well 
as the dissenting opinion of the large number of states that abstained, two caveats need to be 
mentioned. 
)LUVWLWLVTXHVWLRQDEOHZKHWKHUWKHPRWLRQVDWLVILHGWKH&RQIHUHQFH¶VYRWLQJUXOHVRQ
substantive questions requiring a two-thirds majority to pass a motion; in which case, it 
would have needed 32 votes of the 47 States which were present at the time of the vote, 
whereas it was two short of the minimum. Nevertheless, the resolution was considered 
adopted by the Committee.279 Based on the Committee¶V adoption, Commission III and the 
plenary subsequently also adopted the formula as Article 27 of the UN Charter.  
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With this qualified majority caveat, by 13 June up until the end of the Conference, the number of states present 
and eligible to vote (after a few additions) totalled 50. Based on that number, a two-thirds majority would have 
required 34 affirmative votes to carry it. In regard to the vote on the Yalta formula, counting the three countries 
that were absent at the time of the roll-call, the two-thirds majority requirement based on those present would be 
32 affirmative votes. Consequently, under both of these test conditions, the motion by the Big-3 to amend 
Dumbarton Oaks would fail. Thus, one conclusion that can be drawn is that the formula, procedurally, was 
adopted incorrectly. 
  
Of course, one possibility is that states abstaining were excluded from the count, just like the states which were 
absent and not voting. This loose definition of present and voting is 
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Secondly, although the formula was adopted, its interpretation and scope of application 
remained ambiguous. In fact, at the request of Australia, India, and many other states, it was 
formally recorded at the Committee²and the Commission reports²that the P4 joint 
declaration in response to the twenty-three questions and the interpretation of the formula 
was formally rejected as being the official interpretation of Article 27.280 In other words, the 
interpretation of the situations in which the veto could be applied remained largely 
unresolved. 
The two diehard anti-veto states that had cast a no vote in relation to the formula were 
Colombia and Cuba. These two states were prepared to risk no UN rather than accept a 
Charter which legitimised the P5¶V sXSUHPDF\DQGSURYLGHG³ZRUOGRUGHU´XQGHUWKHVKDGRZ
of the veto.  
The Cuban delegation¶Vobjection to the Yalta formula in was presented as follows:281 
His Delegation had not been convinced by arguments in favor of the veto, for if 
unanimity really existed among the great powers the veto was superfluous. 
Furthermore, the veto might help to bring on war through lack of action by the 
Council. The Cuban Delegation wanted not only world order but world Justice. 
One of the main Colombian concerns, similar to Cuba¶V, was that a lack of unanimity among 
permanent members would be a more frequent occurrence than their unanimity and would 
lead to lack of action, therefore creating a dysfunctional SC. Further, in principle, Colombia 
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was against constitutionalising unequal rights for sovereign states,282 a view which they felt 
was widely shared despite the abstaining VWDWHV¶GHFLVLRQWRDFTXLHVFH. The Colombian 
Foreign Minister, Lleras Camargo, in his dissenting opinion, stated:283 
>:@KHQWKHYRWHZDVWDNHQ&RORPELD¶VRSLQLRQ was shared only by Cuba. The great 
majority of the countries represented in this Conference, however, do share the fears 
of Colombia and of Cuba, and a considerable number of abstentions was registered. 
It is apparent that those abstentions have the same PHDQLQJDVRXUQHJDWLYHYRWH« 
Without the negative vote of Colombia and Cuba, the veto power would have 
appeared as unanimously adopted, and the abstentions would have been interpreted 
in a different light. 
The 15 States that had abstained constituted almost one-third of the countries present at the 
time of voting.284 These states included seven of the original 10 countries that seemed to have 
acted in unison and had voted in favour of the Australian amendment before abstaining from 
the vote on the formula: Australia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand and Panama; with two of those original 10 states, Cuba and Colombia, actually 
voting no. 
The 15 abstentions included eight additional states that had abstained or voted against the 
Australian amendment before giving into the Big-¶VGHPDQGVWKXs ensuring that the formula 
came up for adoption. Now, in the final vote, these states intended to register their true 
intention and opposition to the veto by abstaining. These eight states were: Argentina, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru.  
Taking into account the voting pattern of the states that voted in both the Australian test 
amendment and in the second round of the formula adoption, plus the states which had 
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aligned their voting patterns with the P5 on both these voting occasions, but nevertheless 
throughout the conference had demonstrated their objection to the structure of the SC and its 
voting procedures, my research indicates that at least 31 states (a majority of over 60 per 
cent) present in San Francisco were opposed to the formula.285 
Why did these majority states at the Conference vote against their true wishes? 
Setting aside the coercive circumstances detailed in Chapter 8, the short answer is that these 
states had accepted the P5¶s supremacy but believed their endorsement of the veto-power of 
the P5 to be temporary. In addition, they had devised contingency plans in those last few days 
of the Conference to ensure the future circumvention, modification and possible elimination 
of the formula in the Charter.  
With ³PLJKWEHLQJULJKW´DVWKH1HWKHUODQGV¶GHOHJDWHdescribed it, and in view of the 
uncompromising stance adopted by the Big-3, in order to ensure the temporary effect of the 
veto, the weaker states had contemplated more than one Plan B. Three contingency plans 
were devised by the anti-veto states and pursued in parallel. 
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The first, less favoured, contingency plan was to be able to withdraw from the organisation if 
the P5-dominated Council proved to be unbearable. The second plan was to make Charter 
amendments initiated from the bottom up easy by removing the veto right on the amendment 
procedures proposed at Dumbarton Oaks. The third contingency plan, which was more 
popular with the veto opposition, was to fix a Charter review and revision at a set date in the 
future. 
 
5.4 Can a Member State Withdraw from the UN Charter? 
While the anti-veto battle was still going on in Committee III/1, and it seemed that the 
formula would prevail, some states contemplated their future exit strategy²a withdrawal 
clause to be added to the Charter. 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposal did not have a withdrawal provision. This was intentional on 
the part of the American architects of the proposed UN, mainly because of the experience of 
the withdrawal of critical states, such as Japan, from the League of Nations during its brief 
history, and considered to be one of the reasons for the League¶V demise. 
The withdrawal contingency, which was favoured by some states, was to advocate in 
Commission I Committee 2²ZKLFKKDG³JHQHUDOSURYLVLRQV´DQG³DPHQGPHQWV´DVSDUWRI
its terms of reference²for an amendment to allow for withdrawals from the UN Charter.  
By 13 June, the anti-veto battle was already lost in Committee III/1, the SC section; and in 
WKHIROORZLQJIHZGD\V¶GLVFXVVLRQVLQ Committee I/2 the proposal to exclude the permanent 
member veto from Charter amendments and revisions at the ratification stage, as proposed in 
the DO, was also being resisted by the Big-3.  
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At the 16 and 17 June meetings of Committee I/2, the question of withdrawal came up.  
Many of the states that had been opposed to the inclusion of a withdrawal provision in the 
Charter were having a change of heart. The Netherlands delegate stated that, as a result of 
EHLQJ³LPSRVVLEOHWRFKDQJHWKHYRWLQJSURFHGXUH´WKH1HWKHUODQGVJRYHUQPHQW reluctantly, 
was reconsidering its opinion on the withdrawal question. Australia also expressed a similar 
view. According to the Committee report, Ecuador¶Vdelegate, echoing the same sentiments, 
stated:286 
[T]the decisions of the Committee at its last meeting [retention of veto on 
amendments]  left many states no alternative but to insist on the right of withdrawal. 
He admitted that a withdrawal clause might weaken the Charter. 
In addition, Canada, Egypt, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela, among others, were now favouring 
amendment of the DO text to allow for withdrawal.287 However, with the memories of the 
League still fresh, not all the anti-veto states were in favour of an opt-out clause in the 
Charter.  
The debate that followed on the topic of withdrawals, mostly at the 28th meeting of 
Committee I/2, held on June 17, ended up being inconclusive. Even among the Big-3 there 
was disagreement between the USSR and the US. The US was against member states 
withdrawing from the Charter, whereas the USSR favoured a more lenient approach to the 
question of withdrawals, prompting Andrei Gromyko to cite from the Soviet constitution, 
which allowed for the secession of the Soviet Republics from the Union.288 While most states 
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were in basic agreement that the right of withdrawal should exist, some states, including the 
US and France, were insisting that it should be conditional and based on certain terms.  
In the ensuing debate, the final compromise was not to provide formally for state withdrawal 
in the Charter, but to state its possibility as a separate commentary and document it. The final 
text proposed by Belgium, in the context of a commentary, was voted on and adopted by the 
Committee. The commentary, with some modifications, was adopted by Commission I at its 
5th meeting on 25 June 1945. The text allowed a member state, under certain conditions²for 
example, a Charter amendment that was not ratified by that member state²to leave the 
organisation.289  
Therefore, those states in favour of adding a withdrawal section in the Charter were defeated, 
and the final UN Charter adopted in San Francisco has no withdrawal provision. 
5.5 The Question of Veto on Amendments: Is the Charter Mutable? 
A second, more sought-after contingency plan for the anti-veto states²should the formula 
remain²was to be able easily to change the formula via future Charter amendments. 
However, in Chapter XI of Dumbarton Oaks, where the question of amendments to the 
statutes was covered, the veto had omnipresence, and the ratification of any Assembly-
adopted amendments required the concurrence of all five permanent members. 
Practically all of the anti-veto states that opposed the formula were also inherently opposed to 
the veto of constitutional amendments. The leading veto opposition states in Committee III/1 
continued their attack on the veto in Committee I/2, as well as objecting to the formula¶V
applicability to future Charter amendments. Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand warned 
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against giving the veto D³SHUPDQHQWVWDWXV´E\LQFRUSRUDWLQJLWLQWKH&KDUWHU¶Vamendment 
articles.290 Furthermore, Vice-Prime Minister Forde of Australia, at one of the plenary 
VHVVLRQVDGYRFDWHGWKDWWKH81&KDUWHUVKRXOGEHD³ZRUNDEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQ´PDNLQJ a 
comparison with the amendment process in the US Constitution, in which the unanimity of 
the states is not required. Forde stated:291 
We were reminded yesterday of the futility of straining after a perfect Charter. This is 
true, but we must not let that idea block the possibilities of improving the Charter 
here and now. Nor must we allow the possibilities of improvement later to be 
obstructed by adopting too rigid a constitutional form. Mr. Stettinius [US Secretary of 
State]  reminded us that ten vital amendments in the United States Constitution were 
made within four years of its adoption. The parallel must not be pushed too far. No 
amendment of the Charter as it now stands will be possible without the unanimous 
consent of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Any one of the five 
will therefore be able to make the present constitution immutable. If the United States 
Constitution had given to the five major original states similar entrenched position, I 
do not think that many constitutional amendments would have been carried. 
At the 26th meeting of Committee I/2, on June 16, the US delegate stated that, ³VRIDUDVKLV
country was concerned the language of the sponsoriQJJRYHUQPHQWV¶DPHQGPHQWWR Chapter 
;,ZDVHVVHQWLDO´, thereby implying that the Big-¶VGHFLVLRQRQ the veto¶VDSSOLFDELOLW\WRWKH
amendments must stay.292 
Canada and India, foreseeing a similar fate for the outcome of this Committee as that which 
had befallen Committee III/1 on the 6&¶V voting procedures, proposed that the question be 
deferred altogether, particularly on the subject of amendment proposals submitted in a 
Charter review conference, to a future conference to decide its own Charter amendment 
adoption and ratification procedures.293 While the P5 rejected this deferral proposal, they 
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were, at the same time, reassuring the smaller states that the veto would seldom, if ever, be 
used and would be a particularly rare occurrence in the case of Charter amendments.  
The French delegate, believing that the veto would probably never be applied, described the 
XVHRIWKHWHUP³YHWR´DV³XQIRUWXQDWH´7KH&KLQHVHGHOHJDWHHFKRLQJWKHVDPHRSLQLRQ
went even further, heralding the possibility of eliminating the veto. According to the 
5DSSRUWHXU¶Vreport, the Chinese delegate stated:294 
[T]he veto might prove much less important than expected and might, in fact, never be 
used; he felt that it was not unreasonable to suppose that after a time the great 
powers would be willing to consider elimination of the veto. 
With these reassurances, and just before the original text of Dumbarton Oaks Chapter XI 
(Amendments) was to be put to a vote, Belgium intervened and introduced an amendment to 
the sSRQVRULQJJRYHUQPHQWV¶SURSRVDOE\DOWHULQJWKHsimple majority requirement for 
ratifications in the original text to a two-thirds majority.295 The Belgian text did not alter the 
concurrence requirement of the permanent members and was apparently intended to make a 
top-down alteration of the charter more difficult, but some of the weaker states disagreed 
with the Belgian proposal, since it also made bottom-up amendments more difficult. 
The Belgian amendment received the backing of the P5, and when it was put to the vote at 
the Subcommittee I/2/E on June 14, it was adopted by 6 votes in favour and 5 against. 296 
Two days later, at the 16 June meeting of the parent Committee, the sSRQVRULQJJRYHUQPHQWV¶
proposed text, with the Belgian amendment²increasing the simple majority requirement to 
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two-thirds²was adopted by Committee I/2 for the ratification stage for both future regular 
Charter amendments as well as amendments adopted at a Charter review conference.297 
Although Belgium was basically against the formula, and the reason for its intervention was 
to make P5-forced amendments more difficult, its action provoked contradictory opinions and 
confusion in the anti-veto camp. For example, while the Netherlands expressed support for 
the Belgian amendment, Australia and New Zealand spoke against it. ,Q'U(YDWW¶VRSLQLRQ
the Belgian intervention made an already difficult Charter amendment procedure even more 
difficult. 298 
In the case of the amendments and ratification procedures relating to a Charter review 
conference, the original sSRQVRULQJJRYHUQPHQWV¶WH[WDJDLQZLWKWKHVDPH%HOJLDQ
amendment, was put to the Committee vote and adopted by a vote of 29 in favour, 14 
opposed, 3 abstentions, and 4 absences. The proposed text related to the ratification of 
amendments as a result of a review conference. It was adopted and incorporated into 
Paragraph 2 of Article 109 of Chapter XVIII (Amendments) of the final UN Charter, which is 
essentially the same procedure as for regular amendments specified in Article 108 of the 
Charter. Article 109(2) reads as follows: 299 
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Any alterations of the Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the Conference 
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes by two-thirds of the members of the Organization, including all the 
permanent members of the Security Council. 
This contingency plan of eliminating the veto from the Charter amendment process, if 
successful, was probably the best Plan B for the veto opposition. Since these states were 
already a majority in San Francisco, and probably would be in the future, by introducing one 
or more amendments and mustering the required votes they could have altered the veto or 
even eliminated it all together.  
This possibility was, however, also apparent to the P5 and they saw the veto on adoption of 
Charter amendments as part of the formula package, and therefore subject to dictation rather 
than negotiation. To the veto opposition states, this fight was the same as their earlier one in 
the Committee related to the SC voting procedures, and, therefore, for the same reasons as in 
that battle, most of the anti-veto states were already prepared to give in to the P5¶V demand. 
5.6 Antidote to the Formula²Take Article LQ\HDUV¶7LPH 
The third contingency plan, and actually the favourite and most frequently cited alternative 
by the anti-veto camp, was to have a future Conference to review and revise the Charter 
within a five- to 10-year period. The idea was that, when the war conditions had ended, the 
permanent members would be more willing to relinquish some of their privileges and lean 
towards a more liberal SC. As the Cuban and other delegates had put it, this would enable the 
UN to SURYLGHIRU³QRWRQO\world order but world justice´300  
This vision of carrying out periodic revisions to the Charter, and making the UN a better and 
more effective global governance organisation, was in fact shared by the US, the main creator 
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of the organisation. Both before and during the Conference, US government officials had 
hinted at revisions to the Charter as a dynamic and desirable process. President Roosevelt, 
immediately after his return from Yalta, had made extensive announcements to the American 
public and Congress about the plan for the San Francisco Conference and the formation of 
the UN. In those speeches, Roosevelt had mentioned that Charter amendments were to be a 
normal process in the evolution of the future organisation.301 
The US delegate to Commission-I normally credited with introducing the US amendment to 
Dumbarton Oaks to hold periodic reviews of the Charter was Navy Commander and Ex-
Republican Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen.302 This US-proposed amendment came 
about, in part, as a reaction to the feedback the US was receiving from the Latin American 
countries and some other states that considered the veto highly objectionable. The 
information was emanating from both diplomatic and intelligence reports.303 
Therefore, the proposed US amendment to the DO on Charter review, although lacking any 
mention of timing or periods for the review, was considered a necessary feature and a policy 
of the US Government, as well as an effort to appease the participating states in signifying 
that constitutional changes were possible and being provided for. Commander Stassen, in 
reassuring the Conference delegates that there would be an opportunity to work out some of 
the questions and interpretations of the Charter after its adoption, and in a review conference, 
reflected on the US¶V own experience in this regard:304 
We know that even in the United States Constitution there have been questions of 
interpretation that had to be worked out with the experience of time, and finally 
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decided by divided interpretations even of the Supreme Court. So we should not be 
concerned or discouraged that we cannot here agree in precise and detailed language 
on all interpretations of this great document. 
Even the tough and inflexible Senator Connally, the head of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and head of the US delegation tasked with fighting for the formula in 
Commission III/1, was hinting at future Charter revisions. At the Committee, Connally 
referred to the evolutionary path of the US Constitution and the changes made to it as part of 
his argument to persuade the smaller states to vote in favour of the formula. Connally 
suggested that, similar to the framers RIWKHJUHDW86&RQVWLWXWLRQWKH\WRR³ZHUH creating 
RQHRIWKHJUHDWHVWGRFXPHQWVGUDZQE\WKHKDQGRIPDQ´305 
Another influential US official appointed along with the Republican delegation to the 
Conference was John Foster Dulles, the future secretary of state. Likening the proposed UN 
global governance to the 86¶V federal system, Dulles also alluded to the necessity of 
mutation and change at the UN. Speaking at one of the technical committees, Dulles 
argued:306 
The Organization in none of its branches or organs should intervene in what was 
essentially the domestic life of the member states. Moreover, this principle was 
subject to evolution. The United States had had long experience in dealing with a 
parallel problem, i.e., the relationship between the forty eight states and the Federal 
Government. Today, the Federa1 Government of the United States exercised an 
authority undreamed of when the Constitution was formed, and the people of the 
United States were grateful for the simple conceptions contained in their Constitution. 
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Therefore, in the view of the US, an evolving UN with a Charter review and amendment 
mechanism was not just a measure to appease the veto-opposition, but a genuine proposition 
and policy of the US prior to and during the Conference for the creation of the UN. 
From the four sponsoring states, China and the UK had also proven amenable to the idea of 
future Charter revisions, whereas the USSR did not seem to support a dynamic and changing 
Charter²DWOHDVWQRWDQ\WLPHVRRQDIWHUWKH81¶VFUHDWLRQ307 The Soviet Union, unlike the 
other four permanent members, had not emphasised the possibility of future Charter 
revisions, and therefore the possible transitory nature of the veto.  
The anti-veto camp, in the meantime, having lost the two battles on the veto: first, when the 
subject of SC voting came up in Committee III/1, and, again, when the question of the 
exercise of the veto was raised in relation to Charter amendments in Committee I/2, was now 
seeking more than just words. They wanted the promise of a future review conference, where 
all the constitutional options would be on the table again, and the world-governance rules 
could be reviewed and the veto neutralised.  
At the beginning of the Conference, several states had submitted amendments or proposals to 
the Chapter XI of DO related to Charter amendments, reviews and revisions, and the process 
of ratifications, including states such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Norway and Venezuela.308 As previously mentioned, the sponsoring states had also 
introduced their own amendment for charter review at the outset of the Conference. With the 
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topics of amendments and Charter revisions being basically related, Technical Subcommittee 
I/2/E was created to tackle both of these important constitutional topics. 
The last battle for the weaker states to gain some advantage points from the Big-3, after their 
submission to the formula, came in the last days of the Conference in Subcommittee I/2/E 
and its parent, Committee I/2. In this endeavour, Brazil and Canada joined forces and 
combined two of their earlier proposals into a joint amendment to the DO for convening a 
Charter review between the fifth and the tenth year of the UN coming into existence.309 At 
these Committee meetings, as well as in Committee III/1 meetings related to the SC voting 
procedures, many spoke in favour of holding a future review and linking it to alterations of 
the formula. In effect, this was the concession they were seeking from the permanent 
members in exchange for their support of the formula.  
In addition to the main objective of democratisation of SC decisions, other benefits of 
holding a review conference were cited, such as it providing a means of keeping a score card 
on the Council, and an opportunity to gain from experience after the UN and the SC had been 
operating for a while. Also cited was the need to gain the support of national citizens to 
ensure their parliaments endorsed the Charter when it was presented for domestic ratification.  
Some of the states¶YLHZVRQWKHGHVLUDELOLW\RIholding a Charter review² for reasons other 
than its main goal of democratisation of the Council²were, according to Committee 
Summary Reports, as follows: 310 
The Delegate of Uruguay believed it necessary to see how the veto power would be 
exercised and stated that such a revision conference would provide an opportunity for 
the members to denounce any country abusing the veto power.  
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The delegate RI3HUXVXJJHVWHGWKDWFDOOLQJIRUDUHYLHZFRQIHUHQFH³would have a 
tremendous psychological effect in support of the Charter´+Hfurther explained that, to the 
FLWL]HQVRIWKHZRUOG³VXFKDSURYLVLRQIRUUHYLVLQJWKH&KDUWHUZRXOGKDYHZLGHSXEOLF
DSSHDO´7KH%HOJLXPdelegate EHOLHYHGWKDWSURYLGLQJIRUD³IXOOH[DPLQDWLRQ´RIWKH&KDUWHU
in a review conference would demonstrate that the opportunity for reform exists, further 
increasing the chances of both current members and future ones accepting and wishing to join 
the UN. 
%UD]LO¶Vdelegate, Dr. Bertha Lutz, one of the handful of high-level women delegates to the 
Conference, statHGWKH%UD]LOLDQYLHZWKDW³>7@KHYHWRZDVFRQWUDU\WRWKHSULQFLSOHRI
HTXDOLW\RIQDWLRQVH[SUHVVHGLQWKH3UHDPEOHRIWKH&KDUWHU´DQG, EHOLHYLQJWKDW³UHYLVLRQRI
constitutional law is more a questioQRIH[SHULHQFHWKDQRIORJLF´ put forward the Brazilian 
amendment requiring periodic Charter review conferences every five years.311  
Since the general understanding at the Conference, on both sides, was that a Charter review 
would focus on the formula and would mean revisions or perhaps even elimination of the 
veto, the Brazilian proposed amendment was particularly opposed by the Soviet Bloc. The 
Soviets argued that a five-year planned date to review the Charter, which in their view was 
too short, would cause member states not to take the present Charter being released seriously, 
and would WKHUHIRUH³GHWUDFWIURPWKHSHUPDQHQWFKDUDFWHURIWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQ´312 Faced 
with this opposition, and in view of the fact that the Canadians had proposed their own 
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amendment for an automatic special review conference after 10 years, the Brazilians and 
&DQDGLDQVIXVHGWKHLUSURSRVDOVDVDMRLQWDPHQGPHQWFDOOLQJIRUDUHYLHZFRQIHUHQFH³QRW
VRRQHUWKDQ\HDUVDQGQRWODWHUWKDQ\HDUV´313 
The Brazil-Canada joint motion received a majority vote, both in the subcommittee and the 
main Committee, but was not adopted. In Committee I/2, the votes cast were 23 in favour, 17 
against, and one abstention. However, this was not a two-thirds majority.314 Although Dr. 
Lutz later stated that two Latin American states that were in favour of the motion were 
absent, and implied that the proposed Brazil-Canada joint motion could be passed if 
reintroduced as a revised separate amendment, the time pressure to conclude the Conference 
prevented such strategies for those seeking a Charter-embedded review conference.315  
Moreover, the greater battle for the Charter revisionists was to make sure that the P4-initiated 
amendment to the DO, adding the subject of Charter review, was altered or defeated. 
Although the 3¶V sponsored amendment was a step forward in suggesting a review 
conference, it did not contain any specific dates in its text and specified a stringent rule of 
adoption by three-quarters of the General Assembly, as well as SC concurrence, just to 
convene the review conference, making it cumbersome to invoke. 
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Furthermore, the majority demand that the veto should not apply to future Charter revisions 
as a result of a review conference had encountered P5 resistance, and the permanent members 
had again stressed at the Committee I/2 meetings that, DWOHDVWIRUD³IHZ\HDUV´, their veto 
power on future Charter revisions must stay. This latest P5 resistance was reflected in a 
Memorandum of Decisions of Subcommittee I/2/E report of 14 June:316 
The subcommittee took cognizance of the declaration of the delegates of the 
sponsoring governments and France to the effect that they are not able at the present 
moment to consent to a procedure by which the special conference should be able to 
decide that amendments adopted by it should come into force without the unanimous 
consent of the sponsoring governments. 
:LWKWKLV³FRJQL]DQFH´WKHanti-veto camp was even louder in its insistence on a sure way 
and set time to be associated with the special Charter review conference.  
Some states, such as New Zealand and Chile, were linking the ratification of the Charter in 
their national legislation to a set date for reconsidering the veto at a future special review 
conference. For example, Prime Minister Fraser¶VSRVLWLRQZDVH[SUHVVHGE\WKH Summary 
Report of the Committee as follows:317 
«New Zealand supported the proposal for specifying a time-limit within which the 
revision conference should be held. He argued that it was necessary to offer adequate 
opportunity for proposing changes to the Charter which are desired by a number of 
countries. He stated that a number of points in the Charter were contrary to the 
tradition of New Zealand, but he would be able to defend them before his Parliament 
only if he could offer some hope for change in the Charter. 
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In addition to the demand of the anti-veto camp on seeking a date for the review conference, 
its demand for the elimination of the veto, at least as it applied to Charter revisions and 
amendments, was flaring up once more.  
The opinion of the delegate of India, as stated in the Summary Report of the 15 June meeting 
of Committee I/2, provides an example of a state that wished to set an expiration date on the 
veto as it pertained to Charter amendments:318 
The Delegate of India expressed the view that the right of veto on amendments might 
be conferred upon the permanent members of the Security Council for ten years, but 
at the end of that time, the revision conference should be held to reconsider this 
aspect of the problem. 
With the potential for a deadlock, at one of the nightly penthouse meetings of the P4 close to 
the end of the conference, the US prepared a text, with the backing of the USSR, the UK, and 
China, which specified a date for the review conference: 319 
If such a general conference has not been held before the tenth annual meeting of the 
Assembly following the entry into force of the Charter, the proposal to call such a 
conference shall be placed on the agenda of that meeting of the Assembly. 
Given the sSRQVRULQJJRYHUQPHQWV¶SURSRVDOLWVHHPHGthat the Big-5 and the weaker states 
were converging on a 10-year set date for the Charter review conference. 
5.7 The Promise of San Francisco: Linking Council Democracy to a 
Special Charter Review Conference 
The P4 proposal was considered a step towards reconciliation. However, what guarantees did 
the weaker states have that the special review conference would actually be held? Some state 
delegates, such as Eelco van Kleffens of the Netherlands, interpreted the P4 proposal as being 
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D³PDQGDWRU\´DFWLRQLWHPIRUWKHth session of the General Assembly.320 Other delegates, 
such as Dr. Evatt of Australia and Dr. Lutz of Brazil, wanted the scope of the text to be more 
precise, so as to ensure that this special review conference would be easier to convene than 
the normal review conferences already proposed and provided for.321 
In the ensuing debate, the weaker states favoured either automatic convocation or a simple 
majority of the General Assembly, and no concurrence requirement of the P5 to convene the 
review. The Soviet Union, however, and its two Soviet Bloc allies agreed to the timetable of 
the tenth year for the Conference, but, as far as the voting procedure required at the Assembly 
to convene the review was concerned, they favoured a three-quarters majority to decide the 
question. 
In other words, with the exception of agreeing to set the date, the Soviets were sticking to the 
same voting rules as the original DO review amendment proposed and submitted jointly by 
the P4 at the outset of the Conference. 7KDWGD\¶V&RPPLWWHHPHHWLQJRQ15 June, ended 
inconclusively, with a last-minute proposal from Foreign Minister Ioannis (John) 
Sofianopoulos of Greece recommending that the special conference be convened by just a 
simple majority vote at the GA. 322 
The next day, at the 27th meeting of Committee I/2, on 16 June 1945, US delegates, without 
prior approval of the P4, incorporated the Greek proposal in their motion, thus requiring only 
a simple majority vote at the Assembly, as well as a simple majority of the SC to convene the 
proposed special review conference at the 10th session. The US proposal was well received by 
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the anti-veto camp, and the delegates of Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, 
New Zealand, Peru and the Union of South Africa all spoke in favour of the revised US 
motion. The UK, China, and France²all members of the P5²also expressed their 
approval.323  
The only opposition came from the Soviet Union. Although supportive of the US motion on 
the special cRQIHUHQFHLQ\HDUV¶WLPHWKH6RYLHWVZHUHopposed to the simple majority 
procedure for calling such a conference. The USSR and its two Soviet Bloc allies had by now 
dropped their three-quarters requirement and were leaning in favour of a two-thirds 
majority.324  
7KH86¶VPRGLILHGPRWLRQZDVSXWWRDYRWHDQGwas overwhelmingly adopted, with 42 votes 
in favour, 1 against, and 3 abstentions. The text was subsequently adopted by the 
Commission and the plenary and was incorporated in the final draft, as paragraph 3 of Article 
109 in Chapter XVIII of the UN Charter. It reads as follows:325 
If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General 
Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call 
such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General 
Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the 
members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security 
Council. 
The Conference¶VZRUN on formulating a review conference was not yet finished. The 
provisions of this paragraph now needed to be incorporated into the full Article, and it had to 
be determined how the decisions in such a review conference would be adopted.  
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It should be recalled that the DO proposal did not have a Charter review section, and the 
amendment proposed at the outset of the Conference by the sponsoring states to add the 
Charter review section already contained two paragraphs, and its specified adoption 
requirement was identical to the Charter amendments section. In other words, the P5 proposal 
for the adoption of decisions reached by a regular or a special review Conference (eventually 
included in Article 109) was the same as the adoption procedures already chosen for the 
regular amendments (as set out in what would become Article 108). Both procedures required 
a two-thirds ratification of the member states and the concurrence of all the permanent 
members.  
Therefore, the full article that needed to be adopted at the Conference²the future Article 
109²consisted of three paragraphs: 
 Para. (1): In essence, how to convene a regular review conference with no set date being 
specified; such a conference taking place as often as adopted and requiring a two-thirds 
favourable vote of the GA and a majority decision at the Council to convene it; 
Para. (2): In essence, the adoption procedure for decisions at the review conferences, whether 
regular or special conferences. This procedure was identical to the normal amendment 
procedures (as embodied in the future Article 108), requiring a two-thirds ratification by 
member states, plus the concurrence of the permanent members; and 
Para. (3): Insertion of the text of the newly adopted compromise motion at the Conference, 
which, in essence, called for a one-off special review conference after a 10-year period, and 




Prior to the vote on the full text, Dr. Evatt once again objected to the permanent-member veto 
at the ratification phase that still remained in the text. He openly announced his voting 
strategy: that Australia, instead of casting a no vote, would ³DEVWDLQ´, so that the motion with 
the special review conference mentioned in paragraph 3 would carry. In other words, Evatt, 
as the leader of the anti-veto diehards, was implying that those in favour of the special review 
conference but against the P5 veto in the ratification phase of the Charter should cast an 
abstention vote. 
The result of the vote was: 33 in favour, 1 against, 12 abstentions.326 
Finally, the full section on Charter review that later became incorporated into the document 
as Article 109 was adopted. The Article consisted of three paragraphs, with the first two very 
similar to the single-paragraph Article 108 of the final Charter: the amendment section. The 
only significant difference between the two Articles was paragraph 3²a facilitated special 
rHYLHZFRQIHUHQFHLQ\HDUV¶WLPH. The full text of what became Article 109 of the Charter 
reads as follows:327 
Article 109 
1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of 
reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-
thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven 
members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one 
vote in the conference. 
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2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the 
conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including 
all the permanent members of the Security Council. 
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the 
General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the 
proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the 
General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of 
the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the 
Security Council. 
The midnight-hour adoption of the special Charter review provision was a cause for 
celebration, with the delegates of the Committee, as well as the Commission (which 
considered the compromise as a victory for all the powers, big and small), jubilant at having 
removed the last hurdle in framing a Charter for the new world organisation. The Saturday 
evening meeting of the Committee had actually lasted into the early hours of the following 
day, according to the request of the delegate of Greece, practically the last day and working 
session of Committee I/2 and therefore of WKH&RQIHUHQFH¶VZRUNRQ&KDUWHUGHFLVLRQV328 The 
Committee reports in the following week had to be rolled out to the Commission reports and 
discussed at the plenary sessions, which had more of a reporting and commenting function, as 
opposed to being responsible for introducing any amendments or inserting any substantive 
provisions into the Charter. The Coordinating Committee, the Committee of the Jurists, and 
other supporting committees had to make sure that the language and grammar of the adopted 
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texts was correct, and incorporated into the final Charter document, with the appropriate 
translations, ready for the final plenary of Tuesday, 26 June and the signing ceremonies.  
It is noteworthy that the special review embedded in the Charter had, at the time, the full 
support and commitment of the permanent members, according to the Conference 
5DSSRUWHXU¶VUHSRUW 329 
The US delegate had stated that ³his Delegation considered the method of calling the special 
conference democratic and liberal´ 
The UK delegate believed ³that the provision in the Charter for calling the conference would 
add a certain solemnity to it. It assured, he believed, that, subject to the Assembly of that day, 
the FRQIHUHQFHZRXOGEHKHOG´ 
 &KLQDKDGDOUHDG\KHUDOGHGWKDW³RQHGD\´WKHveto might be eliminated; and France, the 
newest member of the P5, had fully supported Article 109, paragraph 3.  
The only P5 member that had some reservations was the USSR. While the Soviet preference 
was for a two-thirds majority versus a simple majority of the Assembly to call the special 
conference, the USSR, in principle, and similar to the other four Big-5 members, was in full 
agreement about holding the special Charter review in \HDUV¶ time. 
As for the majority of the smaller powers, including the 30 states that at some point during 
the conference had either formally submitted motions or spoken in favour of a Charter review 
conference²and which had linked their submission regarding the inequality of the Council 
and WKH³HYLO´veto to the possibility of reviewing and revising the Charter at some point in 
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the future²they had now secured WKH3¶V³FRQFLOLDWLRQDQGJRRG-ZLOO´, as well as its 
promise. Moreover, the Rapporteur had explicitly noted and recorded the unanimity and the 
conciliatory spirit of the P5 on the subject, reporting in San Francisco that: 330 
Delegates of the sponsoring governments and of France stated that the American 
proposal had their support. They stated that the proposal was offered in the spirit of 
conciliation and good-will. 
The UN could now go to work. All the states had yielded to the Big-3 and to the two co-opted 
permanent members in a collective security ³plus more´ global governance scheme, in which 
all the member states would entrust and share sovereignty in the UN organisation, albeit with 
the exception of the P5. However, it was widely believed that this unequal sovereignty 
sharing would last only for a transitional period, and that, after the end of the war, and after 
member states had gained some ³H[SHULHQFH´LQworld governance, the Charter would be 
reviewed, and most likely revised, after the 10 years had elapsed. In fact, the delegates were 
so sure that the general and special future review conference would be held, that the 
Rapporteur of Commission I to the plenary, immediately before the end of the Conference, on 
24 June, announced that the delegates had already selected the venue for it:331 
In this connection the Turkish Delegation suggested that the conference ten years 
hence be held in the city of San Francisco; in recognition of the excellent manner in 
which the present Conference was managed by the Government of the United States 
of America, and in «WKLV&LW\RIWKH*Rlden Gate. This suggestion was met with 
general approval. 
The great compromise of those last few days at the Conference, leading to its jubilant and 
successful completion, resulted in the permanent members dictating the formula in 
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Commission III, but leaving the door open in Commission I for a genuine review and a more 
democratic version of the Charter in a decade¶VWLPH. 
The letter of the compromise reflected in the text of Article 109(3) was that, with a simple 
majority vote of the Assembly and of the Council, the holding of a general review conference 
of the UN Charter in \HDUV¶WLPH was now assured.  
The original intent and the spirit of the Article was, in fact, in its quid pro quo and promise 
that the majority weaker states would acknowledge the 3¶s supremacy, at least temporarily, 
and would empower them and entrust them with keeping the peace and delivering on the 
other great ideals of the UN. In exchange, the P5¶V promise was clear²there would be a 
special review conference and a simple majority of the states could decide to hold it. 
Alterations and even the elimination of the veto would be possible, and any decisions taken 
by a two-thirds majority at the special conference would be honoured by the permanent 
members refraining from vetoing its implementation. 
The most multi-functional universal organisation the world had ever created²the United 











As explained in the previous chapter, the UN Charter was concluded in the closing days of 
World War II as the proposed instrument of the dominant victors. The Big-3 had also acted as 
the proxy for France, and, to a large extent, for China, in formulating the special privileges of 
the P5. The sponsoring governments then presented the Dumbarton Oaks proposal plus the 
latest veto decision of the Yalta Conference, to the world¶V smaller powers in San Francisco 
in April 1945.  
The three months¶ discussions at UNCIO were primarily a presentation by the group of 3+2 
of their model of a UN and how it could provide for peace and security, and for the other 45 
countries simply to present their own wish list (such as the incorporation of human rights, 
economic and educational development, and emancipation for the colonies). None of the 
other 45 countries at the Conference was there to insist on its requirements for the UN, or to 
challenge the proposed Charter, if it meant the risk of being excluded from the organisation. 
However, the only exception, exciting vocal opposition, was related to the veto privilege of 
the P5 in the SC. The Independent States present at the UNCIO²the handful of countries 
that had not been directly affected by the war, because of their geographical distance, and 
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because they were not a colony, or under the military occupation of the P5²challenged the 
veto privilege and the exceptionalism it prescribed at the SC. These countries, mostly from 
Latin America and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), particularly disliked the veto in the 
case of one of the P5 being party to a conflict and still retaining its veto²and thus being able 
to exclude itself from any UN decisions and sanctions. Some of these states, although willing 
to accept the P5¶s privileged status for now in exchange for peace, wished to deal with this 
inequality in the Charter at some point in the future. Moreover, those states were also worried 
about the expanded privilege of the veto granted to the P5, not only under the headings of 
peace and security and what became known as Chapter VII, but also in the provisions for 
Charter Amendments, because of the potential for the future freezing of the Charter in its 
current form.332 
This vocal opposition, as articulated by Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, under 
the leadership of Herbert Evatt, Australian Minister of External Affairs, and with the backing 
of most Latin American countries, led to a compromise and the creation of a new article to 
allow for a comprehensive review of the Charter under Article 109, particularly paragraph 3 
of the article, which essentially promised a review of the whole CKDUWHULQ\HDUV¶WLPH 
This chapter and Chapter 7 chronologically examine the formal events that occurred at the 
UN in connection with a general review conference to review the Charter, as provided for 
under paragraph 1 or paragraph 3 of Article 109. In particular, the invocation and the current 
legal status of paragraph 3 will be examined. 
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The early attempts at &KDUWHUUHYLVLRQLQWKHILUVW\HDUVRIWKH81¶VH[LVWHQFH is the focus 
of this chapter. Who were some of the member-state stakeholders of the Charter at that 
period? What were the main arguments of those states that wanted the Charter to be revised, 
and of those that wanted it to remain unchanged? What procedural and legislative actions 
were taken in the GA to review the Charter, and how successful were those attempts in the 
direction of achieving Charter revisions? 
The first few years of the UN were characterised by the repeated use of the veto, which had 
caused the UN to become dysfunctional not only on decisions related to substantive issues, 
such as peace and security, or admitting new member states, but also in relation to procedural 
and administrative matters. &RXQFLOGHFLVLRQVRQWULYLDOLWHPVVXFKDVDSSURYLQJGHOHJDWHV¶
credentials, authorising new committees or commissions, or even approving agenda items, 
were encountering P5 opposition and hitting a brick wall (as analysed in Section 6.2). 
This impasse was disappointing to the smaller nations, which had seen the creation of the UN 
as a sign of WKHPDMRUSRZHUV¶ consent and unanimity. But now, immediately after World 
War II, they were witnessing the rivalry among the P5, which was making the UN incapable 
of resolving small and large conflicts, such as wars of aggression and the wars of 
independence and self-determination that were now flaring up. The frequent use of the veto 
in unexpected and even procedural matters, which the Big-3 had not foreseen at Yalta, made 
some P5 members, particularly the US and the UK, highly frustrated with the voting 
procedures in the Council. This resulted in an attempt by one of the permanent members, as 
well as some of the smaller member states to seek legislative and procedural methods to 
revise the Charter and make the UN work as it was envisioned.  
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6.2 The UN Goes to Work: The Veto is Unleashed and the Attempts to 
Modify or Eliminate the Veto 
From 25 April 1945, the date on which the UNCIO had started its session to finalise the 
creation of the UN in San Francisco, to 10 January 1946, just 10 months later, when the first 
UN GA session was convened in London, the world underwent monumental change.  
In May 1945, while the UNCIO Conference was still in session, Germany surrendered. Less 
than two months after the UN Charter signing ceremony on 26 June in San Francisco, on 6 
and 9 August 1945, the US demonstrated the destructive power of atomic weapons in the two 
apocalyptic nuclear bombings of Japanese cities. The unleashing of nuclear weapons heralded 
WKH³DWRPLFDJH´DQGLWVLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUIXWXUHZDUIDUHDQGWKHQHZEDODQFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
power relations.  
Japan surrendered in September 1945, and World War II ended. With the completion of all 
the domestic ratifications required for the Charter only four months after the San Francisco 
Conference, on 24 October 1945, the UN Charter came into force.  
Less than three months later, on 10 January 1946, the first session of the UN GA was held. In 
that same month, the first session of the SC was also convened, both at the UN¶VWHPSRUDU\
site in London. The work of the UN had officially started. Thus, within several months, the 
world had transitioned from war to peace, and the international organisation that had been 
created with multiple objectives, including the main mission of keeping global ³SHDFHDQG
VHFXULW\´, was about to be tested. 
However, the spirit of San Francisco among the Big-3 and the member states was short-lived. 
The ideological conflict between the communist East and the capitalist West, coupled with 
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the emerging struggle for self-determination and independence of subjected peoples and 
colonies that would dominate international global relations for nearly three decades, meant 
that signs of polarisation and conflict among member states had already emerged by the time 
of the UN¶s first session.  
Disagreements among the permanent members, problems with the deficiencies in the UN 
Charter, and the inability of the SC to prevent armed conflicts and to cope adequately with 
the geopolitical shifts in international relations, became apparent shortly after the war. In 
view of all this, a number of states were already prepared to reform and revise the Charter, 
starting with the GA¶VILUVW session.  
Within the ILUVW\HDURIWKH81¶VRSHUDWLRQinterest in UN reform was already apparent on 
the part of some of the smaller states, which took the view that the UN Charter had been put 
together hastily and under wartime duress and special circumstances, and was therefore 
inadequate. In the first session, the GA dealt with a request by Cuba to review and revise the 
Charter based on Article 109. Further, the Philippines¶ UHTXHVWWR³GHOHWH´WKH³YHWR
SULYLOHJH´was submitted to the GA First Committee for discussion. Later, during the debates 
in the First Committee, the Philippines withdrew its proposal in favour of that of the CubanV¶. 
However, with many member states wanting to give the Charter a try before attempting 
reforms, the Cuban±Philippines draft resolution received little support and was rejected. 333  
,QWKHPHDQWLPHZLWKWKHROG³HQHP\VWDWHV´JRQHDVUHIHUHQFHGLQWKH&KDUWHUMXVWD\HDU
previously, the new enemy states, particularly in relation to the East±West conflict, were now 
forming. The UN¶s spirit of cooperation among member states and the San Francisco 
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honeymoon of only seven months earlier was clearly over when the Soviet Union cast its first 
veto in the second month of the SC¶VH[LVWHQFH, on 16 February 1946.334  
When the Charter was drawn up, it had generally been perceived that the veto would be used 
sparingly, and only when a P5 member was implicated in Chapter VII military or economic 
sanctions. However, with the use of the veto by the Soviet Union beginning in WKH81¶VILUVW
month of operation and, in particular, its frequent use by the USSR on what were perceived to 
be ³SURFHGXUDOPDWWHUV´member states began to consider how to deal with this Charter-
granted privilege that was proving problematic. Not only the smaller states, but even the US, 
which had emerged as the new and only nuclear weapons superpower in the world, saw their 
attempts at conflict resolution and admitting new member states frustrated by the unanimity 
requirement of the P5. The US and the UK were particularly wary of unexpectedly facing the 
veto in the so-called double veto cases.335 The Article 27 provisions on SC voting provide 
that decisions on procedural matters do not require unanimity, whereas those on substantive 
matters do. But, in practice, the P5 were able to apply the veto even to questions relating to 
whether an issue inherently constituted a substantive question, or whether it could be 
considered procedural²thus the double veto.336 Therefore, not only the smaller states, but 
even two of the P5 were early proponents of changes to the veto structure.  
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By the second part of the 1st session of the GA, the debate on SC voting had been gaining 
momentum, and on 13 December 1946 the GA adopted Resolution 40(I), addressed to the 
SC, indicating that the Assembly: 
Recommends to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures, 
consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of 
Article 27 [SC Voting Procedures]  and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by 
the Security Council of its functions337 
In other words, the GA, interpreting its role as that of the central organ of the UN, considered 
it to be within the scope of its powers (as set out in Article 10 of the Charter) to request the 
SC to put its house in order. 
6.3 Calls for ³abolishing´ the veto 
By the 2nd UN session (1947±1948), the debate on voting procedures in the SC had become 
much more heated, and some member states were asking for the outright abolition of the 
veto. The Argentinian delegation, at the outset of the 2nd session, requested the GA to add the 
item "Convocation of a General Conference under Article 109 of the Charter to abolish the 
privilege of the veto" to the Assembly¶VDJHQGD338 
:LWKWKH*$¶VSUHVLGHQF\having been assumed by Argentina for that year, Dr Jose Arce was 
the President of the Assembly. With his support, the delegation from Argentina, following up 
on their agenda item, submitted a draft resolution (A/351) on 22 August 1947, proposing that, 
LPPHGLDWHO\DIWHUWKHHQGRIWKH*$¶VFXUUHQWVHVVLRQin three days¶WLPH, a Charter review 
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general conference be held to review the Charter, particularly in respect of the SC voting 
procedures and abolition of the veto.339  
The Russian delegation, under the leadership of Andrei Gromyko,340 strongly opposed the 
Argentinian draft resolution and the convocation of the general conference for the purpose of 
reviewing the Charter. Gromyko, one of the drafters of the Charter at Yalta, as well as at San 
Francisco, argued that the unanimity of the super-powers was the main pillar of the UN, and 
that the campaign to do away with the veto, in his view, served only to impose on the USSR 
the will of other nations.341  
In addition to the USSR, some of the other permanent members who feared abolition of the 
veto opposed the Argentinian proposal. In view of this P5 opposition, and particularly that of 
the USSR, the Syrian representative proposed a friendly amendment to ArgentinD¶V draft, in 
which the review conference would EHFDOOHGXSRQWR³DPHQG´UDWKHUWKDQ³DEROLVK´ the veto 
privilege. The amended Argentinian draft resolution, at the General Committee, received the 
required votes to be sent to the Assembly plenary for discussion and possible adoption.342 
In parallel, Australia, one of the other middle powers at the San Francisco Conference which 
had opposed the veto, proposed its own draft resolution on issues related to SC voting, 
focusing on WKHSUHYLRXV\HDU¶V1st session of the GA, in which the Assembly had requested, 
in Resolution 40(I), that the SC remedy the deficiencies in its voting procedures. The 
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Australian proposal also received the necessary votes at the General Committee and was put 
on the *$¶VDJHQGD for debate. 343 
The General Committee then referred the Argentinian and Australian proposals to the First 
Committee (the Disarmament and International Security Committee) to be addressed 
concurrently. At the First Committee, the US, expressing the IUXVWUDWLRQVDQGWKH³JUHDW
GLIILFXOWLHV´HQFRXQWHUHGZLWKWKHYRWLQJSURFHGXUHVDWWKHSC, introduced its own draft 
resolution.344 In the view of the US delegation, the time remaining was too short in the 
current GA session, and their proposal asked for the Interim Committee (the working 
committee between the sessions) to seize the subject and report on its work at the next (3rd) 
session of the Assembly. This resolution had the backing of three other P5 members²the 
UK, France, and the Republic of China²as well as several other states that considered the 
veto KDG³SDUDO\VHG´WKHZRUNLQJs of the Council. The US draft proposal was, however, 
opposed by the Soviet Bloc, with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Byelorussia 
and Yugoslavia against the US proposed draft from the outset.345 7KH%ORF¶Vargument was 
that the unanimity principle at the Council was the sine qua non for the existence of the UN, 
and that the veto discussion should not even have been on the *$¶Vagenda in the first place. 
Further, the Soviet Bloc was opposed to any kind of tasks being assigned to the Interim 
Committee, since it considered it illegal and an illegitimate creation of the Assembly.346 
In addition to the six-nation Soviet Bloc, there were other countries that opposed the US 
proposal. But opposition in this latter group was mostly based on the fact that the US 
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proposal did not go far enough, or that the forum for discussion of such an important topic 
should be the Assembly itself, and not the Interim Committee. On these grounds, Chile, India 
and Egypt, among others, had stated that they would abstain from voting on the US draft 
resolution.347 
Despite this opposition, the US draft resolution received the required majority vote at the 
First Committee and was sent to the floor of the Assembly. Argentina, taking the view that 
the US proposal was inclusive of all other relevant proposals and that its utilisation of the 
Interim Committee between the GA sessions for an extended period of time could act as a 
³pseudo´ review conference on at least the topic of the veto, withdrew its draft resolution in 
favour of the US proposal.348  
As to the Australian proposal, Poland, as a member of the SC at the time, and in direct 
response to the Australian draft and request, submitted a letter to the First Committee stating 
that the SC, at its next session, would report on the results of its recommendations on the 
topic of SC voting procedures, as raised by GA Res. 40(I).349 In other words, the SC¶VVHOI-
assessment of how its voting should be carried out was to be delayed for one more year. 
Therefore, of the three proposed resolutions on the desirability of Charter review²and 
especially revisions to the Council veto privilege²only one, the US draft resolution, was sent 
to the floor of the Assembly for debate.  
The GA picked up the debate on the US draft resolution at its 122nd and 123rd plenary 
sessions, in November 1947.350 Since the proposed resolution did not contain any specific 
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proposals, and the detailed recommendations for the reform of the voting procedures was 
entrusted to the Interim Committee to undertake, the discussion on the resolution that 
followed mostly involved generality and ideology, rather than the specifics. In those two 
plenary sessions, there was a heated debate among the member states of the young UN. For 
the Soviet Bloc, the veto was existential. With China being represented by the Republic of 
China (Taiwan), the Soviets felt that, without the veto, they would always be out-voted by the 
other four SC permanent members, who basically shared the same political and economic 
outlook. 
The position of the Soviets is well summarised in this paragraph from the AVVHPEO\¶VRIILcial 
meeting records: 
It would appear, the U.S.S.R. representative stated, that certain states had accepted 
the principle of unanimity at San Francisco and had signed the Charter only to 
struggle against its basic principles as soon as it had been adopted. 
« 
The attack upon the "veto" constituted a danger to the very existence of the United 
Nations. While the Argentine delegation openly urged the abolition of the "veto", the 
representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom professed to take their 
stand in favor of the principle of unanimity. In actual fact, however, they attempted 
carefully and cunningly, but consistently, to circumscribe that principle.351 
The Soviet delegate, in defence of KLVFRXQWU\¶Vfrequent use of the veto, denied, at the 
AssHPEO\¶VSOHQDU\VHVVLRQany abuse of voting behaviour and defended WKH8665¶V 22 uses 
of the veto. The Soviet delegate claimed that these 22 vetoes (deployed in almost the same 
number of months, since the founding of the UN) had, in essence, been used in relation to 
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only IRXUTXHVWLRQV³WKH Spanish question, the Greek question, the Corfu Channel question 
and the admission of new Members´352 
On the second day of its deliberations, on 21 November 1947, the Assembly at its 123rd 
plenary adopted the US proposal as Resolution 117(II).353 The resolution, making reference 
to the GA¶V powers under Article 10 (which enable it to make recommendations to any UN 
organ), requested in its operative paragraphs that the Interim Committee: 354 
1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all 
proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to 
the second session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee; 
2.  Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate 
with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem; 
3. 5HSRUWZLWKLWVFRQFOXVLRQVWRWKHWKLUGVHVVLRQRIWKH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\« 
As planned by its supporters, therefore, the Interim Committee, according to paragraph 1 of 
the resolution, ZDVWRFRQVLGHU³DOOSURSRVDOV´VXEPLWWHG, including the elimination of the 
veto, which had been requested by Argentina and many other independent small and medium 
powers. 
7RZDUGVWKHHQGRIWKHVHFRQG\HDURIWKH81¶VRSHUDWLRQDQGJRLQJLQWR the 3rd session, the 
different stakeholders in the SC voting procedures formed and their views crystallised. They 
can be grouped as follows: 
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I. The veto abolitionists ± the States that wanted the veto to be abolished altogether. 
These countries and their delegates, such as Argentina, Australia, Chile, Turkey, 
Egypt and New Zealand, among others, had recent memories of the 1945 UNCIO 
Charter debates on the P5¶V privileges, and particularly the objection to the veto. 
Many of the state representatives, in the fiUVWIHZ\HDUVRIWKH81¶VRSHUDWLRQDO
sessions, were in fact the same individuals who had taken part in the San Francisco 
Conference. To these delegates, such as Jose Arce of Argentina, or Sir Carl Berendsen 
of New Zealand, and their respective governments, the time for the fulfilment of the 
promise of San Francisco to revise the Charter had already arrived.355 The UN, in its 
first two years of operation, owing to the lack of super-power unanimity, had turned 
out to be dysfunctional, and they had been proven right in their prediction. Therefore, 
the time to act on the Big-3¶VFRQFHVVLRQ granted in return for their endorsement of 
the UN Charter²the Charter review provisions enshrined in Article 109²had 
arrived. Consequently, these countries did not wish to wait to try out the Charter 
further, but instead wanted substantive revisions to the SC voting procedures 
contained in Article 27 now. In the case of Argentina, New Zealand and some other 
states in this group, not only did they want the total elimination of the veto, they also 
wanted this addressed in a legitimate forum²the general conference to review the 
Charter, as specified in paragraph 1 of Article 109, where they would formally do 
away with the veto and make the Council¶V representation more democratic and 
equitable.  
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II. The Charter reformists²the states in this group were led by the US and the UK. 
These two P5 states (which were also two of the Big-3) and their supporting states, 
which were mostly the countries in their spheres of political, economic or security 
influence, supported revisions to the Charter in order to save the UN from what the 
US delegates termed ³paralysis´.356 The leader of this group, the US, favoured 
majority decision-making in respect of some issues, such as procedural matters (part 
of the problem was the disagreement on what could be categorised as procedural), 
creation of new organs or committees, fact-finding missions, and admission of new 
member states, and argued that this could be achieved by revising Article 27 (the SC 
voting procedures). In the case of the US, there was even domestic popular and 
political pressure beyond the US administration¶s wishes to democratise and empower 
the UN, in line with a federal world government. 357 The late 1940s and the early 
1950s was an active period in US legislative drives in this GLUHFWLRQ7KH866HQDWH¶V
Foreign Relations Committee drew up draft resolutions, while state legislatures 
adopted resolutions relating to Charter revisions and the strengthening of the role of 
the UN, and even the promotion of a federal system of world government.358 
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However, the US administration and the UK government were following a much 
more conservative path, and in fact did not promote majority-decision making on all 
SC matters, being keen to preserve their veto privilege, particularly for Chapter VII 
items concerned with economic sanctions and military action.  
III. The Charter conservatives²these states were led by the USSR, the third member of 
the Big-3, and the lone P5 member of the communist bloc. This group consisted of the 
six Soviet Bloc nations: the USSR, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the 
Ukrainian SSR and Yugoslavia.359 For this group, the Charter was fine as it was: it 
was what they had bargained for, including the veto, and what they had agreed and 
signed up to DW6DQ)UDQFLVFR,QWKHLUYLHZLWZDVRWKHUVWDWHV¶QRQ-compliance with 
the Charter that was the main reason for the difficulties the UN was experiencing. 
Moreover, for the Soviet Union, the majority of UN member states, including the 
other four members of the P5, were antagonistic to its regime, and it therefore 
regarded the veto as an existential matter. As Andrei Gromyko had stated in the 
Assembly, the veto was a ³sine qua non´. It was this that led to the repeated threat by 
the Soviet Union that no veto for the USSR meant that it would leave the Charter, 
thereby spelling the end of the UN7KXVWKH6RYLHW%ORF¶VPHVVDJHGXULQJWKese 
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years was very clear and unrelenting: no Charter review, and no change in the veto 
privilege.  
By the 3rd session of the GA, and while the Interim Committee (between the 2nd and 3rd 
sessions) commenced its work in the summer of 1948, of the three categories of stakeholders 
mentioned above, the abolitionists were the most proactive, offering several alternative 
options for replacement of the veto.  
,QWKLVJURXS1HZ=HDODQG¶V81GHOHJDWLRQunder the chairmanship of Sir Carl 
Berendsen,360 offered support for any proposal that would eliminate or substantially attenuate 
the SC voting structure. In addition to its offer of general support for abolishing the veto, it 
alternatively proposed²in view of the fact that procedural matters were already based on 
simple majority voting²that a majority decision of four out of five of the P5 should be 
viewed as VXIILFLHQWIRUWKH6&¶V substantive decisions to carry.361 
Turkey and Argentina both suggested simple majority voting at the SC for Chapter VI 
(Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter VII (Sanctions) decisions, with no P5 veto 
privilege.362 Belgium recommended that requests to the ICJ for advisory opinions should be 
treated as procedural matters (no veto),363 and Canada recommended that voting procedures 
VKRXOGEHGHYLVHGVRWKDW³QRVWDWHLV-XGgHLQLWVRZQFDVH´364 Lastly, the most radical 
proposal for revising the SC voting procedure was the Argentinian proposal to not have any 
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kind of privileged voting for the P5, totally ³DEROLVKLQJWKHSULYLOHJHRIveto´. This was to be 
accomplished by a call for a UN general conference for Charter review, in compliance with 
Article 109.365 In rHVSRQVHWR6RYLHWFRPPHQWVWKDWWKHLGHDRI³DEROLVKLQJWKHveto´was 
absurd, the Argentinian delegate on the floor of the Assembly argued: 
The political conditions prevailing at present were not the same as in 1945. 
Experience had shown that those who had opposed the "veto" at San Francisco had 
been right. The "veto" was originally intended to maintain peace and to keep 
differences from arising, but the "veto" had not resulted in unanimity and had not 
worked in the interests of peace. Adverse comment from the U.S.S.R. delegation could 
not prevent the Argentine delegation from submitting its proposal to reform the 
Charter. Only those who would deny the right to modify the Charter were violating its 
principles.366 
The Interim Committee, in execution of Resolution 117(II), prepared a long list of 
recommendations to address the SC voting issues and impasses. This comprehensive 
examination of the voting procedures and proposalsXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJ³/LVWRI3RVVLEOH
'HFLVLRQVRIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO´, contained 98 items in different categories.367 
Further, the Interim Committee, in examining the different implementation strategies for its 
legal and procedural recommendations, examined three different options:368 
i. Implementation by means of interpretation. 
ii. Implementation on the basis of agreement among the five permanent members of the 
SC. 
iii. Implementation on the basis of convening a general conference to review the Charter. 
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Of the four states out of the P5 SDUWLFLSDWLQJLQWKH,QWHULP&RPPLWWHH¶VZRUN)UDQFHDQGWKH
Republic of China (Taiwan) preferred option (i), the US and the UK¶VSUHIHUHQFHZDVRSWLRQ
(ii), and all the P5 present at the Committee opposed option (iii). 
The abolitionists, however, preferred option (iii). 
The different options were put to a vote and the majority of members voted in favour of 
option (iii) ²that is, ³WR KROGDJHQHUDOFRQIHUHQFHWRUHYLHZWKH&KDUWHU´, in line with 
paragraph 1 of Article 109²in order to implement the reform of SC voting procedures.369  
Thus, at the Interim Committee, it seemed that the reformists¶ attempt to implement SC 
voting changes, while avoiding a review conference, had failed. In particular, the permanent 
members sponsoring the committee considered the choice of this option to be a setback, since 
the holding of a general Charter conference might trigger a chain reaction of UN 
constitutional changes, and become more than they had bargained for.  
In anticipation of the Charter review general conference under Article 109(1), the Interim 
Committee went on to clarify that the SC decisions related to that article were to be 
FRQVLGHUHG³ZLWKRXWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSHUPDQHQWDQGQRQ-SHUPDQHQWPHPEHUV´370  
In the final conclusions section (part IV) of its report to the Assembly, the Committee 
reiterated that this might be the right time to hold a Charter review conference: 
Whereas the deficiencies observed in the present functioning of the Organization of 
the United Nations require due consideration, The Interim Committee recommends to 
the General Assembly to consider at its third regular session whether the time has 
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come or not to call a general conference, as provided for in Article 109 of the 
Charter.371 
6.4 Third Try at the Third Session²A Tactical Breakthrough? 
At the first part of the 3rd Session of the GA, in November 1948, the Report of the Interim 
Committee was combined with a new request from Argentina and its supporters for the 
convocation of a general conference under Article 109 for a review of the Charter, and after 
being assigned to the First Committee was then referred to the Ad Hoc Political 
Committee.372 
In November and December 1948, several draft resolutions on the reform of SC voting were 
introduced at meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee DWWKH$VVHPEO\¶Vrd session. The four 
permanent members of the US, UK, Republic of China and France presented a joint draft 
resolution seeking revisions and clarification of SC voting, and essentially asking themselves 
plus the USSR WR³IRUEHDU´ from the use of the veto in some cases.373 Australia introduced an 
amendment to the joint draft to the effect that the P5 should forbear from exercising all their 
veto rights, except in relation to the enforcement clauses under Chapter VII, and Argentina 
submitted its separate formal draft resolution on the convening of a general conference to 
review the Charter according to Article 109(1).374 
The USSR, representing the Soviet Bloc, which KDGER\FRWWHGWKH,QWHULP&RPPLWWHH¶V
work, introduced their proposal for a resolution. 375 The text of this draft resolution, while 
defending the unanimity principOHDQGEHLQJFULWLFDORIRWKHUSURSRVDOVDV³XQQHFHVVDU\
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UHJXODWLRQDQGIRUPDOLVPLQWKHDFWLYLW\RIWKH>81@RUJDQV´was, however, somewhat more 
conciliatory than before in stating that the SC LQLWVYRWLQJSURFHGXUHVVKRXOG³WDNHDFFRXQWRI
its past experience to apply the method of consultation and seek to improve the possibility of 
DGRSWLQJFRQFHUWHGGHFLVLRQV´376 In other words, since the Soviets up until that time were the 
only P5 state which had wielded the veto, the Soviet draft resolution could be interpreted as 
their readiness to use the veto more sparingly. 
The Soviet draft resolution, which did not contain any concrete proposals, did not attract any 
support beyond the then six countries of the Soviet Bloc and was rejected.377 
The Argentinian proposal for a Charter review conference had the support of most smaller 
and non-aligned powers, including New Zealand, Chile, Cuba and Egypt. These states 
observed that the trust they had extended to the Great Powers at San Francisco to act in 
unison had not been honoured, and super-power rivalry and the exercise of the veto had 
paralysed the UN and had prevented it from achieving its objectives, particularly in the area 
of maintaining peace and security. $UJHQWLQD¶Vdelegate, according to a summary of the 
meeting minutes, adopted the following position: 
The Great Powers had not kept their promise, and their persistent disagreement 
proved that the unanimity rule served no purpose, and that they would not or could 
not apply it. The United Nations, he argued, was faced with serious difficulties 
because of the right of veto or of the abuse of that right. He considered that a 
provision more satisfactory than the unanimity rule should therefore be found. In his 
opinion, a general conference was necessary to find a way out of the impasse 
confronting the United Nations. The purpose of the conference he was proposing 
would be not merely to abolish the veto, but to seek a solution of the problem.378 
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The countries supporting the Argentinian draft resolution argued that, although they were 
aware that revision of the Charter would be difficult, in their opinion it was the only legal and 
fundamental way of dealing with the serious problem of the veto. In their view, convening a 
Charter review under Article 109(1) and dealing with the SC voting problem there would 
carry much more weight than just making a set of recommendations to the P5. 
The Charter reformists and conservatives joined forces, with all the P5 in unanimity²
including the USSR and the Soviet Bloc, and the US, UK, France, and their allies, as well as 
the Republic of China²to oppose the abolitionists, who supported the Argentinian proposal. 
The argument they put forward was that if a general conference to review the Charter was to 
be held now, it would do harm and lead to a division among the members of the UN. In their 
RSLQLRQ³WKHWLPHKDGQRW\HWFRPHWRFRQYHQHDFRQIHUHQFH´379 
The Argentinian proposal was put to a vote and, by 12 votes in favour, 22 against and 10 
abstentions, was defeated.380  
$XVWUDOLD¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYes, under the leadership of J.D.L. Hood,381 put forward in effect a 
Plan B for the abolitionists, by proposing a draft amendment to the four permanent memberV¶ 
joint draft resolution. 
The Australian proposal to eliminate the veto, except in Chapter VII enforcement clauses, 
contained similar arguments to the Argentinian proposal, stating that the main reason for the 
near paralysis at the SC was the Great Power rivalry that had prevented the permanent 
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members from acting in unison, contrary to the San Francisco promise of P5 unanimity. 
According to the summary minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee: 
Australia declared that the spirit of the Charter had not been observed in the use of 
the veto and that it had been applied in ways never intended by the San Francisco 
Conference and in ways contrary to the assurances given by the Great Powers at San 
Francisco.382 
The Australian amendment to the joint resolution was rejected by the main sponsors of the 
draft. The US, the UK, France and the Republic of China regarded the Australian proposed 
amendment as a misrepresentation of the character of their joint resolution and as ³LQIULQJLQJ
upon the prerogaWLYHVRIWKHILYH*UHDW3RZHUV´. Therefore, this amendment was also 
defeated.383 With all the other draft resolutions rejected, the Ad Hoc Political Committee 
approved the joint draft resolution and sent it to the floor of the Assembly plenary session for 
debate and a vote.  
At the Assembly, the P4-sponsored draft was adopted as Resolution 267 (III).384 This 
resolution, referencing the powers conferred upon the Assembly by Article 10 of the Charter, 
essentially sets rules and guidelines for what are procedural decisions in the SC and therefore 
not subject to veto. The long list of procedural items provided in the Annex to the resolution 
waVVRPHZKDWVKRUWHUWKDQWKH,QWHULP&RPPLWWHH¶VSURSRVHGOLVWEXWVWLOOcontained close to 
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 (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015): G/RES/267 (III) (1949). Also of significance is the 
last paragraph of Resolution 267 (III), which:  
 
4. Recommends to the Members of the United Nations that in agreements conferring functions on the 
Security Council such conditions of voting within that body be provided as would to the greatest extent feasible 
exclude the application of the rule of unanimity of the permanent members. 
 
It seems the above paragraph is relevant to multilateral agreements that have decision-making interaction with 
the SC. For example, in the case of the SC and the ICC, it could be applied to prevent the veto from being used 
to stop the referral of a case to the Court. Another application could be in respect of the situations that the 




50 items. The Annex covers a wide range of procedural questions, from approval of the SC 
representatives¶ credentials, to adoption of the method of selecting [a]  Security Council 
president, to how to set up SC subsidiary bodies, how to decide which conflicts or situations 
to consider (adoption of agenda), and decision rules on many more procedural items.385 
The adoption of Joint Resolution 267 (III) seems to have been a major tactical breakthrough 
for its main sponsors, the US and the UK. While it allowed them to keep the powerful veto 
privilege on what they perceived as substantive issues, it also provided for enough procedural 
rules²which were now acceptable to the USSR²to conduct the Council¶VGD\-to-day 
business. The alternative path to resolving the impasse was the second option of giving way 
to the abolitionists and convening the conference on Charter review. This option, in view of 
the fact that the World War II circumstances of 1945 no longer applied, probably meant that 
the majority states would now demand Charter revisions in the direction of a more 
democratic and representative SC, which in turn would have caused the loss of all or part of 
the P5¶s veto and other privileges. This latter option may also have led to some members²
namely the Soviet Bloc²leaving the UN.  
The fear of splitting the UN was the main factor cited by some neutral countries at the time, 
such as Turkey, Norway and Cuba, for switching to the reformists¶ side and opting for the 
joint resolution, rather than the more substantive option of the Charter review proposed by 
the abolitionists.386  
For the US, the adoption of this resolution, with its package of procedural solutions, was a 
major accomplishment and breakthrough. However, the US still needed to fine-tune the SC 
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voting procedure. For example, removing the P5 unanimity rule for admitting new members 
was on the US¶V agenda: an objective that Resolution 267 did not address. 
As for the Soviets, who had opposed both the Argentinian and the joint draft resolutions, and 
had cast a negative vote at GA for Resolution 267(III), this latter outcome was more 
acceptable to them than the dreaded alternative of a Charter review under Article 109 
proposed by the abolitionists. It should be recalled that the Soviets had boycotted the Interim 
Committee, which had done most of the initial work of preparing the long list of procedural 
items which was then incorporated into the Annex to Resolution 267 (III). However, the 
Soviets realised that complying with the procedural items in the Annex and, as recommended 
in the resolution, restraining their use of the veto, at least in minor cases, would be to their 
long-term advantage. Compliance with the resolution would avoid the risk of losing their SC 
privileges, by preventing a San Francisco-style conference and review.  
As for the abolitionists, although the resolution at least removed the almost daily deadlock at 
the Council, it certainly was not the remedy for the substantive global problems the UN 
increasingly had to face. Moreover, the outcome did not address their demand for expanded 
and more equal representation at the Council. 
In spite of three years of trying, the abolitionists came to the realisation that they were unable 
to hold a Charter review under paragraph 1 of Article 109, let alone implement any 
amendments or revisions to the Charter. This group of independent smaller and medium 
powers realised that, in addition to facing P5 opposition, they probably could not muster the 
two thirds majority required by paragraph 1 of Article 109 to convene a review conference. 
Therefore, their best option was to wait for a few more years, until the 10th session of the 
Assembly, for activation of paragraph 3 of Article 109, and the one-time opportunity of 
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holding a general review Conference with just a simple majority. The events leading up to the 
$VVHPEO\¶V10th session, and whether Article 109 was acted on, and its legal significance, if 













This chapter examines the following: the events leading up to the adoption of GA Resolution 
992(X), calling for the Charter review conference; the establishment of the Committee on 
Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter; the debates and the 
output of this Committee; and whether a formal review has taken place.387 The period 
covered is a span of approximately 70 years, from the beginning of the functioning of the UN 
up to the writing of this thesis (2015). Particular attention is paid to the 12-year period when 
the preparatory Committee was actively meeting, from 1955 to when it held its last formal 
meeting in 1967. The period from 1968 until the present is then reviewed, in order to 
determine the good faith performance of Resolution 992 (X) and its authorised preparatory 
Committee after its last activity. The purpose of the fact-finding mission of this chapter is to 
gather deterministic data as to the legal and procedural status of Article 109(3) and 
Resolution 992 (X) and the UN¶s respective constitutional and statutory compliance. The 
information presented in this chapter is then used in the next to analyse the legal aspects of 
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Article 109 in order to determine whether paragraph 3 has in effect been rendered obsolete, or 
whether it remains in force and is still applicable. If the latter, then the issue is how the 
review conference may be convened without resorting to the more cumbersome paragraph 1 
of Article 109, which requires a two-thirds majority for adoption. 
As a preliminary matter it is necessary to briefly revisit the classification of the stakeholders 
in the UN Charter, which was introduced in the last chapter. This is a useful analytical tool to 
better deconstruct and understand the discourse of the 1950s and the 1960s in the UN¶V 
attempts to reinvent itself. 
By the 1950s, the radical view of the abolitionists that the single reason for holding a review 
conference was to eliminate the veto had faded away. Both the veto abolitionists and the 
Charter reformists were by now in agreement that revisions to the Charter were needed, 
including revisions to the P5¶V voting privileges, and also that exactly what changes, and their 
scope, should be left to the review conference to decide.  
Therefore, unlike the attempts at reform in the late 1940s, the abolitionists came to realise 
that there was no need to insist on a particular outcome before the actual review started. With 
this realisation, the veto abolitionists and the Charter reformists converged on the same goal³
the convening of the Charter review conference. Then, at the Conference itself, they could 
work to achieve their desired outcome. 
This being the case, our three categories of stakeholders in the previous chapter are now 
reduced to two:  
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The Charter reformists: comprising many of the smaller nations, plus three of the P5 
members²the UK, the Republic of China and, in particular, the US, which was the most 
proactive of the P5 in the reformist camp. 
The Charter conservatives: consisting primarily of the Soviet Bloc, plus some indecisive 
states, such as Israel and Sweden, which swung between the Charter conservatives and the 
reformists. Further, in addition to the USSR, France, the last member of the P5, can be 
considered as a stakeholder in this category. Although not openly opposing the reformists, 
France, during this period through to the 1960s, and based on its voting records, was siding 
with the conservatives. 388 
7.2 7KH(YDVLYH8SFRPLQJ&KDUWHU5HYLHZDQGWKH81¶V³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
4XHVWLRQV´ 
After a few years of passivity in the Assembly, as the promised tenth session approached, in 
the GA 8th and 10th sessions of 1953 and 1955, member states actively took up the topic of 
the Charter review again. The discussions of these years among the sWDWHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
had the flavour of those of a constitutional convention or assembly. In the forum debates on 
what type of Charter revisions should be implemented, the veto abolitionists and the Charter 
reformists, mentioned in the previous chapter, were debating more than just the veto. Issues 
such as principles of equal representation and expanded representation (in the SC and the 
Economic and Social Council), competency of the different organs, voting procedures, 
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national ratification procedures, and the degree of constitutionalisation, were all, inter alia, 
debated.  
With the Korean War and the Cold War already having begun, and with ex-colonies 
beginning to emerge as independent sovereign nations, the role of the UN as the global 
governance institution, and thus the attributes of its Charter, were becoming crucial for many 
of these ex-colonies in regard to how and when they could become new states and recognised 
members of the UN. The UN¶s decisions as to whether to allow a new member to join and 
therefore formally exist in the community of nations, or its decisions under Chapter VII, 
revealing its power in imposing sanctions and waging wars, were beginning to highlight just 
what the Charter could and could not do.  
The hope, the interest and the anxiety of the different member states in respect of the 
possibility of convening the promised 1955 Charter review general conference manifested 
themselves in the constitutional question debate at the Assembly of 1953:389 two years in 
advance of the date specified in the operative clause of Article 109(3). 
At the *$¶VILUVWgeneral debate session of 1953, a group of Charter reformists representing 
the states of Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, among others, 
voiced the need for Charter revisions and advocated holding the general conference at the 
81¶Vth session, as provided for by paragraph 3 of Article 109, expressing their support for 
this.390 In addition, these countries were in favour of carrying out some preparatory work in 
anticipation of the 1955 review conference, starting at the 8th session. 
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 A second group of representatives, including those of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK 
and Egypt, without necessarily advocating changes to the Charter, expressed the view that 
conducting preparatory work for the general conference was important and advisable.391 
During the AVVHPEO\¶Vgeneral debate, those who spoke in opposition to Charter revisions, 
including the representative of Israel, doubted that the UN¶V effectiveness would be increased 
by any Charter changes. The representative of Sweden expressed the view that the veto was a 
reality in current international relations, and that the time was not right for turning the UN 
into a ³ZRUOGJRYHUQPHQW´. Consequently, he saw no immediate need to revise the Charter.392 
The five-nation Soviet Bloc (the USSR, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the 
Ukrainian SSR),393 as the main advocates of the Charter conservatives, expressed their 
opposition to any amendments to the Charter and categorically opposed holding any review 
conference. In addition, the Soviet view on the proposed preparatory measures was that it was 
³SDUWRIDFDPSDLJQGLUHFWHGPDLQO\E\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDJDLQVWWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHV
of the Charter, particularly against the rule of unanimity of the permanent members in the 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLO´394 
The only active P5 member in the reformist camp was the US. US official policy at the time 
was in favour of holding the review conference and revising the Charter. This in turn 
reflected strong civil society and popular movements in the US in the late 1940s and early 
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1950s which were advocating a world government, modelled after the US¶s own federal 
system. 
US academics were also interested in the concept of world peace through world law, as 
proposed by Harvard Law School Professor Louis Sohn, by means of the transformation of 
the UN into a world government, and the University of Chicago had spearheaded a 
programme under the heading of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution.395 
US legislative supporters of these ideas of the rule of law at the global level had introduced in 
the US Congress draft resolutions asking for the strengthening of the UN, along the lines of a 
federal world government.396 Although most of these draft resolutions were not adopted and 
remained merely drafts, a number of the more moderate versions were adopted.397 A 
significant example, known as the Vandenberg Resolution, was adopted in 1948, as Senate 
Resolution 239 at the 80th Congress. The operative paragraphs of this resolution instruct the 
State Department to hold the UN Charter review provided for in Article 109, if needed, with 
the objective of eliminating the veto on the questions of pacific settlement of disputes and 
admission of new Members.398 
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Another US Senate resolution, Resolution 126 of the 83rd Congress, of 1953, had created a 
special Sub-committee specifically on the UN Charter, in anticipation of the 1955 review 
conference.399 
During the 1950s, John Foster Dulles, the US Permanent Representative to the UN and, from 
1953 to 1959, Secretary of State, as well as a veteran of the UNCIO Conference in San 
Francisco, was promoting public discussions on UN Charter review, and personally wished 
for another great San Francisco-style conference on the Charter. These earlier sentiments 
were expressed by Dulles in 1950: 
«there is much to hope for, and little to fear, from another great world conference 
FDOOHGSULPDULO\WRPRGHUQL]HWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVLQWKHOLJKWRILWVILYH\HDUV¶
experience, and to review broadly its basic objectives of peace, justice, human liberty, 
and regulation of armaments.400 
Against this backdrop of public and US governmental interest in Charter revisions, the US 
delegation, under the chairmanship of Dulles, VSRNHDWWKH*$¶Vgeneral debate of 1953. The 
US delegation, referring to the US Senate resolution (Joint Resolution 239), expressed their 
support for holding the review with the goal of implementing Charter revisions, including the 
elimination of the unanimity rule on questions of pacific settlement of disputes and the 
admission of new Member States.401 
In a somewhat uncoordinated fashion, but nevertheless with the same objective, the Charter 
reformist states at the *$¶VLegal Committee (the Sixth Committee) presented a 
number of draft proposals for the convening of the review conference. Argentina and Egypt 
jointly with Costa Rica and the Netherlands, made three separate, but similar, proposals 
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requesting preparations for the Charter review conference of 1955, provided for in Article 
109(3). The Argentinian draft, in preparation for the review, included a paragraph that in 
effect instructed the Secretariat to conduct UHVHDUFKRQWKH81¶VSDVWDQGFXUUHQW
constitutional and legislative practices, requesting:402 
(a) a systematic compilation of the documents of the San Francisco Conference not 
yet published;  
(b) a complete index of all the documents of the San Francisco Conference;  
(c) a systematic and comprehensive study of the legislative history of the Charter; and 
(d) a repertory of the practice followed by the main organs of the United Nations on 
given subjects. 
This paragraph of the Argentinian draft was later adopted in Resolution 796 (VIII) of that 
year, which was also incorporated in GA Resolution 992 (X) of 1955. Its repertory of the 
practice at the UN, in particular, has become an ongoing effort, and a useful document which 
has been periodically published up to the present, and has been praised as an invaluable UN 
research tool by both government leaders and academics.403 
Egypt submitted a separate draft proposal accompanied by a memorandum noting that the 
UN Charter had been drafted in extraordinary circumstances that no longer prevailed, and 
that it therefore needed revisions. (J\SW¶VSURSRVDOZKLFK was later supported by Costa Rica 
as a joint draft resolution, in addition to requesting that the review take place, also requested a 
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technical committee to be set up to complement the Argentinian proposal to consider Charter 
revision proposals.  
The WKLUGSURSRVDOVXEPLWWHGWRWKH/HJDO&RPPLWWHHZDVWKH1HWKHUODQGV¶GUDIWUHVROXWLRQ
7KH1HWKHUODQGV¶SURSRVDOZDVsimilar to the Egyptian proposal, explicitly asking for 
member states¶ input on the Charter revisions. However, instead of being handled in a 
committee, the Netherlands proposal asked for all member states directly to submit their 
views on Charter revisions prior to the 10th session.404 
At the same time, a draft resolution, referred to as the joint Six-Power Resolution, sponsored 
by Canada, Cuba, New Zealand and Pakistan, and inclusive, again, of Argentina and the 
Netherlands, was submitted to the Legal Committee. This called for the review conference, 
and in its operative paragraph 2 specified the details of the invitation for soliciting Charter 
revisions, setting a deadline of the first quarter of 1955 for collection of member proposals.405 
France and Belgium submitted an amendment to the Six-Power Resolution, which, while 
concurring with the holding of the Conference, intended to restrict the invitation to obtain 
Charter revision requests. The amendment therefore rejected paragraph 2 of the Six-Power 
Resolution on the elicitation of Charter revisions in advance. France presented two 
objections: a technical one, pointing out that, in )UDQFH¶V view, the operative part of Article 
109(3) only empowered the GA to call for the setting of the date and the place of the general 
conference, nothing more; and further objecting to inquiring about constitutional change 
recommendations two years in advance of the conference. In the view of France and 
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Belgium, this might cause rigidity of the members¶ position at the review conference, which 
they opposed. Therefore, their proposed amendment was to delete paragraph 2 of the Six-
Power Resolution, which, in their view, addressed the substantive question of Charter 
revisions and was not within the scope of Article109(3).406 
The Soviet Bloc, while categorically opposed to any kind of Charter review, was in favour of 
the French amendment. To the representatives of the Soviet Bloc, the whole question of the 
preparatory work for the review of the Charter involved a plan by the US to change the 
Charter, allowing the UN to become an instrument for US world domination. In the summary 
report of the Sixth Committee RIWKH6RYLHW%ORF¶VFULWLFLVPRI86foreign policy was 
stated as follows: 
In 1953, a special committee of the United States Senate had been set up to study the 
proposals for Charter revision. The Chairman of that committee had said that he 
regarded the principle of unanimity as a great weakness in the Organization. In 
addition, it was stated, the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles in a 
speech delivered in Boston on 26 August 1953 had stated that the Charter was out of 
date and that the principle of unanimity failed to meet the present day needs of the 
United Nations. The aim of the United States attack on the principle of unanimity was, 
these representatives held, to use the United Nations as an instrument in achieving 
world domination.407 
7KH6RYLHW%ORF¶VYLHZVLPLODUWRits earlier, 1946 to 1948, debate on Charter review, was 
that the violations of the Charter were the root cause of the international tensions, and not the 
Charter itself. The Soviet delegation cited some recent US-sponsored developments, such as 
the Korean War, the creation of NATO (as a security arrangement outside of the SC), the 
Marshall Plan (outside of ECOSOC), and the non-acceptance of the 3HRSOH¶V5HSublic of 
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China as a UN Member and the legitimate representative of the Chinese people, as examples 
of the US-led Charter violations.408  
Therefore, the Soviet Bloc, recognising that the Charter conservatives were a minority and 
would not be able to stop the authorisation of a review by the Assembly, supported the 
French amendment. The advantage of the French intervention to the Soviet Bloc was that, 
while it did not avoid the conference, it would at least limit the scope of the Charter review 
preparatory work and eliminate the formal seeking and compilation of the desired Charter 
revisions.  
The UK also supported )UDQFH¶V amendment to the Six-Power resolution and therefore the 
deletion of paragraph 2 on the solicitation of Charter revisions. 
Some Charter-reformist member states, on the other hand, expressed their full support for the 
Six-Power resolution, therefore rejecting the French amendment. The representatives of 
Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Argentina, Peru and 
Uruguay expressed the view that not only was Charter revision desirable, but in fact it was a 
necessity. These representatives pointed out that their primary concern was with the 
privileges of the P5 as provided for in the Charter, which they considered to be against the 
principle of the sovereign equality of nations. Other perceived major shortcomings of the 
Charter they sought to revise were:409 




 Ibid: 48-49 
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x Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, regarding the scope of domestic 
jurisdiction and non-interference in relation to Chapter VII interventions and 
sanctions; 
x the role of the General Assembly in the maintenance of peace and security, 
particularly in its relationship with the SC; and 
x the P5 unanimity rule with regard to many questions, such as admission of 
new member states, which was preventing some otherwise well-qualified 
countries from joining the UN.410 
Yugoslavia also expressed its support for the Six-Power Resolution and the creation of a 
dedicated committee to collect and study Charter revisions. 
In addition to the smaller states, the US was the only P5 member expressing its support for 
the Six-Power resolution while rejecting the French amendment. Therefore, unlike the P5 
members France, the UK and the USSR, the US was in favour of the advance elicitation of 
proposed Charter revisions and recommendations from the member states prior to the Charter 
conference. 
The US indicated that the review set out in Article 109(3) would provide ³WKHRSSRUWXQLW\WR
work for a peaceful ZRUOGRUGHUUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHWUXHLQWHUHVWRIDOOQDWLRQV´. The US 
believed that Charter revision proposals should be sought not only from all the member states 
but also from those states which were awaiting admission to the UN, such as Austria, Italy, 
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Japan, and some other western allies. Further, in rebuttal to the Soviet Bloc argument, the US 
representative countered:411 
[T]hat it was indeed true, as stated by representatives of the "Soviet bloc", that there 
was need for scrupulous adherence to the present Charter. However, he said, it was 
the "Soviet bloc" which had been guilty of Charter violations including illegal and 
aggressive intervention in Greece and Czechoslovakia. It had flouted Security 
Council and Assembly decisions on Korea and had sabotaged United Nations efforts 
in the economic and social fields and through the specialized agencies.  
« 
His government [the United States] , however, had an open mind on the question of 
Charter revision and its aim would be to build up the Organization rather than to tear 
it down. 
At the Legal Committee, the draft resolution and the amendment were then put to a vote. 
First, the French amendment was voted on and was adopted (25 in favour, 24 against, and 5 
abstentions), thereby deleting the operative paragraph on elicitation and compilation of 
Charter revisions.412 
Then the Six-Power draft, as amended, was put to a vote and was adopted by a vote of 48 in 
favour to 5 against.413  
7KH/HJDO&RPPLWWHH¶VUHSRUWDQGWKHGUDIWresolution adopted by the Committee were then 
inWURGXFHGWRWKH$VVHPEO\¶VSOHQDU\PHHWLQJon 27 November 1953. The Assembly 
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conducted further debate on the resolution that was basically similar to, and in continuation 
of, the Legal Committee¶s debate.414 The amended resolution, with the exception of the 
Soviet Bloc, had no other opposition. Representatives of the Netherlands and New Zealand, 
two of the main sponsors of the Six-Power draft, highlighted the fact that the resolution was 
the result of a compromise, and although their countries favoured inclusion of Charter 
revision studies and elicitation as part of the resolution, they would not reintroduce it to the 
floor.  
Therefore, the amended draft resolution, as sent by the Legal Committee, was put to a vote 
and was adopted as Resolution 796 (VIII) by a vote of 54 in favour and 5 against.415 
In anticipation of the 1955 review Conference, the operative paragraph of the resolution 
authorised a major study of the legislative repertory of the UN, and a comprehensive 
documentation and indexing of the San Francisco UNCIO Conference records also got 
underway. The Repertory always contains an analytical summary of each Charter article as it 
may have been affected each year, and it has been produced periodically ever since.416 
In the meantime, the division in the reformist camp as to whether they should formally 
preview Charter changes now, or leave it until two years later²the trigger date of Article 
109(3)²helped the Charter conservatives¶ political manoeuvring to pay off. The 
unprecedented yes vote of the Soviet Bloc (to any resolution planning for Charter review), 
and their temporary alliance with the French and the British to have the amendment adopted, 
                                                 
414
 (Yearbook of the United Nations 1953): 50. See also (ODS 1993-2012): A/2559. 
415
 Ibid: 51. 
416
 Thanks to Res. 796 (VIII), a significant part of the empirical part of my research has been from sources, 
records and documentation authorised by that Resolution. The completion of the 22 volumes of the UNCIO 
documents, their updated indexes, as well as the ongoing legislative Repertory of the UN Practices, are the 
result of the work authorised under that Resolution. The Repertory now covers the period from 1945 to 2009, its 
latest edition being the 2000±2009 10-year issue.  
237 
 
made sure that the final resolution, Resolution 796 (VIII), had no preview or elaboration of 
the Charter revisions. This was important for Charter conservatives, because it prevented the 
reformists IURPEHFRPLQJ³ULJLG´DVWKH)Uench called it, and from inhibiting the increase in 
the sWDWHV¶SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGH[SHFWDWLRQVLQWKDWD&KDUWHU5HYLHZmust happen.  
7.3 Ten Years On: The UN Constitutional Debate Coast-to-Coast, in New 
York and San Francisco 
Ten years after the completion of the UN Charter, the US once again, in San Francisco and 
New York, was providing the forum for an exchange of ideas on the constitution of the UN. 
At the 10th session of the Assembly, in 1955, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, in 
execution of Article 109(3), added the item proposal to call a General Conference of the 
Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter WRWKH$VVHPEO\¶V
agenda.417  
The Assembly devoted a significant part of its session, a total of six sub-sessions, to the 
subject of the Charter and its review. The formal discussions and debate had, in fact, started a 
few months earlier at another UN forum in San Francisco, in June 1955, on the tenth-
anniversary commemoration of the signing of the UN Charter.  
The Charter reformists, comprising more than a two-thirds majority of the member states at 
the 10th session,418 engaged in a lively and fundamental debate at both of those events on 
what constitutional changes they envisioned for the UN. The highlights and the summation of 
the UN constitutional debates at the San Francisco Commemoration and at the UN New York 
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headquarters, reflecting member sWDWHV¶Sroposals for changes, can be categorised as 
follows:419 
x Democratisation and Sovereign State Equal Rights: Discussions on the total 
abolition of the P5¶s privileges; modification or elimination of the veto; and 
increasing member state representation at the SC. 
x All states inclusivity and universality at the UN: That is, easier access for new 
members to join the UN in view of a rise in emerging ex-colonial nations as new 
states; simple majority requirement for admission of new members without the 
permanent member unanimity rule; elimination of the Charter term, and concept of, 
³HQHP\VWDWH´; elaboration of and definition of self-determination; and more support 
for freedom movements and emerging ex-colonies as independent states. 
x Human Rights: Establishment of a human rights council at the same organisational 
level as the SC; capability for such a Council to enforce the rights of individuals. 
x Economic Development: Division of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
into an Economic and Technical Assistance Council, and a Social and Human Rights 
Council, thereby facilitating specialisation and focus on economic development, and, 
as a separate and parallel function, social development and protection of human 
rights; increase in participation and membership of ECOSOC and expansion of its 
role in economic development. 
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x Regional Organisations: Further recognition of the regional arrangements, and the 
clarification of Charter clauses referring to regional organisations, particularly on the 
topic of peace and security pertaining to Articles 52 to 54. 
x  Judicial Changes: Establishment of a UN Human Rights Court or Tribunal; the 
clarification and definition of the question of domestic jurisdiction; increasing 
membership of the ICJ; making ICJ rulings in all matters and cases compulsory.  
The minority Charter conservatives naturally did not participate in the constitutional debate in 
terms of how the UN could be reformed or enhanced, but, rather, gave their reasons as to why 
the Charter both in the letter and the spirit was sound and did not require any changes.  
The minority conservatives¶ view, opposing a review conference, was put forward most 
strongly by the Soviet Bloc, but was also shared to some extent by certain other countries, 
such as Sweden and Syria. The arguments put forward by the minority were:420 
x that Article 109(3), calling for a review conference, was not mandatory, and since the 
Charter was adequate as it was, there was no reason to review it, but there should 
instead be more goodwill from all nations to implement and follow Charter 
provisions; 
x that present conditions in international relations, and the ideological polarisations of 
the Cold War, meant that it was not the right time for a Charter revision, since it 
might lead to splitting and ³wrecking´ of the UN; 
x that the routine of going through the Charter review would probably lead nowhere, 
since, according to paragraph 2 of Article 109, any Charter revisions to be adopted 
                                                 
420
 (Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-1 1954-1955): 445,447; (Yearbook of the United 




must receive the favourable vote of two-thirds of the member states and, in addition, 
no negative vote of a member of the P5³in other words, agreement among the super-
powers and their unanimity. However, if there was unanimity between the super-
powers, there would be no need for any Charter revisions in the first place; 
x a review of the Charter would be justified only if the foundations upon which it had 
been based had changed. This was not the case, and a more consistent and genuine 
implementation of the Charter was what was needed; and 
x even if there were some special areas of the Charter that needed to be revised, then 
Article 108, in Chapter XVIII of the Charter, already provided for an amendment 
process, and therefore there was no need for an Article 109-type general review of the 
Charter. 
As regards this last point of the conservatives, suggesting using Article 108 amendment 
procedures to implement changes to the Charter, in fact, by this time, a few of the Charter 
reformists were already adopting this approach. Hence, a number of mostly Latin American 
states, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Venezuela, as well as Spain, 
had already, in the 10th session, as a back-up to the Charter review initiative and in parallel to 
it, requested that three items³expansion of the membership of the SC, ECOSOC and the 
ICJ³be added to the provisional agenda of the 11th session, to be implemented in accordance 
with Article 108.421 
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7.4 The Charter Reformists¶ Quest and the FRXQGHUV¶Promise to ³Seize´ 
the Moment 
As previously mentioned, in both the San Francisco and New York forums of 1955, a 
substantial majority of the member states³more than two-thirds³in principle favoured some 
form of Charter review.422 
The reasoning put forward by this group was partly on the necessity of a Charter review and 
partly on the principle of Article 109 itself. Those countries that emphasised upholding the 
principle of Article 109 reminded the other member states that they had not been ready to 
support the Charter when it was presented to them in San Francisco in 1945 because of the 
flaws and imperfections which they then saw in the Charter. And it was because of the 
concerns and objections expressed by these countries that the Great Powers had agreed to 
review the Charter at some point in the future, and had in fact backed up their promise by 
providing Article 109, especially paragraph 3. Hence, this provision required only a simple 
majority to vote for a Charter review, and also contained a time-specific promise: that it 
would commence by the tenth anniversary of the Charter. The view of the group was that this 
article ³ZDVQRWZULWWHQLQWRWKH&KDUWHUE\DFFLGHQWRUZLWKRXWVHULRXVWKRXJKWDQGLQWHQWLRQ´
and therefore the Assembly should ³VHL]HWKLVRSSRUWXQLW\´ to conduct the review conference, 
as it had intended.423 
Therefore, to seize the promised opportunity, and based on the time-triggered invocation of 
paragraph 3 of Article 109, the Charter reformists started work at the 10th session of the 
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$VVHPEO\¶VSOHQDU\DQGthe General Debate. With the item ³&DOOIRUDGeneral Review 
Conference´ already oQWKH*$¶VZRUNLQJ agenda, in line with paragraph 3, and in view of 
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHPDWWHUDQGWKHHDUOLHU\HDUV¶SUHSDUDWLRQWKHissue was not assigned to a 
committee but was taken directly by the plenary, in six meetings from 17 November to 21 
November 1955. When the Assembly, at its General Debate, took the question, it already had 
a joint draft resolution before it. The US, the UK, Canada, Ecuador, Iraq and Thailand had 
presented a Six-Power draft resolution that referred to the terms of paragraph 3 of Article 109 
and called for the review of the Charter. However, instead of fixing the time and place of 
such a review, the joint resolution deferred the date to an ³DXVSLFLRXV´ time to be decided by 
a committee that the draft was requesting be set up. The committee was expected to report on 
the time and place for the review conference at the 12th VHVVLRQLQWZR\HDUV¶WLPH424 
The General Debate on holding the conference and the discussions on the joint resolution 
RFFXSLHGDVLJQLILFDQWSDUWRIWKH$VVHPEO\¶VWLPHDWWhe 10th Session, and was mostly 
dominated by the majority Charter reformists, who expressed the following main points:425 
x tKH&KDUWHUFRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHG³LPPXWDEOH´. After 10 years of the UN¶V
operation, with the experience gained and the shortcomings encountered, it was 
now time to implement revisions to the Charter to enhance its functioning and to 
provide for the delivery of its objectives; 
                                                 
424
 (Yearbook of the United Nations 1955): 74; (Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-1 1954-
1955): 441. 
425
 The states presenting arguments in favour of the Charter review, either at the tenth anniversary in San 
Francisco or at the 10th 6HVVLRQ¶VVL[SOHQDU\PHHWLQJVLQ1HZ<RUNLQZHUHDPRQJRWKHUVWKH86
Argentina, Ecuador, Iraq, the Netherlands, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Panama, Columbia, Pakistan, 
India, Australia, Honduras, Lebanon, Canada, Haiti, Indonesia, Peru, El Salvador and Uruguay (UNRIC 1946-
2000): A/542, A/543, A/544, A/545, A/546, and A/547. See also Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of 
the Signing of the Charter of the United Nations in the City of San Francisco, 20-26 June 1955: Meeting 
Reports 1-8. See also (Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-1 1954-1955): 443-444; and 
(Yearbook of the United Nations 1955): 75. 
243 
 
x the whole system of warfare had changed. When the UN Charter was drawn up, 
the atomic age had not yet dawned. But now, with nuclear weapons capable of 
causing massive devastation and indiscriminately killing hundreds of thousands of 
people in one blast, and ballistic rockets capable of delivering those nuclear 
weapons anywhere in the world in a matter of minutes, Charter revisions were 
needed to regulate the pacific settlement of conflicts and to provide for total 
nuclear and general disarmament. Furthermore, even if the UN were capable of 
conflict management, the existence of security concepts and defence doctrines 
VXFKDVµVHFRQGVWULNHFDSDELOLW\¶DQG0XWXDOO\ Assured Destruction (MAD) had 
increased the possibility of accidental nuclear wars and nuclear accidents in 
general; consequentlyWKH81¶V role in nuclear disarmament had become critical 
and pivotal³a mission that the GA and its ongoing First Committee on 
disarmament had failed to fulfil, and therefore amendments to the Charter to 
enable the UN to provide for and implement disarmament were paramount; 
x with the current increase in the number of UN member states and the anticipated 
further increase, as colonial dependent nations became independent states, the 
81¶VVWUXFWXUHVKRXOGFKDQJHWRUHIOHFWWKLVrise in membership. Specifically, in 
relative and absolute terms, stateV¶ representation on the governing councils of the 
SC and ECOSOC, as well as the number of judges at the ICJ, should be expanded; 
x some provisions in the Charter required clarification, changes, amendments or 
deletion: for example, the provisions on SC voting and the veto; 
x in view of liberation and freedom movements in the colonies, as well as self-
determination of peoples, the provisions of the Charter dealing with dependent 
peoples needed to be reviewed;  
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x as the UN derived its support and understanding from the peoples of the world, a 
review conference would be helpful in renewing the involvement and the support 
of such peoples for the UN system. Further, the UN should be enabled to protect 
SHRSOHV¶ULJKWVDQGKXPDQULJKWV; 
x  member states that had not participated in the drafting of the Charter and had 
joined the UN after its founding ³should be provided with an opportunity to state 
their views on the instrument which defined their rights and obligations´; and  
x the UN had, since its inception, encountered new global problems that it was not 
designed or enabled to handle. Issues such as immigration and refugee problems, 
resource-sharing of the oceans and unchartered territories, and regulations on 
peaceful uses of atomic energy, had all arisen in the past 10 years, and required 
special handling or provisions in the Charter. 
 
The reformists did not necessarily agree on all of the above, nor did they have the same wish-
list. However, a common denominator for the majority was that the UN had not achieved 
some of its goals, such as the maintenance of peace and security, primarily because of certain 
Charter shortcomings, such as the voting procedure in the SC, and therefore ³a review of the 
Charter was both desirable and necessary.´426  
The Charter conservatives, whose viewpoint was mentioned in the previous section, and 
which primarily consisted of the Soviet Bloc, opposed the Six-Power resolution. In addition, 
a few states were opposed to the draft resolution being put forward, on essentially technical 





and legal grounds. Pakistan, Norway and Yugoslavia argued that the joint resolution did not 
go far enough in satisfying paragraph 3. 
This view was most notably put forward by Pakistan¶VAllah Bukhsh Karim Brohi (Pakistan¶V 
Justice Minister), who argued that, according to paragraph 3 of Article 109, and with regard 
to the tenth anniversary of the UN Charter, all the GA could do was fix the place and date. 
A.K. Brohi, in arguing that the question of time and place could not be deferred, and also that 
the 12th session was not the 10th session, stated: 427 
«>,@WLVnot possible to engraft an additional procedure on to paragraph 3 of Article 
109, because to do that would be to read more into the language of the Charter than 
is warranted. 
«7KHSDUDPRXQWLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHWHQWKVHVVLRQconsists in that it is the favorite of 
the United Nations Charter. 
In other words, if the Assembly was in favour of activating paragraph 3 and holding the 
conference, it could not delay its main purpose of determining the date. A similar position 
was taken by Yugoslavia in opposing the resolution. Norway, along the same lines, when 
analysing paragraph 3 of the article, stated that there was a distinction between actually 
calling the conference, as was provided for, and calling for the conference to be held at an 
³DXVSLFLRXV´ time, as the resolution suggested, while still referring to the same provision. 
Therefore, those countries were against the resolution, not necessarily on the merits or the 
desirability of a review conference, but owing to the technical objection that the decision to 
have the conference was manifestly linked to the selection of the place and time, and the two 
questions could not be separated.428 
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7.5 The General Assembly Resolves to Convene the General Conference 
to Review the Charter 
After the six sessions of the plenary discussionVDWWKHWULJJHUGDWHRIWKH81¶Vtenth 
anniversary, on 21 November 1955, the Assembly put the joint draft resolution to the vote, 
and it was adopted as Resolution 992 (X). Under it, the Assembly called for the convening of 
the review conference, but with the time and place to be set at a later date. The Resolution 
992 (X) text as adopted reads as follows:429 
The General Assembly,  
Mindful that paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations provides 
that if a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of 
reviewing the Charter has not been held before the tenth annual session of the 
General Assembly, such a conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of 
the Members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the 
Security Council, 
Believing that it is desirable to review the Charter in the light of experience gained in 
its operation, recognising that such a review should be conducted under auspicious 
international circumstances, 
1. Decides that a General Conference to review the Charter shall be held at an 
appropriate time; 
2. Further decides to appoint a Committee consisting of all the Members of the United 
Nations to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the question of fixing 
a time and place for the Conference, and its organization and procedures; 
3. Requests the Committee to report with its recommendations to the General 
Assembly at its twelfth session; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to complete the publication program undertaken 
pursuant to General Assembly resolution 796(VIII) of 23 November 1953 and to 
continue, prior to the twelfth session of the General Assembly, to prepare and 
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circulate supplements, as appropriate, to the Repertory of Practice of United Nations 
Organs; 
5. Transmits the present resolution to the Security Council. 
Therefore, in the preamble, the resolution was linked to paragraph 3 of Article 109, and in its 
operative paragraphs 1 and 2 the Assembly decided that the general review conference should 
be held and that the determination of the date and venue of the conference would be 
delegated to a Committee, deferrLQJWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQfor two years.  
The overwhelming majority of states were in favour of the resolution (43 in favour to 6 
against, with 9 abstentions).430 It should be noted that this outcome was more than a two-
thirds majority in favour of the resolution, and was in fact more than the simple majority 
requirement that Article 109(3) had required. 
Operative paragraph 5 of the rHVROXWLRQLQRUGHUWRVDWLVI\$UWLFOH¶VDGGLWLRQDO
requirement for adoption of the decision by the SC, required that the resolution be sent to the 
SC for its concurrence. In Article 109, both paragraphs 1 and 3 specify that, in addition to the 
*$¶VDGRSWLRQPDMRULW\FRQFXUUHQFHRIWKH6&ZLWKRXWUHJDUGWRpermanent membership (no 
veto) was also needed to convene a Charter review conference. 
Therefore, to obtain the concurrence of the SC, Resolution 992(X) was then transmitted to the 
Council. At the SC, the US, Iran, Brazil and the UK sponsored a draft resolution in support of 
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Resolution 992 (X), which was adopted on 16 December 1955431 as SC Resolution 110 
(1955), with 9 votes in favour, the USSR voting no, and France abstaining.432 
With the 6&¶s favourable vote of also more than two-thirds, the last hurdle of Article 109(3), 
SC concurrence of any seven members (that is a qualified majority with no veto), was 
overcome. 
Thus, with the adoption of Resolution 992 ;DWWKH*$¶Vth session, and the SC¶V 
concurrence, in effect the general conference to review the charter had been authorised, 
awaiting a date and place to be held. 
7.6 2QWKH/RRNRXWIRUWKH³$XVSLFLRXV´7LPH 
The Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter 
(Arrangements Committee), created under Resolution 992(X) to fix the time and place for the 
conference, had two meetings in 1957. A draft proposal was submitted by Brazil, Iran, India, 
Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, Panama and El Salvador, known as the Ten-
Power draft, which called for the Committee to be ³kept in being´ and to defer its decision on 
the date and place of the general review conference for a maximum of another two years.433 
This draft resolution had strong support and did not have any outright opposition. Even the 
Soviet Bloc, which still maintained that making the existing Charter work was more 
important than talking about how it should be changed, had softened its position and, instead 
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of casting a no vote, abstained from voting.434 The Ten-Power draft, with some additional 
sponsors, including, Austria, Argentina and Afghanistan, was introduced at the 12th Session 
to the GA plenary and, on 14 October 1957, was adopted as Resolution 1136 (XII). The full 
text of the Resolution states:435  
The General Assembly,  
Recalling the provisions of its resolution 992 (X) of 21 November 1955, having 
considered the report of the Committee established by the above resolution, 
 1. Decides to keep in being the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the 
purpose of reviewing the Charter, established by General Assembly resolution 992 
(X) and composed of all Members of the United Nations, and to request the 
Committee to report with recommendations, to the General Assembly not later than at 
its fourteenth session; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the work envisaged in paragraph 4 of 
General Assembly resolution 992(X). 
With no states voting against, and 9 abstentions,436 Resolution 1136 (XII) extended the 
mandate of the Committee and set a new two-year date for the completion of its work. 
Further, it extended the Secretary-General¶VPDQGDWHWRFRQWLQXHWKHZRUNRIWKH
Repertory and compilation of the legislative practices of the United Nations organs.  
The 1959 events concerning the Arrangements Committee¶s work were very similar to those 
of 1957. The Committee met twice that year and the majority view was to extend the question 
of time and place for another two years. However, some countries suggested that postponing 
the question was ³GHIHDWLVW´, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) was particularly insistent that the 
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date and place should be set without any further delay.437 On WKH&RPPLWWHH¶V
recommendation, the $VVHPEO\¶VSOHQDU\DGRSWed Resolution 1381 (XIV), in which it 
decided ³WRNeep in being´ the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose 
of Reviewing the Charter, and deferred WKH&RPPLWWHH¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQIRUDGDWHDQGSODFH
for the review conference for a maximum of two more years, to the 16th session.438 
At both the 16th and the 17th sessions of the Assembly, the Arrangements Committee met. 
And in both of those sessions, in 1961 and 1962, the Committee met only once, and in both 
years a draft resolution was put forward by Ghana, and had majority support for keeping the 
Committee, but deferring its question of date and venue of the review conference. GA 
Resolution 1670 (XVI) of 1961 deferred the question for one year, and GA Resolution 1756 
(XVII) of 1962 also deferred the question for a maximum of one year. But the 1962 
resolution adopted a more urgent tone, asking that the Committee meet in the summer prior to 
the September plenary session, in advance of the IROORZLQJ\HDU¶V Assembly session, when it 
would presumably have completed its work. Both the 1961 and 1962 resolutions were 
adopted with all the member states in favour, and no objections.439 
As provided by Resolution 1756 (XVII), the Arrangements Committee began its work earlier 
in 1963, in the summer of that year. The Committee decided to create a subcommittee 
composed of, among others, Brazil, Guinea, Iran, Liberia, Nepal, the Netherlands and Poland, 
to ask all the member states for their views on what should be recommended to the next GA 
session for convening the review conference. The subcommittee later concentrated its efforts 
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on asking the P5 members what they believed to be the common ground in regard to the 
conduct of the review conference, and on ensuring that its outcome would be acceptable to 
the P5, so that they would not cast a no vote. The subcommittee broke up into groups and 
individually approached the P5 and asked for their assistance and consultation.  
It should be noted that the subcommittee, as originally proposed by Ghana, had a wider 
scope, including asking for Charter enhancement recommendations from all states, and 
particularly asking questions regarding the expansion of the membership of the SC for better 
regional representation. However, the US and Czechoslovakia raised a legal objection on 
terms-of-reference grounds, stating that the subcommittee was not able to exceed the 
functions and the objectives of its parent committee.440 
In considering the long quest to hold a review of the UN Charter, it is important to pause here 
and recognise two critical developments that had occurred by the early 1960s, when the 
Ghana initiative was taking place.  
First, the reformist camp had lost its only active P5 member²the US. In the late 1940s and 
the 1950s, the US was the only proactive P5 member seeking Charter review and revisions; 
however, by the early 1960s, all its enthusiasm had evaporated. After the anti-communist 
fever of the McCarthyist era of the 1950s, and by the time of the Cuban Crisis of the early 
1960s, the US had lost interest in any developments at the UN which might lead to 
sovereignty-sharing, or any compromise of its P5 privileges. 
As for the other P5 members, the USSR had always openly opposed changes to the Charter, 
while France, according to its voting records, was quietly but consistently proving to be a 
                                                 
440
 See text accompanying ns 444 and 445 below. 
252 
 
Charter conservative. The Republic of China was struggling with legitimacy issues (in 
respect of whether the Taiwanese regime was a true representative of mainland China), and 
therefore followed US policy, since, from a security perspective, the US was its main 
protector. The UK had supported Charter revisions in the late 1940s, but, by the early 1950s, 
was acting more in accordance with the US in its proposals and draft resolutions, as opposed 
to being genuinely interested in, and an initiator for, Charter amendments7KH8.¶V
opposition to the Charter revisions elicitation debate of 1953 was already indicative of its 
transition to Charter conservatism. 441 
As for the most powerful of the P5, the US, although never a veto abolitionist, had broken 
ranks with the other permanent members, supporting the 1953 draft proposal that would have 
elicited and compiled the desired Charter revision changes. That defeated resolution,442 as 
feared by the Charter conservatives, would probably have given rise to the dynamics and the 
preparatory circumstances for the Assembly to convene the review of the Charter in 1955, as 
was expected, rather than delay it and refer it to a committee to decide the date and location. 
In other words, in the early years of the UN and of the Cold War, 1953 was probably more 
auspicious than 1955.  
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 During the early years (1945±1950) of the UN, the US had a unipolar view of the world, since it was by far 
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The US¶V conviction at that time, which was partly fuelled by its domestic popular and 
legislative drives, was so strong that, in addition to its support for soliciting Charter revisions 
from existing UN members, it had even proposed seeking the opinions of members-to-be: the 
states in the queue for admission, including a few of the old ³HQHP\VWDWHV´ and the newly 
independent states. But, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, public sentiment in the US, and 
especially that of its political and legislative classes, actively involved in combating 
communism, had changed profoundly, with the UN then being suspected of becoming a 
communist tool. Furthermore, the US was losing its majority support at the UN and the 
controlling role in the GA which it had enjoyed in the late 1940s and the 1950s, particularly 
with the admission of ex-colonies as newly independent states, which were not necessarily 
supportive of the 86¶Vforeign policies.  
Consequently, E\WKHWLPHRI*KDQD¶VGUDIWUHVROXWLRQLQ the US was no longer 
interested in changes to the Charter, being instead satisfied with the status quo. In line with 
their change in policy, the US and UK were no longer proactively initiating draft resolutions 
in connection with Charter review. By this time, the Charter conservatives, although still a 
minority, had amassed the support of four of the powerful P5²all of which, by 1964, had 
developed nuclear weapons. With communist China still excluded from the UN, the US could 
also count on the vote of Taiwan (a proxy state) at the Council on any occasion. Therefore, in 
practice, not a single P5 state was still interested in substantive Charter reforms. 
The second important development between the adoption of Resolution 992 (X) in 1955 and 
the 1962 draft resolution proposed by Ghana was the fact that the Charter reformists became 
more convinced than ever before that they required a lowest-common denominator 
acceptance of revisions from the P5 in advance in order for the review conference to get off 
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the ground. This conclusion was partly because of the apparent loss of interest on the part of 
the US and the UK³two of the P5 who had supported their cause443³and partly because of 
the observations that were being gleaned from the Article 108 amendment activities that were 
taking place in tandem in the early 1960s, and the real threat of a P5 veto blocking any 
proposed Charter amendment. During this time, resolutions were being debated on Charter 
amendments for expansion of the SC and ECOSOC memberships. While some of the P5 had 
expressed opposition, the USSR categorically and in advance had declared that it would cast 
a no vote and would not concur on the proposed amendments (see Section 9.4). Thus, the 
potential for defeat of any Charter revision proposal that lacked the support of even one P5 
member was becoming more apparent. 
As a result, the subcommittee created by the Arrangements Committee after the Ghana 
initiative of 1962 shifted its focus from seeking the views of all the members on Charter 
revisions, to asking only the P5 for their opinions on what Charter revisions were desirable, in 
order to find some common ground among the permanent members.  
This shift was primarily because of the prevailing logic of the subcommittee members at that 
time²which was that the initial concurrence of the P5 ³was indispensable to bring into effect 
DQ\PRGLILFDWLRQVRIWKHSUHVHQWWH[WRIWKH&KDUWHU´444 However, with the Charter 
amendments that were ratified (1963 to 1965), this presumption proved to be a fallacy, as is 
further discussed in Chapter 9. 
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The subcommittee¶VILQGLQJs, in the summer of 1962, were not favourable. Although it had 
identified some common ground, the conclusion was that there was no unanimity between the 
P5 on the question of the Charter review. In view of this report, the parent Arrangements 
Committee decided to recommend to the plenary session of the Assembly another two-year 
extension to enable it to fulfiO³WKHIXQFWLRQVHQWUXVWHGWRLWE\Assembly resolution 992(X) of 
´ and to resolve the question of the convocation of the review conference. The 
Committee¶V recommendation, presented as a draft resolution co-sponsored by Austria, 
Afghanistan and Costa Rica, was approved without any objections, as GA Resolution 1993 
(XVIII), in December 1963.445 
7.7 The Need Arises to Amend the Amender²Article 109: But Which 
Paragraph? 
During the 20th session of the Assembly and the new round of the $UUDQJHPHQWV&RPPLWWHH¶V 
Charter review activities, a remarkable turn of events took place²the Article which was 
supposed to be the basis for Charter changes became subject to amendment and change itself.  
When the Article 108 amendment efforts to expand the SC¶V membership from 11 to 15 were 
being pursued, it seems that the Secretary-General¶VVWDII responsible for this matter, as well 
as the lawyers and the legal staff at the disposal of the member states, had failed to notice the 
effect of the SC¶VPHPEHUVKLSexpansion on Article 109. The provisions increasing the 
membership of the two councils, the SC and ECOSOC, adopted as Charter amendments in 
1963, had been ratified by the summer of 1965 and were now coming into force.446 The 
expansion of the membership in these two Councils had required the amendment of Articles 
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23, 27 and 61 of the Charter to replace the old membership numbers with the new numbers. 
Hence, in the case of the SC, the membership was increased from 11 to 15 in Article 23, and 
the voting procedures of the SC in Article 27 were correspondingly updated to reflect the new 
qualification for what constituted a majority (from 7 to 9 members). However, the impact this 
had on the voting procedure in paragraph 1 of Article 109, and possibly also on that in 
paragraph 3, was neglected.  
With the last amendment ratification, that of the USSR, being deposited with the Secretariat 
on 31 August 1965, the Secretary-General, Mr. U Thant, issued a protocol announcing to 
member states that the Charter amendments had come into force. Just three weeks later, he 
notified the Assembly that a consequential amendment to Article 109 to correct the numerical 
discrepancy was also required and, on 16 September 1965, asked for the item amending 
Article 109 to be added to the aJHQGDRIWKH*$¶Vth session.447  
The Secretary-General, in explaining the required changes, advised the Assembly that, in 
Article 109(1), the number seven should be changed to nine for designating a qualified 
majority for the convening of a general review conference, with no other changes. However, 
0U87KDQW¶VSURSRVDODOVRVWDWHGthat, according to GA Resolution 992 (X) of 1955, and the 
SC concurrence of the same year, paragraph 3 of Article 109 had already been acted on, and 
therefore that article could EHFRQVLGHUHG³obsolete´448  
During the Assembly discussions that followed, while the majority of representatives agreed 
that Article 109(3) had been operated on and was in progress, some other states²mostly 
from the Soviet Bloc, such as Czechoslovakia²stated that any future review conference 
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should only convene according to Article 109(1), implying that paragraph 3 had indeed 
become obsolete.  
The majority view, however, was that, for both historical reasons and in order to make clear 
that the decision to hold the review conference based on paragraph 3 of Article 109 was still 
in effect, the paragraph therefore should not be deleted and should be left intact. 
The representative of Australia, expressing this view, pointed out: 449 
That a practical purpose might be served by retaining paragraph 3 in its present 
form, as the decision at the Assembly's tenth session to convene a conference for the 
purpose of reviewing the Charter at an appropriate time had not yet been fully 
implemented. To delete paragraph 3 might give rise to the question whether the 
decision remained in effect. 
 
After the debate at the Legal Committee, Greece proposed a draft resolution to support the 
6HFUHWDULDW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQDQGWRDPHQG$UWLFOH to include the higher number as 
qualification for a majority at the SC, while at the same time preserving Article 109(3) with 
no changes to its text.450  
The Greek proposal was adopted at the Legal Committee and sent to the Assembly plenary, 
where it was adopted unanimously as Resolution 2101 (XX) on 14 December 1965. 
The text of Resolution 2101 (XX) reads as follows:451 
The General Assembly, 
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations has been amended to provide that 
the membership of the Security Council, as provided in Article 23, should be 
increased from eleven to fifteen and that decisions of the Security Council should be 
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taken, as provided in Article 27, by an affirmative vote of nine members instead of 
seven,  
Considering that these amendments make it necessary also to amend Article 109 of 
the Charter 
1. Decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the following amendment to the Charter and to submit it for ratification by 
the States Members of the United Nations: 
In Article 109, paragraph 1, the word "seven" in the first sentence shall be replaced 
by the word "nine"; 
2. Calls upon all Member States to ratify the above amendment, in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes, at the earliest possible date.  
The amendment to Article 109, which was essentially to correct an oversight in an earlier 
amendment, came into force almost three years later in, 1968, after the required two-thirds 
ratifications were deposited.452 
7.8 Scholarship on Article 109(3): Is the Paragraph Obsolete?  
The scholarship on Article 109(3) and its effects is very scarce.453 This is perhaps partly 
owing to the fact that the questioning of WKHSDUDJUDSK¶V status occurred at the height of the 
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As far as the French language is concerned, the prominent French modern reference on the Charter, in a similar 
format to the Simma et al Commentaries, and also in its 3rd edition, is La Charte des Nations Unies, 
Commentaire article par article, by Jean-Pierre Cot et al. The section in the latest edition (2005) on Article 




Cold War, and the orientation of writers at the time, in a bipolar world of a capitalist West 
and a communist East, was inclined towards accepting the UN and its governance as 
frozen.454  
A critical review of the subject has so far been neglected, possibly in part because the way in 
which the article was operated on makes it especially complex. In other words, the partial 
implementation of the article; the many years of activity (or inactivity) in relation to it; and 
the multitude of parallel Charter and UN reform efforts, including the current ones, that trace 
their origins to the article makes the subject confusing and elusive.455 This complexity 
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(whether intentional or incidental) obscures the fact that no review has yet occurred, and also 
that the Charter has been effectively breached.  
There are only a few critical sources on the subject, the most prominent of which is the 
section entitled ³&KDSWHU;9,,,$PHQGPHQWV´, by Georg Witschel, in The United Nations 
Charter: A Commentary, edited by Bruno Simma et al.456 This book is in its third edition, and 
has been widely used since it was first published in the early 1990s. It is the only 
contemporary English-language commentary on the UN Charter, and is formally referenced 
by the UN as a recommended research source.457 Georg Witschel, a staff member of the 
German Foreign Office, in Volume II of the latest edition in 2012, has a two-page 
commentary on paragraph 3 of Article 109. In it, he states that Article LV³obsolete´
DQGLV³DFODVVLFH[DPSOHRIDµ81EXULDO¶´.458  
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The basis of this commentary, as mentioned earlier, seems to be Secretary-General U. 
7KDQW¶VHDUOLHUPHPRLQWRWKH$VVHPEO\$, which mentions that, since Article 
109(3) has been operated on, LWLV³REVROHWH´)XUWKHUWKHSecretary-General¶VPHPRUDQGXP
contained a proposed draft resolution for the consequential need to amend Article 109, while 
at the same time it also recommended that paragraph 3 be deleted. However, those scholars 
fail to mention that subsequently the Secretary-General¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWRWKHth meeting 
of the Sixth Committee, on 14 December 1965, announced the reversal of this opinion 
(A/6180), and specifically asked the Legal Committee not to delete paragraph 3, as had been 
suggested in the earlier memo.459 
The main argument presented by Witschel (and his collaborator, Wolfram Karl, in the older 
edition of the book, the text of which is identical) is that ³WKHREVROHVFHQFHRIWKHSURYLVLRQ
became apparent when it was not adjusted to the increase in the number of members of the 
SC±YHU\PXFKLQFRQWUDVWWR$UW´460 
This argument has two weaknesses, however. First, paragraph 3 (unlike paragraph 1) had a 
time-triggered one-time application which had already expired and had been effectively 
operated on. Therefore, the numerical requirement for its adoption (the number of positive 
SC member votes needed) had already been satisfied and hence the paragraph did not require 
any consequential adjustment because of the subsequent SC expansion amendment.  
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Secondly, and more importantly, Witschel and his collaborators fail to follow the final debate 
that took place at the 6th Committee (the Legal Committee) on the subject, in which the 
decision was made to keep paragrDSK7KH$XVWUDOLDQUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶VDUJXPHQW
representing the majority view, was that keeping paragraph 3 would help to clarify questions 
that might arise in the future, and would serve to make clear that in fact the pDUDJUDSK³KDG
not been fully implePHQWHG´DQGwas VWLOOOHJDOO\³in effect´461  
The Australian view and the Committee¶s decision prevailed. Ultimately, the Greek draft 
resolution that was unanimously adopted at the Assembly, modifying paragraph 1 but 
deliberately leaving paragraph 3 intact, is further proof that Article 109(3) was still applicable 
(not obsolete) and had been operated on and, at least up to that point (1965), was still in 
force.462 
In technical legal terms, unless the review conference is held, or unless this is formally 
determined to be unnecessary in a future repealing or reversing resolution of the GA, Article 
109(3) is not obsolete, but in fact remains in effect, partially breached and not fully 
implemented. 
7.9 Setting the Date and the Place²the Last Rendezvous  
At the 20th Session, in parallel with WKH*$¶VHIIRUWV to amend Article 109, the Arrangements 
Committee, created in 1955 to fulfil the terms of Article 109(3), continued its work. At its 
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might lead to the wrong conclusion.  
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meeting of 16 December 1965, the Committee voted to recommend a draft resolution for the 
$VVHPEO\¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQto extend its work for another two years.463 
7KH&RPPLWWHH¶VGUDIWSURSRVDOZDVDGRSWHGby the Assembly with no objections, as 
Resolution 2114 (XX), on 21 December 1965. The rHVROXWLRQ¶VRSHUDWLYH paragraph resolved 
³WRNHHS WKH&RPPLWWHHLQEHLQJ´, and asked the Committee ³WRUHSRUWZLWKUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
to the Assembly at its twenty-VHFRQGVHVVLRQ´464 In other words, the answer to the 
question of the auspicious time, and the $UUDQJHPHQW&RPPLWWHH¶V task of fixing the date and 
the place of the Charter review conference, was delayed by yet another two years.  
Resolution 2114 (XX) did not represent a breakthrough for the convening of the review 
conference ³ it just added a time extension. However, because its adoption occurred several 
days after Resolution 2101 (XX), which had amended Article 109, this further reinforced the 
rational that paragraph 3 of Article 109 had never lost its legal effect and was in fact still in 
force. 
Resolution 2114 (XX), like its predecessor resolutions on this subject, refers in its preamble 
to both Resolution 992 (X) and Article 109:465 
The General Assembly,  
Recalling the provisions of its resolutions 992(X) of 21 November 1955, 1136(XII) of 
14 October 1957, 1381 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1670(XVI) of 15 December 1961, 
1756(XVII) of 23 October 1962 and 1993(XVIII) of 17 December 1963 relating to the 
establishment, under Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations, of the 
Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the 
Charter and to the functions entrusted to the Committee « 
 
                                                 
463
 See n 459 above.  
464
 (Yearbook of the United Nations 1965): 235. 
465
 (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015): Res. 2114(XX). 
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It can be seen that the historical part of the preamble establishes a linkage. In reciting the 
purpose of the Arrangements Committee to arrange a Charter review conference in 
accordance with Article 109, it further links the Committee to its parent resolution, 
Resolution 992 (X), which, of course, makes reference to paragraph 3 of Article 109 as its 
justification. 
In VWDNHKROGHUV¶ terms, when the necessity to amend Article 109 arose, the minority Charter 
conservatives, who were against any kind of Charter revisions, tried to seize the moment and 
delete paragraph 3, suggesting, as Czechoslovakia did, that any review conference should be 
based on paragraph 1 of Article 109³in other words, implying that the question of the review 
conference had been reset and a new decision had to be made based on a higher two-thirds 
majority at the Assembly.466 
However, the majority Charter rHIRUPLVWV¶ view that prevailed at the Legal Committee 
deliberately prevented the deletion of paragraph 3 in Res. 2101 (X), which amended Article 
109. With the amended Article 109 being implemented and coming into force in 1968, this 
represented further legitimisation and verification as to the legal effect of paragraph 3 of 
Article 109, and reinforced WKH$VVHPEO\¶VTXHVWto hold the review conference.  
7KH*$¶Vnd session, in 1967, seems to have been the last meeting of the Arrangements 
Committee.  
The Committee met twice, on 11 and 12 September 1967, but was still unable to agree on 
whether the international-relations circumstances and P5 cooperation were favourable enough 
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 See text accompanying n 459 above. 
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to allow the fixing of a date and venue for the conference.467 Therefore, it decided to propose 
a draft resolution to the Assembly plenary recommending that the Committee be kept in 
being, but this time with no deadline of when to report next on its findings.  
The Committee further agreed that, at the request of any member state, the work of the 
Committee would resume. At the request RI&DQDGD¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHfor clarification on how 
the Committee could be activateGDJDLQWKH&KDLUPDQH[SUHVVHGWKH&RPPLWWHH¶V
understanding, based on the relevant recorded text, as follows:468 
[T]hat every Member State was entitled to request the convening of the Committee 
and that such a request should be made to the Secretary-General who, on the basis of 
established procedure, would consult the Members and would convene the Committee 
if it was found desirable to do so. 
7KH&RPPLWWHH¶VGUDIWZDVDGRSWHGDVResolution 2285 (XXII) DWWKH$VVHPEO\¶VSOHQDU\RQ
5 December 1967, with 85 votes in favour, 0 opposed, and 9 abstentions. The full text of the 
resolution follows:469 
The General Assembly, recalling the provisions of its resolutions 992(X) of 21 November 
1955, 1136(XII) of 14 October 1957, 1381 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1670(XVI) of 15 
December 1961, 1756(XVII) of 23 October1962, 1993 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963 and 
2114(XX) of 21 December 1965 relating to the establishment, under Article 109 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the 
purpose of reviewing the Charter and to the functions entrusted to the Committee,  
1. Decides to keep in being the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose 
of reviewing the Charter; 
2. Requests that the work envisaged in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 992 (X) 
should be continued. 
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 (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015): Res. 2285(XXII). See also (Yearbook of the United 




Consequently, after the decision of the majority of the UN member states DWWKH*$¶Vth 
session, in 1955, based on paragraph 3 of Article 109, to hold a review of the Charter, the 
Arrangements Committee in charge of setting the date and place for the review conference 
was, after 12 years of meetings and discussions, still unable to decide³citing the international 
climate, or, more explicitly, the lack of P5 cooperation on unanimity as the reasons why it 
was not an auspicious time. Thus, after a dozen years of active and periodic meetings and 
eight resolutions in support of arranging and convening the review of the Charter, the 
Committee became dormant.  
My further research shows that, to date, no follow-up GA resolutions or formal 
memorandums have been issued with the effect of killing or repealing the Committee. In fact, 
from 1967, for almost 25 more years, the UN official records intended for external 
publication listed the Arrangements Committee as one of the ongoing GA-commissioned 
committees, albeit reporting that the Committee ³GLGQRWPHHW´IRUWKat year. This 
announcement was reported in the UN Yearbook of activities, almost every year, from 1968 
up to 1991, when it was last acknowledged.470 
 Therefore, in accordance with UN laws and procedures, the Committee on Arrangements for 
a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter is ³in being´, but dormant and 
waiting to be reactivated. 
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 The UN Yearbooks researched were for the period from 1968 (the year after the 1967 resolution) to 2007, 
with the 2007 publication being the latest edition of the Yearbook available (as of March 2014). For over three 
decades, the name of the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the 
Charter appeared in the annual UN Yearbook reports, with the last appearance being in 1991. See (Yearbook of 




The last four chapters have critically examined the legislative history of the UN in its 
democratisation and transformation efforts from the first year of its operation to the last 
attempts in 1967 to convene a formal review of the Charter. 
The quest for UN reform in fact predates the inauguration of the UN and goes back to its 
founding, in San Francisco, where the promise of the review and reform of the Charter by a 
fixed date was grounded in Article 109(3). 
7KHILUVW\HDUV¶aggressive attempts at reforming the SCDVZHOODVPRVWPHPEHUVWDWHV¶81
constitutionalisation debates³mostly in the 1953 to 1955 period³were channelled towards, 
and focused on, the presumed upcoming 10th VHVVLRQ¶VUHYLHZFRQIHUHQFH 
Why, after seven decades, the UN has never had any Charter review conference, or any 
substantive amendments to its Charter to effect UN and SC reform, and why it is important 
that such an exercise is carried out, is the subject of the following chapters, with the next 
chapter, Chapter 8, focusing on the legitimacy of the Charter in general, and on the good faith 
performance of paragraph 3 of Article 109 in particular.  
With the suspended operation of Article 109(3), some fundamental questions remain. Can 
just a single member state, in effect, ask for the convening of the review, or, as the Chairman 
of the Committee later clarified, in 1967, does the request have to be submitted to the 
Secretary-General, who in turn will consult with the other member states? If the latter, is a 
simple majority sufficient, or are we back to the two-thirds requirement of paragraph 1? 
Other than member states, can other organs of the UN, such as the Secretariat, the UN 
Environmental Programme (UNEP), or the ICJ play a role in assisting the Charter reformists 
268 
 
to trigger the arguably badly needed UN and Council Reforms? Based on the Charter 
amendments¶ experience of the 1960s, how critical is a 3PHPEHU¶V no vote in Chapter 
XVIII-related Charter changes?  
Suppose the review conference were finally to be held, why would it be different from the 
other UN reform committees? Would it trigger a UN constitutionalisation process? 
The above legal questions and the substantive constitutional ones are the subjects of the last 

















This chapter discusses the legal aspects of the UN Charter as a treaty, its legitimacy, and the 
process for reviewing and amending the Charter. With respect to the latter point, paragraph 3 
of Article 109 is examined²first as a question of law while the paragraph was being 
formulated in 1945; and, secondly, after the paragraph became operational in 1955, its legal 
status (whether it is still in force or not) is considered as a law question.  
More generally, the legitimacy of the UN Charter as a treaty is analysed. This general global 
governance treaty is the only one of its kind that is universal (rather than multilateral or 
regional) in scope. It encompasses security, economics, human rights, social issues and 
scientific pacts. However, was it legitimately created by its member states? Or was it 
essentially a peace treaty plus global governance put on the table by the Big-3 victors of 
World War II, which probably would have violated the customary international law 
legitimacy test of treaty-making under coercion? 
The 51 states that were the original signatories to the Charter are analysed in Table 2. They 
are categorised according to their foreign-policy independence or dependence, and therefore 
271 
 
according to the degree of influence exerted over them by the P5. A summary of the previous 
discussions on the soft and hard coercions employed by the major powers, both inside and 
outside of the Conference, illustrates the tremendous anxiety and duress that the majority of 
conference participants were subjected to. 
As the law of treaties, especially the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)  
 is widely used in this chapter as a fundamental interpretative tool, the source of the VCLT is 
considered, as well as its relation to the UN Charter, and the issue of WKH³QRQ-UHWURDFWLYLW\´
of the Convention. It is concluded that the VCLT has a recursive relationship with the 
Charter, and the role of the VCLT as codifier of existing customs and a moulder of new ones 
is also established. Consequently, the VCLT serves throughout the chapter to clarify and give 
precision to the existing rules of customary international law as applicable to the UN Charter, 
as if the rules could be reproduced in terms of the Convention¶V provisions. 
In examining the making of the UN Charter as a treaty, Articles 49 and 50 of the VCLT will 
be considered in conjunction with the invalidity tests under Articles 50 and 51. This clearly 
points retrospectively to defects in the San Francisco Conference and the conclusion of the 
UN Charter (even if, in the final analysis, Articles 49 and 50 have not technically been 
breached). The dropping of two nuclear bombs by the US, and its depositing of the first 
ratification instrument in relation to the Charter²all in a matter of seventy-two hours²
further reinforce this hypothesis (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4.4). The anti-veto majority at the 
Conference had allowed the Yalta formula to be adopted, while at the same time a large block 
of states had abstained in the vote as a protest.471 Yet, while the anti-veto majority wanted 
                                                 
471
 See Chapter 5 on the voting pattern at UNCIO and results for Committee III/1 on the Yalta formula. In the 
end, a large block of 15 states, capable of defeating the formula but under pressure from the P5, changed their 
active opposition to passive objection and abstained. Similarly, the applicability of the veto on amendments in 
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escape clauses in the Charter²a veto-proof amendment provision and a withdrawal clause²
it nevertheless agreed to forgo both, subject to the condition of a fixed revision date for the 
Charter. 
In this chapter, I will argue that the great compromise of San Francisco manifested in 
paragraph 3 of Article 109, which was favourably operated on in 1955, retains its legal force. 
My argument consists of two parts: (1) the teleological interpretation of the paragraph; and 
(2) the effect of how it was operated on and its current legal status. 
The VCLT¶V interpretation rules, particularly those contained in Articles 31 to 33, which 
reflected customary international law, are applied to establish the absence of good faith in the 
performance, and the aborted execution, of Paragraph 3. 
In view of the above possible breaches, the chapter ends by asking whether the UN Charter 
should be renegotiated, or, in view of the fact that UN membership has quadrupled since the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶Vfounding in apparent acceptance of its statutes, whether its existing Charter 
should be reviewed. 
8.2 The UN Charter and its Legitimacy: A Peace Treaty, a Security Pact 
or a Quasi-Global Government? 
The question we might ask first, before analysing the UN Charter as a ³treaty´, is: can the 
UN Charter, according to international law, be termed a treaty?  
The answer can be found in the formal definition of ³WUHDW\´contained in Article 2(1a) of the 
VCLT:472 
                                                 
&RPPLWWHH,ZDVDOORZHGWREHDGRSWHGE\DPDUJLQRIRQO\RQHYRWH6HHDOVR3ULPH0LQLVWHU)UDVHU¶VUHSRUW
on his return to New Zealand, referring to the symbolic protest votes at the Conference: (Fraser 1945): 13-14. 
472
 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Sect. 1, Art. 2 (1a). 
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"Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in written 
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or 
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation; 
[Emphases added.] 
The UN Charter, being obviously an international agreement and in writing, we next have to 
decide if the instrument has the ingredient of being ³FRQFOXGHG´&RQFOXsion, in the context 
of treaties, is considered to encompass the whole treaty-making process³from negotiation to 
finalisation of the text, to the final consent of the state parties to be legally bound by the 
treaty.473 )RUPRUHGHWDLOVRQ³FRQFOXVLRQ´RIWUeaties, see Section 8.4.4.) 
As was explained in Chapters 4 and 5, the Charter passed through all these phases. Moreover, 
Article 110 of the Charter, by explaining the ratification rules, made clear at what stage a 
state¶s consent is given, and defined the legally binding point at which the instrument would 
enter into force. This moment was reached on 24 October 1945, when the Charter entered 
into force, with binding effect, and ³JRYHUQHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´. As to the title or 
³GHVLJQDWLRQ´ it seems that, as long as the other requirements in Article 2(1a) of the VCLT 
are satisfied, ³ZKDWHYHU´designation is given to the 1945 UN agreement is not important, and 
the title cannot inherently alter the nature of that instrument as a treaty.474  
Therefore, according to the VCLT¶V terms of referenceWKH81&KDUWHUDVDQ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO
DJUHHPHQWFRQFOXGHGEHWZHHQVWDWHV´LQ³writing´ and ³JRYHUQHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´DQG
UHJDUGOHVVRILWV³GHVLJQDWLRQ´, can be considered a treaty.475 
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 In the ³'HILQLWLRQRI.H\7HUPV´LQWKHUN Treaty Collection, where the UN Charter is deposited as one of 
WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VWUHDWLHVLWLVVWDWHGWKDW³7KHWHUPµFKDUWHU¶ is used for particularly formal and solemn 




In this thesis, depending on the context and the legal significanceWKHWHUP³WUHDW\´in some 
instances is used in place RIWKHFRPPRQO\XVHG³FKDUWHU´WRGHVLJQDWHWKHFRQVWLWXWLYH
instrument of the UN. 
8.2.1 Two-for-One: Security Pact for the Victors, DQG9LFWRUV¶3HDFH7UHDW\IRU 
Others  
The San Francisco Conference began on 25 April 1945, while the war on the European front 
was still being fought. The delegates at the Conference were fully aware of the devastation 
that this use of force was causing, and of the day-to-day shifting of geopolitics during those 
extraordinary times. Furthermore, they could watch the images and the impact of widespread 
coercion on the nightly news reels shown at the &RQIHUHQFH¶V&LQHPD 
Two days into the Conference, on 27 April 1945, Mussolini was captured and summarily 
executed the following day. And, almost three weeks into the conference, on 8 May 1945, 
+LWOHU¶V*HUPDQ\VXUUHQGHUHG476 However, on the Asian front, while Japan was on the 
retreat, the war was still in full force with no end in sight.  
The delegates were also fully aware that the entire origins of the UN (its first iteration), as 
signed in 1942, was primarily a military alliance against the Axis powers.477 In fact, the Big-
3, in their Conference invitation to the states, requested that, by March 1945 (and before the 
                                                 
Organisation of American States (OAS). See: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#charters . 
Further, the UN Treaty Collection, under the heading of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
GeneralKDVDVLWVILUVWWUHDW\OLVWHGDVWKH³Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court 
of Justice´6HHhttps://treaties.un.org/Pages/CTCs.aspx. 
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 (Schlesinger 2003): 173. 
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time of their attendance), the invited states must have declared war on the Axis forces and 
joined the UN as a pre-condition to attending the event.478  
For the first time, at the Tehran Conference of 1943, the Big-3 leaders²Roosevelt, Churchill 
and Stalin²met face to face to discuss the new international organisation. The last time they 
met to discuss the topic was at the Yalta Crimea Conference in February 1945. Both China 
and France were excluded from these two conferences.  
As the war progressed, the objective of the victors shifted from how to wind down the war 
and handle the enemy states, to how, in the future, to resolve conflict among themselves and 
their protectorate states. 
It was at Yalta that the three powers agreed that all SC decisions would be made based on 
their consensus. This implied a veto if any of the three did not want to go along with a 
majority decision of the Council. At the time, this requirement seemed existential to the Big-
3, who could all foresee an after-the-war competition between the Communist East and the 
Capitalist West. 
At the last meeting in Yalta, the uncompromising veto privilege of the Big-3 was agreed on 
and added to the Dumbarton Oaks proposal. As part of the Yalta agreement, the USSR 
committed to enter the war against Japan. The pact was sealed for delivery to San Francisco, 
and the veto privilege was later extended to China and France²the two co-opted permanent 
members.479 
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 (UN Web Services Section 2014). 
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 Most of the historical information in this section, and some of the commentary, is drawn from S. 
6FKOHVLQJHU¶VAct of CreationSDUWLFXODUO\WKHFKDSWHURQ³<DOWDDQGWKH$IWHUPDWK5RRVHYHOW¶V/DVW$FWV´
(Schlesinger 2003); as well as from D. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All (Bosco 2009): 10-38. 
276 
 
Therefore, first and foremost, the UN was a military alliance and a security pact between the 
US, USSR and UK.  
The second objective of the formation of the UN, in the eyes of its sponsoring governments, 
was how to maintain peace and security for the large bloc of nations that would be invited to 
UNCIO, but were in one way or another under the Big-¶VVSKHUHRILQIOXHQFH,QIDFWZLWK
the exception of some states, mostly in Latin America; as well as New Zealand and Australia; 
DQGWKHZDU¶V³HQHP\VWDWHV´WKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOGDWWKHWLPHZDVunder the influence of the 
permanent members, as depicted in Table 2 in Section 8.2.2.  
The majority of the states invited to San Francisco from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East were either: (1) the losers of the war in their fight with the Axis powers, which were 
then freed by the Big-3 and under their military protection and presence; or (2) outright 
colonial dependent states that were being groomed to gain their independence and were 
selectively chosen to participate at UNCIO (Table 2). In both cases, therefore, for these loser 
states and the hand-picked colonial states, the UN Charter was primarily a peace treaty 
through which they would gain their independence and freedom, and be saved from the 
³VFRXUJH´RIZDUDQGRFFXSDWLRQ480 
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 7KHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKH81&KDUWHU¶VREMHFWLYHVLQFOXGHGDPRQJRWKHUVIXQFWLRQLQJSDUWO\DVDSHDFHWUHDW\
and a new security regime between the permanent members and the rest of the world stems from the vision of 
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47) would have a permanent standing military force from armed forces and staff contributions of the permanent 
members under the command of the Council, and would police global conflicts anywhere in the world. Thus, 
under this SC regime, for the rest of the world, arms could be regulated, thereby leading to disarmament. In fact, 
in three Charter articles: Article 11 (GA), Article 26 (SC), and Article 47 (SC-Military Staff Committee) the 
WHUPV³regulation of armaments´DQGRU³disarmament´DUHVSHFLILFDOO\PHQWLRQHG,QWKLVUHJDUGDSHUWLQHQW
FRPPHQWIURP5RRVHYHOWLVFLWHGE\'%RVFRDQGKLVVHFRQGDU\VRXUFHVLQ%RVFR¶VFive to Rule Them All, 
made during the course of a dinner at the White House, and as recounted by the then British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden: 
7KHVPDOOSRZHUVWKHSUHVLGHQW>5RRVHYHOW@VDLGµVKRXOGKDYHQRWKLQJPRUHGDQJHURXVWKDQULIOHV¶ 
7KHUHDOGHFLVLRQVµVKRXOGEHPDGHE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV, Great Britain, Russia, and China, who would 
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8.2.2 The Charter as a Multi-Level Global Governance Treaty  
The UN Charter, as it was being formulated and finalised by the Big-3 at Dumbarton Oaks, 
under American insistence and leadership, had already taken on some aspects of global 
governance. It is well known that, of the P5, it was the US, the UK and the Soviet Union that 
wrote the UN DO proposal for a General International Organisation. A lesser known fact, 
however, is the asymmetry in the Big-¶VUROHVLQWKLVPDVVLYHXQGHUWDNLQJ7KH86
performed the bulk of the work, including, conceptualisation and implementation, and was 
doing practically all the research work, task-force activity and policy formulations. 
Essentially, the US was the master-framer of the draft of the UN Charter draft, and, in 
addition, managed the coordination and organisational efforts. The US also primarily paid the 
associated expenses.481  
China was a signatory to the DO, and, together with the Big-3, was considered one of the four 
sponsoring governments in San Francisco. However, China had very little to do with the 
drafting of the DO and, in fact, like France, was excluded from the Yalta Conference, where 
the Big-3 wartime leaders met in person to finalise the draft Charter before its presentation to 
the rest of the world for co-option.  
The Big-¶VUROHLQIUDPLQJWKH'2 proposal can be summarised as follows: the US was the 
originator, sponsor and the framer of the UN; the UK was the advisor and the collaborator; 
and the Soviet Union was the legitimiser. In other words, the US designed and created, the 
UK collaborated by reviewing and giving feedback, and the USSR²not trusting the other 
                                                 
EHWKHSRZHUVIRUPDQ\\HDUVWRFRPHWKDWZRXOGKDYHWRSROLFHWKHZRUOG¶$QDVVHPEO\RIDOOVWDWHV
FRXOGPHHWRQFHD\HDUKHWROGWKH%ULWLVKVRWKDWWKHVPDOOHUSRZHUVFRXOGµEORZRIIVWHDP¶ 
(Bosco 2009): 15. 
481
 (Schlesinger 2003): 111-126 
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two, but also not wanting to be left out²presented its lowest-common-denominator criteria 
to legitimise the proposed organisation.  
President Roosevelt and his advisors had started work on the design of the UN in 1941. They 
had idealistic quasi-world government plans for the then UN member states and perhaps the 
rest of the world. However, by 1943, they had abandoned those ideas and were focusing more 
on a global collective security pact based on the continental regions.482  
Yet Roosevelt and his advisors were fully aware that the violation of human rights, large 
disparities in economic conditions, and injustice were the main factors in fuelling wars. They 
would therefore vacillate, reverting at times back to the good-governance and global- 
government aspects of the proposed world organisation.483 
The end result was that the DO had mixed objectives and incorporated broader goals, such as 
DFKLHYLQJ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKHVROXWLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOeconomic, social and 
RWKHUKXPDQLWDULDQSUREOHPV´484 To achieve these ends, in addition to the GA and the ICJ, 
the US included, in tandem with the SC, an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the 
final DO proposal. With these objectives, the UN, before the adoption of its formal name, 
was referred to in San Francisco as the General International Organisation.485  
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To comply with the general model, the Charter, as a multi-purpose, multi-functional statute, 
calls for different organs that have a degree of separation of powers and that create their own 
subsidiaries. In the case of the GA and ECOSOC, these bodies can even enter into 
multilateral conventions and treaty agreements. The UN system has become in fact a large 
international-law-making processor and source of law. From the GA to ECOSOC, to the 
specialised agencies, soft law and regulatory and administrative laws are constantly being 
created. In the case of the SC, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the UN has been generating 
hard law, creating criminal laws, setting up courts, and adopting legislative actions. 
Therefore, in the case of the Council, invoking Chapter VII, the Charter empowers the UN to 
become a supranational sovereignty-sharing global institution. In Articles 2(7), 24 and 25, the 
member states, LQWKH³DSSOLFDWLRQRIHQIRUFHPHQWPHDVXUHVXQGHU&KDSWHU9,,´H[SOLFLWO\
delegate their rights to the SC.486 
By now, it should be clear that the UN Charter is no ordinary treaty. It is more than just the 
sum of its functional, collective security, economic and social, and technical cooperation 
FRPSRQHQWV,WLVD³JHQHUDO´JOREDO-governance, and in fact quasi, constitution for a 
supranational government, with sovereignty-sharing concepts similar to those in the EU 
treaties.487 The question is whether such a Charter, so general and universal, and having such 
a significant impact, was constituted legitimately. 
                                                 
486
 Further detail on Charter articles relating to the supranational character of the SC measures pertaining to 
Chapter VII decisions can be found in Chapter 3. For additional elaboration of these points, see Chapter 9.  
487
 The sovereignty-sharing features of Council decisions under Chapter VII are, of course, universal, but 
exclude the permanent members: in their case, empowered with the veto, Council decisions are made and 
applied only if all of the P5 are in agreement. As to the conceptual similarity of sovereignty-sharing between the 
UN and the EU, the EU institutions have been evolving and are a lot more developed, with sovereignty-sharing 
and subsiGLDULW\EHLQJPDLQSLOODUVLQWKHLUGHVLJQ,QFRQWUDVWWKH81¶VVXSUDQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVVXUIDFHG
more by mutation, and almost half a century after the Charter was inaugurated. Nonetheless, the reality is still 
the same²under a Chapter VII decision, the whole world is sharing sovereignty. For a discussion of the law-
making powers of the Council, see Chapters 2 and 3. 
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8.3 Charter Legitimacy²Legitimacy of States and Their Invited 
Governments  
In evaluating the legitimacy of the UN Charter, I will first review some background material 
relating WRWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHVWDWHV¶JRYHUQPHQWVpresent at the Conference, in view of the 
extraordinary circumstances of the time. 
Table 2 serves as a useful reference tool that, together with its notes, provides a country-by-
country analysis of the legitimacy status of the governments invited. The objective, by 
defining and applying dependency criteria, is to identify the states that were Under the 
Influence (U) of the permanent members at the start of, or during, the Conference and up until 
WKHWUHDW\¶VFRQFOXVLRQDQGUDWLILFDWLRQV. 
Table 2 in total depicts the 51 States (including the P5) that were the original signatories of 
the UN Charter. This includes states whose credentials were approved by the Big-3 (and 
therefore the Credentials Committee) while the Conference was in session. The table also 
includes Poland, which was originally denied attendance at the signing ceremonies, but 
signed at a later date and was formally considered one of the original 51 states. 
Extrapolation of some figures (not necessarily mutually exclusive) is presented below. 
Excluding the P5, the number of original Charter signatories is 46. Out of these 46 states, 27 
(more than half) had a significant military presence of one or more of the P5 in their territory 
(the M-factor). There were 14 P5-installed or puppet regimes (the P-factor) in attendance. 
Another seven were government-in-exile regimes (the EX-factor) or emergency cabinets that 
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were not elected based on their national constitutions, and dependent on the P5 for 
legitimisation and support.488  
Furthermore, there were five colonial states. Although they had varying degrees of autonomy 
and were being groomed for independence, they were formally and in fact colonies (the C-
factor) of either Britain or France. In the case of the Philippines Commonwealth, it was a 
formal US dependant. 
To identify the Under Influence criterion (the U-factor), the qualifying parameters were 
defined as the M, EX, P and C factors. The presence of the M-factor (military presence) alone 
did not necessarily imply the state was under the influence of one of the major powers. This 
is true, for example, in the case of Cuba, which had a historical treaty with the US allowing 
the US military bases at Guantanamo that predated the two World Wars. Therefore, the M-
factor is an important indicator, but not a determining criterion for being Under Influence. 
However, if a government representing a state at the Conference had an EX-, P- or C-factor, 
then this, individually, was sufficient to identify the invitee government as being Under 
Influence. These generally included governments-in-exile, puppet regimes, and the colonial 
states. 
With this analysis in mind, I now suggest a precise definition for the U-States participating at 
UNCIO in San Francisco: 
An UNCIO-participating state Under Influence (U-State) is defined as a state 
which, in terms of its foreign relations and policy, was directly or significantly 
                                                 
488According to the Atlantic Charter and the first UN declaration signed in 1942, the number of European 
governments-in-exile states (mostly located in London) amounted to nine: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and representatives of General de Gaulle of France.  
See the UN Charter History site: http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/atlantic_charter.shtml; accessed 3 
March 2014.   
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controlled by one or more of the permanent members at any time during the 
period between the initiation of the UN Charter (11 February 1945²the end 
of the Yalta round, and the start of invitations) including the period of the 
UNCIO in San Francisco (April-June 1945) and WKH7UHDW\¶V conclusion and 
coming into force (24 October 1945). 
The final country-by-country analysis and further notes on the parameters and factors 




Conclusion of the UN Charter as a Treaty²State Parties Under Influence 
Distribution of States as Independent or Under Influence of the Permanent Members 
  (P5 Dependants or Representing Their Interests) * 






Status at UNCIO 
I= Independent 
U= Under Influence 
 
Under Influence Category 
 
Argentina I _ 
Australia I _ 
Belarus U M, P 
Belgium U M, EX 
Bolivia I _ 
Brazil I M 
Canada I _ 
Chile I _ 
Republic of China P5 _ 
Colombia I _ 
Costa Rica I _ 
Cuba I M 
Czechoslovakia U M, P 
Denmark U M, EX 
Dominican Republic I _ 
Ecuador U M 
Egypt U M, P 
El Salvador I _ 
Ethiopia U M, EX 
France P5 _ 
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Greece U M, EX 
Guatemala I _ 
Haiti U M, P 
Honduras I _ 
India U M, C 
Iran U M, P 
Iraq U M, P 
Lebanon U M, C 
Liberia U M, P 
Luxembourg U  M, EX 
Mexico I _ 
Netherlands U M, EX 
New Zealand I _ 
Nicaragua U M, P 
Norway U M, EX 
Panama U M, P 
Paraguay I _ 
Peru U M 
Philippines U M, C 
Poland U M, P 
Saudi Arabia U M, P 
South Africa U C 
Syria U M, C 
Turkey I _ 
Ukraine U M, P 
USSR P5 _ 
United Kingdom P5 _ 
United States  P5 _ 
Uruguay I _ 
Venezuela I _ 
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Yugoslavia  U M 
* Source: Various sources; see footnote.489 
                                                 
489
 Perhaps pioneering the legitimacy angle of research on the UN Charter, the data for this section were not 
found in any concentrated source(s), and had to be collected from various places. Two categories of general 
sources were used. The first consisted of a review of the political history of each state²particularly at the end of 
the war period²to determine primarily whether they were independent or under the influence of the P5 (I- and 
U-factors). If a U-6WDWHWKHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSDUDPHWHUIRUEHLQJLQWKHGHSHQGHQFHFDWHJRU\DVWR&-, P-, and 
EX-factors, were identified. 
 
The exception was information on the Latin American states. Information on their political history as a group 
(continent) was more readily available. For a single source on the Latin American 6WDWHV¶ World War II 
international politics and military involvement, see (Leonard and Bratzel 2006). 
 
:LWKUHVSHFWWRDJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHSHQGHQFHWKH(;- and C-factors were more easily identifiable as being states 
Under Influence. The EX were all the states that were governments-in-exile that had been relocated from abroad 
or installed by the Big-3. The European states in this sub-category, such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, were eight in total (excluding France), and were easily identifiable. In fact, 
these states were formally designated as such (government-in-exile) in the Atlantic Treaty. Those governments 
in the 1945 period under my evaluation were still mostly operating from London and were not necessarily 
democratically elected according to their national parliamentary procedures and constitutions. See n 488 above. 
 
An example of these caretaker governments is the Schermerhorn-Drees cabinet in the Netherlands. This cabinet 
was mostly known as the ³royal cabinet´ or the ³emergency-cabinet´ since it was appointed by the queen 
rather than being constitutionally elected. It was only after UNCIO, in November of 1945, that the Dutch 
parliament started functioning again. See: 
http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvwl/kabinet_schermerhorn_drees_1945_1946.  
 
For interference by the Big-3 in the political processes of some of the EX-states, see, for example, the use of 
force by the UK in an incident in Greece less than six months prior to UNCIO that left 28 people dead: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/athens-1944-britains-dirty-secret. Both accessed 30 December 
2015. 
 
)RUDJHQHUDODVVHVVPHQWRIWKH³IUHH´JRYHUQPHQWVRIEurope in 1945, and the view that the wartime 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVKDGPDGHWKHP³PRUDOO\FRUUXSWHG´DVZHOODVWKHOHJLWLPDF\GHILFLWRIWKH(;-states³for 
example in the cases of imprisoning tens of thousands in Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands as 
³FROODERUDWRUV´HYHQWKRXJKWKH\ZHUHPRVWO\SDUWRIWKHSROLWLFDORSSRVLWLRQ³see Ian Buruma, Year Zero: A 
History of 1945 (Buruma 2013): 169-171, 205, 207. 
 
The other easily identifiable U-States were the colonial (or C-states) invited to the Conference, although they 
were in effect still colonies. In the C-state case of India, for example, at the time of UNCIO, most of the Indian 
National Congress leadership, including Jawaharlal 1HKUXZHUHLQMDLO,QIDFW0DGDPH3DQGLW1HKUX¶VVLVter 
DQG,QGLD¶VIXWXUH81DPEDVVDGRUZDVOHDGLQJDSDUDOOHOXQRIILFLDOHIIRUWLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFRUHSUHVHQWLQJWKH
1DWLRQDO&RQJUHVVDQG³4XLW,QGLD´DQG0DKDWPD*DQGKL¶VYLHZV*DQGKLLQKLVOHWWHUVDQGLQWHUYLHZVUHODWLQJ
to UNCIO, had called for an end to imperialism everywhere, international disarmament, and establishment of a 
world government with a pooled police force. India did not gain its independence until 1947. For information on 
,QGLD¶VJOREDOYLHZVDWWKHWLPHRI81&,2 as expressed by its excluded leadership, see Manu Bhagavan, 
Showdown in San Francisco (Bhagavan 2013): 33-49. 
 
The Philippines, in this analysis is categorised as a puppet regime rather than a colony, since the US referred to 
the Philippines as an assRFLDWH³FRPPRQZHDOWK´VWDWHUDWKHUWKDQDFRORQ\3KLOLSSLQHVGLGQRWDFKLHYHLWV




 Table 2 Notes 
Definitions: 
I = Independent of P5: by and large, the UNCIO-participating state could, in terms of its 
foreign policy and relations, act independently. However, this category does not imply that 
the VWDWH¶VJRYHUQPHQWDWWKHWLPHZDVUXQGHPRFUDWLFDOO\RUWhat the state had no degree of 
economic dependence on the P5.  
U = Under Influence (U-State): by and large, the UNCIO-participating state was, in terms 
of its foreign policy and relations, directly or significantly controlled (in terms of coercion or 
threat of coercion) by one or more of the permanent members. The state did not enjoy 
sufficient sovereign equality and freedom while concluding the treaty or at the time of giving 
                                                 
Egypt and Iraq, which had a certain amount of formal independence after World War I, were actually British 
colonial states in transit (the British troops had not actually left until 1947). In the case of French colonies, 
during the wartime French Vichy regime the French had lost central control of their colonies, including Lebanon 
and Syria. The government-in-exile of Charles de Gaulle supported the independence of Lebanon and Syria, and 
DW'H*DXOOH¶VUHTXHVWthese two states were invited to the Conference as independent states. However, while the 
Conference was still in progress, French troops violently reasserted control over these two countries, thus in 
effect re-occupying them. The French troops did not leave until 1946. In addition to references in Chapter 4, see 
also (Buruma 2013): 322-325. 
 
The second general category used to determine dependency was whether there was a significant degree of 
presence of one or more P5 military forces (the M-IDFWRULQDJLYHQVWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\ at the time of the 
Conference. The data had to be collected from military records and the presence of the P5 armed forces across 
the globe. Historical military records for both the US and the UK were relatively comprehensive and readily 
available on government-published military history databases. In particular, the following two sources on the 
British and US military and naval forces were used to construct the Table: with regard to the UK: British 
Military History, http://www.britishmilitaryhistory.co.uk/; accessed 28 May 2014; on the US, Stephen Howarth, 
To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1998. (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.) 
 
Wikipedia, which has an extensive WW II country-by-country short report, provides primary sources that I also 
consulted. Finally, the Conference documents, as well as its auxiliary documents published with the 22-volume 
UNCIO set, were used. Examples of these UNCIO auxiliary documents were the associated daily journals and 
the selected newspaper articles of interest to the participants, and media coverage that was selectively but 
regularly published by the Conference organisers. In particular, the Conference media coverage proved to be 
very useful, because it captured the international political events at the time that had direct or indirect effects at 
the Conference: changes of government and delegates, uprisings, military advances, and East±West rivalries. 
Examples of prominent international developments which occurred during the two months that the Conference 
was in session include: the quickly shifting borders in Europe between the USSR and the Western powers, the 
change in government in Denmark, the situation in Poland and Yugoslavia, and the French military intervention 
in Syria and Lebanon. 
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its formal consent through ratification. The type of dependence or control is further defined in 
the categories below.490 
U-State ±Under Influence Categories: 
M = Military Presence: this category indicates that a significant military presence (minimum 
of a brigade or five thousand military personnel) of one or more of the P5 existed in the U-
6WDWH¶VWHUULWRU\at the time of UNCIO. There are several scenarios under which a P5 military 
presence occurred. For example, there might have been a massive number of troops active as 
part of a military operation liberating a state from Axis forces. Belgium, Belarus, Denmark, 
Ethiopia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines and Ukraine provide 
examples of this scenario. Or, in other circumstances, there might be a smaller contingent of 
P5 troops, but their presence still posed a potential military threat to the host country. This 
was the case in many Latin American U-States. Yet another scenario is where the P5 military 
presence in a previously independent state resulted not from liberating the U-State from Axis 
occupation, but instead had another objective, such as regime change, or some logistical or 
strategic goal. This scenario played out in Iran in 1942, with the Soviets invading from the 
north and the British invading from the south, and both occupying the country. 
However, a P5 military presence by itself did not necessarily constitute being Under 
Influence. Brazil and Cuba provide examples of this. This could have been because of the 
remoteness of the base (a distant port, or island base) or the existence of a historical lease or 
treaty relating to the use of the base that predated the two world wars (for example, 
Guantanamo in Cuba).  
EX = the state government represented at the Conference was a government-in-exile. 
Therefore, the government-in-exile was essentially legitimised by its permanent-member host 
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 ([WHQVLYHGLVFXVVLRQRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVFRHUFLRQDQG³WKUHDWRUXVHRIIRUFH´DQG non-military types of 
FRHUFLRQVIROORZVLQ6HFWLRQ)RUDQ,&-FDVHRQSURKLELWLRQRIWKHXVHRIIRUFHWRLQIOXHQFHDVWDWH¶V
³IRUPXODWLRQRIIRUHLJQSROLF\´VHH(Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 




country, rather than having been formally elected by its people or representing its nation 
through a constitutional process. 
P = the U-State was a puppet regime installed by a permanent member. Many of the U-
States fell under this category. The start date for this condition of regime dependence could 
have been before, during or immediately after the war, but was still in effect at the time of the 
WUHDW\¶VFRQFOXVLRQ([DPSOHVincluded Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, 
the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine. 
C = Colonial: the U-State, at the time of the Conference, was (1) still formally a colony; or 
(2) had been granted independence, but was still in effect a colony. An example of the former 
is India, which did not gain its independence from Britain until 1947, but at the Conference 
represented itself as a sovereign state. In fact, at the time of UNCIO, most of the leadership of 
the Indian National Congress and the independence movement, including Nehru, were still in 
the prisons of their British colonial masters. Examples in the latter category are Egypt, South 
Africa, Syria and Lebanon. Although the UK or France had formally granted independence to 
these nations, the former colonisers had not, either because of a treaty arrangement or the use 





My analysis, summarised in Table 2, indicates that the majority of the states in San Francisco 
were either under the direct influence of the P5 or were significantly subject to their influence 
in respect of their foreign relations. Of the 46 states (excluding the P5) that were invited to 
the Conference and that participated in drafting the Charter, 27 were U-States (59 per cent). 
And once the P5 are added to this total at the time of voting and adoption of the DO 
amendments, this represents a 63 per cent guarantee of favourable votes, should they have 
needed it, for the DGRSWLRQRIWKH3¶VZLVKHVDQGUHVROXtions.  
Most of the invitee states were fully aware that they were not on an equal footing at the 
Conference and that they would probably have to acquiesce to the WW II vLFWRUV¶SODQVIRUD
UN. However, while the US was being careful to paint a picture of fairness at the 
Conference, some of the other permanent members had no compunction about showing who 
was in charge. According to Carlos Romello, representative of the Philippines, ³HYHQZKLOH
the Soviets preached the rhetoric of liberation from oppression, they behaved toward all of us 
representatives of smaller countries as though we scarcely existed. They acted as if they 
RZQHGWKHZRUOG´491 
In attempting to co-opt member states into signing their global-governance Charter, the Big-
3¶VWDVNZDVPDGHHDVLHUby the fact that only 37 per cent of participants at the Conference 
were Independent States that could have opposed their plans. Therefore, it would seem to 
have been easy sailing for the Big-3 to achieve their desired result. Nevertheless, the 
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 Cited from Carlos and Beth Romulo, Forty Years: A Third World Soldier at the UN, 1986, 9-10, in 
(Schlesinger 2003): 171. Another instance of the Big-¶VSULYDWHEHOLWWOLQJRIWKHOHVVHUSRZHUVFRQFHUQVWKH
powerful US representative to San Francisco Senator Connally. During the latter part of the Conference, around 
the time of the anti-veto rebellion, KHH[FODLPHG³WKHVHOLWWOHFRXQWULHVDUHJRLQJWREHOO\DFKHDQGUDLVHKHOOQR
PDWWHUZKDW\RXGRDERXWLW:H¶UHGRLQJDOOWKLVIRUWKHP:HFRXOGPDNHDQDOOLDQFHZLWK*UHDW%ULWDLQDQG
5XVVLDDQGEHGRQHZLWKLW´&LWHGIURPStettinius Papers. Notes for 29 May, University of Virginia Library, in 
(Schlesinger 2003): 171.  
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permanent members still employed other means, both within and outside of the Conference, 
to intimidate representatives and place WKHVWDWHV¶JRYHUQPHnts under duress. This resulted in 
the unanimous adoption of the Charter. 
8.4 Charter Legitimacy²the Test of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 
Section 2 of the 1969 VCLT contains a series of articles that may delegitimise and therefore 
nullify a treaty. The primary principle that the VCLT adheres to LVWKH³HTXDOVRYHUHLJQW\´RI
VWDWHVDQGVWDWHV¶³FRQVHQW´LQcontracting a treaty.492 Therefore, in this section, I will 
examine the UN Charter in light of VCLT Section 2, Articles 49 to 51, to test for the breach 
RIVWDWHV¶FRQVHQWDW81&,2, and will also discuss the validity of the Charter in the context of 
these articles. 
8.4.1 The UN Charter, VCLT Recursion and Retroactivity: Do the Vienna 
Convention¶V Provisions Apply to the UN Charter?  
First, it is necessary to examine whether the VCLT constitutes a competent source and a 
relevant set of rules to act as a yardstick for the &KDUWHU¶VFUHGLELOLW\RUto evaluate the good 
faith of its execution. 
In fact, there is a circular constituent legitimisation relationship between the UN Charter and 
the Vienna Convention. Article 4 of the VCLT, RQWKH³1RQ-retroactivity of the Present 
&RQYHQWLRQ´, may be interpreted as excluding older treaties from its scope. However, the 
VCLT was sponsored by the UN, and drafted by the ILC (set up by the GA). In the absence 
of a constitutional court, and from a rule-of-law perspective, it can only make sense that the 
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 7KHSULQFLSOHRI³VRYHUHLJQHTXDOLW\´LVFLWHGLQWKHSUHDPEOHFKDSHDXRIWKH9&/7DQGWKHHPSKDVLVRQ
VWDWHV¶³FRQVHQW´LQDGGLWLRQWREHLQJLncluded in the preamble, appears in several other places in the treaty: for 




legal norms and principles established by a subsidiary would also apply to its creator. Dick 
Ruiter, in analysing law as the interplay of norms of conduct and power-conferring norms, 
reminds us of the common occurrence and the natuUHRI³OHJDOV\VWHPVDVUHFXUVLYH
VWUXFWXUHV´493  
On the other hand, the prohibition of coercion and the use of force in concluding treaties has 
existed in international law since the 1920s, clearly predating the VCLT and the UN 
Charter.494 And both the Charter and the VCLT proclaim themselves to be ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´
compliant.  
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 (Ruiter 1993): 23. This interplay of the law of treaties and the UN, particularly in relation to the SC, rapidly 
becomes intricate and complex. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the Council, without regard to the VCLT, can 
make instant treaties. For example, the creation of the UN Compensation Commission, and the requirements 
under Res. 1370 and Res. 1540 regarding terrorism and WMD regulations, were all decided by adoption of 
resolutions, and all created legal obligations for states that have the full effect of treaties. But, in addition to 
pseudo treaty-making powers, the Council can also affect treaties in other ways. It can presumably use 
coercion²the only lawful type according to VCLT Article 52²to make treaties. The Council can also break 
treaties: for example, in the case of Libya in the Lockerbie and the Montreal Convention case, or in the case of 
Serbia and the Danube Convention in the 1990s (conflicts in the former Yugoslavia). It can enforce treaties. One 
of the more recent examples is the Res. 1929 (2010) sanctions on Iran. It asked Iran to comply with its NPT and 
81&/26WUHDW\REOLJDWLRQVDVZHOODV³UDWLILFDWLRQ´RIWKH&RPSUHKHQVLYH1XFOHDU-Test-Ban Treaty. The 
Council can also validate treaties that are otherwise in breach of the VCLT. This can occur when an unlawful 
war (coercion) has led to a treaty, but then the Council adopts a resolution asking the contracting states to the 
treaty to comply with its terms. This is, in effect, validating an unlawful (per Article 52) treaty. Examples of this 
include: the Congo (DRC) war that led to a peace treaty in 1999, and the Kosovo conflict, in the 1990s. For 
these latter examples, see (Corten 2011): 1217-1218; for former cases and examples, see (Wood 2011): 245-
255; and S. Talmon, the Security Council Treaty Action, footnote 12. 
494
 The beginning in international law of the prohibition of the use of force in settling international disputes or in 
treaty-making is conventionally dated to post-World War I activities, such as the creation of the League of 
Nations and, in particular, the Pact of Paris, also known as the Kellogg±Briand Pact, of 1928. According to the 
ILC and the VCLT travaux, an exact date for the prohibition of use of force, and therefore an unequivocal date 
for the applicability of Article 52, was discussed but not set. However, in the discussions on the intertemporal 
law, the Special Rapporteur referred to 1928 (the year of the Pact of Paris) as the effective approximate date to 
be used as a guide for prohibition of the use of force. In any case, the Vienna Convention implies that the UN 
Charter is fully linked to the international law and customs that precede the Charter. Oliver Corten, in his 
Commentary, cites this link as the reason for the particular expression ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´being included in the 
final draft of the preamble of the VCLT, to illustrate that prohibition of the use of force predated the UN: 
It is for this reason that the aforementioned amendment to replace the expression 'principles of the 
Charter' for 'principles of international law embodied in the Charter' was accepted, as its objective 
was to affirm the emergence of a regime prohibiting the use of force before the creation of the United 
Nations. 
(Corten 2011): 1216. See also the secondary source on the ILC (YILC, 1979, vol. I, 1558th meeting, p 132, 





³LQWHUnational law embodied in the Charter of the UN´DIILUPVWKDW³WKHUXOHVRIFXVWRPDU\
international law will continue to govern questions not regulated by the provisions of the 
present Convention.´495  
Further, VCLT Article 4, at the beginning of its single paragraph, states that WKLV³Non-
UHWURDFWLYLW\´FODXVH H[LVWV³ZLWKRXWSUHMXGLFHWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIDQ\UXOHVVHWIRUWKLQWKH
present Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law independently 
RIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ´496 In other words, the rules of the VCLT, as the general law of treaties 
and principles that govern both the treaty-making process and the subsequent interpretation of 
the performance of treaties, apply at any time to any treaty that is still in force and not in 
contradiction of the current international law and customs. The fact that the VCLT is 
primarily the codification of the customary law of treaties, and that its rules are retroactively 
applicable to existing treaties, is well established in the ICJ¶V and other tribuQDOV¶UXOLQJV497  
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 (Charter of the United Nations 1945-2015): Article 1, paragraph 1; (Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Preamble. 
496
 The full text of Article 4 is:  
Article 4. Non-RETROACTIVITY OF THE PRESENT CONVENTION 
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention 
to which treaties would be subject under international law independently of 
the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by 
States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such States. 
Ibid: Article 4. 
497
 In fact, as soon as the Vienna Convention had completed its work in 1969, the ICJ began to apply the 
9&/7¶VUXOHVDVLQVWDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ and customs that were thus applicable to pre-VCLT treaties and 
international agreements. This was before the convention had even entered into force (which happened just over 
a decade later, in 1980). One of the earlier instances in which this happened was the 1971 advisory opinion 
concerning 6RXWK$IULFD¶VSUHVHQFHLQ1DPLELD²LQUHVSHFWRI6RXWK$IULFD¶V older treaty mandates. (Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 1971): 46-47, Para. 94 and 96. 
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Throughout this chapter I have utilised the VCLT primarily in two areas. First, in relation to 
the invalidity of the UN Charter (treaty) based on the use of force (Articles 51 and 52). 
Second, I have utilised VCLT treaty interpretation rules to apply Article 26 to evaluate the 
good faith performance of Article 109(3) of the UN Charter. On the question of the validity 
of my approach, there are several rulings on the customary international law applicability of 
the VCLT provisions to older treaties. However, before discussing some of them, the 
scholarship on the subject will be reviewed. 
Frederic Dopagne, in his discussion of Article 4 in the prominent Commentary, edited by 
Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein, concludes that the main principle laid down in the article is 
that contained in the introductory part of its paragraph: ³ZLWKout prejudice to the application 
of any rules set forth in the [Vienna] Convention to which treaties would be subject under 
international law independently of the ConvenWLRQ´. Dopagne then argues that the 
&RQYHQWLRQ³has in some respects codified pre-existing customary international law while in 
some other respects contributing to the (subsequent) moulding of customary rules´
7KHUHIRUH³Zhat is important here is that the rules of international law 'independent' of the 
Vienna Convention be in force at the time when the question pertaining to the law of 
treaties arises´498 
In conclusion, Dopagne, noting WKDW³since the immediate effect seems to be the general 
principle for every norm of international law, regardless of its source´SRVLWs that the VCLT 
and the current law of treaties apply to all treaties, even if they were concluded prior to the 
³HPHUJHQFH´RIWKHFXUUHQWWUHDW\-making rules.499 
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 (Dopagne 2011): 84-85 [emphasis added]. 
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 Ibid. Dopagne concludes his discussion of Article 4 as follows:  
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Kresten Schmalenbach, in his commentary on the Vienna Convention, after stating that the 
VCLT codified established customs, argues that the Convention's approach to not enumerate 
RU³LGHQWLI\FXVWRPDU\WUHDW\ODZOHDYHVURRPIRUWKHIXWXUHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIµSURJUHVVLYH
UXOHV¶LQWRVHWWOHGFXVWRPDU\ODZ´500 Schmalenbach also argues that, in the context of treaty 
interpretationsWKH³LQWHU-temporal law doctrine is generally QRWDFFHSWDEOH´501 In other 
words, according to Schmalenbach, in contrast to criminal law, and similar to the immediate 
effect of some legislation, for a treaty still in force, the treaty law is applicable, as is.  
$FFRUGLQJO\³[t]he non-retroactivity rule is dispositif. A past treaty can be subsequently 
subjected to the VCLT provisions, either ad hoc in case of a dispute or by another form of 
VXEVHTXHQWFRQVHQW´502 Schmalenbach reinforces his arguments by citing the lex specialis 
character of VCLT in relation to other laws of treaties, and by referring to WKHIDFWWKDW³$UW
itself underlines the self-regulatory charaFWHURIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ´503 This is presumably based 
on the first part of Article 4, in which ³WUHDWLHVZRXOGEHVXEMHFWXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ
independently of the Convention,´504 thereby giving it a dynamic and self-regulating nature. 
In support of his arguments, Schmalenbach cites the ICJ¶V Namibia opinion as being a case of 
dynamic interpretation of a treaty, and WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo as a case of retroactive application of the VCLT.505 
                                                 
As a result, the scope of the limit set by the first words of Article 4 seems to be (too?) far-reaching so it 
could even be contended that, paradoxically, this limit tends to overshadow the principle to which it 
relates. Ibid: 85. 
500
 (Schmalenbach 2012): 81. 
501




 Ibid: 88. 
504
 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Art. 4. 
505
 (Schmalenbach 2012): 81-88. 
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In another commentary on Article 4, Mark Villiger also emphasises the significance of the 
first part of the article, which, he says, has the function of ³XQHTXLYRFDOO\µUHVHUYLQJ¶
FXVWRPDU\ODZDQGDQ\JHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRIODZXQGHUO\LQJWKH&RQYHQWLRQ´506 As to the 
second part of the article, he suggests that it is in fact intended to reinforce Article 28 of the 
&RQYHQWLRQRQWKHJHQHUDO³QRQ-UHWURDFWLYLW\´SULQFLSOHRIFRQWUDFWVQRQ-retroactivity of 
REOLJDWLRQVZKLFKLVDOVRHQVKULQHGLQWKHWUHDW\¶V$UWLFOH.507 In summary, after citing 
relevant Court cases, Villiger concludes that: ³$UWLFOHFDQQRWDVVXFKSUHYHQWcustomary 
rules underlying the Convention IURPHQMR\LQJµUHWURDFWLYH¶HIIHFWQRUFDQLWDWWULEXWHDQ\
such effect´508 
In its judgment in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ applied relevant provisions of the 
VCLT to the 1977 treaty between Hungry and the then Czechoslovakia.509 In that case, the 
Court, while recognising that the 1977 treaty predated the VCLT, held that: 510 
«Consequently, only those rules which are declaratory of customary law are 
applicable to the 1977 Treaty. As the Court has already stated above (see paragraph 
46), this is the case, in many respects, with Articles 60 to 62 of the Vienna 
Convention, relating to termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty.  
Whereas, in paragraph 46, the Court had cited a number of prior cases where it had 
retroactively applied the VCLT:511 
46. The Court has no need to dwell upon the question of the applicability in the 
present case of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties. It needs only to 
be mindful of the fact that it has several times had occasion to hold that some of the 
rules laid down in that Convention might be considered as a codification of existing 
customary law. The Court takes the view that in many respects this applies to the 
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 (Villiger 2009): 114. 
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 Ibid: 113-115. 
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 (Villiger 2009): 108-115. 
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 (Mansell and Openshaw, International Law: A Critical Introduction 2013): 88.  
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 (Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 1997): paragraph 99. 
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 Ibid: paragraph 46. 
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provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning the termination and the suspension 
of the operation of treaties, set forth in Articles 60 to 62 (see Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports. 1971, p. 47, and Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), 
Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 18; see also 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 
Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1980, pp. 95-96). 
With the seeming applicability of the Vienna Convention and its principles to the UN 
Charter, both in terms of giving precision to existing customs and defining new ones, what of 
court rulings on use-of-force provisions regarding older treaties? In the context of Articles 51 
and 52 and the Declaration, used in this chapter, have those provisions been retroactively 
applied? 
There is case law in support of the prohibition of the use of force in contracting agreements, 
regardless of the non-retroactivity of the VCLT or the fact that a party to a dispute has not 
acceded to the Vienna Convention.  
In the ,&-¶VIcelandic Fisheries decision, the Court ruled ³WKDWXQGHUFRQWHPSRUDU\
international law an agreement concluded under the threat RUXVHRIIRUFHLVYRLG´7KLV 
judgment was delivered after the Vienna Convention was signed (1969) but before it had 
entered into force (in 1980).512 
The Dubai-Sharjah Arbitration Tribunal echoed these remarks, while expanding the 
applicability of the VCLT to non-state-parties, noting that, ³EDVHGRQFXVWRPDU\UXOHVRI
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 (Icelandic Fisheries 1973): p. 14, paragraph 24. 
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LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´$UWLFles 51 and 52 are applicable even to states that have not ratified the 
Vienna Convention and are seemingly not bound by the VCLT regime.513 
As to the legal effect of the Declaration (defining political- and economic-type force), in 
strictly technical legal terms, the VCLT¶V treaty interpretation rules, particularly that 
contained in Article 32, consider supplementary documents such as the Declaration to be part 
of the treaty. In other words, the mere existence of the Declaration has legal relevance. 
Perhaps, in the Nicaragua v. USA case, the Declaration was the driviQJIDFWRULQWKH&RXUW¶V
finding that:514 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these 
is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation 
of foreign policy. [Emphases added.] 
This wider interpretation of use or threat of use of force, post VCLT, was possibly one of the 
reasons why the US, after Nicaragua, decided to withdraw from the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the ICJ. 
Consequently, because of the aforementioned UN-VCLT recursive relationship, and since 
most of the principles of treaty-making and interpretive rules contained in the VCLT form 
part of customary international law, including the inadmissibility of coercion, the VCLT rules 
are in force and largely apply to the UN Charter.515  
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 Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, (In the Matter of an Arbitration concerning the Border between the 
Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah), awarded 19 October 1981, 91 ILR (1981) 543, at 569 (1981).  
See also, (Corten 2011): 1204. 
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 See n 556 and n 600 below. 
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 For another opinion that the VCLT had immediate effect and created instant customary international law, see 
(Pazarci 2011): 6. 
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It should also be noted that the VCLT article numbers used below act as a shorthand 
reference to their basic customary international law principles and equivalents, such as non-
interference, sovereign equality, prohibition of use of force to procure the conclusion of 
treaties, and good faith.  
8.4.2 Fraud²VCLT Article 49  
Article 49 states:516 
If a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another 
negotiating State, the State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be 
bound by the treaty. 
The Vienna Convention does not provide a formal definition of fraud, and the 9&/7¶V
travaux simply refers to fraud in this context as ³deceit or wilful misrepresentation´.517 
The world peace and the good governance objectives of the UNCIO sponsoring governments, 
particularly those of the US, cannot be doubted. US foreign policy at the time, and the 
discourse of its political establishment and that of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman prior to 
the Conference, point to the US¶V desire to apply the rule of law in resolving international 
conflicts. Therefore, the Article 49 invalidity test does not seem to apply. 
However, certain practices before and during the Conference mentioned in Chapter 4, 
particularly relating to organisational and procedural legitimisation, seem to raise questions 
as to whether the sponsoring governments crossed the fine line of fraudulent conduct. Some 
examples follow: 
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 Ibid: Article 49. 
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 United Nations Conference on Law of the Treaties, OFFICIAL RECORDS, First Session 1968, p 258, para. 
65; ILC website: http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawoftreaties-1969/vol/english/1st_sess.pdf . See 
also (Villiger 2009): 617. 
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x The secret pact between the Big-3 leaders in Yalta that the veto was not subject to 
negotiation at the Conference should have been openly revealed to the participants. 
This unannounced pre-condition for the Charter, as well as having other implications, 
wasted days and weeks of the weaker states¶OLPLWHGWLPHDQGUHVRXUFHVWKDWZHUH
diverted to the veto fight. This was at the expense of other topics and other Yalta 
formula countermeasures and remedies, such as those relating to withdrawal and 
amendments, which were subject to another commission and other committees. These 
important topics had to be postponed and negotiated under more strenuous time 
constraints.518 
x Once the Conference had begun, but unknown to the participants, all the important 
³PDLQ´committees were dominated by US officials. The high-impact Executive 
Committee and Steering Committee were appointed and chaired by the US. These two 
powerful committees set the agendas (top-down), decided on voting and procedural 
issues, and nominated the chairs to the FRQIHUHQFH¶VIRXUFRPPLVVLRQs and 12 
technical committees. Moreover, the powerful Executive Committee, which had 
responsibility for most Conference activities and decisions, was exclusive and not 
open to all the states. At the Executive Committee in addition to the omnipresent P5, 
there were only seven other state representatives elected to represent the weaker 
states.519 
The Secretary General of the Conference, Alger Hiss, was also from the US State 
Department. These self-appointments (presented in terms of being provisional at first) 
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 On the Big-¶VGLFWDWLRQRIWKHYHWRDQGWKH6&¶VVWUXFWXUHVHH&KDSWHU 
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 (UNCIO - Volume V: Delegation Chairmen, Steering Committee, Executive Committee 1945): 4. See also 
(Schlesinger 2003): 114. 
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and the 86¶Vdomination of the administration of the Conference was unexpected 
even to the other sponsoring states. US dominance had been further extended to 
chairing the plenary sessions, until, finally, at the objection of the Soviet Union, it was 
decided that at least the plenary sessions would be chaired by the sponsoring states on 
a rotational basis.520   
x One of the cardinal principles of international law and the 9&/7LV³VRYHUHLJQ
HTXDOLW\´The VCLT allows the outcome of a treaty negotiation to result in a treaty 
where decisions are made based on weighted voting (for example economic or 
population considerations). However, while the treaty is being negotiated, the 
GHFLVLRQVPXVWEHEDVHGRQ³VRYHUHLJQHTXDOLW\´DQGWKHVWDWHV¶FRQVHQW+RZHYHULQ
San Francisco, the invitee states were presented with the bulk of the Charter as the 
DO proposal, which had effectively needed only three concurrences²those of the 
US, the UK and the USSR (with some input from the Republic of China). At UNCIO, 
however, voting procedures required any amendments to the DO to be carried with a 
two-thirds majority. Therefore, based on the 50 member-state conference participants 
(51 counting Poland) a two-thirds majority required 34 votes for a statutory change or 
an addition to be adopted, whereas, for the bulk of the Charter²presented as the DO 
Proposal at the beginning of the conference²only 3 affirmative votes had been 
necessary. This exclusion of all the other states from the DO proposal meant that only 
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 (United Nations Yearbook 1946-1947): 13, 47. See also (Delegates and Officials of the UNCIO - Doc 639 
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YHUVXVVWDWHV¶YRWHVwere needed for adoption of bulk of the Charter provisions. 
In effect, this favoured the Charter wishes of the US, the UK and the USSR by a 
factor of almost ten-to-one²KDUGO\UHVXOWLQJLQ³VRYHUHLJQHTXDOV´GXULQg Conference 
negotiations. 
x This disproportional representation also manifested itself in the referral by Conference 
organisers of controversial topics to ad hoc-created subcommittees. The Conference 
procedures were such that the higher-level Commissions did not discuss new 
measures or motions, and would only receive the committee UDSSRUWHXUV¶UHSRUWVDQG
then vote on what was rolled up to them from where the actual critical work and 
discussions were taking place²in the committees or subcommittees. Unlike the 12 
committees, which were fixed in number and were open to all the participating states, 
the subcommittees were created as needed, and were generally limited to 15 members 
only²five of which had to be the permanent members. Thus, in subcommittee 
discussions and decisions, the P5 ensured themselves 5 out of 15 or one-third 
representation, whereas if they had allowed the motion to remain in the regular 
committees, the P5 representation would have been limited to 5 out of 50 states (10 
percent).521 
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 The P5 used this divide-and-conquer technique to push the two main issues being fought by the anti-veto 
majority to subcommittees that had been created ad hoc. The Yalta formula was pushed to Subcommittee 
III/1/B; and questions relating to the Charter review and amendments were dispatched to Subcommittee I/2/E. In 
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Charter amendments (Article 108), when, on 14 June 1945, the motion to require a two-thirds majority to adopt 
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and 5 against (only one more additional vote than those of the P5). (UNCIO - Volume VII: Commission I, 




Returning to the analysis of VCLT Article 49, case law addressing fraud is rare in 
international law. This is mostly because its occurrence voids the whole treaty and must be 
taken seriously, and partly because it demonstrates a certain naiveté on the part of the 
contracting states that were defrauded and may lead to public humiliation and political 
uncertainty.522 
Was Dumbarton Oaks and its most important component²the SC²misrepresented as a 
³SURSRVDO´, rather than a dictation?  
                                                 
Another irregularity, or at least a source of confusion at the Conference, concerned voting procedures, especially 
during the first two weeks of the Conference. For example, at the first meetings of the Steering Committee and 
the Executive Committee, it was assumed that the amendments to DO submitted by the sponsoring governments 
would require only a simple majority to pass, whereas amendments from the other nations would require a two-
thirds majority to be adopted. At the objection of the lesser powers, this was changed to a two-thirds qualified-
majority requirement for all substantive Conference proposals to be adopted. At later meetings, and at the final 
voting procedure decision made by the Steering Committee of 9 May 1945, it was decided that the voting 
outcome would be based on those present and voting. (UNCIO - Volume V: Delegation Chairmen, Steering 
Committee, Executive Committee 1945): 187-190. 
  
Based on the adoption behaviour of the Conference Committees, especially in relation to some controversial 
decisions, it seems the Conference had a loose interpretation of the two-WKLUGVDQG³SUHVHQWDQGYRWLQJ´ 
requirements, which excluded abstentions from the total count. For example, on the veto and the Yalta formula 
applicability to SC decisions and to Charter amendments and review outcomes at the ratification stage, once put 
to the vote, the large number of protest abstention votes were treated as being absent. Although this loose 
definition of ³SUHVHQWDQGYRWLQJ´LVDOVRXVHGLQVRPHOHJLVODWLYHSURFHVVHVWKHIDFWWKDW abstentions will be 
counted as not being present is usually defined at the outset. Further, based on my research, it seems the 
Conference not only failed to explicitly define the two-thirds qualification, but also failed to establish any 
quorum for its Committee decisions. The failure to provide these definitions also means that the two-thirds rule 
could be interpreted as implying that the explicit consent of two-thirds of the total states participating was 
required. 
 
This explicit state consent becomes particularly significant when constituting an IO. Otherwise, with this 
imprecise interpretation of the two-thirds majority requirement at the Conference, it could be implied that, out of 
the 50 states participating, if 49 states happened to be absent or abstained from a particular vote, just one 
positive vote would satisfy the two-thirds majority requirement. This is hardly in keeping with the spirit of the 
US Constitution, the model so frequently cited by the US and other states¶ leaders at the Conference. Under the 
US Constitution, an absolute two-thirds majority of the 50 states is required to amend the US Constitution by 
means of a States Convention. In fact, in the alternate way of amending the US Constitution (Article V), which 
is by the adoption of two-thirds of both houses of Congress, any member that is present but abstains does not 
have his/her vote discarded as being absent. On the contrary, it is included in the non-affirmative votes, which 
has the same effect as a negative vote. For a US Congressional interpretation of amendment procedures to the 
US Constitution, see Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and Interpretation - 2002 Edition -
S. Doc. 108-1; (The US Congress 2002): 937-956. 
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 (Villiger 2009): 620. 
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As was explained in the legislative history section of this thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), the DO 
draft at San Francisco was presented by the Big-3 as a proposal and subject to negotiation. 
However, it soon became clear to the anti-veto opposition states that the SC section was not 
subject to any form of negotiation at the Conference and its terms were in fact being dictated 
E\WKH:DU¶VYLFWRUV Chapters 4 and 5 further highlighted some of the procedural 
legitimisation and irregularities of the Conference favouring the sponsoring governments, 
who were to be the permanent members. In other words, it seems that the Conference¶V 
procedures and irregularities treated purportedly equal states unequally, in violation of the 
principle of equality of states required at the outset of any international convention. 
Whether this was intentional and fraudulent on the part of the permanent members remains 
unclear. But the question of the possible consequences of those irregularities and the degree 
of their impact on the formation of the Charter remains.  
8.4.3 Corruption²VCLT Article 50 
Article 50 of VCLT on Corruption of a Representative of a State reads as follows:523 
If the expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured 
through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by another 
negotiating State, the State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to 
be bound by the treaty. 
There is no formal definition of corruption in the VCLT. Jean-Pierre Cot, in his Commentary 
to this article in the VCLT, states: ³$UWLFle 50 of the Vienna Convention aims to state a new 
defect of consent that results from the corruption of the representative of a state and has led to 
WKHVWDWH
VFRQVHQWWREHERXQG´524 The main objective at the Convention, in devising this 
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article, was to distinguish between two categories of fraudulent acts: one directed against the 
state (Article 49) and the other directed against the individual representing the state (Article 
50), and so to PDNH³SURYLVLRQIRUDVSHFLILFGHIHFWRIFRQVHQWE\FRUUXSWLRQsince some 
FRQVLGHUHGWKLVQRWWREHDSDUWLFXODUFDVHRIIUDXG´525 
In the post-colonial period, corruption-related cases and allegations in treaty-making have 
been very rare. However, they were quite common during the colonial period, when colonial 
masters used corruption to obtain favourable treaties. Hence, the provision of Article 50 at the 
Convention was primarily for the protection of smaller states when they were negotiating 
treaties with more powerful and economically stronger states.526 
In the context of the UNCIO, I will not make allegations that intentional and systemic 
corruption existed. However, in common with VCLT Article 49 and the case of fraud, there 
seems to be substantive evidence and borderline cases, which, when taken together, may be 
suffLFLHQWWRHVWDEOLVKYLRODWLRQRIVWDWHV¶consent at the Conference. 
As examples, I will provide two incidents of possible misconduct by the US. This is not to 
imply that the Soviet Union, with its Eastern European puppet regimes, or the imperial UK or 
France, with their colonies and states under their influence, did not, in their pursuit of 
favourable results at the Conference, attempt favouritism, or engage in conduct that may be 
considered corrupt or borderline corrupt. However, I chose the two US incidents for two 
reasons: (1) there are more publicly available sources and information on the subject; and (2) 
as the main sponsor and the host of the Conference, the US was better situated logistically, 
financially and resource-wise to influence the delegates, the events, and the outcome. 
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The first example of US conduct is the well-known fact that the US government paid for the 
HQWLUHFRQIHUHQFHLQFOXGLQJWKHVWDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶H[SHQVHV,WLVGLIILFXOWWRLJQRUHthe 
fact that most delegates to the Conference were either substantially or totally dependent on 
the US government for support, including in respect of the long and difficult journey, at that 
time, to and from San Francisco. For the few lucky representatives who had the privilege of 
flying, it still meant multi-stop flights; and for the rest of the over 2,000 delegates and staff, it 
meant a voyage to the east of the US and then a four-day train ride to California. Then, at the 
Conference itself, the US State Department and military provided lodging, meals, logistics, 
translation, telephone and telegraphic communication, and transportation. During the 
evenings and times off, the US provided shopping trips (personal expenses were formally 
excluded), sightseeing tours, and, in addition to selected news, nightly Hollywood films up to 
the midnight hours at the UN Cinema. For some delegates, the financial and livelihood 
dependency was so great that US officials even bought them walking shoes.527 
The second example of US conduct at the Conference that may be relevant to Article 50 
corruption relates to the US¶V unusual relations with most of its Latin American neighbours. 
Although the US had turned isolationist after World War I, the Monroe Doctrine still 
prevailed in the American continent. The US had great influence over the Latin American 
states and considered those states to be part of its well-guarded regional domain and off-
limits to the European colonialists. One influential US family involved both in lucrative 
private business and US politics, as well as having connections with the leadership of many 
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of US government-provided services to the delegates, including the daily side events, tours, movies, shopping 
trips, and other extracurricular activities, are the Conference daily journals that were formally distributed to the 
delegates. (UNCIO - Volume II: General 1945).  
See also, (Hensley 2009): 385. 
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Latin American countries during the first half of the twentieth century, was the legendary 
Rockefeller family. Nelson Rockefeller was at San Francisco and played an important 
behind-the-scenes role in the Latin American interactions relating to the making of the 
Charter.528 
Mr. Rockefeller, like many of his cousins and relatives, owned profitable investments and 
other interests in Latin America. Rockefeller also headed the US 6WDWH'HSDUWPHQW¶V,QWHU-
America Affairs section. Although he was not a member of the official US delegation to the 
UNCIO, he did hire a charter flight to fly 12 Latin American envoys and numerous other of 
his Latin American diplomatic and influential acquaintances to San Francisco.529 These 
Rockefeller allies hovered around the periphery of the Conference and conducted themselves 
as described below. 
Mr. Rockefeller hosted, entertained, provided services, and even got the US Naval staff to 
attend to VRPHRIWKHGHOHJDWHV¶SHUVRQDODIIDLUV5RFNefeller, both in his official and personal 
capacity, tried to influence the Latin votes by paying special attention to his Latin American 
guests and delegates. Conducting their own meetings, hosted by Rockefeller, they followed 
their own Conference topics and agenda, apparently not all of which was coordinated with 
the State Department. In short, Rockefeller, partly using his own resources and at times those 
of the US government, was conducting a semi-official and unusual relationship with a large 
number of the Latin American delegates²both before and during the Charter negotiations.530 
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 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH0RQURH'RFWULQHDQGPRUHJHQHUDOO\DQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKH86¶VKHJHPRQLF
behaviour in this period, see (Chomsky 2004). For US regional activitLHVLQDQG1HOVRQ5RFNHIHOOHU¶VUROH




 Nelson Rockefeller was very well connected both within the US and Latin America. He was known to have 
had the resources to bypass formal procedures and government officials in order to get his way. For example, 
the FBI and US naval staff support he was given was not coordinated with, and was independent of, the State 
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8.4.4 Coercion²Articles 51 and 52 and the VCLT Declaration (Annex) 
In this section, I will examine the possible use of coercion at the UNCIO. Whether the 
coercion was directed against state representatives (Article 51), or against a state or a number 
of states, and whether the coercion was of a military or of an economic and political nature 
(Article 52 of the VCLT and the Vienna &RQYHQWLRQ¶V'HFODUDWLRQ$QQH[ are examined 
simultaneously. The main reason for examining Articles 51 and 52 together (to test the 
validity of the UN Charter) is the interdependency of the coercion factors used, and because 
establishing its use is more pertinent to this analysis than its type.531  
For example, a state representative as a sovereign may have been psychologically intimidated 
DQGWKUHDWHQHGRUWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶VSKRQHPD\KDYHEHHQWDSSHGDQGKLVKHUFRQILGHntial 
communications listened to. In addition, not only the representative, but the state itself might 
have been under duress either militarily, economically, or politically. For example, in the 
case of a colonial or puppet state invited to the Conference, probably all these coercion types 
would hold true.  
Therefore, successfully establishing that coercion was used, whether under Article 51 or 52, 
should VDWLVI\WKH9&/7¶VWHVWin possibly invalidating the UN Charter.  
With this in mind, I will now examine the text of the two articles. VCLT Article 51, Coercion 
of a Representative of a State, reads:532 
                                                 
Department Conference organisers. Ibid: 95, 129-130. For a description of apparently excessive partying and 
nightlife activities engaged in by the Panama delegates, possibly hosted by the Rockefeller team, as reported by 
their hotel mates²the New Zealand delegation²and recorded by NZ Prime Minister Peter Fraser, see (Hensley 
2009): 385.  
531
 In fact, the Convention acknowledges that the two types of coercion set out in Articles 51 and 52 may 
coincide. Further, Villiger points out the overlapping role of the state reSUHVHQWDWLYHZKRDFWV³LQDGXDO
capacity: (i) as an individual; and (ii) as an RUJDQRI6WDWH´(Villiger 2009): 633, 637. 
532
 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Art. 51. 
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The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured 
by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall 
be without any legal effect. 
Although coercion in this context can encompass both physical and moral violence against a 
state representative, it is generally regarded as involving the latter, with the individual 
concerned having been subjected to threats or intimidation. In fact, G. Distefano, in Corten 
DQG.OLHQ¶V&RPPHQWDUy, goes so far as to state that the Article 51 type of coercion is strictly 
of the moral kind:533  
In the light of an analysis of the ILC travaux preparatoires, in which fear is discussed, 
we are inclined to affirm that only moral violence may be invoked in the application 
of Article 51. 
Adopting this interpretation of Article 51, it seems that coercion at UNCIO was abundant. 
The Big-3 publicly and privately belittled the weaker states at the Conference. The Russians 
were more public in this, as expressed in )RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU0RORWRY¶VVSHHFKHVand 
comments, as later revealed by General Romulo of the Philippines.534  
The US was trying to present an image of fairness at the Conference. However, its most 
powerful political personality at the Conference, Senator ConQDOO\H[FODLPHG³7KHVHOLWWOH
FRXQWULHVDUHJRLQJWREHOO\DFKHDQGUDLVHKHOOQRPDWWHUZKDW\RXGRDERXWLW:H¶UHGRLQJ
DOOWKLVIRUWKHP´535 
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 United Nations Conference on Law of the Treaties, Official Records, First and Second Sessions, 1968-1969, 
pp 65-66; ILC website:  
http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawoftreaties-1969/vol/english/confdocs.pdf . 
See also (Distefano 2011): 1193. This does not imply, however, that the use of physical violence against a state 
representative is considered acceptable; it is jXVWWKDW³DEVROXWHYLROHQFHGRHVQRWIHDWXUHDPRQJWKHJURXQGVIRU
invalidating an international agreement, but rather as a cause of their non-existence. For it will not be a true 
conventional legal act, but rather a unilateral act imposed by the violence RIDQRWKHU6WDWH´,ELG 
534
 See the text accompanying n 237 above and also n 491 above. 
535




foreign affairs, Alexander Cadogan, recalls in his memoires that, in order to quell the Yalta 
formula rebellion, he had teamed XSZLWK6HQDWRU&RQQDOO\³,WHOO>&RQQDOO\@KHLVRXUKHDY\
artillery and I am the sniper «,WZRUNVTXLWHZHOODQGZHZLSHGWKHIORRUZLWKD0H[LFDQ
lDVWQLJKW,WKLQNZHPXVWKDYHVKXWKLPXSIRUDZHHNRUVR´536  
As disclosed almost 50 years after the Conference, practically all the invitees were 
wiretapped and under surveillance, without their knowledge. More worrying was the fact that 
some of the delegates were directly subjected to intimidation.537 One compelling example 
ZDVWKHFDVHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV¶KHDGGHOHJDWH*HQHUDO5RPXOR,QLWLDOO\KHKDGDOLJQHG
himself with the anti-veto camp, but there then occurred an unusual visit from US State 
Department representatives. After this visit, the Philippines¶ vote on the subject of the 
Council¶V structure and the veto powers of the permanent members fully conformed to the 
P5¶V wishes.538  
Modern international law yields no case law for an Article 51 breach.539 However, Villiger, in 
his Commentary on VCLT Article 51, while defining different acts or threats as constituting 
moral pressures of different kinds, does discuss the threshold of when conference 
                                                 
536
 (Bosco 2009): 35. 
537
 The US Army Signal Security Agency (SAA), the predecessor of the NSA, was in charge of wiretapping and, 
together with the FBI, was responsible for spying on the Conference delegates. The details of this conduct was 
disclosed after almost half a century under the Freedom of Information Act, in the early 1990s. (Bosco 2009): 
ix, 93-94. For one example of how this spying proved useful to the US in influencing the outcome of the 
Conference (related to the proposed SC decisions of substantive versus procedural), see Ibid: 194. See also 
Chapter 4. 
538
 Most of the other coercion cases cited in this section were referenced earlier in this chapter, as well as in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
539
 Prior to World War II and the twentieth century, there had been cases of coercion of state representatives. 
However, in modern international law, there has not been any jurisprudence on VCLT Article 51. Perhaps this is 
a favourable indication that coercion of state representatives no longer occurs. However, the obiter dictum of 
two later tribunals can be cited. The Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration case (1981) and the ongoing Iranian-US 
Tribunal (in its arbitral award of 1990) both gave rise to incidental judgments and opinions on violations of 
Articles 51 and 52 as grounds for nullifying a treaty. (Distefano 2011): 1188-1189. 
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argumentation and persuasion, when carried to extremes, can result in ³XQGXHSUHVVXUH´DQG
therefore coercion.540 
Certainly, 6HQDWRU&RQQDOO\¶VFRQGXFWGHWDLOHGSUHYLRXVO\LVDQH[DPSOHRIplacing state 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVXQGHUGXUHVVDQG³XQGXHSUHVVXUH´Just before a crucial vote on the powers 
of the permanent members, and in his capacity as Conference host, the Senator told the 
delegates that their time was up and that WKH\FRXOG³JRKRPH,´ZKLOHWHDULQJWKHGUDIW
&KDUWHULQSLHFHVDQGORRNLQJDWHDFKGHOHJDWH³EHOOLJHUHQWO\´H[HUWLQJ³XQGXHSUHVVXUH´7KH
SenaWRU¶VFRQGXFWDSSOLHGVXIILFLHQWSUHVVXUHWKDWRQH-third of the delegates accepted life 
under the shadow of the veto. They changed their intended no votes to a protest abstention 
vote and therefore allowed the adoption of the P5-sponsored resolution.541 
As to the coercion category related to VCLT Article 52 and its companion Declaration as an 
Annex to the Vienna Convention, this is where the UN Charter as a legitimate treaty appears 
to fail and register its highest defect.  
Article 52, Coercion of a State by the Threat or Use of Force, states:542 
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in 
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter and illustrated in Table 2, a large number of states present 
at UNCIO were under the direct military presence and occupation of the P5. This included 
Belgium, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
                                                 
540
 (Villiger 2009): 633; See also Note 13, by A. Pellete, on the same subject. Ibid. 
541
 See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.4. 
542
 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Art. 52. In addition to the text of Article 52 
and the Declaration (the Annex), WKH³SURKLELWLRQRIXVHRIIRUFH´DVZHOODVLWVGHULYDWLYHWKH³QRQ-interference 
in the domHVWLFDIIDLUVRI6WDWHV´ are stated principles in the VCLT chapeau.  
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the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Syria and Ukraine. In some of these states, this 
military occupation might have been welcomed and possibly considered a friendly 
occupation: examples are most of the Western European states and the Philippines. But for 
some of the other states, this military occupation amounted to a hostile takeover. In these 
states, domination and regime change was the prime motivation behind the interventions of 
the Big-3 and France. Examples are provided by Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Iran, 
Liberia, Lebanon, Poland, Syria and Ukraine. In both cases, and whether friendly or not, as 
far as UN Charter-making goes, the fact remains that these states were subject to the direct 
military presence or occupation of one or more of the P5 members.  
The DeclDUDWLRQE\³Reaffirming the principle of the sovereign eTXDOLW\RI6WDWHV´DQG
affirming ³«that States must have complete freedom in performing any act relating to the 
FRQFOXVLRQRIDWUHDW\´ GHILQHV³IRUFH´DVEHLQJRIWKUHHJHQHUDOW\SHV: military, political and 
economic. In the relevant part, the Declaration:543 
1. Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, 
political, or economic, by any State, in order to coerce another State to perform 
any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the 
sovereign equality of States and freedom of consent,  
2. Decides that the present Declaration shall form part of the Final Act of the 
Conference on the Law of Treaties.  
With this qualified and expanded defiQLWLRQRIWKH³WKUHDWRUXVHRIIRUFH´, and in the context 
of UNCIO, it becomes apparent that a number of other states now fulfil the criteria of having 
been coerced, including, among the Latin American states, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, 
                                                 
543
 (Villiger 2009): 651 [emphases added]. Note also that both Article 52 and the Declaration were adopted at 
the Vienna Convention by an overwhelming majority, with no State casting a negative vote. Ibid: 639, 652. 
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Panama and Peru. They were either US puppet regimes or were subjected to significant US 
military presence.  
In other regions, previously unlisted, Ethiopia, Greece, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
Yugoslavia can now be categorised as having been exposed to the use of or threat of use of 
one or more of the force categories (military, economic, or political) by one or more of the 
permanent members. We also have to recognise the U-factor of the colonial states that were 
invited to the conference as independent states, such as Egypt, India, Lebanon, the 
Philippines and Syria. As colonies, they inherently suffered from all three forms of the use of 
or threat of use of force²economic, political and military²while negotiating the Charter 
under the shadow of their colonial masters. 
Before World War I and the League of Nations, the use of force and coercion in the drawing 
up and conclusion of an armistice or a treaty was acceptable in international law.544 In other 
ZRUGV³ZDUZDVFRQVLGHUHGFRQWLQXDWLRQRISROLWLFVE\RWKHUPHDQV´545 
After World War I, prohibiting intimidation and use of force to secure contractual obligations 
was becoming customary and lex lata in international law. This was further reinforced by the 
Pact of Paris of 1928, and adopted by the League of Nations in 1932.546 
Recent case law is scarce on the subject of voiding a treaty or an international contractual 
obligation based on coercion of the participant states. This is for two reasons. First, typically 
a regime change is imposed on the coerced state, and therefore the newly installed regime is 
dependent on the aggressor state and has no reason to file a legal suit which in effect will 
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 Ibid: 640. 
545
 (Weissner 1994-1995): 594.  
546
 (Corten 2011): 1202-1203. 
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delegitimise itself. This was particularly true immediately after World War II and during the 
Cold War era, when, in the East±West race, many vulnerable states were coerced and co-
opted into the communist or anti-communist blocs. It is also possible that the independence 
treaties made between colonies and their colonial masters that did not involve third-party 
arbitrators, like the UN Trusteeship Council, also fell into this category. 
Despite many acts of political and economic coercion, and even the outright use of military 
force, the second and primary reason we do not find Article 52 invoked is that some of those 
acts are usually authorised by the Council. The last part of Article 52 prohibits use of force or 
LWVWKUHDWEXWRQO\LILWLV³LQviolation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations´ A reasonable interpretation of this is that the Vienna 
Convention allows coercion if the use of force is authorised by the SC.  
We observed in the previous chapter that the Council makes international law through 
Chapter VII quasi-legislative resolutions. Therefore, SC laws are enforceable without 
requiring a formal treaty. For example, in the Council-authorised First Gulf War, the 
&RXQFLO¶VGHFLVLRQWRFUHDWHWKH81&&DQGWD[,UDTLVDQGSD\ELOOLRQVRIGROODUVWRFHUWDLn 
states (and non-state actors) was based on Council Resolution 687 (1992). These actions did 
not require a treaty with Iraq.547 
Without a treaty, it seems that there is no recourse to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and its Article 52 coercion provision. The VCLT provides no mechanism for the 
state of Iraq to limit or void the UNCC regime.  
                                                 
547
 (UN Security Council Resolutions 1946-2015): S/RES/687. For a detailed discussion of the tort-type 
resolutions of the Council in the case of Iraq in the First Gulf War and the creation of the UNCC, see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.6. For a discussion of the invalidity of using coercion (of any type) in the context of Article 52, and as 
a consequence creating reparation obligations, see ibid: 1209. 
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Despite the use of force in obtaining state contractual obligations, there is, as just discussed, 
no case law on the subject. Nonetheless, at least two international tribunals have 
acknowledged the prohibition of coercion in treaty-making.  
The first relates to the ICJ judgment in the UK v. Iceland case, Icelandic Fisheries. Iceland 
had claimed that, essentially owing to the British Ro\DO1DY\¶VXVHRIIRUFHLW had exchanged 
DVHULHVRI1RWHVZLWKWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW³XQGHUH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWFLUFXPVWDQFHV´ 
In that case, the Court observed:548 
This statement could be interpreted as a veiled charge of duress purportedly 
rendering the Exchange of Notes void ab initio, and it was dealt with as such by the 
United Kingdom in its Memorial. There can be little doubt, as is implied in the 
Charter of the United Nations and recognized in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, that under contemporary international law an agreement 
concluded under the threat or use of force is void. 
A similar reaffirmation of the prohibition of use of force to obtain international agreements is 
found in the Dubai-Sharjah Arbitration Tribunal case. In examining the border dispute 
between Dubai and Sharjah, and whether VCLT Article 52 applies to treaties between states 
that are not state parties to the Vienna Convention, the court of arbitration held:549 
Articles 51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 reflect, in the view of the Court, 
customary rules of international law which are binding upon States even in the 
absence of any ratification of that Convention. 
This applicability of the article beyond the state parties to the VCLT should also apply to the 
'HFODUDWLRQ¶VRWher category types of force: political and economic coercion.  
                                                 
548
 (Icelandic Fisheries 1973): p. 14, paragraph 24. 
549Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, (In the Matter of an Arbitration concerning the Border between the 
Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah), awarded, 19 October 1981, 91 ILR (1981) 543, at 569 (1981); see  
also, (Corten 2011): 1204. 
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In fact, the main objective of the Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or 
Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, adopted at Vienna, was to clarify and 
apply the generally accepted principles of customary international law, particularly the non-
intervention principle as it pertains to the making of treaties.550 
$FFRUGLQJWR&RUWHQ³WKLVSULQFLSOHLVWRGD\ZLGHO\HVWDEOLVKHGE\WKHGRFWULQHZKLFK
generally admits that economic or political coercion can be contrary to the principle of non-
LQWHUYHQWLRQ´Therefore, the existence of any type of coercion in treaty negotiations violates 
³WKHVRYHUHLJQULJKWVRID6WDWHSDUH[FHOOHQFH´551 
Granted, however, that it is more difficult to prove or to measure political and economic 
coercion than is the case, say, with a direct military intervention.  
Perhaps for this reason, the Vienna Convention travaux shows resistance by some ex-
colonisers and powerful states to the inclusion of these other types of coercion, as proposed 
by lesser powers as a 19-state amendment, to the main text of Article 52. The compromise 
reached was the adoption of the Declaration, depicting the other coercion types in the formal 
annex DQGSDUWRIWKH³ILQDODFW´RIWKH9&/7552 The adoption of the Declaration was by the 
overwhelming majority of 102 votes in favour, none against, and four abstentions.553 
With the Declaration not being a separate article on its own or being incorporated as part of 
Article 52, what are the legal implications? What is the legal status of the Declaration, and 
                                                 
550
 (Corten 2011): 1209. 
551
 Ibid: 1209. 
552
 (Corten 2011): 1207-1209; and (Villiger 2009): 651-657. 
553
 (Villiger 2009): 652. 
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what does it mean to be formally adopted and presented as an annex, and be part of the Final 
Act of the Vienna Convention? 
Both Corten and Villiger, in their separate VCLT commentaries, express the view that the 
Declaration-type coercions do not have the same legal effect of ³IRUFH´ mentioned in Article 
52 in nullifying a treaty. Moreover, cases involving political and economic coercion would be 
more difficult for a court to interpret. Villiger goes as far as suggesting that the Declaration is 
probably not binding, but that with state practice it may become so in the future.554 However, 
Corten, highlighting the non-intervention principle, and citing two of the many GA 
resolutions on the subject, as well as the related emerging custom, concludes that the legal 
applicability of the broader interpretation of Article 52 includes political and economic 
coercion.555 
The emerging custom and the LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³WKUHDWRUXVH RIIRUFH´WRLQFOXGHRWKHU
coercion types, and as being something other than direct military intervention and violating 
the non-interference principle, has also been confirmed in the Nicaragua case. In the Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, in 1986, the ICJ, 
inter aliaUXOHGWKDW³WKHDFWLYLWLHVLQTXHVWLRQ´VXFK as naval mining and economic 
sabotage, did constitute coercion and were against the international law principle of non-
interference. The Court stated:  
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these 
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 Ibid: 656-657. 
555
 (Corten 2011): 1209-1210. 
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is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation 
of foreign policy.556 [Emphases added.] 
In any event, the Declaration annex seems to be a valuable interpretational aid for any Article 
52, non-military coercion violations raised before a tribunal. Section 3 of the VCLT, and 
$UWLFOHRQWKHUXOHVRI³,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI7UHDWLHV´VSHFLI\WKDWDQ\WUHDW\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
must be made in context, and should include not only the text of the treaty, but also its 
preamble and annexes. Article 31 of the VCLT, in setting out WKH³*HQHUDO5XOHRI
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ´IRUWUHDWLHV, in Paragraph 2(a), states: 557 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty « [Emphases added.] 
In summary, as regards Articles 51 and 52 and the Annex, coercion of a state or its 
representative in concluding a treaty is, both under the Vienna Convention and by virtue of 
post-World War I customary international law, a critical defect and subjects the treaty to 
nullification.558 
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 (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America) 1986): paragraphs 201-205. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that: 
 
Expressions of an opinio juris regarding the existence of the principle of non-intervention in customary 
international law are numerous and not difficult to find. 
 
To support this claim, the Court provided examples of these opinio juris and customary international law cases, 
including GA Res. 2625 (XXV), the Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States, and the Corfu Channel case. Ibid. Also in the context of the UNCIO, 
and relevant to our Under Influence analysis, it should be noted that the ,&-¶VGHFLVLRQLQUHODWLRQWRW\SHVRI
coercion specifies independence in ³IRUPXODWLRQRIIRUHLJQSROLF\´DVDVWDWHULJKW, and therefore not to be 
subject to ³SURKLELWHGLQWHUYHQWLRQ´E\another state. 
557
 The Declaration is a formal annex to the VCLT. (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 
1969): Article 31, and the Annex. 
558
 Further, VCLT ArWLFOHSDUDJUDSKRQWKHVXEMHFWRI³6HSDUDELOLW\RI7UHDW\3URYLVLRQV´VWDWHVWKDWLQ




Returning WRRXUGLVFXVVLRQRI³FRQFOXVLRQ´559 of the UN Charter, as mentioned earlier, and 
as reflected in Table 2, there was rampant use of soft and hard coercion in violation of 
                                                 
559
 Below are some notes on the LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH9LHQQD&RQYHQWLRQ¶VXVHRIWKHWHUP³FRQFOXVLRQ´LQ
reference to treaty-making. For all the VCLT text references below, see (Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Arts. 6-18. [Emphasis added.] 
 
Recall that the coercion specified in Article 52 of VCLT, voiding a treaty, LVDSSOLFDEOH³LILWV conclusion has 
EHHQSURFXUHGE\WKHWKUHDWRUXVHRIIRUFH´ 7KH9LHQQD&RQYHQWLRQGRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\GHILQH³FRQFOXVLRQ´RU
OLVWLWLQWKH³XVHRIWHUPV´VHFWLRQRI$UWLFOH+RZHYHULWGRHVFRQWDLQDODUJHDPRXQWRILQIRUPDWLRQRQZKDW





are all categorised under WKH³&RQFOXVLRQRI7UHDWLHV´ 
 
To determine if treaty ratification, if so required by the treaty text, is indeed part of what constitutes the 
³FRQFOXVLRQ´SURFHVV$UWLFOHV and 14 are of relevance. Article 11 reads as follows: 
  
MEANS OF EXPRESSING CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY 
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments 
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so 
agreed. [Emphases added.] 
 
7KHUHIRUHUDWLILFDWLRQDQGWKHRWKHUPHWKRGVVXFKDV³VLJQDWXUH´DUHDOODFFHSWDEOHZD\VIRUVWDWHVWRH[SUHVV
consent, as long as the criteria for acceptance are mutually agreed in advance. In the case of the UN Charter, the 
agreed method, according tR$UWLFOHRIWKH&KDUWHULV³UDWLILFDWLRQ´$UWLFOHRIWKH9&/7VHWVRXWWKH
FULWHULDWREHXVHGLQHVWDEOLVKLQJVWDWHV¶FRQVHQWE\PHDQVRIUDWLILFDWLRQ$UWLFOHVWDWHV 
 
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: 
(a) The treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification; 
(b) It is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification 
should be required; 
(c) The representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or 
(d) The intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from 
the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation. 
 
For the above VCLT texts, see (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Part II, Sec. 1, 
Conclusion of Treaties, Arts. 11 and 14. 
 
Although it appears that any of the above tests would satisfy the consent criteria being based on treaty 
ratification, in fact, the text and the legislative history show the UN Charter had all the above elements in 
UHTXLULQJWUHDW\UDWLILFDWLRQVDVDPHDQVRIHVWDEOLVKLQJVWDWHV¶ILQDOFRQVHQW 
 
$GRSWLQJWKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³FRQFOXVLRQ´coercion violations can occur anytime durinJWKHWUHDW\¶V
conclusion process, which includes negotiations, finalisation of the text and signatures, and ratification, or any 
other agreed means that establishes the member states have given their final consent and are bound by the treaty. 
See also (Villiger 2009): 77-79. Sir Humphry Waldock, the ILC rapporteur at the Vienna Convention, was also 
RIWKHYLHZWKDW³FRQFOXVLRQ´FRQVWLWXWHVWKHZKROHSURFHVVRIQHJRWLDWLRQVDQGSUHSDUDWLRQRIWKHILQDOWH[W
progressing to the lDWHUVWDJHRI³GHILQLWLYHHQJDJHPHQWWKDWWKHSDUWLHVDUHERXQGE\WKHLQVWUXPHQWXQGHU




Articles 51 and 52. Discounting the Declaration, and even if adopting a narrower definition of 
force or coercion, many states in Table 2 fall under the classic category of ³boots-on-the-
ground´ and the military presence of the would-be permanent members. 
A large number of states at the time of the making of the UN Charter were under the direct 
military occupation (friendly or hostile) of the P5. Many states had regimes that were recently 
installed (or moved from exile) by the permanent members, and several colonies (dependent 
states) were purportedly participating as independents.  
With the exception of some Latin American countries and a few other states, 26 states out of 
the 50 states at San Francisco were under the direct influence of the permanent members. In 
terms of voting power²counting the five permanent members plus their dependaQWV¶YRWHV²
the P5 commandeered 31 votes, or a guaranteed 62 per cent majority, to push their agenda 
and to ensure the inclusion of their special privileges in the UN Charter.560 
                                                 
On the other hand, there are those scholars, such as Duncan Hollis, who argue thaW³IRUDOOSUDFWLFDOSXUSRVHV´
DWWKHHQGRIWUHDW\QHJRWLDWLRQVDQGILQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHWH[WWKHSRLQWRI³FRQFOXVLRQ´LVUHDFKHGDQGWKDWthe 
treaty may not need to go into force, with the signing of the final text marking the conclusion of the treaty. 
(Hollis 2014): 21. See also (Gardiner 2014): 484. Anthony Aust, while holding similar views, makes an 
H[FHSWLRQLQWKHFDVHRIWUHDWLHV³ZKLFKDUHEURXJKWLQWRIRUFHE\VLJQDWXUH´VXJJHVWLQJLQWKRVHFDVHV³WKDW
µFRQFOXGHG¶UHIHUVWRHQWU\LQWRIRUFHRIWKHWUHDW\´(Aust 2013): 86. This is, in effect, the kind of requirement 
stated in Article 110(3) of the Charter. 
 
In this thesis, I subscribe to the former view: that treaty conclusion is a multi-stage process, in which a treaty 
UHDFKHVLWVILQDOVWDJHDQGLV³FRQFOXGHG´ERUQZKHQWKHVWDWHVDVVSHFLILHGE\WKHWUHDW\KDYHH[SOLFLWO\JLYHQ
their consent to be bound by it. Therefore, in the UN Charter treaty-making context, used in Chapters 8 and 9, 
WKH9&/7WHUP³FRQFOXVLRQ´PHDQVWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVWDJHVILQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHWH[WDQGXSWRDQGLQFOXGLQJWKH
ratification stage. It should be noted, however, that, discounting the two nuclear attacks, most of the coercion 
cases mentioned in this chapter, and all the Under Influence cases listed in Table 2 in relation to the possible 
EUHDFKRI$UWLFOHVDQGDUHLQIDFWRIWKHVWULFWHULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³FRQFOXVLRQ´ZKLFKZDVDSSOLFDEOH
GXULQJWKHWZRPRQWKV¶GXration of the San Francisco Conference while the Charter text was being negotiated 
and finalised. 
560
 These numbers are extrapolated from Table 2. Poland was not included in the tally because of its absence at 
WKH&RQIHUHQFHYRWLQJVHVVLRQV+RZHYHU3RODQG¶s vote should be included when calculating the ratification 
requirements, since Poland was formally considered a Conference signatory (as the 51st state). 
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Returning to the wartime setting of the Charter¶VFRQFOXVLRQDQGWKHXQXVXDO circumstances at 
San Francisco, the question arises as to why some of these states, which were under duress 
during the signing of the treaty, did not opt-out at the ratification stage. This is commonly 
done with many treaties (including the VCLT), and some of the independent states at San 
Francisco, such as New Zealand and Chile, had mentioned the possibility of doing so. When 
the states could have taken time to further consider their votes, why was there unanimous 
ratification of the treaty in such a short space of time? The required number of ratifications 
was submitted by 24 October 1945²only four months after the signing of the Charter. 
A major part of the answer seems to lie in another dramatic use of force, and the threat of 
future use of force, by one of the permanent members. On 6 August 1945, the US dropped the 
first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, instantly killing tens of thousands of people²mostly 
civilians. Two days later, on 8 August 1945, the US government submitted its ratification of 
the UN Charter²becoming the first state to do so. In fact, the dramatic show of additional 
force, to both the Japanese and the rest of the world²seemingly callous and redundant ²was 
the dropping of the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, on 9 August, one day after the Charter 
ratification submission.  
This significant sequence of events can hardly be a coincidence. Rather, it was a show of 
force²not only to the Japanese to expedite their surrender²but also to the rest of the world 
regarding the type of world order options available to the then soon-to-be UN member states 
and the potential future ones.  
Both nuclear bombings inflicted destruction of apocalyptic proportions. Thousands of 
Japanese civilians died instantly, and the radiation-related human suffering and economic 
devastation persisted for decades. The use of the atomic bombs showed the effect of using 
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this type of new force for decades to come, and certainly served as a constant reminder to all 
the states. It was a strong message and a reminder to those states contemplating whether or 
not to ratify the UN Charter. It was also a strong message to those states not invited to San 
Francisco, and to all the other future would-be member states of the UN. 
After the chronological sequence of the dropping of the first bomb, the US depositing the first 
ratification instrument of the treaty two days later, and then the dropping of the second 
nuclear bomb the next day, the world was in shock, and an avalanche of ratifications of the 
UN Charter followed. In just 11 weeks, all the required ratifications were deposited, 
including from states whose parliaments were showing signs of hesitation, such as New 
Zealand, as well as the required concurrence of the other four permanent members. All the 
necessary ratifications were deposited by 24 October 1945.561 
Ironically, the UN Charter, this most primary, supreme, and general of the global governance 
charters, has all the characteristics of being negotiated under duress and thus possibly being 
void. What then happened to the &KDUWHU¶VUHYLHZ and revision process that had been due to 
take place 10 years after it came into force, and which so many states, acting under duress, 
had opted for²with the consent of the permanent members. 
                                                 
561
 )RUWKHGDWHVRIVWDWHV¶GHSRVLWRIWKH81&KDUWHUUDWLILFDWLRQLQVWUXPHQWVVHH(United Nations Yearbook 
1946-1947): 34. On Chilean and New Zealand representatives at the Conference, among others, going on record 
to state that, without the provision to revise the Charter in the future, they would have a difficult time getting the 
Charter adopted by their respective parliaments, see (UNCIO - Volume VII: Commission I, General Provisions 
1945)2Q1HZ=HDODQG¶VSXEOLFSDUOLDPHQWDQGPHGLDORVLQJLQWHUHVWLQWKHSURSRVHG81DQGWKH
slow pace in debating the Charter ratification, which was evident by late July of 1945 (but before the atomic 
explosions), see (Hensley 2009): 401-403. In fact, on 31 July, Prime Minister Fraser had complained about New 
=HDODQG¶VPHdia in relation to the San Francisco Conference, and had said that the press should speak of New 
=HDODQG¶VUROH³PRUHDVDFKDPSLRQDQGOHVVDVDQDSRORJLVWDQGPRXUQHU´,ELG1HZ=HDODQGGHSRVLWHGLWV
Charter ratification instrument on 19 September 1945. (United Nations Yearbook 1946-1947): 34. 
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8.5 Article 109 Paragraph 3²Teleological Interpretation and Pacta Sunt 
Servanda 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I discussed paragraph 3 of Article 109, which provided for a review of 
the Charter at a specified later date. However, it is now necessary to establish the original 
intent requirement, which, taken together with the paragraph becoming operational in 1955, 
allow us to test for pacta sunt servanda and the exercise of good faith. 
8.5.1 Article 109 and its Paragraph 3²Original Intent 
Let us revisit the exact text of Article 109, particularly paragraph 3 as it was adopted, 
highlighting its keywords to demonstrate original intent.562 
The objective of Article 109 is stated in paragraph 1:563  
A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of 
reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-
thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven 
[amended to 9]  members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations 
shall have one vote in the conference. 
                                                 
562
 Original intent is an interpretation theory or method, mostly applicable in constitutional judicial review, 
aimed at determining the original intent behind a specific clause at the time of its drafting. (Black 1994): 1133. 
Therefore, by definition, original intent should not be concerned about possible changes in intent over time, 
unless through constitutive amendments re-establishing the intent. Even proponents of the evolutionary 
interpretation of treaties seem to share some common ground with the original intent approach, in that both seek 
to uphold the original intent of the text. Eirik Bjorge, in The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties and 
Evolutionary Interpretation and the Intention of the Parties, DUJXHVWKDW³HYROXWLRQDU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQLV
inexorably linked to the objectivized intention of the parties. ... In that sense evolutionary interpretation relates 
to the intention of the parties in the saPHZD\WKDWFRQWHPSRUDQHRXVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQGRHV´(Bjorge 2014): 139. 
See also https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Second%20Batch/EirikBjorgeCh3.pdf;  
and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159657. 
563
 (Charter of the United Nations 1945-2015): Article 109, paragraph 1 and paragraph 3. Paragraph 1 above is 
the original 1945 text as it was adopted in San Francisco and was still effective in 1955. That paragraph was 
ODWHUDPHQGHGLQFRPLQJLQWRIRUFHLQWRLQFUHDVHWKH6&PHPEHUV¶UHTXLUHGYRWHVQHHGHGIRU
adoption from 7 to 9. As explained in Chapter 7, this was a consequential amendment to Article 109 to correct a 
numerical discrepancy mistake, made earlier when the SC was expanded from 11 to 15 members. The expansion 
amendment resulted from GA Res. 1991 A (XVIII), adopted in 1963, which came into force into 1965.  
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Paragraph 2 of Article 109 deals with the ratification procedure for any revisions adopted 
at the Conference. Paragraph 3 proposes a deadline and an easier voting procedure for 
deciding to hold such a conference: 
If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the 
General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the 
proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of 
the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority 
vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of 
the Security Council. 
In view of the coercive practices and wartime circumstances that characterised the 
Conference, the polarised camps of permanent members and non-permanent members 
compromised. They agreed to accept the proposed Council as is and to review and revise the 
rules governing its structure and operation at a later date. The UNCIO formal documentation 
and travaux report the rHYLHZDVDFRPSURPLVHDQG³LQFHQWLYH´IRUWKHDFFHSWDQce of the veto 
arrangement.564 In fact, to end the stalemate on the veto, the concept of the review and the 
possibility of Charter revisions was introduced by the main Big-3 sponsor of the 
Conference²the US. 
The provision to hold a review of the Charter was introduced by the head of the US 
Republican delegation to the Conference, Harold Stassen, at a late stage during the 
Conference, when the veto fight was deadlocked. 565 The proposal was first put by the US to 
the other sponsoring governments and, after their agreement, it was presented to the weaker 
states. John Foster Dulles, the US delegate to the Conference and the future Secretary of 
6WDWHDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWLWKDG³RQO\EHHQSRVVLEOHWRVHFXUHDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH&KDUWHUDW
                                                 
564
 In addition to the UNCIO documentation on Commission III/1 and I/2 on this topic, see, for example, the P5 
statement that, ³Whe proposal was offered in the spirit of conciliation and good-ZLOO´. See Chapter 7 (n 74). For a 
post-mortem, see (United Nations Yearbook 1946-1947): 25. See also (K. Krishna 1955): 361. 
565
 (Schlesinger 2003): 161. 
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San Francisco by a provision assuring that there would be an opportunity to review it in the 
OLJKWRIH[SHULHQFH´566  
At the conclusion of the conference, in a statement by the delegation of Australia²the de 
facto state-rapporteur for the anti-veto camp²Mr. Forde, Vice-Premier of Australia, said:567 
In drawing this Charter, we have recognized that it must be flexible²that we must be 
able to undo later anything which proves unworkable or clumsy in new circumstances, or 
to readjust particular features of the Organization to the happier world which we believe 
a lasting peace will bring into being. 
5DWKHUWKDQUHSHDWWKHOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\DQGWKH6DQ)UDQFLVFRVSLULWWR³XQGR´WKHYalta 
formula which were mentioned in the previous chapter, I will now attempt to link the 
keywords highlighted in the above text of paragraph 3 directly to the original intent behind 
them.568 
Article 109(1) Keywords: ³5HYLHZLQJWKHSUHVHQW&KDUWHU´ 
x It was clear to the majority of the states at the Conference that the Charter-making 
process was not complete. The 23 questions posed by the weaker states to the 
sponsoring governments, and which the P5 deliberated over for three weeks of the 
                                                 
566
 (Scott 2005): 74. See also the secondary source used by Scott, Note 15, ³$GGUHVVE\WKH+RQRXUDEOH-RKQ 
Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, made in General Debate of the United Nations Assembly, New York 
7KXUVGD\6HSWHPEHU´6WDWH'HSDUWPHQt Press Release No 505 AA A1838 851/10/1 Part 1. Ibid. 
567
 (UNCIO - Volume II: General 1945): 164, 177. 
568
 The legislative history of Article 109 and the support of the permanent members for that provision, including 
WKH86KRVW¶s support for conducting a review of, and implementing revisions to, the Charter, is detailed in 
Chapter 5, which covers the US position and statements by: (1) President Roosevelt; (2) the US delegates at the 
Conference (the Republican head-delegate, Commander Stassen, and the US Congressional Joint chief delegate, 
Democratic Senator Connally); (3) the US delegate and future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; and (4) the 
then US Secretary of State and the Secretary General of the Conference, Edward Stettinius. This chapter also 
describes the favourable views of the P5 members France, the UK and China. Furthermore, the following non-
permanent states had, by submission of motions or recorded statements at the Committee meetings, gone on 
record in advocating the need for a review of the Charter: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Chile, 
Ecuador, India, Peru, Turkey, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. (References for all of the above can 
be found in Chapter 5.) 
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FRQIHUHQFH¶VWLPH(primarily because of disagreement among them), were left 
unanswered. Fundamental issues such as how the Secretary-General is elected, or how 
a new member state is admitted, were not resolved (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). 
x The majority of the P5, especially the Conference organiser, the US, had publicly²
before, during, and after the conference²stated that a review and amendment 
procedure would be normal, useful and expected. Both President Roosevelt and the 
Secretary General of the Conference and Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, had 
cited the importance and frequency of amendments to the US Constitution, 
particularly in earlier years, as an expected and necessary process of constitutional 
development. They believed that such a process would also apply to the UN Charter. 
x The anti-veto majority states had agreed to the Yalta formula²as long as it was later 
limited or abolished by means of a Charter amendment, and therefore had 
compromised on adopting the veto as a temporary measure until a later review of the 
Charter. 
x The review provision (Article 109) was not part of the original DO proposal. It was 
added in San Francisco, where the overwhelming majority of the states, including the 
permanent members, recognised that the Charter being created was a work in progress 
and that future revisions were desirable and expected. In fact, Committee II/1, in 
debating whether to add the Charter review to the DO, adopted the relevant resolution 
overwhelmingly, with just a single negative vote.569 
                                                 
569
 The text that was subsequently adopted by the Commission and the plenary, and incorporated into the final 
draft as paragraph 3 of Article 109 of Chapter XVIII of the UN Charter, was adopted with 42 votes in favour, 1 
against, and 3 abstentions. (UNCIO - Volume VII: Commission I, General Provisions 1945): 249-253. 
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The conviction at UNCIO was so strong regarding holding the review WRUHIRUPWKH&KDUWHU¶V
known defects that some states referred to it as the ³Uevisionary conference´.570 In fact, the 
French translation of Article 109(3) (French being one of the formal languages of the 
Conference) refers to the Conference as a revision rather than a review conference.571 
Article 109(1) Keywords: ³*HQHUDO&RQIHUHQFH´ 
7KH³amendments´SURFHVVLQ$UWLFOHZDVGHVLJQHGWREHGLIIHUHQWIURPWKH³UHYLHZ´
process in Article 109, although both could serve the same function. In the amendments 
procedure, one or two changes were expected, but in the review exercise, a series of changes 
to, and consequently major revisions of, the Charter were anticipated. The review of the 
Charter at a conference, which would place the whole instrument²including its preamble, 
objectives, and the SC¶Vstructure and voting procedure²under scrutiny and subject to 
amendmentZDVFHUWDLQO\H[SHFWHGWRKDYHDZLGHVFRSH7KHUHIRUHWKHWHUP³JHQHUDO´ZDV
added as a qualifier to the name of the conference.  
It was anticipated that such a large conference, with so many attendees and a broad scope, 
would require its own logistics and a dedicated location available for a lengthy period of 
time. Hence WKH³IL[LQJRIWKHGDWHDQGSODFH´PHQWLRQHGLQparagraph 1. Indeed, in one of the 
last plenary sessions of the UNCIO, it was decided, by an informal vote, to hold the next 
general review conference of the Charter back in San Francisco.572 
Article 109(3) Keywords: ³7KHWHQWKDQQXDOVHVVLRQ´ 
                                                 
570
 (Fraser 1945): 37. 
571
 For the use of the French term révision (rather than revue or examiner) in the Charter, see (La Charte des 
Nations Unies 1945), and later discussion in this chapter. 
572
 (UNCIO - Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions 1945): 251. 
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All the permanent members (with the exception of the USSR), as well as the anti-veto 
majority, understood and were fully aware of the perceived temporary nature of the SC¶V 
structure and the Yalta formula as set out in the DO proposal when it was being adopted.573  
The formula and the privileges enjoyed by the P5 were debated in terms of lasting only a 
number of years. The majority states favoured an expiration date ranging from five to 10 
years, with the permanent members preferring a later one. The P5 claimed a longer period 
was necessary so that their status would not be delegitimised as they carried out their peace-
keeping missions in the near future.  
The Brazilian±Canadian motion to hold a mandatory review in a minimum of five and a 
maximum of 10 years received 23 votes in favour and 17 against. This was a majority, but 
not a two-thirds majority.574 The US reintroduced the measure, altering it to the upper limit of 
10 years, but automatically placing the proposal to hold the rHYLHZRQWKH*$¶VDJHQGDDIWHU
this 10-year period had passed. It was adopted with only one negative vote cast.575 Therefore, 
the nearly unanimous intention of the states in San Francisco was to hold the review, ³Lf such 
a conference has not been held before´, DWWKH³WHQWKVHVVLRQ´ 
Article 109(3) Keywords: ³%\DPDMRULW\YRWH´ 
Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 109 essentially seek to accomplish the same thing²the holding 
of a review conference. The difference between the two, in the text and according to the 
legislative history of the Conference, is the deadline specified and the facilitated voting 
procedure provided for in paragraph 3. In paragraph 1, the initiation of a review is not 
                                                 
573
 See Chapter 5 for sources, including the related UNCIO travaux references, esp. Sections 5.6 and 5.7.  
574
 (UNCIO - Volume VII: Commission I, General Provisions 1945): 219. 
575
 Ibid: 249-253. 
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associated with a specific period or date; furthermore, it requires a two-thirds majority vote of 
the Assembly to be adopted.  
The review to be held under the paragraph 3 provision, however, was referred to in San 
Francisco as thH³VSHFLDO´review conference: first, because of the deadline specified in the 
paragraph for initiating a proposal to convene such a conference, and secondly²and more 
significantly²because it could be held following DVLPSOH³PDMRULW\YRWH´ 
Therefore, the textual analysis of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 109 illustrates that the choice 
of the keywords in its text was not coincidental. The wording reflects the legal spirit and the 
intention WRKROGD³JHQHUDO´review of the statutes of the UN 10 years after WKH&KDUWHU¶V
conclusion. 
8.6 Operating on Article 109 Paragraph 3²Implemented or Breached? 
One of the principles of international law is pacta sunt servanda: that state parties must abide 
by their agreements. The Vienna Convention defines pacta sunt servanda as: ³(YHU\WUHDW\LV
ELQGLQJXSRQWKHSDUWLHVWRLWDQGPXVWEHSHUIRUPHGE\WKHPLQJRRGIDLWK´.576 
Pacta sunt servanda is one of the oldest and most fundamental principles and the ³EDVLF
QRUP´LQRXUHVVHQWLDOO\³FR-archical, consent-based and consent-GULYHQ´LQWHUQDWLRQDOlaw 
system.577 There is no known case or judgment of a tribunal that has repudiated it.578 Yet, 
under the same international law system and the power-of-law at the disposal of the powerful 
states, violation of the pacta sunt servanda principle is not uncommon. 
                                                 
576
 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Art. 26. 
577
 (Weissner 1994-1995): 567. 
578
 (Villiger 2009): 363. 
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To test for good faith in keeping to the letter and spirit of Article 109(3), I will use the 
customary international law principle of good faith in adhering to treaty provisions in the 
Vienna Convention context and will primarily apply these rules of the law of treaties. Before 
doing so, however, I present a brief review of the main points relating to how paragraph 3 
was operated on at the GA, and whether its implementation was carried out to completion or 
miscarried. 
In 1955, after the 10-year period specified in paragraph 3 had elapsed, and after many years 
of anticipation and preparatory work, the Assembly adopted Resolution 992 (X), with which 
the SC concurred. This resolution was intended to implement paragraph 3 and arrange for the 
general review conference to be held. The overwhelming adoption of this measure by the GA 
and SCGHVSLWHWKH8665¶VQHJDWLYHYRWHwas by more than just the needed simple majority, 
and even surpassed the two-thirds mark (as required under paragraph 1 of Article 109) in 
both of the UN chambers.579  
However, the operative paragraph of the resolution did not actually convene the review. 
Although this may have been the original intent, paragraph 1 of the resolution merely 
³Decides that a General Conference to review the Charter shall be held at an appropriate 
time´. In operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, a preparatory Committee is created, and 
paragraph 3 ³Requests the Committee to report with its recommendations to the General 
Assembly at its twelfth session´, gLYLQJLWWZR\HDUVIRU³fixing a time and place for the 
Conference´580  
                                                 
579
 (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015): Res. 992(X). See also (Yearbook of the United 





The preparatory committee that was set up by Resolution 992 (X) reported back after two 
\HDUVWKDWWKHWLPHZDVQRW³DXVSLFLRXV´, and requested an extension of its mandate. The 
Assembly then adopted Resolution 1136 (XII) to extend that mandate. This process of 
sometimes annual and sometimes biennial extensions of the CRPPLWWHH¶VPDQGDWHWRUHSRUW
the venue of the conference continued for 12 years and resulted in eight GA resolutions. The 
last such resolution was Resolution 2285 (XXII), in 1967.581 7KLVUHVROXWLRQ¶VRSHUDWLve 
SDUDJUDSKVLPSO\VWDWHGWKDWLW³Decides to keep in being the Committee on arrangements for 
a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter [emphasis added@´582 This resolution 
essentially put the Committee into hibernation and indefinitely deferred the timing and 
location of the general review. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this blocking of the review was primarily the wish of 
the permanent members,ISRZHUUDWKHUWKDQ³JRRGJRYHUQDQFH´LVFRQVLGHUHGDVWKHPDLQ
motivation, the P5 had potentially the most to lose should a review have been held.  
The Soviet Union was opposed to a review from the outset. However, by 1955, some of the 
other permanent members, and in particular the US, thought that a revision of the Charter 
could address defects and deficiencies the UN had experienced in global governance over its 
first 10 years. In particular, a Charter revision had the potential to improve WKH81¶VPLssion 
of maintaining peace and security. However, by 1967, US and British policy (and, prior to 
that, French policy) on the UN had changed. These states now wanted to preserve their 
privileges and supremacy, and therefore they opted for a frozen Charter and the status quo at 
                                                 
581
 The eight resolutions, including the first one, are: 992(X) of 21 November 1955, 1136(XII) of 14 October 
1957, 1381 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1670(XVI) of 15 December 1961, 1756(XVII) of 23 October1962, 
1993 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963 and 2114(XX) of 21 December 1965, and (the last one) 2285(XXII) of 5 
December 1967. (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015).  
582
 Ibid: GA Res. 2285(XXII). 
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the Council.583 Consequently, 12 years after the adoption of Resolution 992(X), the question 
of when to hold the review had²for all of the P5²become an undesirable political 
question.584 
'HVSLWHWKH3¶VWUXHZLVKHVDQGWKHrealpolitik, it appears that, in technically legal terms, the 
good faith in Article 109(3) of the UN Charter²as far as the permanent members are 
concerned²has been violated, and the completion of its operation has been breached. 
However, as a whole, and as far as the GA membership is concerned, it can be concluded that 
paragraph 3 of Article 109 has been partially implemented and is still legally in force. This 
finding is evaluated below through the application of the rules of the Vienna Convention, 
particularly Articles 26 and 31 to 33. 
In the Vienna Convention, in addition to its chapeau, ZKHUHWKHSULQFLSOHRI³JRRGIDLWK´LV
specified, in Part III, Section 1, ³Observance of Treaties´Whe good-faith performance of 
Charter obligations is briefly referred to in Article 26:585 
µ3$&7$68176(59$1'$¶ 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith. 
According to Mark Villiger, the ILC purposefully chose a simple yet powerful statement to 
demonstrate the cardinal importance of pacta sunt servanda: ³WKHSURYLVLRQLVIRUFHIXOO\\HW
                                                 
583
 The reasoning behind, and the evolution of, US foreign policy during those 12 years was discussed in 
&KDSWHU6HFWLRQ)RULQIRUPDWLRQRQWKH8.¶VDQGVRPHRWKHUVWDWHV¶YLHZVGXULQJWKHVDPHSHULRGVHH




 Zacklin referred to this repeated delaying of the decision on the timing of the review by the 3DVWKH³FODVVLF
H[DPSOHRIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUQPHQWRIDQXQGHVLUDEOHVXEMHFWPDWWHU´(Zacklin 1968-Reprint 2005): 118 
585
 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): PART III, OBSERVANCE, 
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES, Section 1, Article 26. 
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elegantly drafted, containing no exceptions or conditions which could lead to debates calling 
in question its validity.´586 
&RPSOHPHQWLQJ$UWLFOH¶VVLPSOHELQDU\WHVWregarding the implementation of paragraph 3 
and its apparent violation are the Vienna Convention¶V UXOHVIRU³,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI7UHDWLHV´
These rules are primarily contained in Section 3, Articles 31 to 33. Examination of these 
articles further bolsters the argument that the paragraph 3 provision has been in effect 
partially breached and not fully implemented. 
The relevant text of the above three articles is analysed separately below, and in each case the 
supporting arguments are presented. 
8.6.1 General Rules of Interpretation: VCLT Article 31 
Paragraph 1 of Article 31 reads as follows:587 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose [Emphasis added.] 
The ordinary meaning of paragraph 3 was perfectly clear. If no review of the Charter had 
been conducted prior to the tenth session of the Assembly, then at the tenth session a simple 
majority could decide to hold the review.  
In fact, in 1955, when the text of the joint draft (led by the US and the UK) of GA Resolution 
992 (X) came to the floor for debate, a few states discerned the intent of the yes-but-not-now 
contradiction in the resolution. Norway, for example, argued that there was a distinction 
between actually calling for the conference as was provisioned, and calling for the conference 
                                                 
586
 (Villiger 2009): 368. See also the secondary source cited in Waldock Report VI, YBILC 1966, at Footnote 46. 
Ibid. 
587
 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Article 31 Para 1.A. 
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WREHKHOGDWDQ³DXVSLFLRXV´WLPH, as the resolution suggested. Similarly, Yugoslavia 
objected to the indeterminate nature of the conference date as presented in the draft 
resolution. 3DNLVWDQQRWHG³Whe paramount importance of the tenth session consists in that it is 
the favourite of the UN Charter´3DNLVWDQIXUWKHUDUJXHGWKDW³[I]t is not possible to engraft 
an additional procedure on to paragraph 3 of Article 109, because to do that would be to read 
more into the language of the Charter than is warranted.´588 
Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, while in favour of the Resolution 992(X) text (deferral of 
the exact date), reminded the Assembly of the spirit of the Charter on conducting the review, 
DQGIXUWKHUUHLWHUDWHG³:HZRXOGQRWZLVKWRUXOHRXW²or even to appear to rule out²the 
possibility of holding a constructive and useful review conference within the foreseeable 
IXWXUH´The US fully endorsed Sir Leslie¶VVWDWHPHQWV589 
8.6.2 Supplementary Means of Interpretation: VCLT Article 32 
The main part of Article 32 states:590  
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
FRQILUPWKHPHDQLQJUHVXOWLQJIURPWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIDUWLFOH« [Emphasis added.] 
                                                 
588
 For arguments presented by Pakistan, Norway and Yugoslavia, see (Yearbook of the United Nations 1955): 
75-76; (Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-1 1954-1955): 447. For one of the very few law 
journal articles on the subject at the time, see (Schwelb, Charter Review and Charter Amendment--Recent 
Developments 1958): 308-311. See also (UNRIC 1946-2000): A/544, A/545.  
589
 On the New Zealand and US statements, see, respectively, GA reports (ODS 1993-2012): A/PV.545 and 
A/PV.547. For link access: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL5/502/95/PDF/NL550295.pdf?OpenElement;  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL5/502/97/PDF/NL550297.pdf?OpenElement. Both accessed 
17 May 2014. 
See also, (Schwelb, Charter Review and Charter Amendment--Recent Developments 1958): 310. 
590
 The remainder of Article 32 of the VCLT reads as follows: 
«RUWRGHWHUPLQHWKHPHDQLQJZKHQWKHinterpretation [sic] according to article 31: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Article 32. 
334 
 
It will be recalled that much of Chapter 5, on the statutory promise of San Francisco, was 
devoted to the legislative history of the compromise that gave rise to paragraph 3. Therefore, 
$UWLFOH¶VUHOLDQFHRQ³WKHSUHSDUDWRU\ZRUNRIWKHWUHDW\DQGWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRILWV
FRQFOXVLRQ´ as a means of interpretation confirms &KDSWHU¶V findings. These are that a 
review and possible revision of the Charter at a later date, not exceeding 10 years, was part of 
the outcome of the 1945 San Francisco Conference and the intent of Article 109(3). 
According to &RQIHUHQFHUDSSRUWHXUVDQGWKH81&,2UHSRUWVZKDW,QGLD¶VRamaswami 
Mudaliar expressed DV,QGLD¶VVWDQFH towards the end of the Conference²at a crucial anti-
veto-rebellion moment and turning-point in San Francisco²was perceived by the majority 
states to embody the anti-veto compromise:591  
 [T]hat while they were prepared to agree to the Yalta formula over the next ten 
years, it would be a very proper proposition on their part to urge that the whole 
SRVLWLRQVKRXOGEHUHH[DPLQHG« And we felt that if this unanimity rule were not to 
be applied at the end of ten years to any proposal regarding the amendment of the 
Charter, we could safely, and with good conscience and with complete trust and 
confidence in the five great powers, agree to the complete Yalta formula during the 
intervening period of ten years.  
Moreover, Dr. Evatt of Australia, at a committee meeting before the crucial vote on the text 
of paragraph 3, in clarifying the difference between the text of that paragraph and the text of 
paragraph 1, stated WKDW³WKHFKRLFHEHIRUHWKH&RPPLWWHHZDVWRKROGDUHYLVLRQFRQIHUHQFH
at one specific time or at an indefinite period.´592 The members states, being fully aware of 
the distinction between paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 109 and the options before them, opted 
                                                 
591
 (UNCIO - Volume XI: Commission III, Security Council 1945): 173-175. [Emphases added.] 
592
 (UNCIO - Volume VII: Commission I, General Provisions 1945): 211. 
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for a specific review date and incorporated it into the Charter. The founders had already 
decided on their choice. 
The ³SUHSDUDWRU\ZRUN´relating to the adoption of Article 109(3) can probably be cited as a 
classic (and dramatic) case of satisfying the test set out in VCLT Article 32, in linking the 
paragraph to the UN Charter and WKH³FLUFXPVWDQFHV of its conclusion´. This is true not only 
of its substance²of when WKH&KDUWHU¶VGHIHFWVZHUHWREHDGGUHVVHGZKLFKZHUHNQRZQ
while the treaty was being drafted) ²but also in its symbolism of being adopted almost at the 
eleventh hour (after midnight, in the early hours of Sunday morning) during the last working 
days of the Conference, as a compromise to ensure its successful conclusion.593 
8.6.3 Interpretations of Treaties Authenticated in Two or More Languages: 
VCLT Article 33 
French was one of the five official languages at UNCIO.594 The formal text of the UN 
Charter in French regarding Article 109(3) specifies that, at the tenth session, D³révision´
conference will be held²not the expected French term revue or examiner, which is closer to 
the English word ³UHYLHZ´ 595 This raises the question of what happens if there is a 
discrepancy among the official languages of a treaty. Which interpretation prevails? 
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 Ibid: 249, 253, and 261. See also Chapter 5. 
594
 Although there were five official languages, there were only two working languages: French and English. 
(United Nations Yearbook 1946-1947): 14. 
595
 The related text in the French version of the UN Charter is: 
 
Une conférence générale des Membres des Nations Unies, aux fins d'une révision de la présente 
Charte, pourra être réunie aux lieu et date qui seront fixés par un vote de l'Assemblée générale à la 
majorité des deux tiers et par un vote de neuf quelconques des membres du Conseil de sécurité. 
Chaque Membre de l'Organisation disposera d'une voix à la conférence. [Emphasis added.] 
 




The provision of the Vienna Convention codifying customary international law contained in 
Article 33(1), first recognises that ³When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more 
languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the 
parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.´ Given that at the 
UNCIO EQJOLVKDQG)UHQFKZHUHWKHRQO\WZR³ZRUNLQJ´ODQJXDJHV, that the Charter does 
not specify which language is more authoritative, and that there is a difference between 
review and révision LQWKHVHWZR³equally authoritative´ODQJXDJHV, which version prevails? 
Article 33(4) explains how to resolve such conflicts:596  
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a 
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles 
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted. 
In other words, the general treaty interpretation rules of Articles 31 and 32 described above 
still apply. In this case, recourse can be made to the preparatory work of the Conference, the 
circumstances of the tUHDW\¶VFRQFOXVLRQDQG, of course, the principle of good faith. 
Returning to the legislative history, it should be recalled that France was not one of the 
sponsoring governments at San Francisco, and at the outset of the Conference was in favour 
of liberalising the SC. In fact, France, earlier in the Conference, had introduced an 
amendment to the DO proposal limiting the use of the formula (it was later withdrawn).597  
The use of the term révision (rather than revue or examiner) was not an accident. It reflected 
the French-speaking VWDWHV¶YLHZDWWKH&RQIHUHQFHWKDWLI, at the tenth session, the GA 
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 (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) 1969): Article 33, paragraphs 1 and 4. 
597
 (UNCIO - Volume III: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Comments and Proposed Amendments 1945): 665. As to 
France entering the Conference and, at the beginning, siding with the weaker states, see Chapter 4; and also 
(Schlesinger 2003): 101±102. 
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decided to adopt the proposed general conference, it would not be just a review. Instead, it 
would trigger a process leading to Charter revisions limiting the permanent members¶ 
powers. This was the majority sWDWHV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJDWWKH&RQIHUHQFHDWWKe time.598 
With such an awareness at the Conference, it is most likely that the Coordinating Committee 
in San Francisco, which was in charge of diligently scrutinising the final text of the Charter 
for precision, common usage and conformity with the official languages, did not object to the 
use of the term révision.599 
The objective here is not to quibble over semantics. Instead, I merely highlight the issue in 
order to indicate beyond reasonable doubt that, for the majority member states at UNCIO, the 
original intent of paragraph 3 was to revise rather than merely review the Charter. 
8.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first examined the UN Charter (treaty) as to its type, finding it atypical and, 
in fact, RIWKH³JHQHUDO´DQGVXSUDnational type. I then scrutinised the legitimacy of the UN 
Charter in different stages of its conclusion, and found possible defects under Vienna 
Convention Articles 49 and 50, so far as they reflect customary international law, and 
demonstrated the use of coercion and circumstances of duress referenced in Article 51. In 
view of the widespread ³WKUHDWRUXVHRIIRUFH´at the time, in clear violation of Article 52 of 
the VCLT, I hypothesised serious defects in the conclusion of the UN Charter. 
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 Jacques Dehaussy, in his Charter Commentaries on the French text, while reaffirming the Article¶s 
concessionary origins, emphasises the intent behind the use of the term revision rather than review in the text of 
the Article©/HWHUPHµUpYLVLRQ¶VHPEOHDSSHOHUjXQHODUJHUHFRQVLGpUDWLRQGXWUDLWpFRQVWLWXWLI ». (Dehaussy 
2005): 2219-2220. 
599
 The Coordinating Committee was one of the four main committees at UNCIO, in charge of drafting the final 
text of the Charter, and reporting to the Executive Committee. (United Nations Yearbook 1946-1947): 13. 
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Both the relevant scholarship and case law point to the fact that the VCLT has mostly 
codified custom, including that relating to coercion (Article 52), with immediate effect, and is 
therefore potentially applicable to all treaties currently in force.600 With the dictation of the 
Charter by the powerful sponsoring states apparent at WKH81¶V founding, the recourse chosen 
by the contracting state-parties was to provide, within the Charter itself, a facilitated means to 
review and possibly revise the treaty. 
In this regard, the second part of the chapter analysed the Charter review process enshrined in 
Article 109 of the Charter, and in particular the execution of its paragraph 3, finding that in 
effect the provision has not been fully implemented. This finding is in two parts: first, that the 
permanent members, based on their practices as well as their adopted policies since 1955, 
might be in breach of the completion of Article 109(3); and, secondly, and more generally²
as it pertains to the UN membership and the GA²it can be concluded that Article 109(3) has 
been partially implemented and is legally still in force. 
Paragraph 3 was intended to correct some of the defects of the Charter²known at the time of 
its conclusion, but due to be reviewed and possibly revised at a fixed date in the future. In 
legal terms, this violation of good faith is evident in the context of VCLT Article 26 and the 
rules of interpretation set out in Articles 31, 32 and 33. 
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 With regard to the Declaration (which defines non-military coercions of the economic and political type as 
forms of prohibited threat or use of force), it ZDVDGRSWHGDVSDUWRIWKH³ILQDODFW´RIWKH9&/7In this respect, 
since Article 31 of the VCLT specifies WKDWWUHDW\³DQQH[HV´DUHFRQVLGHUHGDVSDUWRIWKHWUHDW\, it can be argued 
that this article recursively applies to the VCLT itself, meaning that the Declaration forms part of the VCLT¶V 
rules. (see Section 8.4.4 above.) The fact that the prohibition of non-military types of coercion has become 
custom, as part of the non-intervention principle, seems to have been established in the ICJ¶V ruling in Nicaragua 
v. USA, concerning, inter alia, the US¶V blockade of Nicaraguan harbours, and dealing with a treaty that 
predated the VCLT. (Again, see Section 8.4.4.) That said, my application of the Declaration in this chapter 
serves only to expand the possible number of states under duress in San Francisco. However, the bulk of the 
Under Influence States (UI-States), depicted in Table 2 of Section 8.3, were in fact subject to the classLF³boots 




With this conclusion, there is a basic question that can now rightfully be asked. Given that the 
UN Charter has defects, and given the interpretive rules set out in Section 2 of Part V of the 
VCLT in relation to the invalidity of treaties, particularly in relation to a breach of Article 52, 
the legitimacy of the Charter can be questioned and perhaps, for some of its founding state 
parties, be considered void.601 And, assuming that a united-nations type of organisation is still 
required, then potentially a new general global-governance treaty can be negotiated. Why, 
then, worry about Article 109(3) and its good-faith performance? Mindful of the fact that the 
UN¶V membership has grown almost four-fold since its founding, and presumably with the 
free consent of the states acceding the Charter since 1945.  
further discussion of this question and a suggested answer can be found in the next chapter. 
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9.1 UN Reform and Constitutionalisation  
This chapter is the main normative part of the thesis and expands on some of the topics 
covered in the introductory Chapter 1, with the focus on United Nations and international law 
constitutionalisation. With that normative lens concepts of UN constitutionalism will be 
examined and the legal strategies to invoke a review of the Charter as a trigger towards its 
constitutionalisation will be explored.  
Assuming that a conference to review the Charter finally occurs, two substantive questions 
arise.  First, should the P5 veto be feared, which, technically, would kill any Charter revisions 
proposed by such a review, thus rendering its efforts useless? And, secondly, even without 
the application of the veto, should we expect the first review of the Charter to produce a 
critical mass of constitutional changes to trigger the transformation of the UN and therefore 
international law? In other words, is it reasonable to expect that the review would indeed give 
ELUWKWRD³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOPRPHQW´" 
Before attempting to answer these questions, the Chapter first considers the age-old question 
of UN reform: that is, can the UN be reformed and pass through a series of gradual changes, 
either procedurally or through charter amendments, to circumvent its known shortcomings 




only a review conference of the magnitude of that first conference would be able to 
accomplish its transformation?602 
At the end of the chapter, a concluding abstract of the thesis is presented. 
7KH(OXVLYH815HIRUP³(YHU\6WDWH´:DQWVLW" 
The notion of UN reform is as old as the UN itself. In 1945, the Big-¶VGLFWDWLRQRISDUWVRI
the Charter at San Francisco had already prompted a future reforms wish list. The past and 
current UN reform topics encompass many areas, including democratisation of the Council, 
human rights, the environment, the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and merit-based 
election of officers at the UN (including the SG).603 However, the focus in this section will be 
on changes to the SC, which is the oldest and most sought-after part of UN reform. Hence, 
UN and Council reforms have been mostly used interchangeably. After all, the primary 
objective of the UN is to maintain international peace and security, assigned to the Council, 
and that is where it seems the UN is failing the most. 
Some of the more recent questions and collective efforts regarding Council reform include 
the need for an expanded and more representative SC, as was recommended by the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, in its diligent 2004 report to the Secretary-
General;604 and the recommendations of the 2005 World SummitLQZKLFKWKHZRUOG¶V
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 For UNCIO references, see Chapter 5, especially section 5.5. 
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 The historical records of some of the UN reform wish lists in the first decade of the UN, and the 
³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO´TXHVWLRQVUDLVHGLQ6DQ)UDQFLVFRDQGLQ1HZ<RUNRQWKHth anniversary of the UN, in 1955, 
and at the 10th session of the GA (when Article 109(3)) was invoked are covered in Part II of the thesis, 
particularly Chapters 5 and 7. 
604





In parallel to the independent experts and collective efforts on SC reform, there are also blocs 
of states pursuing their interests in targeted reforms. For example, the Group-4 states: 
Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, as current major world powers, and whose weight, in 
terms of the size of their populations or economies, or both, surpasses some of the existing 
permanent members (the UK, France and Russia) have proposed becoming additional 
permanent members, and have led a bloc of states in devising a new formula for the 
&RXQFLO¶VH[SDQVLRQ606  
There are also SC reform proposals which are veto-limitation type reforms: for example, 
those arising from the more current and urgent situations relating to humanitarian 
intervention and the R2P.607  
Among these efforts are those of a bloc of states led by the Small Five (S5) states, who are 
DSSHDOLQJWRWKH3¶VPRUDOREOLJDWLRQVDQGWKHLU³UHVSRQVLELOLW\QRWWRYHWR´&RXQFLO
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 (Rensmann 2012): 59-63; and (Blum 2005): 632-649. 
Kofi Annan, in circulating the report of The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, dated 2 
December 2004, to the GA said:  
I have long argued the need for a more representative Security Council. It is disappointing that, for 
more than ten years, littOHRUQRSURJUHVVKDVEHHQPDGHWRZDUGVWKLV7KH3DQHO¶VUHSRUWRIIHUVWZR
formulas for expansion of the Council. I hope that these will facilitate discussion and help the 
membership to reach decisions in 2005. (High-level Panel on Threats 2004): 3. 
Both alternative recommendations of the High-level Panel on SC reform would expand the size of the Council 
to 24 members based on geographical representation. However, the two plans are somewhat different with 
regards to the permanent seats; ibid: 67-68. 
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 The Group-4 proposal includes six additional permanent seats, including seats for the regions of Africa and 
Asia/Pacific, plus four new non-permanent seats, bringing the total size of the Council to 25. (Rensmann 2012): 
63-64. 
607
 For a short description of the humanitarian intervention and the R2P doctrines, see Section 2.3.3, n 102. 
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decisions involving humanitarian situations. Their goal is to, in effect, limit the powers of the 
3DQG³IUDPH´WKHLUXVHRIWKHYHWR608 
Reform can, of course, take many shapes. For example, there can be changes or reforms that 
do not require Charter amendments: by means of interpretation, non-constitutive agreements, 
or as a matter of fact and in practice.609 The notion of UN reform employed in this section, 
however, is of the more substantive type that would normally require formal constitutive 
revisions and Charter amendments. 
The topic of radical reforms to the Council in fact surfaced at the very first session of the GA, 
in 1946. The Philippines and Cuba intURGXFHGPRWLRQVWR³GHOHWH´WKHYHWR%\WKHVHFRQG
Assembly session, in 1947, it had become obvious that the veto would be used frequently and 
that the Council was unable to deal with the multiple international conflicts that had erupted 
after the war, thereby rendering it to a large extent dysfunctional. With the anti-veto rebellion 
RIVWLOOIUHVKLQPHPEHUV¶PLQGVXQGHU$UJHQWLQD¶VLQLWLDWLYHDJURXSRIPHPEHUVWDWHV
GHFLGHGWRFRQIURQWWKH3GLUHFWO\DQGVXEPLWWHGPRWLRQVWR³DEROLVK´WKHYHWRand other 
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 The S5 initiative on SC reforms, led by Switzerland, was submitted in a GA draft resolution that claimed to 
have the support of 100 states, and in fact included a wide range of proposed changes. Among others, the S5 
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veto/. Both accessed 2 November 2014. 
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 For these other types of reforms which have taken effect, a prominent example is the abstention of a P5 
member from a SC vote. By the 1950s, this came to be interpreted as not constituting a negative vote, and this 
view has prevailed HYHUVLQFH$QRWKHUH[DPSOHZDVWKHDGRSWLRQRI*$5HV,,,DWWKH81¶VWKLUGVHVVLRQ
in 1949, which clarified the internal workings and procedures of the Council, saving it from becoming 
completely dysfunctional. (See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.) For a more general discussion on these non-constitutive 
types of reform, see (Zacklin 1968-Reprint 2005): 171-197; and (Rensmann 2012): 28-33. 
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motions to conduct a full review of the Charter under Article 109, when the UN was only two 
years old.  
Details of those reform movements that were active during the early years of the 
organisation, from 1946 to 1967, can be found in Chapters 6 and 7. As was explained, with 
the exception of the Soviet Union, some degree of Council reform was supported by all the 
other P5 powers. In the case of the US, from 1946 to 1955, both popular and governmental 
opinion and attempts was in fact in favour of strengthening and democratising the UN.610 
However, probably as a result of the following factors: not being able to muster the two-
thirds support to hold a review conference; strong opposition from the USSR to such a 
conference; and the belief that it was too early for any reforms to the veto, and that attempts 
WRFKDQJHWKH&KDUWHUDWWKDWWLPHZRXOGPHDQ³ZUHFNLQJ´LWWKHVHUHIRUPLQLWLDWLYHVZHUH
instead postponed and funneled towards the promised review of 1955. 
With the 1955 activation of Article 109(3) and the adoption of Resolution 992 (X), the 
convening of the review conference was set in motion. Or was it?  
As pointed out in Chapter 7, when, in 1967²12 years after the founding of the UN²the 
work of the Arrangements Committee was put into hibernation, without the holding of the 
conference, this in effect represented a breach of Article 109(3) by the P5 and a failure to 
fully implement its provisions. Chapter 7 also explained how France, and then the UK, and, 
finally, by the late 1960s, the US had lost any interest in genuine SC reform and had joined 
their fellow P5 member the Soviet Union in opposing any type of review or revision to the 
Charter that would jeopardise their unequal rights. 
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 See n 636 below. 
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Although this P5 policy of a frozen Charter continues to date, other member states, taking a 
gradualist approach, did not give up their struggle for Council reforms. 
First, recognising that the review was being delayed, they opted for amendments to the 
Charter under Article 108. In all, four amendments were successfully introduced in the 1960s, 
with modest success. Two related to the increase in the size of the membership of ECOSOC, 
and one, GA Resolution 1991A (XVIII) of 1963, increased the membership of the Council 
from 11 to 15. The fourth Charter amendment was of no significance, and was in fact a 
technical amendment to correct an oversight when the resolution on the expansion of the 
Council was adopted (although the occurrence of the error and the travaux leading to 
adoption of its corrective amendment are relevant and significant to this thesis).611 
$QDO\VLQJWKHLPSDFWRIVWDWHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDWWKH&RXQFLOLQTXDQWLWDWLYHWHUPV5HVROXWLRQ
1991A (XVIII) increased the SC membership ratio from 11 out of 51 States in 1945, to 15 out 
of 117 states in 1965 (based on membership ratifications for that year)²in other words, a 
GURSIURPDSHUFHQWUDWHRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDWWKHWLPHRIWKH81¶VIRXQGLQJWRSHUFHQW
after 20 years. Comparing this with the current membership of 193 states, the figure appears 
even worse, with only 8 per cent of member states being represented at the Council as of 
2014.612 
7KHIDFWWKDWWKHDPHQGPHQWGLGQRWUHPRYHDQ\RIWKHSHUPDQHQWPHPEHUV¶XQHTXDO
privileges, coupled with the actual reduction in proportional representation of the member 
states compared with the 1945 ratios, seems to have represented a step backward. However, 
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 See Chapter 7, Section 7.7. 
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 The historical membership data is extracted from the UN site: http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml, 
accessed 30 October 2014. This dismal figure looks better when populations are taken into account. For 





travaux and agreements, as well as the fact that weaker states were able to get the amendment 
ratified despite the expressed opposition of some of the P5, perhaps this revision can be 
considered a modest achievement.  
The intransigence of some of the P5, if not all, regarding Council-related changes that might 
jeopardise their privileges, coupled with the requirement of a two-thirds majority and 
concurrence of all the P5 (non-application of the veto) for bringing an amendment into force, 
seems to have been the main reason why, since the late 1960s, and for almost 50 years, there 
have not been any further formal attempts, under either Article 108 or 109, to amend the 
Charter. 
With the US, as the main potential change agent in the UN, joining Russia in opting for the 
status quo, and being the main force in putting the adopted Article 109(3) Charter review 
process into hibernation in 1967, it would appear that achieving the reformed UN that 
seemingly everybody wants has become a frustrating experience and an elusive goal.  
,QWKHODVW\HDUVPHPEHUVWDWHV¶81UHIRUPHIIRUWVKDYHQRt been conducted in a united 
fashion, but have been fragmented, apparently diverging in different directions. These reform 
initiatives have taken the form of multiple and sometimes parallel efforts, often lasting many 
years (with some lasting decades), and ZLWKRXWFKDOOHQJLQJWKH3¶VXQHTXDOSULYLOHJHV
constitutively. On the other hand, the permanent members, while paying lip service and 
lending passive support, have become more entrenched in their foreign-policy resolve to 
prevent any reforms that would diminish their exclusive and superior powers.  
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For example, the tactic of some of the P5, if not all²and particularly that of the US²has 
EHHQWRDOORZUHIRUPHIIRUWVLQWHUPVRIPXOWLSOH³VSHFLDO´DQG³RSHQ-HQGHG´HQGOHVV81
committees and forums to operate, but to make sure that the terms of reference of these 
bodies do not include Charter amendment or review. Thus, any reform efforts have been 
effectively sterilised.613 
To illustrate the development and adoption of this seemingly intentional P5 strategy in 
derailing Council reform efforts, a few examples will be cited, beginning from the time the 
review process was put into hibernation.  
In 1969, the weaker states, on the initiative of Colombia, and still being under the impression 
that a review conference XQGHU$UWLFOHZDVLPPLQHQWSODFHGWKH³1HHGWRFRQVLGHU
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 2QHRIWKHVH³RSHQ-HQGHG´IRUXPVLQDGGLWLRQWRWKH³VSHFLDO´FRPPLWWHHVDQG³High-/HYHO´SDQHOVDQG
some regular GA sessions which take up the subject of Council reform, is the Open-ended Working Group to 
consider all aspects of the question of increase of the membership of the Security Council and other matters 
related to the Security Council, created by GA Resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993. Five years after the 
adoption of this resolution, in 1998, the GA decided that any decision relating to the Working Group would 
need to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of all the member states (General Assembly Documentation Center 
1946-2015): A/RES/53/30.  
 
However, in a later adoption of the decision-making procedures of the working group, the text of the adopted 
YRWLQJSURFHGXUHVUHIHUUHGWREHLQJ³PLQGIXORI&KDSWHU;9,,,´DQGWKHUHIRUHDGRSWLQJDPHWKRGRI³JHQHUDO
DJUHHPHQW´ZKLFKPLJKWEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVFRQVHQVXV2ULIXVLQJWKHH[DFW&KDUWHU&KDSWHU;9,,,UXOHVWKHQ
the procedure can be interpreted as requiring a two-thirds PDMRULW\DQGWKH³FRQFXUUHQFH´RIWKH3,QHLWKHU
FDVHWKLVZRXOGPHDQQRGHFLVLRQZLWKRXWWKH3¶VFRQVHQVXVZKHUHDVQR*$GHFLVLRQRUWKDWRIRQHRILWV
committees, such as the working group, is normally subject to the veto. One can only conclude that the P5 
strategy in advocating this formula was, most likely, either to confuse the member states on their voting rights, 
or, perhaps, to warn them that their decisions will eventually be subject to the veto. (Open-ended Working 
Group to consider all aspects of the question of increase of the membership of the Security Council and other 
matters related to the Security Council 2008): A/AC.247. 
 
Lastly, when it comes to the dynamics of Charter reform, the pattern that seems to be repeating is circular in 
motion with no forward thrust. The P5 hypocritically seem to cooperate and participate in a multitude of parallel 
reform committees and forums, and then, by threatening the use of their veto card, push these committees to 
consensus decision, which means standstill and inaction. Then, after many years of frustrating attempts, member 
states give up and search for other forums or revert back to the plenary of the GA for discussion and guidance. 







The GA, and especially its Sixth Committee (Legal Committee), took up the subject in 1970, 
1972 and JDWKHULQJWKHPHPEHUVWDWHV¶YLHZVRQWKHHVVHQFHDQGW\SHRI&KDUWHU
revisions needed.614  
In 1974, the work of the GA and its Sixth Committee, through the adoption of GA Resolution 
3349, was delegated to a newly formed committee, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of 
the United Nations7KHUHVROXWLRQ¶VRSHUDWLYHWH[WLQSDUDJUDSK&HPSRZHUHGWKHAd hoc 
Committee to consider all kinds of Charter matters and UN reform suggestions, but, 
SDUDGR[LFDOO\RQO\DVORQJDVWKH\ZRXOG³QRWUHTXLUHDPHQGPHQWVWRWKH&KDUWHU´615 A year 
later, in 1975, the GA created another committee under the title of the Special Committee on 
the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organisation 
with the same mandate as the Ad hoc Committee: in other words, with the stated objective of 
changing and reforming the UN, but without amending and changing the Charter.616 Where 
did this contradiction in intent and terms come from? 
In the case of the US, starting in the late 1960s, at the time of the Nixon administration, the 
US State Department, under Henry Kissinger, had adopted an anti-Charter-revision policy. In 
WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VYLHZ as a long term strategy was conveyed to Congress for 
backing and was adopted in the House Concurrent Resolution 206 of the 94th Congress. It 
was also included in the final recommendation of the Subcommittee on International 
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 (Office of Legal Affairs, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supplement 5, Articles 108 and 
109 1970-1978): 196. 
615
 Ibid: 196-197. See also (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015): A/RES/3349. 
616
 See n 614 above. In fact, by examining the 2013 year-end report of the Special Committee, it becomes 
DSSDUHQWWKDWWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VPDLQDFWLYLW\ZDVUHODWHGWR³assistance to third States affected by the application 
of sanctions under Chapter VII´²hardly related to UN reform (Special Committee on the Charter of the United 
Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization 2014). 
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Organisations of the House of Representatives, of 26 November 1975. Since then, the general 
policy of the US on UN reform has effectively EHHQWRVXSSRUW³UHIRUPVZKLFKGRQRWUHTXLUH
&KDUWHUUHYLVLRQV´617 
The *$¶V Special Committee has met every year for the past 40 years, but since its decisions 
are made on a consensus basis, and its terms of reference exclude Charter amendment 
proposals, WKLVKDVPDGHWKHUHIRUPRIWKH&RXQFLO¶VGHILFLWVYLDWKDWIRUXPYLUWXDOO\
impossible.618 
It therefore seems that UN reform efforts of the new millennium, without being formally 
channeled through constitutive changes (Articles 108 or 109), remain similar to reform 
efforts of previous decades²mostly just a wish-list.  
To illustrate the way in which a Council reform proposal, once it becomes serious and gains 
momentum, is frustrated by the P5, the latest S5 effort is described.  
Paul Seger, the head of the Swiss Mission to the UN, headed the S5-initiated GA draft 
UHVROXWLRQWRUHIRUPWKH6&¶VZRUNLQJPHWKRGVLQFOXGLQJEORFNLQJWKHYHWRLQ53W\SH
circumstances. This collective effort was one of the more recent casualties in the dead-end 
path to democratisation of the Council. 
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 The US 94th Congress, the Question of UN Charter Review, report by the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, 26 November 1975, the US House of 
Representatives; (Subcommittee on International Organizations 1975): 5-7. For a relatively recent reaffirmation 
DQGSROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQWKDWWKH&RXQFLOH[SDQVLRQGRHVQRWVHUYHWKH86¶VDQGLQGHHd, the P5s interests, 
and that the status quo should be maintained, by a semi-governmental think tank, see the special report by the 
Council on Foreign Affairs: the UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interest, 2010; (McDonald and 
Stewart 2010): 12-18. 
618
 (Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the 
Organization 2014). Despite the existence of other SC reform forums and the Working Group, and in addition to 
GA resolution-type activities on the subject, the Special Committee has at least twice in the past (in a case raised 
by Cuba and another case initiated by Libya) explicitly considered SC reform proposals, without any decisions; 
(Office of Legal Affairs, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supplement 10, Articles 108 and 109 
2000-2009): Para. 5-11. 
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Seger withdrew the draft resolution just before it was put to the vote, on 16 May 2012, and 
made a frank statement to the Assembly. The S5 draft, which apparently had the support of 
close to 100 member states, had been withdrawn, Seger complained, primarily because of the 
³ZUDQJOLQJ´DQGWKHSUHVVXUHWKH\ZHUHIDFLQJIURPWKH3ZKLFKLQFOXGHGSXWWLQJ³FRPSOH[
DQGFRQIXVLQJ´OHJDOURDGEORFNVLQWKHLUZD\VKRXOGWKH\GHFLGHWRJRDKHDGZLWKWKH
resolution.619 A disappointed Seger then said that, while they would continue to work with 
the P5 on the issue, reforming the Council was a work in progress, or rather, as he put it, a 
³ZRUNQRWLQSURJUHVV´620 
9.1.2. Leave the Treaty, or Renegotiate and Constitutionalise? 
Recognising that the permanent members of the SC are unrelenting in maintaining their 
exclusive power at the UN, and in view of their unwillingness to accommodate gradual 
democratisation of the Council, what then are the legal options for the member states? 
One radical option for states might be to leave the Charter (treaty) and either join other 
multilateral functional economic and collective security arrangements or enter into a new 
UN-type of global treaty arrangement, giving the P5 the option of acceding in a more equal 
setting.  
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 See n 608 above. 
620
 (Meeting Coverage and Press Release: Sixty-sixth General Assembly 2012). For another first-hand 
H[SHULHQFHRIWKHIUXVWUDWLRQVRIGHDOLQJZLWKWKH3DWWKH81DQGWKH3¶VXQUHOHQWLQJDSDUWKHLGVWDWXVVHHWKH
relatively recent book by the ex-President of the Security Council from Singapore, Kishore Mahbubani, who 
states that the P5 regard the non-permanents DV³WRXULVWs´ and that all of the P5 are united in their 
uncompromising stand on Council changes² ³WRWDOFRQWUROLVZKDWWKH\VHHN´(Mahbubani 2013): 232. See 
also n 762 below. The disappointment of member states and NGO advocates in not achieving a democratic UN 
and Council is further aggravated by the fact that many of the UN lawyers and scholars, by referring to the 
applicability of the veto to even Charter amendments, also argue that the Charter is frozen. For example, 
/RUDLQH6LHYHUVDQG6DP'DZVXVLQJWKHVDPHUHDVRQLQJDUJXHWKDWLWLVXQOLNHO\WKDWWKH³&RXQFLOZLOOHYHUEH




As the Charter does not have a withdrawal provision, leaving it may be easier said than done. 
%DVHGRQWKHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHU¶VDUJXPHQWVRQWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHZDU-time Charter, and 
based on the customary International law prohibition of the threat of use of force in 
concluding treaties that predates the Charter (from the time of the 1928 Paris Pact) ²as well 
as the coercion tests modelled on the Vienna Convention guidelines that point to the apparent 
defects in the conclusion of the UN Charter²why not propose the invalidity and termination 
of the Charter? HoweverWKLVPD\LPSO\WKH³ULSSLQJ´the instrument. 
In fact, the physical act of ripping up the Charter in front of member states was first 
performed by Senator Connally at San Francisco, in 1945, and, more recently, was carried out 
by Muammar Gaddafi during his 2009 speech to the Assembly.621 These symbolic (or 
belligerent) gestures, of course, represented two completely opposing views²the necessity 
versus the fairness²in submission to the SC with its existing structure and voting procedure.  
In addition to the problem of procedural indeterminacy in contesting the validity of the 
Charter, there are at least two other substantive reasons to avoid this approach. First, many 
more states have joined the UN since it was founded²presumably of their own free will. 
Current UN membership stands at 193, whereas the original founding members amounted to 
51. This is almost a four-fold increase, with 142 new states having acceded to the Charter 
since 1945. 
Of course, it cRXOGEHDUJXHGWKDWWKHJUHDWPDMRULW\RIWKHVHVWDWHV¶DFFHVVLRQVZHUHLQ
fact instances of existential actions on the part of newly born states: that they had broken 
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 2Q6HQDWRU&RQQDOO\¶VXQFRPSURPLVLQJVWDQFHRQWKHYHWRVHH&KDSWHU6HFWLRQ,QWKHFDVHRI
Gaddafi, while criticising the SC structure and its voting rules, he also likened the permanent members to an Al 
Qaida-OLNH³WHUURULVW´JDQJhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/23/gaddafi-un-speech; accessed 26 
October 2014. Two years later, in October 2011, the rebels against his dictatorship, aided by Council resolutions 
(under Chapter VII), captured and killed Gaddafi²without a trial while in captivity. 
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away from their colonisers and were acting under duress, and that legitimising their 
independence and that of their regimes was the main cause of their rush for UN recognition. 
Turning to the original 51 state founders of the Charter, in Table 2 of Chapter 8, it was shown 
that at least 27 states out of the original 46 (excluding the P5) or 59 per cent in attendance at 
San Francisco were acting under duress, because their foreign-policy decisions were under 
the influence of one or more of the P5. Indeed, the depositing of the US ratification of the 
Charter between the two nuclear bomb attacks on Japan, before any other state had expressed 
its final consent by ratification, was an act that placed all the other non-permanent member 
states under duress. This would bring the total to 46 states, as the original signatories, that 
could claim invalidity of the Charter on coercion grounds.  
Therefore, excluding the colonial-states argument, and assuming that all the other 142 UN 
member states that have acceded to the Charter have done so freely, it can be concluded that 
the possible claim for the ChaUWHU¶VLQYDOLGLW\LVOLPLWHGWRWKHIRXQGLQJPHPEHUV
Consequently, in the hypothetical case of legal pursuits, this, if successful, could lead to 
possible withdrawal of a certain number of UN member states rather than the dissolution of 
the Charter. 
However, there is a second and more overarching reason why the route of invalidating the 
Charter should be avoided. Considering the pivotal role the UN plays in global governance, 
and all the good things the UN system and its related organs do, the notion of invalidating the 
Charter, and its suspension or dissolution, even if only temporary and until another UN-like 
institution is formed, seems at best chaotic, and at worst catastrophic.622 Even temporary 






LQWHUUXSWLRQRIWKH81DQGLWVVSHFLDOLVHGDJHQFLHV¶ZRUNVand services would be 
intolerable.623  
If the path of pursuing Charter invalidity is neither feasible nor desirable, then what is the 
alternative? 
Frederic Megret, in his Commentary related to The Declaration on the Prohibition of 
Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, reminds us that 
QXOOLILFDWLRQRIWUHDWLHVEDVHGRQFRHUFLRQLVDGUDVWLFVWHSDQGWKDWPRVW³XQHTXDOWUHDWLHV´
particularly in the areas of economic, trade, or financial agreements, have, in the past, been 
renegotiated rather than invalidated.624   
If Charter renegotiation is the remedy for substantive UN reform and achievement of the 
normative objectives of constitutionalism mentioned in Chapter 1, the end product of its 
review and renegotiation, regardless of the extent of revisions, would, once presumably freely 
adopted by the member states inherently have the implied benefit of removing the Charter 
legitimacy deficiency mentioned earlier. This would be because, presumably, the injured 
original founding states would then have a chance, at the renegotiation, to freely recommit 
                                                 
and conceptual assessment of the positive global impact of the UN, see Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij and 
Thomas Weiss, UN Ideas That Changed the World (Jolly, Emmerij and Weiss 2009). For a negative (and 
somewhat bizarre) view of the UN, not generally accepted, but shared by some of the conservatives in the US, 
see Nathan Tabor, The Beast on the East River, WKH817KUHDWWR$PHULFD¶VSovereignty and Security. Endorsed 
E\6HQDWRU-HVVH+HOPVWKLVERRNRQLWVFRYHUVWDWHVWKDWLWLVDERXWWKH81¶V ³UXWKOHVVDWWHPSWWRFRQWURO86
HGXFDWLRQODZJXQRZQHUVKLSWD[DWLRQDQGUHSURGXFWLYHULJKWV´ (Tabor 2006).  
623
 Although even a temporary suspension of the 81¶VRSHUDWLRQ would, from day one, most likely negatively 
LPSDFWKXQGUHGVRIPLOOLRQVRIOLYHV+RZHYHUZKHQLWFRPHVWRWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRI³SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´ZLWK
the exception of some of the areas where peacekeeping missions are deployed, a world without the UN, 
probably in the short term, would not have that much of an adverse effect. With the UN side-lined, and the 
Council dysfunctional and incapable of dealing with many armed conflicts²and, on the other hand, mutual 
deterrence and the balance of destructive power inherent in the MAD doctrine, and all the different military 
alliances in place²a world without the UN would probably not be that different. 
624
 (Megret 2011): 1868-1869. 
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themselves to the Charter, regardless of the extent of any changes, and therefore this would 
VHUYHDVWKHUHDIILUPDWLRQRIWKH81¶VFRQVWLWXWLYHLQVWUXPHQW 
With review and revision being desirable, but considering the failures of UN reform attempts 
in the past (mostly under the shadow of the veto), the principal question then becomes how to 
facilitate the member states and the P5 to come together in one forum to in effect renegotiate 
the Charter.  
However, before exploring the feasibility of conducting a Charter review and revision 
SURFHVVZKLFKLQHIIHFWZRXOGOHDGWRWKH&KDUWHU¶VUHQHJRWLDWLRQDQGSRVVLEO\WKH
constitutionalisation of the UN²and before examining some of the legal strategies that may 
initiate such a process²I will first briefly expand on some of the constitutional ideals and 
principles highlighted in Chapter 1 which should be normatively applied to the UN system. 
9.2. Constitutionalisation of the Charter and International Law: Concepts 
Constitutionalisation was defined, in short, as the supreme legal order, with the necessary 
structures and primary and secondary rules to achieve its constitutional ideals, and was 
further characterised as a cognitive process with gradations and degrees.625 
UN constitutionalisation, even if feasible, is unlikely to happen in one Charter review 
conference which may turn into a constitutional convention. The UN constitutionalisation 
process most likely would take an evolutionary dialectical path, and, moreover, as a 
construct, must have a set of ideals it sets out to accomplish, and must have at least an 
LPSOLFLWEHJLQQLQJRU³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOPRPHQW´ 
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Furthermore, it is recognised that, at any UN constitutional conference, the forum itself 
would ultimately decide on the features and the degree of constitutionalism it may adopt.  
However, based on the experiences of working domestic constitutions, particularly those of 
the federal systems or the supranational regional models, I have attempted to identify the 
grand constitutional features and ideals required in any UN constitutionalisation attempt. 
These are presented below.  
 Democracy (or Demoi-cracy) 
,QYLHZRIJOREDOLVDWLRQ¶V³GH-FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ´HIIHFWRQIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVDQG
domestic constitutional processes,626as well as the demonstrated legislative and judicial 
decisions of the SC and some other international law regimes that directly affect individuals 
and non-state actors, it becomes apparent that removing the democratic deficit in 
international law and governance must be the primary objective of a constitutionalised UN. 
7KLVZLOOUHTXLUHDSDUDGLJPVKLIWIURP³VRYHUHLJQW\RIVWDWHV´WR³VRYHUHLJQW\RISHRSOHV´,Q
RWKHUZRUGVDVKLIWIURPWKH:HVWSKDOLDQFRQFHSWRIVWDWHV¶ULJKWVWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶ULJKWV
similar to all democracies, and towards the recognition of global citizens as the subjects and 
objects of law.627 
This was exactly the European path taken in transforming the European Economic 
Community into the EU. The treaties establishing the Community were essentially concluded 
by sovereign states. This was helped by the constitutional jurisprudence of the landmark Van 
Gend en Loos decision, which recognised peoples as well as states as subjects of Community 
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law, and represented a turning SRLQWWKDWUHVXOWHGLQWKHODZKDYLQJ³GLUHFWHIIHFW´RQQDWXUDO
persons in the EU. 628  
6LPLODUO\DVZLWKWKH(8OHJDORUGHUDQGLWVFRPSHWHQFHVDQGWKHVWDWHV¶FRQFHSWRIshared 
sovereignty, UN member states have also, in cases of Chapter VII decisions, limited their 
VRYHUHLJQULJKWVDQGVXEPLWWHGWRWKH6&¶VFRPSHWHQFHV$QGVLPLODUWRWKH(87UHDW\WKH
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 The European Court of Justice in its 1963 ruling stated: 
 
[T]his Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the 
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to 
governments but to peoples. «The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for 
the benefits of which the states have limited their sovereign right, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States, but also their nationals. Independently of the 
legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals 
but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. [Emphasis 
added.] 
 
 (Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62 1963): Sect. B-On the 
substance of the Case, at 12.  
In Van Gend en Loos, the Court recognised and further framed the (r)evolution that had started to occur in 
traditional international law in two substantive respects: first, that EU law had formed a new sovereign legal 
order; and, secondly, that, through the application of the direct effect doctrine, EU citizens had now been 
granted new direct supranational rights. See (Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2010): 15-16, 268-271; and also 
(Weiler, Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and object and the dilemma of European legitimacy 
2014): 94-103. 
In fact, there was a precedent to Van Gend en Loos in traditional international law in terms of the recognition of 
individual rights and the direct effect doctrine. This was the advisory opinion issued in 1928 by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in a case involving individual claims by citizens of the Free City of Danzig 
against the state of Poland. In Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, the Court, while 
acknowledging that there was ³DZHOO-established principle of international law that an international agreement 
DVVXFKKDVQRGLUHFWHIIHFWV´, further recognised that ³the situation may be different if such be the intention of 
the Parties.´(Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig 1928): 17. For online access, see http://www.icj-
cij.org/pcij/serie_B/B_15/01_Competence_des_tribunaux_de_Danzig_Avis_consultatif.pdf . 
The PCIJ opinion further added that (ibid: 17-18):  
 
 [T]he very object of an international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting Parties, 
may be the adoption by the Parties of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and 
enforceable by the national courts.  
  
Although there is some disagreement as to the exact interpretation of the opinion, nevertheless, most legal 
scholars, including Judge Schwebel and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, concur that the Danzig opinion was the 
departure point for the exclusivity of states in having rights in international law, and the beginning of the 




of the Courts of Danzig 1928): 18. 
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81&KDUWHUUHFRJQLVHV³ZHWKHSHRSOHV´LQLWVSUHDPEOH629 In the EU context, with a Van 
Gend en loos type of interpretation by the highest European court, this was one of the main 
IDFWRUVLQFRQILUPLQJULJKWV³QRWRQO\WRJRYHUQPHQWVEXW>DOVR@WRWKHSHRSOHV´630 In fact, the 
UN Charter implicitly grants rights to global citizens, not only in its preamble but also in the 
other parts of the Charter, including in Chapters IX and X, relating to ECOSOC.631  
Therefore, what empowers people in a democratic framework is not just being objects of law 
but also being able to make laws, directly or through representation, and ultimately being able 




The UN constitutionalisation goal of global democracy should in effect be the paradigm shift 
IURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZRIVRYHUHLJQVWDWHVWRVRYHUHLJQJOREDOSHRSOHVWKH³KXPDQLVDWLRQ´RI
international law.633 This empoZHUPHQWRIWKHZRUOG¶VFLWL]HQVVKRXOGGLOXWHWKHVWDWHV¶
PRQRSRO\RQLQWHUQDWLRQDOQRUPJHQHUDWLRQDVZHOODVPLWLJDWHSRZHUIXOVWDWHV¶DUELWUDU\
application of the rule of law, by giving global peoples material and direct access to 
international law-making.  
                                                 
629
 (Charter of the United Nations 1945-2015): Preamble. 
630
 See n 628 above. 
631
 For references to some of the mostly implied human, social and economic rights in the Charter, see the 
³IXQGDPHQWDODQGKXPDQULJKWV´VHFWLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHU 
632
 (Weiler, Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and object and the dilemma of European legitimacy 
2014): 100; and Phillippe Schmitter and Karl Lynn, What Democracy IV« and Is Not, in ibid: n 16. 
633




That said, the injection of democracy into international law, and making global citizens the 
law-makers, does not imply that states will disappear anytime soon. Rather, it is that the 
governance of the UN, and international law, will be shouldered jointly, as a responsibility of 
both states and peoples, similar to the EU-type supranational or federal models of 
governments. 
:LWKWKLV³JOREDOGHPRFUDF\´GLVFRXUVHDPRUHGHVFULSWLYHWHUPWRXVHLQRXU81
constitutionalisation model here is the notion of ³GHPRL-FUDF\´7KLVLVLQUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKH
plurality of the global demos, and the dual character of the global community²that is, in the 
global democracy being proposed, the demoi-FUDF\RI³ERWKVWDWHVSHRSOHVDQGLQGLYLGXDOV
in a common supranationaOSROLW\´ZRXOGMRLQWO\JRYHUQWKHZRUOG634 
Parliamentary Representation  
With representation and accountability being the main pillars of GHPRV¶power, these pillars 
would still hold in the global and multitude form of demoi-cracy. In domestic governance 
models, these two principles have been grounded in the creation of parliaments and the 
election of governments. 
Similarly, in the global context, the establishment of a global parliament is the substantive 
component of global constitutionalisation. In other words, for global citizens to be 
represented by electing a global government freely, and holding that government responsible, 
                                                 
634
 On demoi-cracy mostly in the EU context, see (Cheneval, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2014): 1-18;  
For Cheneval et al: 
,QDµGHPRL-FUDF\¶VHSDUDWHVWDWHV-peoples enter into a political arrangement and jointly exercise 
political authority. Its proper domain is a polity of democratic states with hierarchical, majoritarian 
features of policy-making, especially in value-laden redistributive and coercive policy areas, but 
without a unified political community (demos). Ibid: 1. 




and being able to change it when it is not performing, is ultimately when the requirements of 
global representation and accountability are fulfilled.635 
In the US²the main creator of the UN²the idea of a world union and a representative world 
government was popular and had significant public backing as well as politicians drive 
during the 1940s.636 The creation of the UN, during 1941 to 1945, in fact took a short 
GLDOHFWLFSDWKIURPWKH6WDWH'HSDUWPHQW¶VILUVWGHVLJQVZKHUHWKHUHZHUHSURSRVDOVIRU
minimal world government, to suggestions of an exclusively collective security pact between 
states, to the re-injection of some social, economic, and human rights ideals at Dumbarton 
Oaks, which were reinforced in San Francisco. These economic and social concepts, coupled 
with governance concepts of majority decision-making and shared sovereignty, eroded the 
VWDWHV¶DEVROXWHVRYHUHLJQW\DQG resulted in the quasi-world governmental organisation 
created at the end of the San Francisco Conference.637  
                                                 
635
 $FFRUGLQJWR:HLOHU¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKH(8¶VGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLW²which is partially countered by the 
constitutional jurisprudential activism of the ECJ²the non-existence of a fully formed government, with an 
elected executive branch and a parliament with sufficient powers WRGRLWVMREDQGZKLFKFDQEHµWKURZQRXW¶LI
not performing, is exactly the core cause of the democratic deficit and WKH³GDUNVLGH´of the Union, thereby 
causing Weiler to rethink the necessity for a European state. (Weiler, Van Gend en Loos: The individual as 
subject and object and the dilemma of European legitimacy 2014):100-103. 
636
 During the decade 1940 to 1950, popular books promoting political integration and world union, such as 
&ODUHQFH6WUHLW¶VUnion Now(PHU\5HDYHV¶Anatomy of Peace and Wendell Wilkie¶VOne World, were best 
sellers, with the latter work selling two million copies. The American NGO the United World Federalist had 
over 100,000 members and was fully supported by scientists such as Albert Einstein, artists and musicians, such 
as the composer Oscar Hammerstein, and scholars and philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell. 
 
At the political level, 22 US states had adopted legislative resolutions or proclamations expressing their 
willingness to be part of a world federal government, including the state of California. In Congress, there were a 
number of draft resolutions and hearings on UN Charter review and reform, including the House Concurrent 
Resolutions, HCR-59, 1948, and HCR-64, 1949. While the text of HCR-64 was asking the US Administration to 
UHIRUPWKH81LWVVWDWHGREMHFWLYHZDVWRWXUQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQLQWRD³ZRUOGIHGHUDWLRQ´ This unsuccessful 
resolution had nearly 110 congressional supporters, including John F. Kennedy. The most detailed accounts on 
the above are in the two-volume series by Joseph Baratta, The Politics of World Federation (Baratta, The 
Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to Global Governance 2004). See also (Baratta, The 
Politics of World Federation: United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control 2004). See also (Weiss, Thinking 
about Global Governance: Why People and Ideas Matter 2011): 66-86; and also (wittner 2013); and (Cabrera 
2011): 3-6. 
637




In that period, the last significant formal political drives to turn the UN into a representative 
union and create a UN parliament, before the movement was frozen by the Cold War, were, 
in the UK, a proposal by Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin to the House of Commons in 
November 1945,638 and, in the US, the House Concurrent Resolution HCR-64 of 1949 
(Senate equivalent, Res. SCR-56), which attracted 111 Congressional signatories, including 
the future Presidents John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford.639 
In academia, the last significant attempt to propose the constitutionalisation of international 
law and the establishment of a world parliament, in the 1940s and 1950s, was the University 
of Chicago project involving a prominent group of scholars in the Committee to Frame a 
World ConstitutionDQG*UHQYLOOH&ODUNDQG/RXLV6RKQ¶VZRUNRQHVWDEOLVKLQJD81
parliament by means of Charter revisions in World Peace Through World Law.640 
More recently, Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have argued for a global parliament and, 
more specifically, have examined four models: 1) as an advisory body to the UN²created by 
civil society and eminent persons; 2) as a parliamentary assembly and advisory body to the 
UN²created under Article 22, as a subsidiary of the Assembly; 3) as a separate and 
                                                 
638
 On the recommendation to the House of Commons by the UK Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, of the 
IHDVLELOLW\RI³FUHDWLQJDZRUOGDVVHPEO\HOHFWHGGLUHFWO\IURPWKHSHRSOHRIWKHZRUOG´VHH (Childers 2011): 32. 
639
 On the related US Congressional Resolutions, see (Baratta, The Politics of World Federation: From World 
Federalism to Global Governance 2004): 357-358, 461-462, 578. See also (Baratta, The Politics of World 
Federation: United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control 2004): 3-4; and (Center for Legislative Archives 
(USA)-Committee on Foreign Relations 1947-1968). See also a more extensive list of draft resolutions before 
the Senate on United Nations, including SCR-56, in the Digital Collections of the University of Wisconsin: 
(University of Wisconsin Digital Collection 1950). 
640
 On the University of Chicago efforts, between 1945 and 1950, see (Weiss, Thinking about Global 
Governance: Why People and Ideas Matter 2011): 66-86. On Harvard University Law Professor, Louis Sohn, 
and former legal advisor to President Roosevelt, Grenville Clark, and their comprehensive UN reform proposals, 
including turning the GA into a parliament and the SC into an executive council, see their 1958 book World 
Peace through World Law (Grenville and Sohn 1958). For more recent efforts and a proposal for a Constitution 




competent binding organ of the UN²created with revisions and amendments to the Charter; 
and 4) as a separate treaty with formal links to the UN.641 
Although there have been no significant political proposals sponsored by states in favour of a 
global parliament, individual politicians have joined civil society in establishing the 
Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA). Since the start of the campaign in 
2007, it has attracted the support of former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
and been endorsed by over 700 current and 600 former global parliamentarians.642  
There are currently close to 40 parliamentary assemblies acting as advisory bodies to 
international functional and regional organisations. One such entity, the European 
Parliamentary Assembly, which was initially an advisory-only body of the EEC, took the 
transformational path of becoming the European Parliament in 1979.643 Since then, the MEPs 
have been elected by direct universal suffrage. The legislative role of the Parliament, very 
limited at first, has significantly increased over the last 30 years.644 
                                                 
641
 (Strauss and Andrew 2007): 347-359, esp. 357. See also (Falk and Strauss, On the Creation of a Global 
Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty 2000); (Falk, What Comes After 
Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge 2007); and (Falk and Strauss, Give citizens a voice 2008). 
642
 (Peters, Dual Democracy 2011): 324-6HHDOVR813$¶VZHEVLWHIRUWKHODWHVWSDUOLDPHQWDULDQV¶VXSSRUW 
http://en.unpacampaign.org/index.php, accessed 26 November 2014. 
643
 (Levi, Introduction 2014): Vii and 7-24. 
644
 (Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2010): 81-88. 
According to the official EU websites, the EU Parliament has 751 members representing 500 million citizens. 
7KH(8¶VIRXQGDWLRQDQGIXQFWLRQLQJLVEDVHGRQWZRSULQFLSDOWUHDWLHV, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The latest review and revision to these two 
treaties is commonly referred to as the Lisbon Treaty, which has been in force since 2009. Article 13 of the TEU 
designates the seven main institutions of the EU, among them the three main law-making bodies of the 
European Parliament, the Council of the EU (formerly the Council of Ministers), and the European 
Commission. The other four EU institutions have no direct law-making competency, including the European 
Council (consisting of heads of state or government), which, according to Article 15 of the TEU, is charged with 
SURYLGLQJ³LPSHWXV´DQGVHWWLQJSULRULWLHVIRUWKH(8DQG³VKDOOQRWH[HUFLVHDQ\OHJLVODWLYHIXQFWLRQV´ 
 
Therefore, of the three EU institutions which are jointly responsible for making most EU law, the Commission 
can only initiate legislation, and the EU Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU must both jointly adopt the 
final text before it EHFRPHVODZ7KHYDVWPDMRULW\RIWKH(8¶VOHJLVODWLRQLVRIWKH³RUGLQDU\´W\SHZKLFK
UHTXLUHVWKLV³FR-GHFLVLRQ´SURFHGXUHRIERWKWKH(3¶VDQGWKH&RXQFLO¶VFRQFXUUHQFHRQDQHTXDOIRRWLQJ7KHUH
DUHVRPHH[FHSWLRQVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³VSHFLDO´OHJLVOative procedures (such as taxation), that require only the 
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The UN system, however, has never had a parliamentary assembly in any capacity and, by 
virtue of its 1945 design, lacks its own parliament. Therefore, any attempt at UN 
constitutionalisation, in its initial stages, should include some type of popular representation 
with some degree of decision-making and binding effect.645  
                                                 
&RXQFLO¶VGHFLVLRQWREHDGRSWHG+RZHYHULQDOOWKHVSHFLDOFDVHVWKH(3PXVWEHFRQVXOWHGDQGLQVRPH
instances the favourable opinion of the Parliament is obligatory. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, in addition to reinforcing the equal footing of the EU Parliament and the Council; 
strengthening the co-decision process; and further expanding the types and scope of the legislative powers of the 
EP, has also significantly increased the indirect law-making powers of the parliament, including by requiring the 
(3¶Vconsent to be given to the appointment of the European Commission members and to the election of the 
President of the Commission, as well as giving it the right to propose changes to the treaty, and to give consent 
on most types of international treaties and agreements. 
 
In terms of the democratisation of the EU supranational government, in tandem with the Lisbon Treaty, and 
effective from 2012, was the introduction of the concept of direct democracy through the European Citizens' 
Initiative (ECI). This empowers EU citizens, based on the main criterion of collecting a minimum of one million 
signatures from citizens of at least a quarter of the EU member states, to appeal to the European Commission (as 
well as the EP) to propose legislation on matters WKDWIDOOZLWKLQWKH(8¶VOHJLVODWLYHFRPSHWHQFH. Noteworthy, 
for the analysis of the legal means of holding the UN Charter Review, later in this chapter, the European 
&LWL]HQV¶,QLWLDWLYH although not in the scope of this thesis, might be a viable initiative, that if successful could 
potentially give a direct peoples voice in addition to the will of the EU states in requesting the Review. 
 
The references for all the material in this footnote, in addition to (Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2010) cited 
above, are from the following official EU sources: the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN; 
the description of the EU institutions and their functions, including the EP: EUR-Lex, http://eur-




 Granted that any type of concrete attempt to parliamentalize the UN will face many questions and challenges, 
both in theory and practice, two material questions are: How to qualify a majority decision at the parliament? 
And: What to do with the non-democratic member states? 
 
As to how to account for states with large populations (such as China and India, with populations of over one 
billion each) and the states with smaller populations (there are even 13 micro states with populations of less than 
100,000 each, such as the Seychelles and Nauru), in determining a balanced voting method, the experience and 
the schemes used in political integration and unions of states can be consulted. In addition to the voting formulas 
being used in practice, in regional and federal models, there are scholarly and NGO proposals on possible future 
voting methods in a democratised UN. For an example of an elaborate population size classification and 
weighted voting scheme, see (Schwartzberg 2013): Chapters 2 and 3.  
For another weighted-voting method that takes the three factors of population, states, and the economic size of 
the states or their contribution to the UN budget into consideration²WKH³ELQGLQJWULDG´VFKHPH²see (in 
French) (Dehaussy 2005): 2226-2228. 
 
$VWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHPHPEHUVWDWHV¶GHJUHHRILQWHUQDOGHPRFUDF\DQGLWVSRVVLEOHDGYHUVHHIIHFW on 
freedom of elections should they participate in the global democracy, based on the objective of universality, 
virtually present in the current UN membership, no willing state should be excluded. The assumption here is that 
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Judicial Order, Review, and Independence 
The judicial branch of the UN, the ICJ, has two major flaws as regards its ability to 
adjudicate contentious cases. First is the defect that ICJ jurisdiction is not compulsory. 
Secondly, without adoption in the Council and P5 concurrence, ICJ decisions cannot be 
enforced. 
The ICJ Statute has no explicit enforcement provisions. Article 59 of the Statute further limits 
the binding judgment of the Court to the parties involved and only to that particular case:646 
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case. 
$VWULFWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$UWLFOHLPSOLHVWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQWFDQQRWEHXVHGDVD
precedent and case-law, and cannot affect or bind third states under similar circumstances.647  
The Charter, on the other hand, in Article 94, provides a possible means of enforcing ICJ 
decisions through Council actions:648 
1. Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decisions of the 
International Court in any case to which it is a party. 
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a 
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon 
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 
Therefore, according to Article 94, compliance with, and enforcement of, ICJ judgments is 
not automatic and is not initiated by the Court. Further, according to paragraph 2 of the 
                                                 
popular elections for a UN parliament would be with the authorisation and the collaboration of the host state, but 
financed, managed, and conducted by the 81DQGWKHUHIRUHLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHKRVWVWDWH¶VLQIOXHQFH 
646
 (Statute of International Court of Justice 1945): Art. 59. 
647
 For an expanded view of Article 59, with ICJ decisions in practice affecting third states, see (Brown, Article 
59 2012): 1416-1446. 
648





enforcement of ICJ judgments political acts, and subject to the veto of the permanent 
members. 649 
At San Francisco, just as they were aware of the shortcomings of the SC, the lesser powers 
were also aware of the flaws of the proposed international court, since nearly 20 states had 
submitted formal amendments for substantive changes to its statute. However, as part of the 
³SDFNDJHGHDO´RIUXOHE\WKH3WKHUHVROXWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHGHIHFWVLQWKH81¶VMXGLFLDO
organ was, as with opposition to the Yalta formula, put off to revisions at a future Charter 
review.650 
Despite its limited jurisdiction, the Court, in its first half-life, enjoyed prominence, and 
presided over a number of significant contentious cases, as well as providing advisory 
opinions. This was partly attributable to Article 36 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the ICJ Statute. 
These proviVLRQVJLYHWKHVWDWHVWKHRSWLRQRIYROXQWDULO\DFFHSWLQJWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ
This option can further be qualified as unconditional or limited, based on reciprocity or 
exceptions.  
                                                 
649
 See also (Tanzi 1995): 571-572. The binding effect of Article 59 was apparently a step backwards from the 
League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), where compliance proceedings 
could have been automatically launched after a PCIJ judgment. (Llamzon 2008): 822, esp. n 38.  
650
 The founding travaux reflect the fact that most of the states at San Francisco in the majority anti-veto camp 
were also in favour of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Nearly 20 states, including Australia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Iran, the Netherlands, Paraguay, the Philippines and Venezuela, had submitted, at the opening of the 
Conference, their formal amendment proposals to the DO document (DO- Chapter VII) with the intention of 
PDNLQJWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQFRPSXOVRU\0DQ\RWKHUVWDWHV at the Conference¶V proceedings and 
commissions, such as Brazil, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Mexico and Turkey, had also expressed views 
along the same lines. Moreover, there were proposals on the independence of the ICJ from the SC on 
enforcement measures, and even on the ,&-¶VRYHUVLJKWUROHwith respect to Council decisions. The source for 
the above is found in various UNCIO volumes. As a quick reference and index of the formal proposals to revise 
WKHVSRQVRULQJJRYHUQPHQWV¶SODQIRUWKH,&-, see (UNCIO - Volume III: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, 
Comments and Proposed Amendments 1945): 669-672. 
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The optional clause was well received in the earlier years of the ICJ¶VRSHUDWLRQDQGDODUJH
number of member states who had confidence in the jurisprudence of the UN made unilateral 
GHFODUDWLRQVDQGDFFHSWHGWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ7KH\LQFOXGHGDOOWKH3ZLWKWKH
exception of the USSR.651 
However, in the second half oIWKH,&-¶VH[LVWHQFHDQXPEHURIVLWXDWLRQVDQGFDVHV
undermined the popularity and utility of the Court. This marginalisation of the Court can 
primarily be attributed to the Council and the role of the P5 in challenging the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ and iWVLQGHSHQGHQFH7KDWLVWRVD\QRWRQO\ZDVWKH,&-¶VMXULVGLFWLRQRSWLRQDOEXW
in contentious cases, the Council showed that, by adopting a SC resolution, it could take over 
MXULVGLFWLRQDQGVWD\³VHL]HG´RIDVLWXDWLRQDQGLQHIIHFWXQGHUPLQHDQGLQWHUUXSWWKH&RXUW¶V
proceedings and judgment. This was illustrated in the Lockerbie case, Libya v. United States, 
1992, and the Bosnia application to the ICJ, in 1993.652  
The international rule of law and UN jurisprudence were further discredited in the Nicaragua 
v. USA case (started in 1984 and concluded in 1986), in which the Court ruled against the US, 
including on the issue of the US having mined Nicaraguan harbours. However, when 
1LFDUDJXDUHTXHVWHG&RXQFLOHQIRUFHPHQWRIWKH,&-¶VMXGJPHQWLWZDVEORFked by the US, 
rendering the ruling without effect. The US also, in 1985, while the case was still in progress, 
                                                 
651
 (Crawford and Grant, International Court of Justice 2008): 195-196. Later, all of the P5, except the UK, 
opted out of WKHRSWLRQDOSURWRFRO7KHQRWLRQRILWEHLQJ³RSWLRQDO´ to be ruled by the law seems²in a rule of 
law sense²something of an oxymoron.  
652
 In the Lockerbie case, the SC, by adopting Res. 748 (1992), mandated that the Council had seized the matter. 
This decision was directed, not only, as usual, to all the member states, EXWDOVRWR³DOOLQWHUQDWLRQDO
RUJDQL]DWLRQV´LQHIIHFWUHTXHVWLQJWKH,&-WRUHIUDLQIURPH[HUFLVLQJMXULVGLFWLRQ (Chesterman, Franck and 
Malone 2008): 101-1057KLVFKDOOHQJHWRWKH,&-¶VMXULVGLFWLRQE\&RXQFLOLQWHUYHQWLRQRFFXUUHGDJDLQLQ




withdrew from the optional clause, leaving the UK as the only permanent member still 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.653  
With WKLVLQGHWHUPLQDF\RIWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQFRXSOHGZLWKLQGHWHUPLQDF\LQWKH
H[HFXWLRQRILWVMXGJPHQWVWKH&RXUW¶VSRSXODULW\DQGWKHUHODWLYHKDQGOLQJRIFRQWHQWLRXV
cases has declined in recent decades.654 
7KH81¶VFXUUHQWMXGLFLDOV\VWHPGHVSLWHWhe existence of the ICJ, is missing a critical 
element: individuals and non-state actors as subjects of law. It was mentioned earlier that any 
constitutional project for the UN must first and foremost be concerned about democratisation. 
This democratisation would also mean that, in addition to states, people would be the subjects 
and objects of law and justice.  
With the exception of the ad hoc courts mentioned in Chapter 2 that have been created by the 
SC, there are no permanent human rights or criminal courts as part of the UN system. 
Multilaterally, there are two regional human rights courts² in Europe, the European Court of 
Human Rights (the ECtHR), and, in Latin America, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACHR) ²and the one permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC was 
intended to be universal, but with some of the most populous states opting out²such as 
China, India and the US²LWVMXULVGLFWLRQFRYHUVOHVVWKDQKDOIRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQ
Furthermore, with the ICC prosecuting only crimes against humanity, genocide, and large-
                                                 
653
 See (Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism 2009): 147-148; and, (Crawford and Grant, International Court of 
Justice 2008): 196. 
654
 Ibid: 195-196; and (Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism 2009): 137-149. See also (Schwartzberg 2013): 
132-135. In fact, other than in issuing advisory opinions, the Court has become more of an elaborate arbitration 
panel for willing parties. The ,&-¶V credibility is again being put to the test as regards to how it will handle the 
complex Marshall Islands cases recently brought before the Court against the nine nuclear-weapons states, 
particularly in relation to India, Pakistan and the UK, which these latter states recognise the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court (albeit. with some reservations). See: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/marshall-islands-sues-nine-nuclear-powers-failure-disarm; and 
also Section 9.3.1. 
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scale war crimes, and since it enjoys only limited jurisdiction, this has meant very few cases 
have so far been tried. 655 2QWKH,&&¶VFRPSOHPHQWDULW\SULQFLSOHDQGLWEHLQJWKHFRXUWRI
last resort, see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1.) 
Hans Kelsen published his classic work on accountability in international crimes, Peace 
through Law, in 1944, before the founding of the UN and the Nuremberg trials. Kelsen 
argued that the ultimate deterrence in respect of international crimes is when individuals who 
have committed such crimes are held responsible and tried, as opposed to states being viewed 
as the primary actors. 656 This thesis holds true even more so today, with globalisation and the 
ease of physical and virtual mobility. Many international crimes²such as terrorism, illicit 
drugs trafficking, human trafficking, international financial and banking crimes, as well as 
environmental and cyber-crimes²are in fact committed by individuals, multinational 
corporations and other non-state actors, operating in multiple states, where no single state can 
be pinpointed as being responsible.  
The current state-centric international law is, on the whole, not well equipped to deal with the 
above international crimes, as well as the yet-emerging ones²all of which are primarily 
committed by individuals and non-state actors. 
                                                 
655
 As of 2014, after 12 years of operation, the ICC had accepted only 21 cases in nine situations, with only one 
conviction, in 2012, of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. See: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx; and: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/HRW_2012_DRC_Lubanga_QA.pdf. With regard to the ICC being only 
concerned with large-scale war crimes, in a relatively recent case the ICC ruled out launching an investigation 
into an Israeli raid on a Turkish flotilla in which 10 activists were killed. The ICC¶V chief prosecutor announced 
that, despite there existing D³UHDVRQDEOHEDVLVWREHOLHYHWKDWZDUFULPHVZHUHFRPPLWWHG´WKHVLWXDWLRQZDVQRW
of ³VXIILFLHQWJUDYLW\´ to justify prosecution by the Court. See: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/israel-raid-gaza-flotilla-turkey-icc . 
All accessed 29 November 2014. 
656
 (Kelsen, Peace Through Law 1944 (reprint 2008)), especially Part II. For more on Kelsen and individuals as 
subjects of international law, see (Zolo 1998): 306-324. 
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In the pursuit of global human rights and criminal adjudication, and the attainment of the 
principle of direct effect, however, the likelihood of an advisory opinion of the ICJ triggering 
a Van Gend en Loos-type moment, similar to the EU experience, seems both unlikely and 
impractical. Therefore, the normative proposition of this chapter remains that universal 
criminal and human rights adjudication, in conjunction with, and as a complement to, 
domestic jurisprudence and court systems, would, inherently, need to be incorporated into 
any UN constitutionalisation project. 
Charter and constitutional interpretations and, more generally, judicial review is another 
important area that any Charter review would have to address. Amendments to the Charter 
can be introduced to identify the ICJ or a newly created court as the ultimate broker on the 
81¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQVDOORZLQJWKHFRXUWWRGHILQHLWVIXQFWLRQVFRPSHWHQF\Dnd 
jurisdiction, as well as ensuring the independence of the court. 
The existing Charter, premeditatedly, does not permit the ICJ or any other organ to be the 
final authority for interpreting the Charter. The San Francisco travaux indicate that any of the 
principal organs of the UN, such as the GA, and including the ICJ, can interpret the Charter. 
However, such an interpretation will have no binding effect, unless LWLV³JHQHUDOO\
DFFHSWDEOH´LQRWKHUZRUGV attracts unanimous support (currently, 193 states need to be in 
favour), thereby enabling it to be formally adopted into the Charter.657 This latter stipulation 
for formal amendment again bears the fingerprints of P5 supremacy, with the permanent 
PHPEHUV¶UHTXLUHGFRQFXUUHQFHDOORZLQJWKHPWRUHMHFWDQ\XQZanted Charter interpretation. 
                                                 
657
 (Sohn 1995): 171-176. In practice, the ICJ, especially in its earlier years, has performed some degree of 
Charter interpretation, as can be seen in the Corfu case, 1949, and the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion of 
1962. It seems that this judgment and opinion, respectively, were ³generally DFFHSWDEOH´ and therefore not 
contested by the P5. Ibid. See also (Schachter 1994): 7-8. 




and non-state actors, as well as states, are subjects and objects of law. The global judiciary 
must be ensured its independence, and should be endowed with compulsory jurisdiction and 
the means to enforce its decisions independent of the SC.658 The other material component 
needed in the global legal order is judicial review.659 The judicial organ entrusted with this 
function, in addition to being independent, must have the power to determine the limits of 
RWKHURUJDQV¶FRPSHWHQFLHVDQGZRXOGDOVREHWKHILQDODXWKRULW\LQWKHPDWWHURILQWHUSUHWLQJ
constitutional questions. 
Protection of Fundamental and Human Rights 
A global legal order in which individuals are subjects and objects of international law should 
require and result in the constitutionalisation of basic human rights as fundamental rights.660 
                                                 
658
 Apart from the enforcement of decisions, another way in which the ICJ is dependent on the Council is in the 
election of its judges. Historically, five of the 15 judges²one each²have been selected by the P5. The 
permanent members also have a disproportionate advantage when it comes to the selection of the other 10 
MXGJHV)RUGHWDLOVRIWKH&RXUW¶VHOHFWLRQSURFHGXUHVVHHWKH,&-¶VZHEVLWHhttp://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1; accessed 11 July 2016. See also (Akande 2014). 
659
 Jose Alvarez, during the 1990s, when the rule of law and international law seemed to be flourishing at the 
global level, and when there was P5 unanimity in respect of most critical Council decisions, believed, perhaps 
over-optimistically, that a critical moment had arrived for the World Court to establish itself as the judicial 
review body for the UN. Alvarez argued for WKH&RXQFLO¶VFRRSHUDWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\WKDWRIWKH³3´WKH86 in 
SURPRWLQJDQGKHOSLQJWKH,&-³WRHYROYHLWVRZQSRZHUV´WRHQFRPSDVVMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ(Alvarez, Judging the 
Security Council 1996): 1-39; especially 38-39. However, Alexander Orakhelashvili, a decade later, was more 
pessimistic about such an outcome, warning that continuation of (de)legitimate Council decisions, without 
MXGLFLDOUHYLHZFRXOGOHDGWRWKH&RXQFLOEHLQJ³SDUDO\]HG´ERWKLQWHUPVRIGLVDJUHHPHQt in reaching 
GHFLVLRQVDQGLQPDNLQJGHFLVLRQVDQGDGRSWLQJUHVROXWLRQVWKDWZRXOGULVN³QRQ-FRPSOLDQFH´DWHLWKHUWKHVWDWH
or regional level. (Orakhelashvili 2007): 143-195; especially 194-195. Perhaps Kadi III functions as a model of 
a regional court (where there is one, such as the EU) starting to perform some level of review of Council 
decisions. See: http://www.ejiltalk.org/kadi-showdown/ . 
660
 Fundamental rights and human rights in this thesis are mostly used interchangeably. However, the distinction 
between the two, particularly in this section, is based on the presumption that fundamental rights are a subset of 
the generally recognised International Bill of Human Rights (the UDHR plus the ICCPR and the ICESCR), 
which enjoy a degree of constitutional protection and cannot be taken away except by conformance with the due 
process of law. In this context, the notion is similar to the usage of fundamental rights in the Indian constitution, 
or the bill of rights DQGWKH³XQDOLHQDEOHULJKWV´LQWKH86&RQVWLWXWLRQRU since the coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in EU law. See: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx; andhttp://fra.europa.eu/en/about-fundamental-
rights/frequently-asked-questions. Both accessed 1 December 2014. See also (Palombella 2006). 
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The UN, in its seven decades of operation, has carried out extensive and monumental work in 
defining²and encouraging the world to come to some common understanding of²our 
global human rights. Its Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, along with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (both in force as of 1976) have become a 
global core of rights, and are together known as the International Bill of Human Rights.661 
The second UN general conference on human rights, held in Vienna in 1993 (the Vienna 
Conference), further consolidated previous human rights efforts and prompted future work 
and instruments on more specific rights, such as the rights of women, children and indigenous 
SHRSOHV,QDGGLWLRQWKH&RQIHUHQFH¶VRXWFRPHGRFXPHQWFRQILrmed that such rights have 
three important features: they are interdependent, interrelated and indivisible.662  
All these UN human rights achievements originate from the UN Charter. Its incorporation of 
certain fundamental rights and economic and social objectives²albeit in a somewhat 
discursive form²can in turn be explained by the advocacy of certain Latin American states 
at the 1945 Conference for their inclusion, as well as to the support provided by the US, with 
both political and civil society in the country at the time championing such rights.663 
                                                 
 
661
 (Steiner, Alston and Goodman 2007): 133. 
662
 (Lam 2008): 527-535. See also (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014): Vienna 
Declaration PDF. 
663
 At UNCIO, several Latin American states, including Mexico and Panama, were calling for a robust bill of 
rights to be incorporated in the Charter. Other states, such as Australia and Peru, were more concerned about 
economic rights. (UNCIO - Volume I: General 1945): 559-562, 682-685; and (UNCIO - Volume III: Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals, Comments and Proposed Amendments 1945): 176,178. The American propensity for human 
rights at the time was partly owing to President Roosevelt and his promotion of the Four Freedoms: freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Further, Roosevelt and many of the US 
drafters of the Charter were, at the time, particularly conscious of human rights violations being one of the 
causes of wars.  
 
For the first time at San Francisco, civil society was formally invited by the State Department to participate in 




RU³IXQGDPHQWDOIUHHGRPV´twelve times; gender equality five times; the right to education 
eight times; health four times; and freedom from fear of war and armaments, or disarmament 
also four times.664  
Chapters IX and X of the Charter were dedicated to achieving the above human rights goals. 
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was created, albeit without the enforcement 
might and the legislative powers of the Security Council. ECOSOC decisions, according to 
Article 67, and in a similar fashion to those of the GA, are majoritarian based²a significant 
GHSDUWXUHIURPVWDWHV¶FRQVHQWDQGQRveto²which that meant decisions could be made and 
made faster.  
Further, ECOSOC, in order to deliver on the human rights and economic promises of the 
Charter articulated in Article 55, was empowered, in Articles 56 to 59, to create subsidiaries 
and enter into treaties, and in effect create aIILOLDWHRUJDQVDQG³VSHFLDOLVHGDJHQFLHV´ 
                                                 
SURMHFWZKLFKLWLQWHQGHGDVWKH³LQVWUXPHQWRIWKHSHRSOH´1HDUO\WZRPLOOLRQFRSLHVRIWKH'2SURSRVDOZHUH
published and distributed to the US public. The media and civil society were highly engaged, participating in 
side activities relating to the new organisation both before and during the Conference. Although the 
participating NGOs at the Conference were practically all from the US and were pre-selected (the excluded 
NGOs continued to be highly active outside of the Conference), in all, 43 NGOs and 160 observers, from a 
range of organisations, were able to attend some of the meetings as observers, and received regular briefings 
from the US delegation. 
 
The activism of the NGOs is attributed to some of the references to human rights that were to be added to the 
&KDUWHUSDUWLFXODUO\RQWKHVXEMHFWRIHGXFDWLRQ³HTXDOLW\RI>WKH@VH[HV´DQGIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV 
(Schlesinger 2003): 31, 122-125. As an example of productive activism at the Conference, the NGOs 
championing women¶V rights ZHUHLQVWUXPHQWDOLQJHWWLQJWKHLVVXHRIZRPHQ¶Vequality on the agenda for the 
Charter, notwithstanding the fact of a completely male-dominated Conference, and one where 20 of the 50 states 
in attendance did not allow their female populations to vote at the time. See Torild Skard, Getting Our History 
Right: How Were The Equal Rights Of Women And Men Included In The Charter Of The United Nations? 
(Skard 2008): 37-51. NGO activism inside and outside of the Conference also resulted in the inclusion of Article 
71 of the Charter²establishing a formal consultative role for the NGOs²which was another first, recognising 
FLYLOVRFLHW\¶VUROHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDQGWUHDWLHV 
664
 The data counts were extracted directly from the Charter. 
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Moreover, in accordance with Articles 57 and 58, ECOSOC was intended, in effect, to 
administer and govern all the UN affiliated organs created in the future. Despite that 
intention, most of the critical UN affiliates created, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the 
,$($DUHRXWVLGHRI(&262&DQGWKH*$¶VPDQDJHPHQWDQGFRQWURO665 
The current collection of human rights treaties has had mixed results in the past 70 years in 
DFKLHYLQJWKH³XQLYHUVDO´REMHFWLYHVRIWhe UDHR and the International Bill of Human 
Rights, with citizens of many states, particularly those located in Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia, experiencing systemic violations of their political, civil and social rights. 
It is true that, in general, the ratification of HR treaties has led to some degree of 
implementation in regional and domestic laws, and therefore has furthered the development 
of human rights.666And there are non-judicial and dialogical approaches that can lead to 
improved human rights practices.667 However, by and large, in the absence of the necessary 
                                                 
665
 (Childers 2011): 23-24, 221; and (P. Kennedy 2006): 113-116. 
666
 For the argument, accompanied by empirical evidence, that ratification of international human rights treaties 
leads to better HR practices and compliance, see Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International 
Law in Domestic Politics, (Simmons 2009))RU(ULF3RVQHU¶VFULWLTXHRI6LPPRQV¶ZRUNDUJXLQJWKDWKHU
VWDWLVWLFDOUHJUHVVLRQDQDO\VLVILQGLQJVVKRZFRUUHODWLRQVEXWQRWQHFHVVDULO\FDXVDWLRQ³+XPDQ5LJKWV
FRPSOLDQFH´VHH(Posner, SomH6NHSWLFDO&RPPHQWVRQ%HWK6LPPRQ¶V0RELOL]LQJIRU+XPDQ5LJKWV
Symposium 2012): 819-831. 
667
 +XPDQULJKWVVFKRODUVVHHPWRKDYHXVHGWKH³GLDORJLFDODSSURDFK´LQWKUHHGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WV7KHILUVWLVDV
a philosophical approach, in which cultural differences are recognised, and cross-cultural mediation and dialogs 
DUHHQFRXUDJHGWRFRPHXSZLWKKXPDQULJKWVDJUHHPHQWVEDVHGRQ³XQIRUFHGFRQVHQVXV´6HHIRUH[DPSOHWKH
work of Jeffrey Flynn, in Reframing the Intercultural Dialogue on Human Rights, in which he proposes a 
³GLDORJLFDOIUDPHZRUN´, suggesting more of a moral rather than a legal perspective to be used in developing HR 
QRUPVZKLFKKHVXJJHVWVFRXOGDOVROHDGWR³JOREDOFLYLFVROLGDULW\´ (Flynn 2014): esp. 79, 101, and 104-105. 
 
7KHVHFRQGXVDJHRI³GLDORJLFDODSSURDFK´KDVEHHQLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHGLDORJEHWZHHQWKHMXGLFLDU\DQGWKH
legislative bodies of states in order to promote human rights in a more democratic way²by, presumably, 
shifting some of the constitutional and judicial responsibility for the interpretation and promotion of HR to 
parliaments, where people, through their representatives, can have a more participatory role and also hold their 
governments to account. See (Hunt, Hooper and Yowell 2015): esp. 447-468. 
 
7KHWKLUGXVDJHRI³GLDORJLFDODSSURDFK´LQKXPDQULJKWVLVPRVWO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIIHGHUDOVWDWHVSDUWLFXODUO\
the US, and the HR dialog and interaction at the different layers of multilevel-government. Catherine Powell, in 
KHUDUWLFOHRQ³GLDORJLFIHGHUDOLVP´JLYHVWKHH[DPSOHRIWKH Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which the US signed in 1980, but has, after more than three decades, 
still chosen not to ratify. In contrast, the municipality of San Francisco, in dialog with the federal layer, and 
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global, legislative, adjudicative and enforcement powers, the goals of ECOSOC and the UN 
in the areas of political, social and economic rights have proven difficult to achieve and have 
been sidelined in the discursive global governance and human rights regimes. On the 
promotion and protection of human rights, the UN and ECOSOC have, through the issuing of 
SURFODPDWLRQVWKHJHQHUDWLRQRIVRIWODZDQGWKHSUDFWLFHRI³QDPLQJDQGVKDPLQJ´²mostly 
directed at states rather than individuals, and with no adjudication²been as effective as such 
PHDVXUHVKDYHDOORZHGWKHPWREHDQGWKHUHIRUHWKH81¶VVWDWHGKXPDQULJKWVREMHFWLYHV
remain largely unfulfilled. 
According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN 
ideals for global human rights are unequivocal:668 
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place 
of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other 
status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These 
rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. 
Not only are these rights equal and non-discriminatory, as well as universal, they are also 
inalienable (that is, they can only be limited or taken away according to due process of 
                                                 
WDNLQJWKHWUHDW\DVLWVPRGHOKDVVLQFHLQFRUSRUDWHGPRVWRIWKH³SULQFLSOHVRI&('$:´LQWRORFDO
binding law. (Powell 2001): 245-295. 
668
 See: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx. Note that, in addition to the 
OHCHR, which is part of the Secretary-General¶V2IILFH mentioned above, there is the Human Rights Council, 
which is also part of the UN System. 
 
The OHCHR primarily supports the work of the UN human rights mechanisms, ³including the treaty bodies 
established to monitor State Parties' compliance with the core international human rights treaties and the Special 
Procedures of the Human Rights Council´,QIDFWWKHInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 




The main UN body concerning human rights promotion and thematic HR issues is the Human Rights Council 
(HRC), which is a subsidiary of the GA. The HRC is made up of 47 member states elected by the GA. The 
Human Rights Council replaced the former UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in 2006. See:  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx. For the 2015 version of the organisational 




take for the UN to protect and enforce these fundamental rights? 
:LWK³OLIHOLEHUW\DQGSXUVXLWRIKDSSLQHVV´670 being the ultimate goals of many human 
rights regimes, the international law constitutionalisation of the UN would have to ensure the 
promotion and protection of rights by grounded means of legislation and adjudication as 
outlined earlier in the parliamentary and jurisprudence sections of the constitutional project.  
As a supranational organisation, the role of the UN in the promotion and protection of human 
rights would be the necessary minimal671²the goal being to promote and ensure the 
fulfilment of that common set of human rights that are global fundamental rights and non-
derogable, leaving the added rights and values, and later additions to these, to the regional 
organisations and the member states. 
International Rule of Law, Due Process, and Multilevel Constitutionalism 
The rule of law was the core promise of the legal order of the UN, as much in 1945, as it is 
today. 
However, a formal definition of the global rule of law was never formulated, and was for the 
first time presented in the Secretary-*HQHUDO¶VUHSRUWWRWKH6&LQ$XJXVW2004, a definition 
which has been embraced by the UN ever since:672 





in the US Declaration of Independence: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html  
671
 Kai Moller, however, argues that the moral structures of human rights are such that, whether domestic 
constitutional rights or international, human rights are in fact identical, with thin distinction between the 
minimalist and maximalist HR fundamentals. (Moller 2014): 373-403. 
672
 (Report of the Secretary General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
soicieties 2004): S/2004/616; paragraph 6; [emphasis added]. This definition of the rule of law has, ever since, 
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 The ³UXOHRIODZ´ is a concept at the very KHDUWRIWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶VPLVVLRQ. 
It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which 
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.  
In the global governance setting, however, the rule of law (ROL) has been elusive, and more 
easily invoked than defined. Therefore, a global consensus on, and definition of, the rule of 
law and its institutionalisation will be of immense utility in the constitutional project.  
7KHVWDWHG³PLVVLRQ´RIWKH81RQ52/DOUHDG\KDVPDQ\RIWKHPDWHULDOREMHFWLYHVRIWKH
constitutionalisation project. The stated democratic and judicial principles, such as equality, 
fairness, participation (representation) and human rights, coupled with the rule of law 
structural characteristics of supremacy of law, legal certainty, and separation of powers and 
independence, as well as the good governance stated objectives of transparency and 
accountability²and the fact that all these principles and concepts are inclusive of both 
³VWDWHV³DQG non-VWDWHV³DOOSHUVRQVLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGHQWLWLHVSXEOLFDQGSULYDWH´²cover 
most if not all of the constitutional grounds and grand principles. 
To ensure the workings of the ROL, the constitutional requirement of the principle of due 
process, similar to that in domestic models, is paramount. This is mostly to protect the 
different organs from overstepping their competencies, and more importantly to protect 
individuals from the government, or, in our case, the UN²the global government institution. 
                                                 
been used in various GA declarations, and SC open debates and Presidential Reports, as well as referenced in 
formal resolutions. See (Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law 2011): 7-10. 
376 
 
Therefore, a constitutionalised UN must provide both for substantive due process, such as 
protection of global human rights, as it may apply to multiple and across institutional organs, 
and procedural due process7KLVODWWHUGXHSURFHVVIRUH[DPSOHLQFOXGHVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
right to notice, counsel, and fair trial.  
,Q0RQWHVTXLHX¶VWHUPVWKH81FRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURMHFWZLWh the mission of global rule of law 
and democracy, would require separation of powers, monitored with legal review, which 
would utilise the due process of law when invoked to apply the necessary oversight of the 
checks and balances of the different branches of the UN.673 This fundamental governmental 
architecture and processes, complemented by the other constitutional concepts covered 
earlier, should provide for all the essentials of a working democratic government²similar to 
the many functioning state democracies now. 
One substantive question, not directly addressed, remains: how should a supranational UN 
interact with state governments and regional governments?  
The proposition of multilevel constitutionalism and multilevel government considerations for 
a constitutionalised UN is, again, not a major political or legal invention. It is rather a 
reinvention and fine-tuning of our experience with the political and legal developments of the 
nearly 25 existing federal unions and states, two of the oldest being Switzerland and the US, 
and the most populous one being India, in fact, SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQWRGD\LV
represented by a federal system of government.674 In addition to these federal states, 
                                                 
673
 The separation of powers mentioned here does not have to be in the strict Montesquieu terms of tripartite, 
common in many of the republican presidential systems, but could also be of the bipartite type, where the 
parliament in effect elects the executive branch, common in many of the parliamentarian systems. 
674




multilevel constitutionalism ideas can be drawn from the not-so-federal, but still multi-





mere utopia, and believing that nation-state liberal constitutionalism is dialectic in nature, 
DUJXHVWKDWWKH³GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQQDWLRQDODQGWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPDUHRI
GHJUHHUDWKHUWKDQRINLQG´676 
To summarise, a constitutionalised UN in a multi-level government setting must have a 
supranational architecture accommodating vertical and horizontal legal inter-governmental 
relationships, migrating and incorporating federal or EU-type grand principles of subsidiarity 
(to ensure that powers are exercised as close to the citizen as possible), and proportionality 
(regulating and limiting the exercise of powers proportional with the aim pursued), with the 
subjects being states as well as citizens with direct effect. 677 
                                                 
675
 (Walker, Multilevel Constitutionalism: Looking Beyond the German Debate 2009): 1 (n 1) and 10-11.  
+HUH³PXOWLOHYHOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´LVXQGHUVWRRGLQLWVglobal constitutionalism context: that is, integration and 
interlink at the different layers of government while withholding subsidiarity, with the result that rules and 
norms are applicable such that no political or judicial actors can claim non-compliance based on legal grounds. 
(Krisch 2010): 242. 7KLVLVLQFRQWUDVWWR³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOSOXUDOLVP´ZKLFKDVVXPHVKLHUDUFK\RIQRUPVPRVWO\
on rights, and mostly based on jus cogens or opinio juris). But legitimisation and enforcement of those norms is 
OHIWWRWKHVRYHUHLJQVWDWHVDQGW\SLFDOO\QR³ILQDODXWKRULW\´H[LVWVWRUHVROYHMXULVGLFWLRQDOFRQIOLFWVRUHQIRUFH
compliance. For a debate, conducted by Nico Krish and Alec Stone, on constitutional pluralism and whether, in 
WKDWVHWWLQJWKHFODLPWRKLHUDUFK\RIQRUPVVXJJHVWVGLFKRWRP\³R[\PRURQ´VHH(Stone Sweet 2013): 49-500; 
and (Krich 2013):501-506. 
676
 (Rosenfeld 2014): 177, 199. 
677
 On the EU subsidiarity and proportionality principles, see n 24 above. See also (Chalmers, Davies and Monti 





/DVWO\D³WKLFN´FRQVWLWXWLRQDVQRWHGLQ&KDSWHUUHTXLUHVVHFRQGDU\UXOHV In other words, 
a constitutionalised UN as a global autonomous legal order containing superior legal norms 
must also have rules of change in order to be able to adapt to the future constitutional 
challenges of a dynamic world.678 
A successful UN constitutionalisation project, in terms of its effect, as well as its paradigm 
shift from states to peoples, perhaps may be considered a global governance and international 
law revolution. However, conceptually, and as far as the legal structure is concerned, the 
model is not new or untested. In fact, global constitutionalism seems to be just the next stage 
LQWKHH[WHQVLRQRIVWDWHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQVDQGOHJDORUGHUVDQGLQHVVHQFHWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
and evolution of the existing fragmented, unitary, or federal and mulWLODWHUDOUHJLRQDOVWDWHV¶
political and legal systems into a global union.679 And, by applying the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, the independence of its member states will be protected. 
                                                 
With regard to judicial matters, in a constitutionalised UN setting, perhaps the ICC principle of complementarity 
can also be migrated. This principle may be particularly useful in prosecuting international crimes, where the 
states, first and foremost, have the responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes, and the role of the 
81¶VMXGLFLDU\RUJDQLVUHJXODWHG7KH81FRXUWVRUWKH,&&LQFDVHRIWKH,&&EHLQJLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKH81
system), can only exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so. For a summary of the 
complementarity principle of the ICC, see: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf#search=principle%20of%20complementarity . 
 
For migration and translation of some of the domestic and existing constitutional concepts to a supranational 
realm, see (Ulfstein, Empowerment and Constitutional Control 2010); and (Walker, Multilevel 
Constitutionalism: Looking Beyond the German Debate 2009): 10. $Q\PLJUDWLRQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDO³WHPSODWHV´
from the unitary domestic models, or from the federal and supranational models, would most likely not be 
GLUHFWDQGVRPHGHJUHHRIDGDSWDWLRQZRXOGEHUHTXLUHG6HHDOVR:DONHU¶VPRUHH[WHQGHGGLVFXVVLRQLQ6XMLW
Choudhry (Sujit 2006): 316-344. 
678
 6HH&KDSWHU6HFWLRQRQ³WHUPVRIUHIHUHQFH´DQGWKHUHODWHGIootnotes. See also (Reinold and Zurn 
2014): 236-273. 
679
 Some of the potential barriers mentioned when debating the practicality of multi-state unions include 
diversity of languages, religions, cultures and size (physical and economic). However, some older federations, 
such as Switzerland and Canada, and certain newer ones, such as India and South Africa²as well as the supra-
national EU²provide functioning examples of how two or more of these barriers have been solved 
simultaneously. The real barrier, historically, has been political rather than language, religion, culture, or size. 
See also (Kelsen, Peace Through Law 1944 (reprint 2008)): 9-13. Historically, in terms of the number of 
independent political units on earth, there are anthropological estimates that, 3,000 years ago, there were 





9.3. Convening the Review: the Legal Strategies to Effectuate Article 
109(3) 
With the need for UN constitutionalisation, but with the path of gradual Charter changes and 
UN reform at a standstill, and perhaps no more than a pipe dream, is it feasible to uphold the 
IRXQGHUV¶FRPSURPLVHDQGWKHSan Francisco promise of in effect putting everything on the 
table and holding the review conference?  
In strictly legal terms, unless the review conference is held, or unless, in a repealing or 
reversing resolution of the Assembly, it is proclaimed undesirable, Article 109(3) is not 
obsolete, but has been only partially implemented and has continuing legal force. How then 
can the partially implemented article be given legal effect to complete its operation? 
My research points to three legal strategies to fully implement paragraph 3. The first two 
draw on cases at the ICJ, while the third is inspired by an Assembly decision. The highlights 
of the three options are: 
I.  ICJ Contentious Cases: One or More States vs. the Permanent Five 
The ICJ was not intended to have jurisdiction over contentious cases by member states 
against the UN organisation or its organs. Nor was the ICJ designated to act as a 
constitutional court in order to interpret the Charter on its application or its breach.680  
With regard to the breach of Article 109(3), the above ICJ jurisdictional options are closed. 
However, there may be a backdoor way in which the states responsible for blocking the 
Review²namely the P5²can be challenged.  
                                                 
680
 See above: n 657; and (Sohn 1995): 171-175. 
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It may be recalled that the San Francisco anti-veto rebellion was all about opposition to the 
apartheid-like and unequal status of the P5. And that it was the P5 who, in order to protect 
their privileged status, offered as a concession the Charter review process. Furthermore, 
according to the legislative history, all the permanent members, with the exception of the 
Soviet Union, expressed their willingness to abide by the majority decision at the future 
review conference, even if this meant limiting or abolishing the veto.681 
Accordingly, in respect of this option, one or more states may institute contentious 
proceedings against the P5, holding them responsible for the dysfunctional SC and the breach 
of responsibilities entrusted to its permanent members by the Charter to effectively maintain 
international peace and security.682 The applicant states can then establish a linkage to Article 
109(3) as the statutory means to renegotiate this power-responsibility matrix in the Charter 
and the Court to order full P5 cooperation in conducting the review. 
In fact, to link the case to the ChDUWHU¶VOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\WKHDSSOLFDQWVFRXOGEHRQHRU
PRUHRIWKHIRXQGLQJ³8QGHU-,QIOXHQFH6WDWHV´OLVWHGLQTable 2 in Chapter 8. Or, regardless 
of the existence of duress, the applicants could come from the large block of anti-veto states 
that, by casting a large number of abstentions in a crucial committee vote, allowed the Yalta 
formula to be adopted, while at the same time registering their protest vote and bargaining for 
Article 109, and particularly its paragraph 3.683 
                                                 
681
 The legislative history is set out in Chapters 4 and 5. 
682
 ,QIDFWWKHPDLQWKUXVWRIWKH3¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQDW6DQ)UDQFLVFRIRUWKHLUVSHFLDOSULYLOHJHVZDVMXVWWKLV²
that the effective maintenance of peace and security was a paramount responsibility for the permanent members, 
and that they would have to dedicate substantial financial and human resources to this mission, most likely 
through the creation of a standing UN armed force, and were therefore deserving of their enhanced powers. On 
this point, see statements made by the P5 in support of the Yalta formula in Chapter 4. 
683
 )RUWKHOLVWRIVWDWHVIRUPLQJDEORFXQGHU$XVWUDOLD¶VOHDGHUVKLSZKRVXEVHTXHQWO\DOORZHGWKHDGRSWLRQRI
the formula, while registering their protest by abstaining, see the description of the activities of Committees III/1 
and I/2 in Chapter 5, esp. Sec. 5.7. 
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Alternatively, and in addition, an applicant could be a non-founding member state that can 
link an armed conflict situation to a particular Council decision or inaction which has caused 
harm and injury to that state. This is particularly relevant in the more recent R2P-type 
situations and what the group of S5 was unsuccessfully pursuing. 
Therefore, regardless of the variations mentioned, the applicant states could request 
renegotiation of the Charter-granted SC competency-responsibility matrix and that of its main 
actors, the P5. 
A similar ICJ case which could function as a crucial precedent for our hypothetical scenario 
is the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) v. the Nuclear Weapons States, currently in 
progress. At the time of writing, the RMI has filed applications, and proceedings have been 
instituted but the Court has not yet decided on its jurisdiction over the cases.684 Similar to our 
hypothetical case, this case involves multiple applications against the nine nuclear-armed 
states, among them the P5, which are state parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The RMI has alleged that each of the P5 states has essentially 
breached its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The cases involve multiple applications 
and requests to the Court, and are complex.685  
                                                 
Note that other states can file suit as complainants, either initially separately or by joining at a later stage as 
interventions. It should also be noted that, in the case of P5 members that have opted out of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, the possibility still exists that some of them may have existing bilateral agreements on 
³UHFLSURFDOHIIHFW´RIWKH,&-¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ,QVXFKDVLWXDWLRQDFRPSODLQDQWVWDWHZLWKD³UHFLSURFDO´
DJUHHPHQWZLWKD3PHPEHUFDQGUDJWKHWDUJHW3LQWRWKH&RXUWFDVH)RUDVXPPDU\RIWKH&RXUW¶VZRUNLQJV
see: http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 . For a complete veto list, including a P5 veto involving 
one of the founding members in a conflict situation, see: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. Both accessed 
29 January 2015. 
684
 (ICJ Annual Report 2014-2015): 41-43. 
685
 Of the nine nuclear-weapons states (NWS), six (the US, Russia, China, France, Israel and North Korea-
KPDR) do not recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Four are not state parties to the NPT (India, 
Pakistan, Israel and North Korea). Only three have made optional declarations accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court²India, Pakistan and the UK²and, of these three, only the UK is both a state party to 
the NPT and, by means of an ICJ declaration (with some reservations), also subject to the compulsory 
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against the other four permanent members, using the forum prorogatum provision allowed by 
WKH&RXUWZKLFKZRXOGHQDEOHWKHYROXQWDU\DFFHSWDQFHRIWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQE\WKH86
Russia, China and France. However, so far, there has been no positive response from any of 
these P5 states, and the Court has not published those applications on its website.687 
                                                 
jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, the RMI application that targets the UK²Obligations concerning 
Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. 
United Kingdom)²is the only one of the P5-members cases so far accepted by the Court. In addition to the UK, 
RMI has filed two separate applications against India and Pakistan, as the other two NWS under the compulsory 
MXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH&RXUW6HHWKH,&-¶VZHEVLWHhttp://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=miuk&case=160&k=ef; and 
 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/160/18342.pdf. See also (ICJ Annual Report 2014-2015): 41-43. 
 
The Marshall Islands, in the initial application filing of 25 April 2014, pursuant to Article 38, Paragraph 5 of the 
Rules of Court, had asked the Court to notify the other four permanent members, plus Israel and North Korea, of 
WKHDSSOLFDWLRQDQGWRUHTXHVWWKHLUFRQVHQWWRWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ8QOHVVWKRVHVWDWHVHxplicitly give their 
consent, their names will not be entered in the formal General List, and in effect the case will be dismissed for 
those states. See the associated ICJ Press Release: http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/0/18300.pdf. It is 
noteworthy that, in the applications against the four NWS non-state parties to the NPT, RMI is basing its claim 
on customary international law (CIL). It is arguing, inter alia, that the NPT, being almost universally accepted 
(by 190 states), and having been in force since 1970, means²especially in viHZ&RXUW¶VDGYLVRU\RSLQLRQLQ
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996²that the provisions of Article VI of the treaty have in 
effect become CIL and therefore binding on all states. 
686
 See the separate Declarations for India, Pakistan and the UK at: 





declarations submitted by states when consenting to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The submission date 
of the RMI declaration to the Court is 24 April 2013: exactly a year before its multiple-application submissions 
RI$SULO7KLVFDQQRWEHDFRLQFLGHQFHDQGPXVWKDYHEHHQGHOLEHUDWHRQWKHSDUWRI50,¶VODZ\HUVWR
VDWLVI\DQRWKHURIWKHFRQGLWLRQVFRQWDLQHGLQPRVWGHFODUDWLRQVVXFKDVWKH8.¶VWKDWDWOHDVW³twelve months 
prior to the filing´WKHDSSOLFDQWVWDWHPXVWKDYHVXEPLWWHGLWVRZQGHFODUDWLRQWRVDWLVI\WKH³condition of 
reciprocity´6HHWKHGHFODUDWLRQRI50,DVZHOODVIRUH[DPSOHWKRVHRIWKH8.DQG,QGLD,ELG 
687
 )RUWKHODWHVWRQWKH50,¶VWKUHHFRQWHQWLRXVFDVHV see: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3. The possibility of a state in effect instantly accepting WKH&RXUW¶V




Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, raised certain preliminary objections regarding 
the RMI application concerning the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the 
application.688 7KH&RXUW¶V±DQQXDOUHSRUWVWDWHVWKDW³LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK
paragraph 5 of the same article, the proceedings on the merits have therefore been 
suspendHG´7KH&RXUWWKHQJDYHWKH50,IRXUPRQWKVLQZKLFKWRUHVSRQGWRWKHSUHOLPLQDU\
objections raised by the UK.689 
7KH50,¶VFODLPDJDLQVWWKH8.ZLOOQRGRXEWIDFHPDQ\FKDOOHQJHV3URIHVVRU1LFN*ULHI
a member of the legal team currently representing the RMI at the ICJ, points out that there are 
VLJQLILFDQWH[FHSWLRQVLQWKH8.¶VRSWLRQDOFODXVHGHFODUDWLRQV,QSDUWLFXODU3URIHVVRU*UHLI
KLJKOLJKWVWKHOLPLWDWLRQFRQWDLQHGLQWKHGHFODUDWLRQWKDWWKH,&-¶VFRPSXOVRU\MXULVGLFWLRQLQ
respect of the UK LVRQO\DSSOLFDEOHWR³DOOGLVSXWHVDULVLQJDIWHU-DQXDU\´690  
                                                 
³Basis of the Court's Jurisdiction´VHFWLRQRIWKH&RXUW¶VZHEVLWHDVIROORZV³If a State has not recognised the 
jurisdiction of the Court at the time when an application instituting proceedings is filed against it, that State has 
the possibility of accepting such jurisdiction´6HHhttp://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=2. 
688
 For WKH,&-¶VRules of Court, see: http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&. 
689
 (ICJ Annual Report 2014-2015): paragraphs 218-223. 
690
 7KHH[FHSWLRQVFRQWDLQHGLQWKH8.¶VRSWLRQDOGHclaration were raised by Professor Grief at the time this 
thesis was being defended, and are noted as part of the revisions, considerations and requests. For the latest text 
RIWKH8.¶VGHFODUDWLRQUHYLVHGRQ'HFHPEHUQRWDEO\WKHUHYLVLRQGDWHLs after the RMI submission 
against the UK earlier that same year!), see: http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=GB. 
However, for the purposes of the legal strategy proposed in this section, perhaps another exception, specified in 
Article 1(ii), can introduce a new variation of the contentious-case scenario²that is, the possible applicability of 
contentious cases outside of the ICJ forum, to other international tribunals and courts in regional or multi-lateral 
agreements.  
The UK declaration also excludes:  
(ii) any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the 
Commonwealth «  
 
This suggests that the UK expects the Commonwealth countries to use a different forum for their legal disputes 
with the UK. As recounted in the legislative history section of this thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), at the San 
Francisco Conference, a number of British Commonwealth states were opposed to the Council¶V proposed 
structure and the Yalta formula, and only consented to them on the basis of the perceived temporary nature of 
the formula and the Article 109(3) compromise to review the Charter at a later time. Notable among these anti-
veto states were the Commonwealth members Australia, India and New Zealand. Therefore, it seems one of 
those original state parties, or in fact any other willing Commonwealth member, can be the complainant in a 
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As at the end of December 2015, the Court had not established its jurisdiction over any of the 
three RMI applications that it has acknowledged so far. 




after-1984 criterion. Possibly, for example, the materialisation of the P5 intent and act of 
breach could be linked to when the Arrangements Committee²³NHSWLQEHLQJ´EXt not 
actually meeting²ILQDOO\³GLVDSSHDUHG´IURPWKHURVWHURIWKH*$¶VDFWLYHFRPPLWWHHVLQ
1991.691 
In this hypothetical scenario of the contentious cases, assuming that the submission of the 
applications is admissible, but that the Court does not rule in favour of the applicant states, 
the pleadings and arguments during the proceedings and the trial would at least, in a legal 
fashion, publically reveal the political reality of whose interests the Council actually serves. 
This would further demonstrate why SC reforms are a no-go, and why the UN Charter has 
been essentially frozen since its inception.  
The global public exposure of these facts during the trial, and the revelation that the unequal 
powers granted to the permanent members are disproportional to their effective 
responsibilities, would be of significant public informational value, making the need to 
UHGUHVVWKH&KDUWHU¶VELUWK-defect in order to democratise the UN particularly apparent, 
                                                 
Commonwealth-related tribunal or forum. This scenario may be particularly feasible in the cases of France and 
the UK (both EU and P5 Members) if it can be applied in the framework of the EU¶V jurisprudence or 
parliament, however, this is a topic beyond the scope of this thesis. 
691
 See Chapter 7, Section 7.9. 
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regardless of the outcome of the case. This in turn should make it difficult for the P5 to 
ignore their moral and political liability.692 
However, rather than pursue contentious cases against the permanent members, a second 
option involving the ICJ²and one that might be considered a win-win situation for all states 
(including the P5), and is probably more plausible and practical²is that of requesting the 
&RXUW¶VDGYLVRU\RSLQLRQ 
II. ICJ Advisory Opinions: Application by One or More UN Organs or Agencies 
Article 96 of the UN Charter, which is linked to Chapter IV (Articles 65 to 68) of the ICJ 
Statute, allows UN organs or specialised agencies (but not states) to ask the Court for an 
advisory opinion. 693 Charter Article 96 has two paragraphs.694 Article 96(1) allows the 
Council and the GA to independently and directly reTXHVWWKH&RXUW¶VDGYLVRU\RSLQLRQ,Q
FRQWUDVWXQGHU$UWLFOHWKH81V\VWHP¶VRWKHURUJDQVDQGVRPHRIWKHDIILOLDWHG
agencies can also request an advisory opinion from the Court, but only with the approval of 
the GA. However, based on GA-agency agreements or other arrangements, there is a GA pre-
DSSURYHGOLVWRIRYHURUJDQVDQGDJHQFLHVWKDWFDQUHTXHVWWKH&RXUW¶VDGYLVRU\
opinions.695 
                                                 
692
 For an accounWRIWKHKLVWRULFDOSROLWLFDOVHQVLWLYLW\RIWKH3WRWKHPDMRULW\RIVWDWHV¶ZLVKHVRQ&KDUWHU
decisions, see Section 9.4. 
693
 (Statute of International Court of Justice 1945): Chapter IV.  
694
 (Charter of the United Nations 1945-2015): Article 96. 
695
 For the latest revision (2010) of the authorised list of entities that can request WKH&RXUW¶VDGYLVRU\RSLQLRQV
see: http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/en/kos_faq_en.pdf, accessed 29 January 2015. See also the ICJ annual 
report for each year. It should be noted that some of the organs on the list, such as ECOSOC, have associated 
subsidiaries and agencies. For the purposes of this study, and in respect of this legal option for the filing of 
advisory-opinion applications at the Court, the UN¶V main organs and their eligible associated sub-organs or 




The opinions are non-binding but carry significant moral and legal weight. Some of these 
advisory opinions have also had the flavour of Charter interpretation, and in effect have set 
legal frameworks and rules for the UN.  
,QWKH&RXUW¶VPRUHSURDFWLYHHDUOLHU\HDUVRQHRIWKHVHODQGPDUNDGYLVRU\RSLQLRQVZDVWKH
Reparation case (1949), in which the Court established that the UN Charter has, in effect, 
FUHDWHGDOHJDO³LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHUVRQDOLW\´WKDWLVLQGHSHQGHQWRILWVPHPEHUVWDWHV696 In the 
Certain Expenses FDVHRIWKH&RXUWZKLOHH[DPLQLQJWKHPHPEHUVWDWHV¶UHVSRQVLELOLW\
for expenses of peacekeeping operations, also in effect interpreted the Charter in terms of the 
scope of GA functions vis-a-vis the Council.697 
The usefulness of this legal strategy is that it widens the scope to non-state actors and to a 
wide array of current topics. Any UN organ or affiliated agency that considers the 
DFFRPSOLVKPHQWRILWVPLVVLRQDQGREMHFWLYHVWRKDYHEHHQMHRSDUGLVHGEHFDXVHRIWKH81¶V
structural and Charter flaws could argue for a review and ask the Court for an advisory 
opinion on the legality of the suspended operation of Article 109(3).  
One such application could be in the critical area of global governance of the environment. 
Considering the harm that climate change will inflict if no concrete global action is taken, and 
that governance in this area has been hindered by having to obtain the consensus of every 
single state²whether populous or small, whether economically developed or poor, or a major 
                                                 
696
 (ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 1949): Report 174. See also 
(Ulfstein, Institutions and Competencies 2011): 71. That supranational organisations (states) are in fact 
sovereign themselves, with legal powers independent of their member states, has also been confirmed in the 
case of EU law, by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). (Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2010): 186-188, 
especially at 186, Costa case. 
697
 In Certain Expenses, WKH&RXUW¶VDGYisory opinion of Charter significance was that the maintenance of peace 
and security did not fall exclusively within the domain of the Council, and that the GA, without being ultra 
vires, could also engage in peace and security activities, as long as those DFWLYLWLHVGLGQRWUHTXLUH³DFWLRQ´VXFK
as the GA interventions for peace keeping operations, at the time, in the Suez and Congo situations. (ICJ, 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations 1962): at 61. See also (Duke 1963): 304-306. 
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carbon emitter or not²agreeing on the terms a treaty and then further committing to enforce 
them is of paramount importance.698 
Further, the Secretary-General, recognising the gravity of the problem, and inspired by the 




cited three main pillars for promoting sustainable development, two of which were 
³HPSRZHULQJSHRSOH´DQG³strengthening institutional governance´699 
The High-OHYHO3DQHO¶VSURSRVDOVLQFOXGHGWZRVLJQLILFDQWLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV³WR
revitalise and reform the international institutional framework´DQd to consider the 
FUHDWLRQRID³JOREDOVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWFRXQFLO´ 700  
%DVHGRQWKH3DQHO¶VILQGLQJWKHWZRFDQGLGDWHDJHQFLHVRIWKH81(QYLURQPHQW3URJUDPPH
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) could individually or 
collectively request an advisory opinion from the ICJ. The application would have to be 
framed in terms of one or more legal questions arising within the scope of their activities 
KHQFHWKHDGYLFH$QGLQWKLVFDVHWKHWZRDJHQFLHVFRXOGOLQNWKH3DQHO¶VILQGLQJVRQthe 
needed institutional reforms to their inabilities to achieve their objectives in combating the 
                                                 
698
 The main treaty effort in the environmental area, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), was initiated at the Earth Summit of 1992, and is supported by the research and reports of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Although there have been proposals for majority 
YRWLQJ81)&&&¶VVXEVWDQWLYHGHFLVLRQVDUHVWLOOEDVHGRQFRQVHQVXV6HH
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/02.pdf, accessed 30 January 2015. The two main UN agencies dealing with 
climate change are, the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO), which have jointly set up the Nobel laureate Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which acts as a resource in conducting research and reports on the topic.  
699
 (High-level Panel on Global Sustainability 2012): 1-2 [emphasis added]. 
700
 Ibid: 8-9. 
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adverse effects of climate change. In other words, they could link the global governance 
shortcomings regarding the environment to the institutional and structural changes needed. In 
particular, at the UN level, they could seek the advice of the Court on the legality of the 
review as the forum where substantive institutional changes can occur.701 
Another area where such a link could be established is in the area of human rights. For 
example, the Human Rights Council (HRC) could argue at the Court that the reason for the 
relative ineffectiveness of the HR regime is that it needs to shift from governance to 
governing of international human rights, and that it needs to be equipped with legitimate 
legislation and a court system to promote and protect global human rights and its covenants.  
In fact, concerned about the state of global human rights, and based on a GA resolution and a 
HRC-commissioned consultation on the ³3URPRWLRQRIDDemocratic and Equitable 
International Order´WKH,QGHSHQGHQW([SHUWZKRZDVFRPPLVVLRQHGDORQJWKHVDPH
³GHPRFUDWLF´OLQHVUHFRPPHQGHGWKHQHHGIRUD81SDUOLDPHQWDU\DVVHPEO\7KDW
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQDVSDUWRIWKH+5&¶VHIIRUWVZDVSUHVHnted by the Secretary-General to the 
$VVHPEO\$LQ7KLVUHSRUWDPRQJRWKHUVKLJKOLJKWHGWKHQHHGIRUD³:RUOG
3DUOLDPHQWDU\$VVHPEO\´DQGD³:RUOG&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´702 
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To achieve sustainable development, we need to build an effective framework of institutions and 
decision-making processes at the local, national, regional and global levels. We must overcome the 
legacy of fragmented institutions established around single-LVVXH³VLORV´GHILFLWVRIERWKOHDGHUVKLS
and political space; lack of flexibility in adapting to new kinds of challenges and crises; and a frequent 
failure to anticipate and plan for both challenges and opportunities ² all of which undermine both 
policymaking and delivery on the ground. [Emphasis added]; 
Ibid: 8. 
702
 (Zayas 2013): 24. See also the two related GA resolutions (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-
2015): A/RES/67/175, 28 March 2013, and A/68/284, 7 August 2013 [emphasis added]. 
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Related to human rights and security is the situation of refugees. In a similar manner, the two-
time Nobel laureate UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), overburdened with 50 million Iraqi, 
Syrian, Somalian, Ukrainian and other refugees worldwide, could request an advisory opinion 
on Charter revisions to give R2P and the Responsibility-not-to-veto legal definitions and 
applications.703 
Questions on advisory opinions could also be raised by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) on world hunger and food security, by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) on combating pandemics, and, perhaps, by the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP), in relation to its objectives of addressing global poverty and reducing the adverse 
effects of severe economic fluctuations and meltdowns. The list of potential organs able to 
raise the advisory-opinion questions could include other UN agencies involved in many other 
functional areas, such as nuclear disarmament, drug trafficking, human trafficking, global 
financial issues, terrorism, and other global perils.704 
                                                 
For the press release, see: http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/131028_Democracy.doc.htm, accessed 30 January 
2015. 
703
 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is part of the UN Development Group 
(UNDG). (VWDEOLVKHGLQWKH81'*³XQLWHV´WKH81IXQGVSURJUDPPHVDJHQFLHVGHSDUWPHQWVDQG
offices that play a role in development. See: 
http://www.undg.org/docs/10350/UNDGFactSheet_August2009.pdf. For statistics on the number of refugees in 
a dozen countries reaching 50 million, the highest figure since World War II, see: 
http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html. Both accessed 3 February 2015. 
704
 The topic of nuclear disarmament is one functional area that clearly illustrates that the existing UN and its 
related agencies are incapable of delivering their objective (in this case, nuclear disarmament) without radical 
changes towards a revamped world order and what is currently perceived as collective security. 
 
Ironically, tKH*$¶V first resolution, five months after Hiroshima, in January of 1946, FDOOHGIRU³WKHHOLPLQDWLRQ
from national DUPDPHQWVRIDWRPLFZHDSRQV´In fact, the GA adopts a resolution to this effect almost every 
year. However, while a number of UN sub-organs and agencies are dedicated to the elimination of the dreaded 
nuclear weapons, after almost 70 years, there still exist thousands of such weapons, which, if not quantitatively, 
then certainly qualitatively, have been upgraded and are becoming more destructive.  
Nuclear weapons, in the eyes of their possessors, are indispensable, serving two main functions for nuclear 
weapons states (NWS). First, they are believed to act as a deterrent, in line with the mutually-assured-
destruction (MAD) doctrine. In fact, some attribute the emergence in the 1950s of the MAD doctrine as the 




In addition to the narrowly defined specialised agencies, there are general units and standing 
commissions that can request advisory opinions, such as the International Law Commission 
(ILC), and the Rule of Law Unit (ROL). The relatively recent establishment of the ROL at 
the Secretariat level represented a major advance in defining the rule of law, as mentioned 
HDUOLHU3URFODLPLQJWKDWWKHUXOHRIODZDSSOLHVQRWRQO\WRVWDWHVEXWDOVRWR³SHUVRQV´DQG
³LQVWLWXWLRQV´52/UHFRPPHQGVPHDVXUHVWREHWDNHQWR³HQVXUHDGKHUHQFHWRWKHSULQFLSOHV
RI«HTXDOity before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
DUELWUDULQHVVDQGSURFHGXUDODQGOHJDOWUDQVSDUHQF\´705  
There is legal precedent for the type of strategy being recommended in this option. In 1993, 
the WHO requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ, in a submission that linked world 
health to the means and weapons of war, and particularly the use of nuclear weapons. 
Considering the catastrophic direct and collateral damage that such weapons can wreak, and 
hence the grave threat to health they pose, the WHO essentially asked the question of whether 
VXFKZHDSRQVDUHOHJDO7KH&RXUWKDYLQJH[DPLQHGWKH:+2¶V³DSSOLFDWLRQ´UHTXHVWZDV
                                                 
comparison with their perceived adversaries regard nuclear weapons as indispensable in their defence postures, 
in the likelihood of a large-scale conventional arms conflict. (Sharei, The Treaty on Non Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Regime, and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons: Is there the "good faith" in a Legal 
Regime for Nuclear Disarmament? 2010): especially 11, 19-20, 24-25, and 77. 
 
Both the MAD and first-strike doctrines, in relation to disarmament, imply a catch-22 situation. Nuclear 
GLVDUPDPHQWDQG³JHQHUDO´FRQYHQWLRQDODUPVGLVDUPDPHQWERWKREMHFWLYHVLQ$UWLFOH9,RIWKH137EHFRPH
two sides of the same coin²one cannot be achieved without the other. Needless to say that the institutional 
requirements for providing collective security based on the abolition of war and states without armaments will 
be principally different form the existing security governance where states can maintain armaments and conduct 
³OHJDO´ZDUV,QIDFW$OEHUW(LQVWHLQDIWHUWKHGHSOR\PHQt of nuclear weapons, in 1945, recognised the 
institutional deficiency in coping with the world security requirements in the post-nuclear era, and called for the 
³FUHDWLRQRIZRUOGJRYHUQPHQW´WRILOOWKHJDSDQGEHDFFRXQWDEOHIRUHOLPLQDWLRQRIQXFOHDUZeapons. (Isaacson 
2007): 487-489. 





That was not the end of the case, however. This low-cost initiative (in terms of time and 
material) on the part of some audacious individuals at WHO, with the backing of a few 
dedicated NGOs,707 DFWXDOO\SURPSWHGVLJQLILFDQWSXEOLFGHEDWHDQGVXEVHTXHQWO\VWDWHV¶
interest, in the issue, and finally culminated in the GA taking up essentially the same question 
with the Court. This time, the ICJ had to respond to its main constituency, and to one of the 
principal organs of the UN, the GA. The Court issued its opinion on 8 July 1996.708 
The path, the dynamics, and the findings of the WHO Application, culminating in the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, appears highly valuable 
DQGHQFRXUDJLQJLQWHUPVRIWKLVOHJDOVWUDWHJ\RSWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWRWKH&RXUW¶VUHJLVWUDU
states submitted written statements and 24 States made oral submissions. In addition, a 
                                                 
706
 The exact advisory question submitted by the WHO was: 
In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or 
other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO 
Constitution? 
(World Health Organization: Request for Advisory Opinion 1993). The WHO, based on a 1946 agreement with 
the GA, is authorised to request advisory opinions, and had earlier, in 1980, successfully submitted another 
advisory question. Ibid. See also (WHO 1993): 1-7. The Court, in its opinion on the GA version of essentially 
the same question on the legality of nuclear weapons, had just made a short reference to the previous WHO case 
and had simply stated that the Court lacked jurisdiction. (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
1996): paragraph 14. However, in a more detailed report, the ICJ had clarified that the WHO lacked competence 
to ask this type of question, and that the main reason for refusing the request was:  
[T]he request for an advisory opinion submitted by the WHO did not relate to a question arising 
µZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI >WKH@DFWLYLWLHV¶RIWKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQ 
 See: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/7406.pdf: paragraph 27. 
707
 The Director General of WHO at the time was Hiroshi Nakajima of Japan; and one of the lead NGOs 
championing the case and also functioning as a legal aid on the suit was the International Association of 
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms. See (Green, Security Without Nuclear Deterrance 2010): 191. 
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endorsed and submitted Declarations of Public Conscience to the Court.709 
According to the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, this level of state and non-state 
DFWRUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQZDV³XQSDUDOOHOHGLQWKHDQQDOVRIWKLV&RXUW´$QGDOWKRXJKWKHSXEOLF
DSSHDOVFRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGIRUPDOVXEPLVVLRQV-XGJH:HHUDPDQWU\¶VRSLQLRQQRWHVWKDW
³WKH\HYLGHQFHDJURXQGVZHOORIJOREDOSXElic opinion which is not without legal 
UHOHYDQFH´710 
/DWHULQKLVGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQ-XGJH:HHUDPDQWU\H[SODLQVWKLV³OHJDOUHOHYDQFH´LQD
section entitled Impact of the United Nations Charter and Human Rights on "Considerations 
of Humanity" and "Dictates of Public Conscience".711 Here, he explains how the Martens 
Clause had, over the years²with the addition of the UN Charter, and the various human 
rights conventions and covenants²DFWXDOO\WUDQVIRUPHGKXPDQLWDULDQVWDQGDUGVVRWKDW³WKH
public conscious of WKHJOREDOFRPPXQLW\KDVQRZEHHQµVHQVLWL]HGWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI
KXPDQLW\¶DQGµGLFWDWHVRISXEOLFFRQVFLHQFH¶´WKHUHE\WUDQVIRUPLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDO
humanitarian law.712 Elsewhere in his dissenting opinion, Judge Weeramantry, in considering 
law recognised b\³FLYLOL]HGQDWLRQV´FRQFHGHVWKDWDIWHUDOO³WKHODZRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV
SURFHHGVIURPWKHZLOORIWKHSHRSOHVRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV´713 
                                                 
709
 (Lindblom 2006): 220-222. See also (Dissenting Opinion of Judge WEERAMANTRY 1996): 438; for 
electronic access: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7521.pdf . 
710
 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge WEERAMANTRY 1996): 490.  
711
 Ibid: 490-491. 
712
 Ibid: 490-491. Judge Weeramantry, in building the case for an expanded international humanitarian law, 
UHIHUUHGWRWKH&KDUWHU¶V3UHDPEOHDQGWR$UWicles 1, 55, 62, and 76, in addition to citing important human rights 
conventions, such as the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Convention Against Torture. Ibid: 441-442, 490-
491. 
713
 Ibid: 530. 
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Therefore, it appears that the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons is a 
successful precedent for our hypothetical legal option to follow. With the involvement and 
partnership of the global public, NGOs, and willing states, it should be possible to request an 
advisory opinion concerning Charter review, which might result in the positive findings of 
the Court.714 
It is noteworthy that, in making use of this legal strategy, all the previously mentioned 
potential cases would be based on institutional questions that directly impact the structure and 
the competencies of their respective functional organisations (or their parent in the UN 
hierarchy), and therefore, compared with the WHO case, the institutional question and the 
related advisory opinion should carry a higher relevancy.  
0RUHRYHUWKHRUJDQV¶DUJXPHQWEHIRUHWKH&RXUWLVUHLQIRUFHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWPRst of the 
PHQWLRQHG81VXEV\VWHPV¶SROLF\DQGVWUDWHJ\UHSRUWVLQWKHQHZPLOOHQQLXPLQWKHLU
adopted recommendations refer to a degree on institutional strengthening and capacity 
building. In addition to the ones mentioned earlier, the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000, 
endorsed by the world leaders at the Millennium Summit, encompassed detailed wish lists of 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOJRDOVLQLWV³+XPDQULJKWVGHPRFUDF\DQGJRRGJRYHUQDQFH´VHFWLRQDVZHOODV
WKHPRUHIRFXVHG³6WUHQJWKHQLQJWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV´VHFWion, implying substantial 
institutional reforms.715 
                                                 
714
 For the role of the World Court Project and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms 
(together with the help of some other NGOs) in coordinating the request, and the immense impact they had from 
the beginning of the case until the advisory opinion was issued by the Court, see (Lindblom 2006): 220-222; and 
(Burroughs 1997): especially, ix-xi, and 9-14.  
715
 The Millennium Declaration by world leaders was adopted as a GA resolution on 18 September 2000. 
(General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-2015): A/RES/55/2, esp. Sec. V and VIII. 
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The strategy with such Court cases, even if there were only one or two, is not only to attain 
the desired outcome: where the Court finds one of the organs requesting an advisory opinion 
to be competent (or if the WHO route, then perhaps the parent organ) and intra vires, and 
issues the Opinion that Article 109(3) should be fulfilled. It is just as much geared to 
provoking policy and structural debate within the UN system internally, and to generating 
global public debate and interest externally. 
,,,*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\'HFLVLRQ5HDFWLYDWHWKH³$UUDQJHPHQWV&RPPLWWHH´  
The most direct way of convening the review would be by a GA decision. This could be done 
in two ways: 1) by reactivating the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the 
Purpose of Reviewing the Charter, also known as the Arrangements Committee;716 or 2) 
adopting a GA resolution reactivating the review with the time and venue already specified as 
part of the resolution. 
In the first alternative, although procedurally the reactivation of the Committee can be 
requested by the Secretary-General, it may more reliably be requested by member states.717 
Therefore, one or more member states, based on Resolution 2285 (XXII) of 1967 (the last 
resolution on the topic), may request the Arrangements Committee to be reactivated.  
+RZHYHUUHTXHVWLQJWKHUHDFWLYDWLRQRIWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VZRUNDWVWDWHV¶UHTXHVWDQGZLWKRXW
the backing of a GA resolution may be problematic. The possible indeterminacy is owing to 
                                                 
716
 The Arrangements Committee was set up by the first GA resolution of 1955, Res. 992 (X). For the 
&RPPLWWHH¶VDFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHODVWUHVROXWLRQRQWKHWRSLF Res. 2285 (XXII) of 1967, see Chapter 7, Section 7.9.  
717
 According to Rule 13(g) of the GA Rules of Procedures, the SG can request any item, such as the review, to 
be put in the provisional agenda of the Assembly. (UNGA: Rules of procedure and comments 2015), and 
possibly add the Arrangements name back in the list of the GA active committees. However, this requires a bold 
Secretary General to be the initiator, who would have to go against the 3¶V wishes. Given the fact that, in the 
election and the re-election of the SG, it is indeed the P5 rather than the Assembly who are the kingmakers, the 
SG taking this initiative seems doubtful. Assuming the review is held, the fair election of an SG based on merits, 
which was a concern at San Francisco, would probably resurface as one of the critical Charter revision topics. 
See also n 265 above. 
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how the ODVWUHQGH]YRXV¶s re-enactment criteria are interpreted. In the travaux of the 
UHVROXWLRQZKHUHLWZDVGHFLGHGWRNHHSWKH&RPPLWWHH³LQEHLQJ´WKHWHUPVRIUHIHUHQFHIRU
LWVUHDFWLYDWLRQZHUHEDVHGRQDQ\VLQJOHVWDWH¶VUHTXHVW+RZHYHUZKHQWKH chairman of the 
Committee was specifically asked the question, it was vaguely stated that it would be up to 
the Secretary-*HQHUDOZKR³ZRXOGFRQVXOWWKH0HPEHUVDQGZRXOGFRQYHQHWKH&RPPLWWHH
LILWZDVIRXQGGHVLUDEOHWRGRVR´718 
With that contradiction in terms, and the fact that almost half a century has elapsed since the 
last rendezvous, it seems that option (2) below will be more effective. 
In this second alternative, a GA resolution in reaffirmation of the 1955 to 1967 efforts to 
convene the Charter review, based on the adoption of Article 109 Paragraph 3, and in 
consideration of the need to follow up and fulfil that effort, would be submitted, with the 
actual time and venue of the review conference unequivocally specified in its text.719 
To ensure that the Article 109(3) implementation is completed, and the review is held, there 
are four key considerations regarding the proposed resolution.  
First, it must be ensured that the review conference is not confused with the current ongoing 
UN and Council reform efforts: that is, the review is not intentionally or coincidentally 
derailed into multiple non-productive and non-substantive existing efforts. To that end, the 
resolution should be unequivocal and make clear that the objective is, as specified in Article 
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 (UNRIC 1946-2000): A/6865, paragraph 4. See also (Yearbook of the United Nations 1967): 290; and 
Chapter 7, Section 7.9. 
719
 The list of relevant resolutions referenced in the proposed resolution should at least include the first and the 
last GA resolutions mentioned, as well as the SC concurring Res. 110 (1955), Doc. S/3504. See n 716 above; 




with the same intent, despite any other parallel UN reform efforts that might be ongoing.720  
Second, the resolution must contain the exact date and time and venue of the Conference. The 
start date of the review should not be open-ended and preferably should have a conclusion 
date.721 
Third, the adoption of the proposed resolution should be based on a simple majority decision 
and not a two-thirds majority. The P5 and some of their allies or states under their influence 
may try to impose a two-thirds vote for adoption of the resolution, arguing that the review 
conference request is a new proposal, based on paragraph 1 of Article 109, therefore 
requiring a two-thirds vote of the GA to be adopted.  
The counter-argument, however, could be that this is not a new proposal but in fact a 
reaffirmation of paragraph 3 of Article 109, which facilitated a simple majority to decide 
what was already adopted in 1955²and, indeed, that the purpose of the resolution is to 
redress the breach of Article 109(3) and complete its suspended operation. 
Fourth, the sponsors of the resolution should seriously resist obtaining any type of formal 
concurrence from, or procedural involvement by, the Council. According to Chapter XVIII, 
FRQGXFWLQJ&KDUWHUUHYLHZVDQGSURSRVLQJDPHQGPHQWVLVWKH*$¶VFRQFHUQDQGZLWKWKH
                                                 
720
 For a discussiRQRIWKH³2SHQ-HQGHG´ZRUNLQJJURXSVDQG³6SHFLDO´FRPPLWWHHVRQ81UHIRUPDQGWKH
Charter that may cause confusion in purpose or suggest redundancy, see Section 9.1.1. 
721
 In fact, as the UNCIO legislative history shows, the venue had already been decided at the 1945 Conference. 
The delegates were so confident that the review would occur in 10 years that, at the closing plenary, a Turkish 
proposal of holding the review conference in San Francisco again was approved by a show of hands. (UNCIO - 
Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions 1945): 251. 
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exception of a majority concurrence at the Council (veto not applicable) on initiating a 
review, the Council has no other intervention rights.  
In fact, the review conference, once convened, is independent of both of the two main UN 
RUJDQVDQGLWVGHFLVLRQVDQGZKDWHYHU³DOWHUDWLRQV´LWDGRSWVUHTXLUHQHLWKHUWKH$VVHPEO\¶V
QRUWKH6&¶VFRQFXUUHQFHDQGLQHIIHFWZRXOGEHGLUHFWO\VXEPLtted for ratifications. 
Therefore, based on SC Resolution 110 of 1955, the Council has already given its 
concurrence for conducting the review under Article 109(3), and is not required to do so 
again. This avoidance of any legal and procedural entanglement with the Council at this stage 
is for the obvious reason that the privileged P5, which historically have resisted the Review, 
are the main stakeholders who would most likely oppose any Charter renegotiation.722 
7KH*$¶VDGRSWLRQRIWKHSURSRVHGUHVROXWLRQbased on consideration of the above four 
points, should be more likely: the reason being that almost every year there are UN reform-
type resolutions that are being adopted and corresponding committees being created or their 
mandates renewed²all adopted with at least a simple majority.723  In terms of ease of 
adoption, the proposed reactivation resolution should not be any different. In fact, the 
proposed resolution would be just a wider and more concrete alternative to the existing ones, 
which could also serve to channel the previous and the existing reform efforts into the 
Charter-endowed path.  
                                                 
722
 The strategy of avoiding any P5 concurrence or votes at the Council at the review stage is based on the fact 
that the P5 at the Council, even in cases where they are prevented from exercising their veto²as a voting 
bloc²always have disproportionate leverage. In the GA, the five account for just 3 per cent of the votes, 
whereas, at the Council, they enjoy 5 out of 15 or, as a bloc, 33.3% of the votes.  
723
 For an example of a related committee, which has had its mandate renewed every year by means of GA 
resolutions, based on simple majority, see (Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the 
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization 2014). The Special Committee on the Charter has been meeting 
every year for almost 40 years and traces its origins to Res. 992(X).  
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As a closing remark, the three separate legal strategies being proposed in this section are not 
mutually exclusive and in fact are most effective as a three-pronged action. In other words, 
all three options of a contentious case at the ICJ, one or more advisory opinion requests to the 
Court, and the reinforcing Assembly resolution should all be employed, with the first two 
options at the Court being initiated preferably before the recommended submission of the 
convocation resolution at the GA.  
The ICJ cases, in addition to their own merits, would establish the legal need and the 
backdrop for the review. 
Furthermore, the importance of the Court referrals, particularly the request for advisory 
opinions, is that the abstract UN reform topics get translated into functional and current 
global issues. The possibilities of the different UN organs and specialised agencies translating 
the types of institutional deficiencies mentioned under the second strategy into advisory 
questions, each through their own lens, are in practice many, provided that²to stay intra 
vires²WKHWRSLFVDWKDQGDUHOLQNHGWRWKH81¶VRZQGLVFRXUVHRQWKHSULQFLSOHVRI³52/´
DQGWKHIXQGDPHQWDOVRI³JRRGJRYHUQDQFH´SRVHGDVFRQVWLWXWLRQDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDO
requirements, and therefore questioning the legality of a frozen Charter.724 
The primary reason for this three-pronged strategy is to encourage not only the member 
states, but also the global public and the NGOs to become engaged, to create synergy and to 
DFWDVDPHDQVRISXWWLQJSUHVVXUHDQGWKHVSRWOLJKWRQWKHSROLWLFLDQVDQGVWDWHV¶IRUHLJQ
                                                 
724
 For examples RIWKH81¶VRZQGLVFRXUVHRQinstitutional requirements and reforms covering powerful 
concepts, see the reports of the Rule of Law Unit, the HRC High-level Panel, and the World Summit, ns 672, 
701-702, and 715 above. 
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offices and their UN representatives to take the review seriously, and, unlike in 1955, to bring 
it to a conclusion, and to stay accountable.  
9&RQYHQLQJWKH5HYLHZ:KR¶V Afraid of the Veto? 
When it comes to Charter revisions and amendments, the mighty SC is essentially excluded 
from the process. In Chapter XVIII, the amendments section of the Charter²whether 
revisions are decided in an ordinary session of the Assembly, as in Article 108, or adopted in 
D³JHQHUDOFRQIHUHQFH´GHGLFDWHGWRUHYLHZLQJWKH&KDUWHUDVLQ$UWLFOH²it is, in the end, 
the two-thirds majority of the member states that adopt the revisions and send them for the 
member states¶ governments to ratify. No approval of the Council is required and the veto 
privilege does not apply. In other words, even an explicit P5 no vote on a Charter revision 
during its adoption, on its own merits, cannot stop the adoption of the amendment. 
However, according to Charter rules, the dreaded veto comes into play at a much later stage, 
when the adopted revisions are sent to national governments for ratification. This is when a 
P5, by refusing to ratify, can defeat any adopted revision.  
7KLVVXSHULRULW\RIWKH3HYHQZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH&KDUWHU¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOIXWXUHDQGWKH
veto's applicability to the adoption of the Charter amendments, has led many politicians and 
policy and legal analysts to conclude that the Charter is immutable and therefore frozen (see 
Section 9.1.1). Historically, however, this two-step process, with first the adoption and then 
subsequently the ratification of Charter revisions, with the time window of approximately 
two years in between, KDVGHPRQVWUDWHGXQH[SHFWHGIOH[LELOLW\LQWKH3¶VYRWLQJEHKDYLRU,Q
regard to the Review, the key question is, is the veto invincible? Or can citizens and their 
elected representatives overturn a negative vote of a permanent member? 
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In the history of the UN there have been effectively three amendments which may be 
considered moderate steps in the direction of the democratisation of the organisation. In all 
three cases, two or more of the P5 formally cast their opposition.725  
My empirical observation has IXUWKHUUHYHDOHGWKDWGHVSLWHWKH3¶VLQLWLDORSSRVLWLRQDOO
three amendments were ratified within a period of two years. This finding seems to be 
possible because of the two-phase process of adoption and then later ratification of 
amendments envisioned in Articles 108 and 109, and the typical two-year period in between. 
,QDOOWKHWKUHHFDVHVHLWKHUEHFDXVHRIWKH3JRYHUQPHQWV¶UHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLUYRWHRU
because of a shift of ratification decision-making, according to their national constitutional 
processes, from their executive to their legislative branches, their earlier veto was overruled 
and the amendment was in fact been ratified. 
Consequently, it appears that the veto, in cases where it counts the most²those of Charter 
revisions²may not be invincible after all. Once the issue had left the environs of the UN 
building in New York and returned to the national capitals and governments, the veto was in 
effect overruled by the citizens and the national legislatures of the P5 states that had wielded 
it in the first place.726 And this significant but often neglected outcome in fact happened on 
all three occasions on which the UN underwent structural changes through Charter 
amendments.727  
                                                 
725
 7KHUHZDVDFWXDOO\DIRXUWKDPHQGPHQWDWHFKQLFDORQHWRFRUUHFWDQRWKHUDPHQGPHQW¶VFRQVHTXHQWLDO
negligence relating to Article 109, which is of no significance on its own, but of legal significance in this thesis. 
See Chapter 7, Sections 7.7 and 7.8. 
726
 (Sharei, Creation of a Global Parliament and the Fear of Veto 2014): 10-12. 
727
 The GA-adopted Charter-amendment resolutions corresponding to the expansion of the SC and ECOSOC 
were, respectively, Res. 1991(A) and Res. 1991(B) of 17 December 1963. The second ECOSOC expansion 
amendment was Res. 2847, adopted on 20 December 1971. For the P5 voting record on the resolutions, see, 
respectively, (Yearbook of the United Nations 1963): 87-88; and (Yearbook of the United Nations 1971): 469. 





7KHILUVWRIWKHVHDPHQGPHQWUHVROXWLRQVH[SDQGHGWKH6&¶VFRPSRVition from 11 to 15 
members in 1963. Practically all the P5 were against it. The USSR and France cast a no vote, 
while the US and the UK abstained. The second case related to enlarged representation at the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), also in 1963, and encountered similar P5 
opposition. In the third and the last case, in 1971, the amendment resolution increased the 
membership of ECOSOC from 27 to 54 states. This time, the UK and France voted no and 
the USSR abstained. But in all three cases, at the deadline date of two years for country 
ratifications to be registered, all of the P5, regardless of their earlier veto or lack of 
concurrence, had ratified the amendments, and in effect allowed the Charter to be 
changed.728  
The might of the P5 and their veto is notorious in many vital aspects of global governance, as 
realism. However, the fact has been widely neglected that, in cases where it counts the 
most²the UN Charter amendments and revisions, where the whole UN system and its 
functioning, including the use of the veto can be reformed²transferring the debate to the 
people and their national legislatures means that the veto can be challenged and in fact 
overruled.729 
What then is the countermeasure in cases of one or more P5 members casting negative votes 
at the review conference? For the Charter reformists, it seems they should not be intimidated, 




 During my research, I scarcely came across any source on the analysis of the P5 voting pattern relating to the 
three Charter amendments or the significance of the topic²that of being able to overturn the negative vote of a 
permanent member. The only exception was an analysis by Edward Luck, arguing that, when it comes to 
&KDUWHUDPHQGPHQWVD³ORQHO\YHWR´E\D3PHPEHU because of its high political costs, would be unlikely. 





3¶VSHRSOHFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGWKHQDWLRQDOSDUOLDPHQWVZKHUHKLVWRUically those societal and 
political elements of the P5 have been more amenable to the democratisation of the UN. As 
IRUWKH3H[HFXWLYHEUDQFKHVZKLFKDUHWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHVWDWHV¶NH\GHFLVLRQ-makers at the 
UN, should the review outcome result in two-thirds majority backing RIWKHZRUOG¶VVWDWHV, 
then the veto option might be legally available, but not politically. Hence, perhaps being fully 
aware of the consequences of such a situation, the P5 have, since the 1960s, consistently 
pursued the policy of avoiding a review.730 
9.5. Convening the Review: Towards a Constitutional Moment? 
In the legal strategies section on convening the review, the emphasis was on holding the 
Conference based on paragraph 3 of Article 109, rather than under the functionally equivalent 
SDUDJUDSKZKLFKDOVRSURYLGHVIRUD³JHQHUDO´UHYLHZRIWKH&KDUWHU 
There are two main reasons for opting for paragraph 3. The first is that it requires a simple 
rather than a two-thirds majority decision to hold the review conference, and it has already 
been invoked, so, technically, the review process has already begun. The second and equally 
important reason is that paragraph 3 is loaded with legislative history as to what its review 
VKRXOGDGGUHVVSDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQLWFRPHVWRWKH6&¶VVWUXFWXUe and the veto. In short, the 
spirit of Article 109(3) dictates that the present Council structure and its rules should have 
had a 10-year life-span, after which they were due for change or renewal, and that term has 
already expired. 
                                                 
730
 Ultimately, the P5²under the spotlight of a review²cannot pursue a double standard of heralding 
democracy while suppressing it at the UN, and would have to give in to the wishes of the majority. See Chapter 
7; and also n 617 above. 
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Moreover, with the UN being more than the sum of its parts and currently acting as the quasi-
world government, and after 70 years of UN experience, if a Review were held now it would 
most likely extend beyond just Council voting considerations and lead to the intended 
³JHQHUDO´ review and possible transformation.  
,QWHUPVRIVFRSHWRGD\¶V81LVLQYROYHGLQWKHJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHRIDZLGHVSHFWUXPRI
areas, other than peace and security, such as human rights, food, poverty and income gap, the 
economy and finance, the environment, international crimes, health, telecommunications, and 
other substantive as well as functional areas.  
&RQVLGHULQJWKH81¶VYDVWJRYHUQDQFHUROHLQWKHHYHQWRIDUHYLHZZLWKOHJDOUDPLILFDWLRQV
what would happen to the future of international law? With the UN and its organs being the 
direct originator of, and contributor to, the many sources of international law with extensive 
global coverage and applications, a review with a significant impact on UN law would in turn 
have a direct impact on international law.731  
                                                 
731
 See Joyner, The UN System as Source of Law (Joyner 2010): 3-65.  
For DVXPPDU\RIWKH81¶VRZQDVVHVVPHQWRILWVZLGHUROHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ-making and upholding, see: 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/uphold-international-law/. SomHRIWKH81¶VRUJDQVRURWKHUERGLHV
that make, affect, or uphold international law are: the SC, GA, the ICJ and the ad hoc courts and tribunals; the 
*$¶V6L[WK&RPPLWWHH/HJDOWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ,/&DQGWKHPDQ\81-affiliated 
multilateral bodies, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organisation 
(WHO); the subsidiary organs of the UN, such as the UN Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); and multilateral negotiating bodies, such as 
the Commission on Disarmament.  
Some of the treaties which have been directly adopted by the GA are: 
-   Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 
-   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) 
-   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966) 
-   International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) 
-   Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) 
-   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) 
-   Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
-   Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (NPT) (1996) 
-   International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) 
-   International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) 
-   International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) 
-   Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) 
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Therefore, assuming that the existing UN and Council reform efforts, including the 
substantial institutional changes required at the functional agencies, were channeled to the 
review, would the review also be receptive to fundamental legal questions and concepts 
revolutionary to international law, such as direct effect, representation, participation, 
accountability, and, in more general terms, democratisation? Or, in cognitive terms, would 
the review lead to the start of a UN constitutionalisation process? 
If the conference is convened, it seems that the review process may first go through a 
frustrating period of trying to focus on solving some issues and not others, which may not be 
possible in the complex and highly-integrated, and interrelated, globalised world.  
For example, on the subject of SC reform, assuming that an S5-type proposal732 attracts 
sufficient support at the Conference, and the veto is weeded out or survives with limited 
applicability, the second major concern with the Council reform is expansion of its size in 
terms of the permanent or non-permanent membership. In that case, what should be decided 
about the existing contested proposals: would any of them get the two-thirds majority 
backing?  
Should it be the High-OHYHO3DQHO¶V recommendation under two models that include a 
combination of new permanent and non-permanent members to be added, which would 
                                                 
-   United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or  
    Partly by Sea (2008) 
-   Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008) 
In addition, the GA has initiated and adopted resolutions that, through the facilitation and contributions of the 
ILC, have led to the creation of other multilateral treaties. Examples include the draft code of the International 
Criminal Court (1994) (later the Rome Statute, ICC, 1998) and the draft Code of Crimes against Peace and 
Security of Mankind (1996). It also drafted the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (1969), and the draft articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). See also: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011/Press_kit/fact_sheet_5_english.pdf. 
732
 See n 608 above. 
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expand the Council membership to 24 states?733 Or is it sufficient for the Council just to add 
the presumed four new super-powers²Germany, Japan, Brazil and India, as in the Group-4 
proposal?734 Or, should it take the counter proposal of the Uniting for Consensus group, led 
by the Group-4 rivals, Italy, South Korea, Mexico and Pakistan, proposing a 25-member 
Council?735 Or should the Council be inclusive of blocs of nations, such as the Arab and the 
Moslem League, or regions, such as the EU and the African Union, with some type of 
formula as to how their member states should be represented?  
In fact, one approach could be to include all the states in the above mentioned scenarios. This 
last option would likely ensure getting the necessary two-thirds majority vote. In this last 
scenario, however, we would end up with a Council that, with the possible exclusion of some 
of the micro-states, would generally resemble the GA. Is it advisable to have two assemblies, 
both representing the sovereign states? 
The review conference, most likely at first, would find itself deadlocked on the questions of 
Council reform. In fact, the past failed attempts at reforming the Council cannot all be 
DWWULEXWHGWRWKH3¶VXQZLOOLQJQHVVDQGPDQLSXODWLRQ7KHODFNRIDUHVROXWLRQKDVDOVREHHQ
partly due to the fact that the stakeholder states could not agree among themselves.736 
The problem with a standstill on the question of Council reforms at the review is that it 
cannot just be set aside, since it impacts many other institutional reforms and their regimes, 
which are interrelated with the Council.   
                                                 
733
 See n 605 above. 
734
 See n 606 above. 
735
 (McDonald and Stewart 2010): 38-39. 
736
 Ibid: 11-18. 
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For example, nuclear disarmament²a vital concern of the Assembly²would continue to be 
unresolved. Armed conflicts would continue. The election of top UN officials would continue 
to be based on politics rather than merits. The international criminal law and adjudicative 
roles of the Council would continue. And, if the P5 act as a hegemonic body, targeted lists 
without due process of the law, as well as the precedent-setting undemocratic legislative acts 
of the Council would continue to be administered, affecting global citizens and non-state 
actors, universally. With the Council, regardless of its vires, in practice, being the 
adjudicator, the legislator, and the enforcer, all-in-one, the degree of its reform could involve 
major redesign and serious structural impact on the other areas of the UN system. 
Another major topic on WKHUHYLHZ¶VDJHQGDZRXOGPRVWOLNHO\EHWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO
requirements of how to tackle global warming. The different substantive suggestions, such as 
strengthening environmental institutions, or recommendations for the creation of an 
environmental court, or streamlining the environmental agencies, perhaps under one umbrella 
upgraded to a main organ status to be called the environment or sustainable development 
³FRXQFLO´ZRXOGDOOEHRQWKHWDEOHDWWKHUHYLHZDQGVXEMHFWWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ737 However, if 
the states insist on their absolute sovereign rights and try to confine climate-change decisions 
and impacts to their own borders, reaching agreements, similar to outside the review, will be 
deadlocked. 
On the substantive human rights institutional and enforcement topics, most likely a similar 
scenario would develop.738 Human rights, since the inception of the UN in San Francisco, 
                                                 
737
 See ns 699-700 above. 
738
 For the problematique of even a single state being able to stop global HR or environmental solutions, see 




have been recognised as not only fundamentally important in themselves, but also because 
their violation is recognised as a cause of war and conflict. The HR project touched on at San 
Francisco, partly due to lack of time, was deferred to when the UN became operational and to 
future reviews.739 7KUHH\HDUVODWHULQWKH*$¶VDGRSWLRQRIWKH8QLYHUVDO'HFODUDWLRQ
of Human Rights (UDHR) was a monumental achievement that, up until the present, has 
essentially remained soft law, and in many regions of the world lacks adjudication.740 
Therefore, at the review, by trying to tweak the current ineffective HR functional regime 
based on sovereiJQVWDWHV¶FRQVHQVXVGHURJDWLRQVDQGRSWLRQDOSURWRFROVDQGDOVRZLWKRXWD
court system and enforcement, it would soon realised that, under a state-centric international 
law, the regime cannot be much improved on, and the reform efforts would soon be 
deadlocked. 
                                                 
739
 (Ramcharan 2008): 442-443. See also n 663 above. 
740
 $VZDVPHQWLRQHGHDUOLHULQWKLVFKDSWHULQWKHVHFWLRQKHDGHG³3URWHFWLRQRI)XQGDPHQWDODQG+XPDQ
5LJKWV´WKHUe is no denying that the UDHR and its spin-offs, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR have, together, 
influenced customary international law, and have formed the core of what is referred to as the International Bill 
of Human Rights. (Steiner, Alston and Goodman 2007). It is also the case that significant international and 
regional treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), have also been inspired by, and 
have successfully given effect to, the UDHR principles. In fact, the ECHR Preamble, by first acknowledging the 
8'+5VHWVDVLWVPLVVLRQWRLPSOHPHQWDQG³to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of 
the rights stated in the Universal Declaration´(European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950-2010): 
Preamble. Further, Section II of the text of the Convention has led to the establishment of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). Ibid: Sec. II. 
  
Since 1998, the ECtHR has sat as a full-time court, to which individuals, as well as European Council member 
states, can apply directly, alleging violations of civil and political rights. In almost fifty years, the Court has 
delivered more than 10,000 judgments on European human rights violations. See: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts; and 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf. However, in thH³XQLYHUVDO´FRQWH[WDQGLQWKH
UN constitutionalisation context, without global legislation, or without a global human rights court or effective 
enforcement, then, as can be observed today, in many states and regions of the world there continues to be 




Perhaps after some months (if not years) of unsuccessful attempts to resolve substantive 
global governance questions in fragments and isolation, the conference might then reach a 
FULWLFDO³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOPRPHQW´ 
In defining the constitutional moment in the UN context for governing, I suggest the 
following three fundamental apexes as the trigger for radical departure from the past and for 
the transformation of the institutional framework of the organisation. This moment would be 
reached when at least the two-thirds majority of the states at the review would come to these 
three fundamental realisations:  
1) that the fragmented global governance regime, in managing the increasingly complex 
and interrelated global challenges, has been mostly inadequate. Addressing these 
challenges requires coherent, holistic, collective and integrated approaches in 
governing²a transformation from governance to government²democratically, with 
the necessary representation, transparency and accountability;741 
 
2) that the peoples are objects and subjects of international law, and its ultimate 
legitimisers; therefore, the formal recognition and protection of a rights-based global 
citizen is necessary; 
 
3) that the states, in their collective approach to the global commons742 and peace and 
security, are compelled to share limited sovereignty mutually with other states as well 
as the global citizens. 
                                                 
741
 It seems that most of the main concepts in the first realisation have already been reached at the different areas 
within the UN system. In addition to some of the institutional assessments and reports along these lines 
mentioned earlier, the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, in its report in 2013, 
came to similar conclusions. Having recognised the shortcomings of the ³JOREDOJRYHUQDQFHUHJLPH´ 
including poor representation and also the exclusion of many of the developing countries from some of the 
multilateral regimes, such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the G-20, the Task Team noted that: 
 
In a more interdependent world, a more coherent, transparent and representative global governance 
regime will be critical to achieve sustainable development in all its dimensions ± economic, social, and 
environmental. [Emphasis added.] 
 
The ongoing Task Team is co-led by the Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) and UNDP, 
DQGKDVVHQLRUH[SHUWV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQRYHU81V\VWHPV¶VXEVLGLDULHVDQGVSHFLDODJHQFLHV(UN-DESA & 
UNDP 2013): 1-11, at 8. 
742







In other words, they would reach the grand conclusion that Global Citizens are the rightful as 
well as rights-bearing agents of global and political social transformations, the only 
legitimate interlocutors of the global interests, and for that reason the best guarantors of a just 
and a democratic global society.743 
7KLVSDUDGLJPVKLIWIURPVWDWHV¶DEVROXWHVRYHUHLJQW\WRDPXOWL-level governmental system of 
states and peoples in a federal or supranational model is not a new phenomenon and has had 
PDQ\KLVWRULFDOSUHFHGHQWV,QIDFWPRVWRIWKHZRUOG¶VH[LVWLQJIHGHUDOVWDWHVLQRQHZD\
or another, have experienced this constitutional moment.744 
)RUH[DPSOHLQWKHFDVHRIWKH86LWLVJHQHUDOO\DJUHHGWKDW$PHULFD¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
moment occurred in 1787, 11 years after the American Revolution and independence. This is 
when the original 13 sovereign states, in order to solve their interstate problems (stemming 
IURPKDYLQJDVWDWHVFRQJUHVVEXWQRSHRSOH¶VFRQJUHVVQRMXGLFLDU\DQGQRH[HFXWLYH
organs), met in Philadelphia, to review and to amend the Articles of Confederation. While at 
the convention, the member states went against the ConfedeUDWLRQ7UHDW\¶VDPHQGPHQWUXOHV
changing their formal charter rules at the conference, and abandoned consensus decision-
making. Consequently, at the Convention, the Articles of Confederation were essentially 
turned upside-down, from state-centric to populDUVRYHUHLJQW\DQGWKHIRFXVEHFDPH³ZHWKH
SHRSOH´7KHUHIRUHWKH3KLODGHOSKLDFRQIHUHQFHWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
                                                 
743
 ³7UDQVODWLQJ´0LFKDHO2¶1HDO¶VGHILQLWLRQIURPLWV(8FRQWH[W(O'neal 2008): 49. 
744
 See n 674 above. 
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Convention of the United States of America, producing a full-fledged Constitution which 
incorporated an unprecedented and significant Bill of Rights.745  




³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOPRPHQWZLWKRXWDFRQVWLWXWLRQ´746 Although it is difficult to link a specific 
FRQIHUHQFHRUWUHDW\ZLWKWKH&RPPXQLWLHV¶WUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQGLWV
constitutionalisation,747 the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 is generally associated with the 
³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOPRPHQW´IRU(XURSHZKHn the European Parliament was granted more 
powers, and, more fundamentally, the people of the Union were recognised as multi-level 
citizens and granted a rights-based European citizenship.748 
As for the review conference, and whether it would turn into a constitutional convention, on 
the basis of similar past experiences, the prospect seems to be high. After the review reaches 
VWDOHPDWHZKHUH³QRWKLQJLVDJUHHGXSRQXQOHVVHYHU\WKLQJLVDJUHHGXSRQ´SHUKDSV³DVD
SDFNDJHUDWKHUWKDQVLQJO\´749 and it reaches the earlier mentioned three realisations, 
especially on the recognition of a rights-based global citizen, that is when the conference will 
reach its transformational moment²towards a democratised and constitutionalised UN. Only 
                                                 
745
 )RUH[WHQVLYHFRYHUDJHRIWKH86¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOHYROXWLRQVHH%UXFH$FNHUPDQ¶VWZR-volume series, We 
the People, particularly volume 2, which has a detailed account of the three ³WUDQVIRUPDWLYHPRPHQWV´ he 
associates with the formation of the US Constitution, especially the constitutional moment at the Philadelphia 
Convention. (Ackerman 2000)2QFKDQJLQJWKH&RQIHGHUDWLRQ¶VFRQVHQVXVUXOHVHHLELG6HHDOVR(Baratta, 
The Politics of World Federation: United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control 2004): 7, 16. On Article 109 
parallelism with the US Constitutional Convention, see (Perez 1996): 399-403. 
746
 (Castiglione 2004): 86. 
747
 For example, Weiler, without citing a specific date or event, argues that the first phase of EU 
constitutionalisation was completed in the 1970s. (Weiler, The Transformation of Europe 1991): :HLOHU¶V
conclusion is as much based on the (&-¶Vjudicial constitutionalism, such as the Van Gend en Loos case, as it is 
on transformational treaties. 
748
 (Schutze 2014): 35-38. See also (Maas, Creating European Citizens 2007): 45-46.  
749
 On arriving at a package solution rather than a sum of singular ones as a technique in negotiations that have 




then will the vision, the achievable goals, and the path become crystallised, and the required 
institutional structure and components, to a degree, start to fall into place at the Conference. 
Towards constitutionalisation, some of the fundamental convergences at the review might be 
as follows.  
With the recognition of the rights-based global citizen, the next step is representation. A 
chamber representing the states²the GA²is already in existence, but, on the path to 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQDSHRSOHV¶DVVHPEO\DSDUOLDPHQWQHHGVWREHHVWablished. Perhaps the 
dysfunctional Council, which has embarked on adjudicative and legislative roles before, can 
now be formally replaced by a democratic parliament, towards legitimate legislation of our 
³JOREDOFRPPRQV´750  
The Secretariat and the operatiRQRIWKH81PXVWEHFRPHLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKH3¶VILQDQFLDO
and power politics, and the election of the Secretary-General and the senior officials should 
be merit-EDVHGDQGGHPRFUDWLFSHUKDSVEDVHGRQWKHUHVROYHRIERWKWKHVWDWHV¶$VVHPEO\
and the envisioned parliamentary assembly. Further, an empowered and independent ICJ and 
judiciary is vital and one of the main pillars of constitutionalism that must be grounded in any 
future Charter revision.751 
That said, it would be hard to imagine that, at the first review of the Charter of the UN, there 
will be a major constitutional turn, similar to that experienced by the US. However, once the 
transformational awareness is reached, most likely at the review, the foundations are laid and 
                                                 
750
 See n 664 above. 
751
 Specific Charter transformation proposals and policy recommendations are not in the scope of this thesis. 
However, the few principles and features highlighted above are in fact extracts from the Constitutional section 
of this chapter.  
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the initial steps taken, the complementary steps can be left to subsequent reviews and future 
dynamics of the constitutionalisation process.  
For example, on the subject of democratic representation, the first step might be exactly what 
the Independent Expert and some NGO observers have recommended, and which is included 
LQWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV&RXQFLO¶VVWXG\RI³3URPRWLRQRIDDemocratic and Equitable 
International Order´ZKLFKLVRQWKH6HFUHWDU\-*HQHUDO¶VGHVNDZDLWLQJSRVVLEOHIXUWKHU
action.752  
This study recommends, without going into great detail, the establishment of a UN 
parliamentary assembly (UNPA).753 Such a parliamentary assembly would presumably be 
primarily an advisory and monitoring body, consisting of the sitting parliamentarians, with 
the capacity to review, recommend and monitor, particularly in relation to the substantive GA 
and Council decisions. The UNPA, while being a relatively quick, low cost, low controversy 
and easy to implement interim solution, should be of added value not only in its consultative 
role, but also, to some extent, in adding to the legitimisation of the UN and its decisions, as 
the top-layered global organisation. 
7KHILUVWUHYLHZPD\DOVRLPSOHPHQWDQRWKHURIWKH+5&¶VH[SHUWUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVZKLFKLV
the establishment of a global human rights court, perhaps similar to the European Court of 
Human Rights.754 
                                                 
752
 (Zayas 2013): 24. See also the two related GA resolutions (General Assembly Documentation Center 1946-








constitutionalisation, and what would be some of the possible consequences, if one or more 
of the P5 decide not to ratify the outcome of the review? 
/HWXVUHFDOOWKDWDSHUPDQHQWPHPEHU¶Vno YRWHFDQQRWVWRSWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHUHYLHZ¶V
recommended changes. In fact, according to the Charter rules, the review conference is run 
independently of the GA and presumably can have its own rules of procedure. Its output does 
not require a GA resolution or its explicit adoption, or the concurrence of the SC.755 
Based on historical precedents, it can be presumed that the global political liability for a P5 
state is too high for it to go against the majority and oppose the ratification of Charter 
amendments, as this would mean opposing what has been adopted by at least two-thirds of 
virtually all the states in the world.756  
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 $FFRUGLQJWR.HOVHQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH³*HQHUDO&RQIHUHQFH´DQGZKRSUHVLGHVRYHULWGRHVQRWIDOO
under the auspices of either the GA or the Council. (Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis 
of its Fundamental Problems 1950): 822. (Schwelb, Charter Review and Charter Amendment--Recent 
Developments 1958): 322. See also (Simma, Mosler, et al. 2002): 1368. For differing views by member states 
during the 1950s on ratification procedures, see (Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-2 1955-
1959), especially 553; and (Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-3, 1959-1966), especially 
259. 
 
With the charter being silent on how the review should conduct its business and on its apparent independence, 
the conference could be given the freedom to decide on its size and scope of work, and, in addition, be permitted 
some degree of leeway in defining and refining the details of the ratification procedures. For example, in the 
event of a queue of states waiting to be admitted to the UN, the conference could decide on the question of what 
constitutes the two-thirds ratifications. Is it two-thirds of member states at the time of adoption, or later, at the 
time of the last required ratification²at which time the number of member states might have changed?  
A more vital question that can be decided internally by the conference is how to treat P5 acquiescence at the 
ratification stage. 
  
This is to anticipate the highly likely strategy of a P5 government that, while not intending to ratify the proposed 
changes, at the same time attempts to dodge the domestic and international public debate and pressure. 
Therefore, the P5 government would not take the typically required parliamentary action on ratification, or 
ZRXOGVORZLWVSURFHVVE\OHWWLQJWKHFRQIHUHQFH¶VUDWLILFDtion deadline pass, in the hope of its inaction being 
interpreted as a veto aQGODFNRI³FRQFXUUHQFH´+RZHYHUWKHFRQIHUHQFHVHHPVWRKDYHWKHFRPSHWHQF\WR
decide beforehand that, unless there is an explicit rejection by a P5 national government, that P¶VDFTXLHVFHQFH
RQWKHUHYLHZ¶VDGRSWHG amendments ZRXOGDOVRFRXQWDV³FRQFXUUHQFH´7KLVZRXOGEHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH
existing SC practice that a P5 abstention from a vote at the Council is interpreted as a concurrence. 
756
 See Section 9.4. 
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Three of the P5, France, Russia and the UK, have a questionable status as the top five super 
states in terms of population or size of the economy. Nor are they the exclusive members of a 
five-member nuclear-ZHDSRQVFOXEDQ\ORQJHU,QDGGLWLRQZLWKWKH3¶VRYHUDOOSRRU
performance in keeping the world free of armed conflicts during the past 70 years, those 
states cannot expect to hold on to their World War II legacy of unequal UN rights and would 
more likely follow the majority decision at the Conference.757 
As to the other two permanents members, China and the US, based on the size of their 
populations or their economies, they may be classified as super-powers and could still vie for 
the Yalta formula over any other voting procedure at the review, and opt not to ratify the 
adopted Charter changes. 
But in the globDOQHLJKERXUKRRGZKDWDUHWKHLURWKHURSWLRQV"&KLQD¶VOLYHOLKRRGDQG
economy owes its success to globalisation and it therefore cannot afford the risk of staying 
outside of the global community. 
As for the US, it is probably the only P5 member that is powerful enough and presumably 
independent enough from the rest of the world to opt to stay out of the UN. In that unlikely 
HYHQWVXFKDVFHQDULRVKRXOGQRWODVWORQJFRQVLGHULQJWKDWWRGD\¶VZRUOGLVPXFKPRUH
globalised than that which existed during the US isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s. Then, 
most of the American continent and Latin America were not isolated from the US and were 
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 In the case of France and the UK, these two states have additional foreign relations and UN obligations to 




 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN, accessed 16 
February 2015. For the possible constructive role of the EU in SC reforms, see (Finizio 2013): 307-308. 
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part of its sphere of influence, which is no longer true.758 But still, the isolationism of that 
SHULRGZLWQHVVHGWKH³*UHDW'HSUHVVLRQ´LQWKH867KHUHIRUHWKH86VLPLODUWR&KLQDEXW
perhaps with higher tolerance, could not deny its global economic and other 
interdependencies and stay outside of the world community for too long. 
,QIDFWMXGJLQJE\WKH86¶VRZQFRQVWLWXWional history, it seems a scenario of a US without 
the UN would be very short-lived. During the 1787 transition of the Confederation to the 
federal union, the then super-power state of New York, having doubts about a United States 
of America, did not adopt the Philadelphia &RQYHQWLRQ¶VSURSRVDOVDQGZDVQRWRQHRIWKH
founding states that ratified the constitution at the time that the US was legally created. 
However, shortly thereafter, the state of New York, recognising the synergy and the moral 
and material power of the union, rejoined its ex-Confederation members in a 
constitutionalised United States of America.759  
7KHUHIRUHLQWKHXQOLNHO\HYHQWRIWKH86QRWUDWLI\LQJWKHUHYLHZ¶VSURSRVDOVDQGRSWLQJWR
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 (Chomsky 2004) 
759
 See n 745 above. See also: 




Governance is what governments do.760 In fact, a state without a government is considered a 
failed state and the condition is called anarchy. In the global setting without a government, if 
JOREDOJRYHUQDQFHLVIXQFWLRQLQJLWVHHPVWREHD³P\VWHU\´²but in many substantive areas 
it is not; it is in fact dysfunctional and anarchic.  
Within the patchwork of fragmented global governance organisations, the closest institution 
resembling a quasi-world government is the United Nations, which with its shared 
sovereignty and supremacy clauses embedded in its Charter, has demonstrated that in 
DGGLWLRQWREHLQJWKHZRUOG¶VEURNHUof the legal use of coercion, in practice, it is also 
adjudicating and legislating universally.  
+RZHYHUWKLV³JHQHUDO´DQGQHDUO\DOO-encompassing world organisation, with large impact 
on creating and upholding international law761, at the global scale, and the promoter of human 
ULJKWVDQGWKH³UXOHRIODZ´LVGHILFLHQWLQGHPRFUDF\DQGOHJLWLPDF\,QIDFWLWVPRVW
SRZHUIXORUJDQFDSDEOHRIGHYLVLQJDQGHQIRUFLQJ³KDUG´ODZLVD:RUOG:DU,,PDUWLDOODZ
legacy, designed to be administered by the Five Permanent Members.762 
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 (Yunker 2014): 1-13. 
 
761
 Here, international law impact, is considered more in its global context, not bi-lateral or regional treaties. For 
the current large UN impact, in, creation or origination, and upholding of global international law, see, above:  
n 731. 
762
 The fact that the Council would have extraordinary powers DQGZRXOGEHGRPLQDWHGE\WKH3³WKHMXU\WKH
MXGJHDQGWKHH[HFXWLRQHU´DOO-in-one, was mostly referenced in the legislative history chapters, Ch. 4 and 5; 
For examples, see views expressed by foreign ministers of Egypt and Netherlands, respectively at, Ch. 4: n 220 
and Ch. 5: Sec. 5.2.  
However, that war-time design and governance mentality still prevailing today, is perhaps best explained by 
Kishore Mahbubani, experienced personally by him while being the President of the Security Council from 
Singapore in 2002. Mahbubani, while explaining the non-democratic procedural means the P5 were employing, 
such aV³LPSOLHGYHWRHV´DQG³GRXEOHYHWRHV´DQGZKLOHWKH\ODEHOOHGWKHQRQ-permanent members of the 
&RXQFLODV³WRXULVWV´WKDWGHVSLWHWKHLUGLIIHUHQFHVZKHQLWFDPHWRWKHLU3LQWHUHVWVDWWKH81WKH\RIWHQDFWHG
in harmony. Mahbubani argues that keeping ³LQVWLWXWLRQVRIJOREDOJRYHUQDQFHZHDN´LVLQWHQWLRQDODQGWKDWWKH
³3KDVGLVWRUWHGWKH81V\VWHPWRVHUYHWKHLQWHUHVWVRIILYHFRXQWULHVRIWHQDWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKH
YDVWPDMRULW\RIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXODWLRQ´ (Mahbubani 2013): 223-238. 
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Alexander Wendt, considered one of the living icons and theoreticians in the field of IR, has 
DUJXHGWKDWD³ZRUOG-VWDWHLVLQHYLWDEOH´ 763 His prediction:  it will happen within one to two 
hundred years.764  
The Americans in the early 1940s, with a little help from the rest of the world, attempted to 
create a quasi-ZRUOGJRYHUQPHQWSDUWO\PRGHOOHGRQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶H[SHULHQFH765 With a 
chamber of states, a judiciary, and the underpinning institutional structures to provide for not 
only world peace and security but also for humanity in the areas of social, cultural, 
technological, and economical rights and needs. 
The United Nations that was created was a much scaled-down version of that world union 
dream, and more of a world order766 regime to prevent conflicts and maintain peace²with 
one birth-defect. The major defect detected at the foundational time was in one of the 
principal organs, the Security Council.  
                                                 
 
763
 (Wendt, Why a World State is Inevitable 2003): 491-542. 
764
 Ibid: 492. 
765
 7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶ZRUOGJRYHUQPHQWIHYHURIWKHVERWKSXEOLFDQGJRYHUQPHQWDODQGWKHNH\UROHRI
President Roosevelt in promotion of his Four Freedoms DQGWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHLGHDOVRIWKH³8QLWHG1DWLRQV´
beyond a security pact were explained in Ch. 6 and 7. However, probably the second most important American 
political personality, often neglected, who played a leading role in the founding of the UN was Vice-President 
Harry Truman. Taking over from Roosevelt after his death, President Truman steered the last few months of the 
founding to its completion and ratification. At those times, Truman was influenced by AlfreG/RUG7HQQ\VRQ¶V
poem, Locksley Hall (the Parliament of Man), including the following verse: 
Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle-flags were furled 
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the World. 
Truman was known to carry the poem iQKLVZDOOHWDQGUHDGLO\VKRZHGWKHYHUVHVGXULQJWKH\HDUVRIWKH81¶V
formation and at the San Francisco Conference. (Schlesinger 2003): 5-6; And, (P. Kennedy 2006): xii. See also, 
(Baratta, The Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to Global Governance 2004): 485.  
766
 The Anti-veto majority DW81&,2ZHUHRSWLQJIRUPRUHWKDQD³ZRUOGRUGHU´EXW³ZRUOGMXVWLFH´6HHCh. 5, 




.QRZLQJWKDWWKH81EHLQJGHOLYHUHGZDV³QRHQFKDQWHGSDODFH´767 the visionary leaders 
VRXJKWUHPHG\DWWKH&RQIHUHQFH7KHJUHDWFRPSURPLVHUHDFKHGZDVLQWHQ\HDUV¶WLPH
EDVHGRQWKH³H[SHULHQFHV´JDLQHGWRUHIRUPWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGSDUWLFXODUO\LWV&RXQFLO768 
If Wendt is correct and if we are to have a world-state it might as well be a constitutional one. 
Not one modelled after an Orwellian blueprint or an end-game product of one of the global 
hegemons becoming the single empire.769The forum and the legal place to start, it seems, is 
what we were endowed in the Charter with the General Review to bootstrap the process of 
the transforming the United Nations and consequently international law. Article 109(3) holds 
the intent and the spirit and it seems that its fulfillment would set the wheels of international 
law constitutionalisation in motion. 
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 The words of Lord Halifax, acting chairman of the UK delegation at San Francisco. (Mazower 2008): 1. 
 
768
 The rich set of related UNCIO references were covered in the legislative history chapters, esp. the Great 
Compromise, Ch. 5, esp. Sec. 5.6. 
 
769
 As an argument that a kind of a liberal hegemon may be a good idea and in fact America is already acting as 





Notes to Bibliography: 
x All electronic documents, unless otherwise noted, were last accessed 18 January 
2016. 
x The online sources are listed in the footnotes, except the ones which were used more 
than once, in which case their full link access is expanded here. 
x The full list of court cases used are in the ³7DEOHRI&RXUWVDQG&DVHV´VHFWLRQDWWKH
beginning of the thesis. However, where available, the online links to some of the 
cases are listed here for easy web access. 
 
Acheson, Dean. 1969. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: 
Norton. 
Ackerman, Bruce. 2000. We the People: Volume 2: Transformations. Belknap Press. 
Akande, Dapo. 2014. UN General Assembly and Security Council Elect four Judges to the 
ICJ But Fail to Agree on a Fifth, Again! Accessed February 24, 2015. 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/icj-elections-2014-un-general-assembly-and-security-council-
elect-four-judges-to-the-icj-but-fail-to-agree-on-a-fifth-again/. 
Alvarez, Jose. 2003. "Hegemonic International Law Revisited." American Journal of 
International law (AJIL) 97 (4): 873-888. 
². 2005. International Organizations as Law-makers. Oxford University Press. 
Alvarez, Jose. 1996. "Judging the Security Council ." AJIL 90 (1): 1-39. 
Alvarez, Jose. 2008. "Legal Perspectives." In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 
edited by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws. Oxford University Press. 
Andenas, Mads, and Eirik Bjorge. 2015. In A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and 
Convergence in International Law. CUP. 
Annan, Kofi. 2002. "What is the International Community? Problems Without Passports." 
Foreign Policy 30-31. 
Archives, US National. n.d. http://www.archives.gov/. 
420 
 
Arsanjani, Mahnoush. 1999. "Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the ICC." In Reflections 
on the International Criminal Court, Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos, edited by 
Herman Herbel, Johan Lammers and Jolien Schukking. T.M.C. Asser Press. 
Aust, Anthony. 2013. Modern Treaty Law and Practice. 3rd. CUP 
Backer, Larry. 2009. "From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for 
Legitimate Public Power Systems." Penn State Law Review 113 (3): 101-178. 
Baratta, Joseph. 2004. The Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to Global 
Governance. Vol. 2. II vols. Praeger. 
². 2004. The Politics of World Federation: United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control. 
Vol. 1. II vols. Praeger. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif. 1996. "International Crimes: "Jus Cogens" and "Obligatio Erga 
Omnes" ." Law and Contemporary Problems 59 (4): 63-74. 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=lcp. 
Beeson, M. 2009. "The G-20 and the International Economic Governance: Hegemony, 
Collectivisim, or Both?" Global Governance 67-86. 
Benvenisti, Eyal, and George Downs. 2007. "The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy 
and the Fragmentation of International Law." Stanford Law Review (60): 595-624. 
Berman, Sir Franklin. 1999. "The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and 
the Security Council." In Reflections on the International Criminal Court, Essays in 
Honour of Adriaan Bos, edited by Herman Hebel, Johan Lammers and Jolien 
Schukking. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
Bernstroff, Jochen. 2011. The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen, Believing in 
Universal Law. Cambridge University Press. 
Besson, Samantha. 2009. "Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and 
democracy." In Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance, edited by Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, 381-408. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bhagavan, Manu. 2013. India and the Quest for One World: the Peace Makers. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Bjorge, Eirik. 2014. The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties. OUP. 
Black, Henry. 1994. Black's Law Dictionary. 6th. Springer. 
421 
 
Blum, Yehuda. 2005. "Proposals for UN Security Council Reform." AJIL 99: 632-649. 
Bosco, David. 2009. Five to Rule Them All, The UN Security Council and the Making of The 
Modern World. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Boulden, Jane. 2008. "Terrorism." In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by 
Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, 427-436. Oxford University Press. 
Boyle, Alan, and Christine Chinkin. 2007. The Making of International Law. Oxford 
University Press. 
Brown, Chester. 2007. A Common Law of International Adjudication. Oxford University 
Press. 
Brown, Chester. 2009. "A Common Law of International Adjudication." European Journal of 
International Law (EJIL) 20 (1): 230-233. 
Brown, Chester. 2012. "Article 59." In The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary, edited by Karin Oellers-Frahm, Christian Tomuschat, Christian Tams, 
Andreas Zimmermann. OUP. 
Brownlie, Ian. 1998. Principles of Public International Law. 5th Edition. OUP. 
Buchanan, Alen, and Robert Keohane. 2006. "The legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions." Ethics and International Affairs.  
Burroughs, John. 1997. The Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the 
Historic Opinion of the International Court of Justice. LIT Verlag. 
Buruma, Ian. 2013. Year Zero: A History of 1945. The Penguin Press. 
Cabrera, Luis. 2011. "Global Institutional Visions." In Global Governance, Global 
Government: Institutional Visions for an Evolving World System, edited by Luis 
Cabrera, 1-26. State University of New York. 
2013. Cambodian Tribunal Monitor. http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/. 
Campell, Craig. 2010. "The Resurgent Idea of World Government," edited by Paul Diehl and 
Brian Frederking; 397-408. Lynne Rienner Publishing. 
Caron, David. 2004. "The Reconstruction of Iraq: Dealing with Debt." University of 
California, Davis. 122-143. 
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 




Cass, Deborah. 2005. The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization, 
Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System. Oxford 
University Press. 
Cassese, Antonio. 2008. International Criminal Law. 2nd. Oxford University Press. 
². 2005. International Law. Second Edition. OUP. 
Castiglione, Dario. 2004. "A Constitutional Moment without a Constitution?" In Deliberative 
Constitutional Politics in the EU, edited by Carlos Carlos Closa and John Fossum. 
Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/projects/cidel/old/Reports/AlbarracinRep
ort_PartI.pdf. 
Center for Legislative Archives (USA)-Committee on Foreign Relations. 1947-1968. 
"Committee on Foreign Relations (1947-1968)." Guide to the Records of the U.S. 
Senate at the National Archives. 
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-10-1947-1968.html. 
Cerone, John. 2007. "Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes Toward 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals." European Journal of International Law 
18 (2): 277-315. 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations. 1962. (International Court of Justice, July 20). 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/49/5261.pdf. 
Chalmers, Damian, Gareth Davies, and Giorgio Monti. 2010. European Union Law: Text and 
Materials. 2nd. Cambridge. 
1945-2015. "Charter of the United Nations." http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. 
Cheneval, Francis, Sandra Lavenex, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2014. "Demoi-cracy in the 
European Union: principles, institutions, policies." Journal of European Public Policy 
22 (1): 1-18. 
Chesterman, Simon, Thomas Franck, and David Malone. 2008. Law and Practices of the 
United Nations. Oxford University Press. 
Childers, Erskine. 2011. "Development Dialouge." 
Chomsky, Noam. 2004. Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance. Holt 
Paperbacks. 




2014. "Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC)." Accessed February 9, 2014. 
http://www.iccnow.org/. 
Cohen, Jean. 2010. "Constitutionalism Beyond the State." ReconWorkingPapers. 
http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_1016.pdf?fileitem=5456414. 
Condorelli, Luigi, and Santiago Villapando. 2002. Referral and Deferral by the Security 
Council. Vol. I, in The Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, edited by Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John Jones. 
Corner, Mark. 2010. The Binding of Nations, From European Union to World Union. 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Corten, Olivier. 2011. "Article 52, Coercion of a State by the Threat or Use of Force." In The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary, by Corten Olivier and 
Pierre Klein. Oxford University Press. 
Cortright, David, George Lopez, and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf. 2008. "Sanctions." In The 
Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, 
359-369. Oxford University Press. 
Cot, Jean-Pierre. 2011. "1969 Vienna Convention." In The Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties, A Commentary, by Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein. Oxford University 
Press. 
Crabera, Luis. 2006. Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World 
State. London: Rutledge. 
Craig, Paul, and Grainne De Burca. 2007. EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford 
University Press. 
². 2011. The Evolution of EU Law. Oxford University Press. 
Crawford, James, and Tom Grant. 2008. "International Court of Justice." In The Oxford 
Handbook on the United Nations, edited by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, 193-213. 
Oxford University Press. 
Crawford, James, Philippe Sands, and Ralph Wilde. 2004. "Joint Opinion, In the Matter of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court and In the Matter of Bilateral 
Agreements Sought by the United States Under Article 98(2) of the Statute." 




2011. "Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law." Security Council Report. Accessed 12 05, 
2014. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/XCutting%20Rule%20of%20Law%202011.pdf. 
Cryer, Robert, Tamara Hervey, and Bal Sokhi-Bulley. 2011. Research Methodologies in EU 
and International Law. Hart Publishing. 
Czempie, Ernst-Otto. 1992. "Governance and Democratization." In Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James Rosenau and 
Ernst-Otto Czempie. Cambridge University Press. 
Davis, Kevin, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry. 2012. "Introduction: Global 
Governance by Indicators." In Governance by Indicators: Global Power through 
Classification and Rankings (Law and Global Governance), by Kevin Davis, 
Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry. Oxford University 
Press. 
de Larrinaga, Miguel, and Marc Doucet. 2010. Security and Global Governmentality: 
Globalization, Governance and the State. Edited by Miguel de Larrinaga and Marc 
Doucet. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 
De Wet, Erika, and Jure Vidmar. 2012. "Conclusions." In Hierarchy in International Law, 
The Place of Human Rights, by Jure Vidmar and Erika De Wet, 301-302. Oxford 
University Press. 
Dehaussy, Jacques. 2005. "Article 109." In La Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire 
article par article, by Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet and Mathias Forteau, 2219-2228. 
Economica. 
1945. "Delegates and Officials of the UNCIO - Doc 639 G/3(2)." United Nations Conference 
on International Organizations. United Nations Information Organisation. 
Dicker, Richard. 2012. Human Right Watch - UN Security Council: Address Inconsistency in 
ICC Referrals . October 12. Accessed April 8, 2013. 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/16/un-security-council-address-inconsistency-icc-
referrals-0. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge WEERAMANTRY. 1996. (ICJ). http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7521.pdf. 
Distefano, Giovanni. 2011. Article 51 Coercion of a Represtative of a State. Vol. II, in The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary, by Olivier Corten and 
Pierre Klein. Oxford University Press. 
425 
 
Domingo, Rafael. 2011. The New Global Law: ASIL, Studies in International Legal Theory. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dopagne, Frederic. 2011. "Article 4, Non-retroactivity of the Present Convention." In The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary, by Olivier Corten and 
Pierre Klein, 79-85. Oxford University Press. 
Doyle, Michael. 2010. "A Global Constitution? The Struggle over the UN Charter." Hauser 
Globalization Colloquium: NYU Symposium. 1-23. Accessed September 09, 2014. 
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/HC2010Sept22.Doyle.pdf. 
Doyle, Michael. 2009. "The UN Charter²A Global Constitution?" In Ruling the World?: 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey 
Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, 113-132. Oxford University Press. 
Duke. 1963. "Certain Expenses of the United Nations: Advisory Opinion." Duke Law Journal 
304-307. http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol12/iss2/. 
Dunoff, Jeffrey, and Joel Trachtman. 2009. "A Functional Approach to International 
Constitutionalization." In Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, 3-35. 
Cambridge University Press. 
ECJ, cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council of the EU and Commission of the European Communities. 2008. (European 
Court of Justice, September 3). 
EUR-Lex. 2015. "European Union Law Documents." EUR-Lex. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML. 
European Commission (C-584/10 P), Council of the European Union (C-593/10 P), United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (C-595/10 P) v Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi. 2013. Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P (The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), July 18). Accessed 21 November, 2013. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=139745&mode=req&pageI
ndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=155332. 
1950-2010. "European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)." 
Falk, Richard. 1999. Law in an emerging global village:a post-Westphalian perspective. 
Hotei Publishing. 
Falk, Richard. 2007. "What Comes After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge." Widener 
Law Review 243-254. 
426 
 
Falk, Richard, and Andrew Strauss. 2008. "Give citizens a voice." The Times of India.  
Falk, Richard, and Andrew Strauss. 2000. "On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: 
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty." Stanford Journal of Int. Law 36 
(2): 191-219. 
Fassbender, Bardo. 2009. "Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on the Place of the 
UN Charter in the International Legal Order." In Ruling the World?: 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey 
Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, 133-147. Oxford University Press. 
². 2009. The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community 
(Legal Aspects of International Organization). Brill. 
Finizio, Giovanni. 2013. "The Security Council Reform as a "Sustainable Process": The Role 
of the European Union." In Democracy at the United Nations: UN Reform in the Age 
of Globalization, edited by Giovanni Finizio and Enesto Gallo, 289-316. Peter Lang. 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia. 2006. "The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties." In 
International Law, edited by Malcolm Evans. Oxford University Press. 
Flynn, Jeffrey. 2014. Reframing the Intercultural Dialogue on Human Rights: A 
Philosophical Approach. Routledge. 
Focarelli, Carlo. 2008. "The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian 
Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities For A Working Doctrine." Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 13 (2). 
2014. "Forum of Federations²The Global Network on Federalism and Devolved 
Governance." Accessed December 07, 2015. 
http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/federalismbycountry.php. 
2013. "Fox News." UN fund pays out $1.3 billion compensation for Iraq's Kuwait invasion, 
total tops $40 billion. Jannuary 24. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/01/24/un-
fund-pays-out-13-billion-compensation-for-iraq-kuwait-invasion-total-tops-40/. 
Franck, Thomas. 2006. "The Security Council as World Legislator?" Discussion Paper Based 
on Panel 1 of the series, "The Role of the Security Council in Strengthening a Rules-
Based International System". Institute for International Law and Justice - NYU Law. 
1-6. 
Fraser, Peter. 1945. United Nations Conference on International Organization, Report on the 
Conference held at San Francisco 25 April - 26 June 1945, by the Rt. Hon. Peter 
Fraser, Chairman of the New Zealand Delegation. Publication No. 11, Wellington: 
New Zealand, Department of External Affairs. 
427 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. 2002. "U.S. vs. Them: Opposition to American policies must not become 
the chief passion in global politics." Washington Post A17. 
GA 6th Committee (Legal Committee): A/C.6L.306/rev.2. 1953. A/C.6L.306/rev.2 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). 1997. (ICJ, September 25). 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf. 
Gaddis, John. 2007. The Cold War; The Deals, The Spies, The Lies, The Truth. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Gardiner, Richard. 2014. "Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation ." In The Oxford 
Guide to Treaties, by Duncan Hollis. OUP. 
Gavin, Brigit. 2001. The European Union and globalisation: towards global democratic 
governance. Edward Elgar. 
General Assembly Documentation Center. 1946-2015. "UN General Assembly 
Documentation Center (ONLINE)." GA Resolutions, Documentation Center, United 
Nations General Assembly. http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm. 
General Assembly Official Records (A/58/47). 2004. Report of the Open-ended Working 
Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the 
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security 
Council. United Nations. 
Glasius, Marlies. 2002. "Expertise in the Cause of Justice: Global Civil Society Influence on 
the Statute for an International Criminal Court." In Global Civil Society 2002, edited 
by Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheier. Oxford University Press. 
Glennon, Michael. 2003-2004. "The UN Security Council in a Unipolar World." Virginia 
Jounal of International Law 44 (1): 91-112. 
Goldsmith, Jack, and Eric Posner. 2005. The Limits of International Law. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Green, Robert. 2010. Security Without Nuclear Deterrance. Christchurch, New Zealand: 
Astron Media. 
². 2010. Security Without Nuclear Deterrance. Christchurch, New Zealand: Astron Media. 
Grenville, Clark, and Louis Sohn. 1958. World Peace Through World Law. Harvard 
University Press. 




Hajer, Maarten, and Hendrik Wagenaar. 2003. Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding 
Governance in the Network Society. 
http://www.maartenhajer.nl/upload/DPAIntro.pdf. 
Hale, Thomas, David Held, and Kevin Young. 2013. Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is 
Failing When We Need it most. Polity. 
Happold, Matthew. 2003. "Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the 
United Nations." Leiden Journal of International Law 16: 593-610. 
Held, David. 2010. Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Polity. 
Hensley, Gerald. 2009. Beyond the Battle Field, New Zealand and its Allies 1939-45. 
Auckland: Penguin Group. 
Higgins, Rosalyn. 1963. Development of International Law Through Political Organs of the 
United Nations. OUP. 
High-level Panel on Global Sustainability. 2012. Resilient people, resilient planet: a future 
worth choosing. A/66/700, UNGA, 102. Accessed January 30, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/700. 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 2004. A/59/565. UN General 
Assembly, 99. Accessed November 02, 2014. https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/602/31/PDF/N0460231.pdf?OpenElemen. 
Hollis, Duncan. 2014. In The Oxford Guide to Treaties. OUP. 
Howse, Robert, and Ruti Teitel. 2009. "Beyond the Divide: The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Political Rights and the World Trade Organization." In The 
World Trade Organization and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, by 
Sarah Joseph, David Kinley and Jeff Waincymer. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5749.pdf. 1973. FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE, 
(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN Ireland V. Iceland) 
(International Court of Justice (ICJ), February 2). Accessed May 2, 2014. 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5749.pdf. 
Hunt, Murray, Hayley Hooper, and Paul Yowell. 2015. Parliaments and Human Rights: 
Redressing the Democratic Deficit. Hart Publishing. 
Hurd, Ian. 2007. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security 
Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
ICCPR. 1966-1976. "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." OHCHR.  
429 
 
ICJ Annual Report. 2014-2015. Report of the International Court of Justice http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/en/reports/report_2014-2015.pdf. 
2013. "International Criminal Court (ICC)." Accessed February 18, 2014. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Pages/default.aspx. 
Isaacson, Walter. 2007. Einstein: his life and universe / Walter Isaacson Simon & Schuster, 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Istrefi, Kushtrim. 2012-2013. "The Application of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter 
in the European Courts: the Quest for Regime Compatibility on Fundamental Rights." 
European Journal of Legal Studies 5 (2): 81-93. 
Jackson, John. 1995. "International Economic Law: Reflections on the "boilerroom" of 
International Relations." American University Journal of International Law and 
Policy 10 (2): 595-606. 
Jackson, Vicki. 2009. Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era. Oxford University 
Press. 
Jolly, Richard, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas Weiss. 2009. UN Ideas That Changed the World. 
Indiana University Press. 
Johnstone, Ian. 2008. "Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing 
down the Deliberative Deficit." American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 102 
(2): 275-308. 
Joseph, Sarah. 2009. "Democratic Deficit, Participation and The WTO." In The WTO and 
Human Rights, edited by Sarah Joseph, David Kinley and Jeff Waincymer. Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
Joyner , Christopher. 2010. "The UN System as a Source of Law." In The United Nations and 
International Law, edited by Christopher C. Joyner. CUP. 
Juni, Robin. 2000-2001. "The United Nations Compensation Commission as a Model for an 
International Environmental Court." Environmental Law 53 (7): 53-73. 




K. Krishna, Rao. 1955. "The General Conference for the Review of the Charter of the United 
Nations." Fordham Law Review 24. 
Kelsen, Hans. 1944 (reprint 2008). Peace Through Law. The Law Book Exchange Ltd. 
430 
 
². 1950. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems. 
The Law Book Exchange (Reprint 2008). 
Kennedy, David. 2011. Mystery of Global Governance. Princeton University Press. 
Kennedy, David. 2009. "The Mystery of Global Governance." In Ruling the World?: 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey 
Dunoff and Joel Trachtman. Cambridge University Press. 
Kennedy, Paul. 2006. The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and the Future of the United 
Nations. First Vintage Books. 
Klabbers, Jan. 2011. "Setting the Scene." In The Constitutionalization of International Law, 
edited by Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, 1-44. Oxford University Press. 
². 2010. The Genre of Constitutionalization? And Constitutionalization and Law-making. 
Accessed September 1, 2014. http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/jklabbers/. 
Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. 2011. "Epilogue: Debate on EJIL Talk! Blog." 
In The Constitutionalization of International Law, edited by Jan Klabbers, Anne 
Peters and Geir Ulfstein. Oxford University Press. 
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2007. "Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes 
about International Law and Globalization." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (8): 9-36. 
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2006. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682. 
Koskenniemi, Martti. 1995. "The Police in the Temple²Order, Justice and the UN: A 
Dialectical View." European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 6 (1): 325-348. 
Koskenniemi, Martti. 1990. "The Politics of International Law." The European Journal of 
International Law (EJIL) 1: 1-32. 
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2009. "The Politics of International Law²20 Years Later." The 
European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 20 (1): 7-19. 
Krisch, Nico. 2013. "Constitutionalism and Pluralism: A Reply to Alec Stone Sweet." 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 11 (2): 501-505. 
Krisch, Nico. 2010. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law. 
Oxford University Press. 
431 
 
Kuijper, Pieter Jan. 2011. "The European Courts and the Law of Treaties: The Continuing 
Story." In The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, by Enzo Cannizzaro. 
Oxford University Press. 
2009. "The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State." In Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance, by Mattias Kumm, edited by Jeffrey 
Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, 258-324. Cambridge University Press. 
Kyl, Jon, Douglas Feith, and John Fonte. 2013. "The War of Law: How New International 
Law Undermines Democratic Sovereignty." Foreign Affairs (July/August). 
1945. "La Charte des Nations Unies." Nations Unies. Accessed May 13, 2014. 
https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap18.shtml. 
Lam, Maivan Clech. 2008. "Minorities and Indigenous Peoples." In The Oxford Handbook on 
the United Nations, edited by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, 525-538. Oxford 
University Press. 
Lamy, Pascal. 2007. "Globalization and the Environment in a Reformed UN: Charting A 
Sustainable Development Path." WTO. Feb. 5. Accessed May 1, 2010. 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl54_e.htm. 
Lavalle, Roberto. 2003. "A Vicious Storm in a Teacup: The Action by the United Nations 
Security Council to Narrow the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court." 
Criminal Law Forum 14 (2): 195-220. 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). 1971. Reports 
1971, 16 (ICJ). http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=53&k=a7&p3=0. 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 1996. Advisory Opinion, Report 226 
(International Court of Justice (ICJ), July 8). http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7497.pdf. 
Leonard, Thomas, and John Bratzel. 2006. Latin America During World War II. Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Levi, Lucio. 2014. "Introduction." In The Democratization of International Institutions, 
edited by Lucio Levi, Giovanni Finizio and Nicola Vallinoto, 7-24. Routlege. 
Levi, Lucio. 2010. "Looking Back at Federalist Ideas." The Federalist Debate (Einstein 
Center for International Studies) 23 (2): 59-63. 
432 
 
Libera, Rosemary. 2000-2001. "Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for Wartime 
Damages." B.C. International & Comparative Law Review 24: 291-312. 
Liivoja, Rain. 2008. "The Scope of the Suprermacy Clause of the United Nations Charter." 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57 (3): 583-612. 
Lim, CL. 2000. "On the law, procedures and politics of United Nations Gulf War 
reparations." Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 4: 435-478. 
Lindblom, Anna-Karin. 2006. Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law. CUP. 
Liste, Philip. 2011. "Public' International Law? Democracy and Discourses of Legal Reality." 
In Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2011, Agora: The Case of Iraq: 
International Law and Politics, 177-191. Springer. 
Llamzon, Aloysius. 2008. "Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the 
International Court of Justice." EJIL 18 (5). 
Luck, Edward. 2003. Reforming the United Nations: Lessons From a History in Progress. 
Academic Council on United Nations System, 78. 
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430132.pdf. 
Maas, Willem. 2007. Creating European Citizens. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
². 2013. Multilevel Citizenship (Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism). University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Magaisa, Alex. 2010. "Constitutionality Versus Constitutionalism: Lessons for Zimababwe's 
Constitutional Reform Process." The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 
(OSISA). Accessed Augugst 23, 2014. 
http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/sup_files/Constitutionality vs 
constitutionalism.pdf. 
Mahbubani, Kishore. 2013. The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One 
World. Public Affairs. 
Malloch-Brown, Mark. 2008. "Can the UN be Reformed?" Global Governance 14: 1-12. 
Malone, David. 2008. "Security Council." In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 
edited by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws. Oxford University Press. 
Mandelbaum, Michael. 2006. 7KH&DVHIRU*ROLDWK+RZ$PHULFD$FWVDVWKH:RUOG¶V
Government in the Twenty-first Century. Public Affairs. 
Mansell, Wade, Alan Thomson, and Belinda Meteyard. 2004. Critical Introduction to Law 
(Third Edition). Cavendish Publishing. 
433 
 
Mansell, Wade, and Karen Openshaw. 2013. International Law: A Critical Introduction. Hart 
Publishing. 
Mansell, Wade, and Karen Openshaw. 2009. "Suturing the Open Veins of Ecuador: Debt, 
Default and Democracy." Law and Development Review 2(1): 150-191. 
Marceau, Gabrielle. 2002. "WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights." European Journal 
of International Law 13 (4): 753-814. 
Martínez, Luis. 2008. "Bad Law for Good Reasons: The Contradictions of the Kadi 
Judgment." International Organizations Law Review (5): 339-357. 
Martínez, Luis. 2008. "The Legislative Role of the Security Council in its Fight Against 
Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical Limits." International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 333-359. 
Mayerfeld, Jamie. 2011. "Strengthening International Human Rights Institutions." In Global 
Governance, Global Government: Institutional Visions for an Evolving World System, 
edited by Luis Cabrera. State University of New York Press. 
Mazower, Mark. 2008. No Enchanted Palace, The End of the Empire and the Ideological 
Origins of the United Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
McDonald, Kara, and Patrick Stewart. 2010. UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. 
Interests. Special Report No. 59, Council on Foreing Relations. 
McGinnis, John, and Mark Movsesian. 2000. "The World Trade Constitution." Harvard Law 
Review 114 (December): 511-599. 
McGovern, Francis. 2009. "Dispute Systems Design: The United Nations Compensation." 
Harvard Negotiation Law Review 14: 171-193. 
McKendree, David. 1954. "The Future of the United Nations: Issues of Charter Revision." 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 296: 151-155. 
Meeting Coverage and Press Release: Sixty-sixth General Assembly, 108th meeting. 2012. 
Switzerland Withdraws Draft Resolution in General Assembly Aimed at Improving 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶V:RUNLQJ0HWKRGVWR$YRLGµ3ROLWLFDOO\&RPSOH[¶:UDQJOLQJ UN 
Meeting Coverage and Press Releases (16 May 2012). Accessed November 2, 2014. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11234.doc.htm. 
Megret, Frederick. 2011. Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic 
Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties. Vol. II, in The Vienna Conventions on the 
Law of Treaties, A Commentary, by Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, 1861-1869. 
Oxford University Press. 
434 
 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 1984. (International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)). http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=nus&case=70&k=66&p3=0. 
Mofid, Kamran. 1990. The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War. Routledge. 
Moller, Kai. 2014. "From Constitutional to Human Rights: On the Moral Structure of 
International Human Rights." Global Constitutionalism 3 (3): 373-403. 
Morrison, Fred. 1987. "Legal Issues in the Nicaragua Opinion." American Journal of 
International Law (AJIL) 81 (1): 160-166. 
Murphy, John. 2011. The Evolving Dimensions of International Law, Hard Choices for the 
World Community. Cambridge University Press. 
Nazarkin, Yuri. 2010. "Negotiating as a Rival: A Russian Perspective." In American 
Negotiating Behavior: Wheeler-Dealers, Legal Eagles, Bullies, and Preachers, edited 
by Richard Solomon and Nigel Quinney, 237-250. United States Institute of Peace. 
1LFRODLGLV.DO\SVR7KH1HZ&RQVWLWXWLRQDV(XURSHDQµGHPRLFUDF\¶"Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7 (1): 76-93. 
Nicolaidis, Kalypso, and Robert Howse. 2002. The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of 
Governance in the United States and The European Union. Oxford University Press. 
Nijman, James. 2011. "After 'Iraq': Back to the International Rule of Law? ." In Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 2011, Agora: The Case of Iraq: International Law and 
Politics, edited by I.F. Dekker and E. Hey, 71-94. Springer. 
ODS. 1993-2012. Official Document System of United Nations (ODS). Accessed March 07, 
2012. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/417/02/PDF/N0441702.pdf?OpenElement. 
Office of Legal Affairs, UN. 2000-2009. "Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, 
Supplement 10, Articles 108 and 109." Accessed November 03, 2014. 
http://legal.un.org/repertory/art108-109/english/rep_supp10_vol6-art108-
109_e_advance.pdf. 
Office of Legal Affairs, UN. 1970-1978. "Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, 
Supplement 5, Articles 108 and 109." http://legal.un.org/repertory/art108-
109/english/rep_supp5_vol5-art108-109_e.pdf#pagemode=none. 




O'Neal, Michael. 2008. The Struggle for the European Constitution: A Past and Future 
History. Routledge. 
Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the question of increase of the 
membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. 
2007. Accessed November 04, 2014. http://www.un.org/ga/president/61/follow-
up/scr/SC-draft-10Sept2007.pdf. 
Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the question of increase of the 
membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. 
2008. Accessed November 06, 2014. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N08/504/53/PDF/N0850453.pdf?OpenElement. 
Orakhelashvili, Alexander. 2007. "The Acts of the Security Council: Meaning and Standards 
of Review." In Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 11 (2007), 143-
195. http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/mpunyb_04_orakhelashvili_11.pdf. 
Palombella, Gianluigi. 2006. "From Human Rights to Fundamental Rights: Consequences of 
a conceptual distinction." EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/34.  
Patrick, Stewart. 2014. "The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Global 
Governance." Foreign Affairs (Jannuary/February). 
Paulus, Andreas. 2009. "The International Legal System as a Constitution." In Ruling the 
World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, edited by 
Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, 69-109. Cambridge University Press. 
Pauwelyn, Joost. 2003. Confilict of Norms in Public International Law, How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of Intnernational Law. Cambridge University Press. 
Pauwelyn, Joost. 2010. Global Challenges at the Intersecion of Trade, Energy, and the 
Environment. Geneva: Center for Trade and Economic Integration. 
Payandeh, Mehrdad. 2011. "The Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. 
Hart." The European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 21 (4): 967-995. 
Payandeh, Mehrdad. 2012. "The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change 
in Libya." Virginia Journal of International Law 52: 355-404. 
Pazarci, Huseyin. 2011. "1969 Vienna Convention Preamble." In The Vienna Conventions on 




Perez, Antonio. 1996. "On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and the 
Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter." Texas International Law 
Journal 31: 353-450. 
Peters, Anne. 2011. "Dual Democracy." In The Constitutionalization of International Law, 
edited by Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, 263-352. Oxford University 
Press. 
2011. "Membership in the Global Constitutional Community." In The Constitutionalization of 
International Law, by Anne Peters, edited by Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir 
Ulfstein, 153-262. Oxford University Press. 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich. 2009. "International Trade Law, Human Rights, and the 
Customary International Law Rules on Treaty Interpretation." In The World Trade 
Organization and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Sarah 
Joseph, David Kinley and Jeff Waincymer, 69-90. Elgar. 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich. 2000. "The WTO Constitution and Human Rights." Journal of 
International Economic Law 19 (3): 19-25. 
Picciotto, Sol. 2008. "Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?" International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 457-479. 
3RVQHU(ULF6RPH6NHSWLFDO&RPPHQWVRQ%HWK6LPPRQ¶V0RELOL]LQJIRU+XPDQ
Rights Symposium." N.Y.U. -,QW¶O/	3RO 44: 819-831. 
². 2009. The Perils of Global Legalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Powell, Catherine. 2001. "Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation 
of Human Rights Law in the United States Social Movements and Law Reform." 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150: 245-295. 
PROSECUTOR V. DUSKO TADIC a/k/a "DULE", DECISION ON THE DEFENCE 
MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ON JURISDICTION. 1995. No. IT±94±
1±AR72, Decision of 2 October 1995 (ICTY, October 2). Accessed April 20, 2013. 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION Arising 
From: The Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v. UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA). 1998. (ICJ, February 27). http://www.icj-
cij.org/homepage/index.php. 




Rajkovic, Nikolas. 2012. "'Global law' and governmentality: Reconceptualizing the 'rule of 
law' as rule 'through' Law." European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 29-
52. 
Ramcharan, Bertrand. 2008. "Norms and Machinery." In The Oxford Handbook on the 
United Nations, edited by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, 439-462. Oxford University 
Press. 
5HLQROG7KHUHVDDQG0LFKDHO=XUQµ5XOHVDERXWUXOHV¶DQGWKHHQGRJHQRXV
dynamics of international law: Dissonance reduction as a mechanism of secondary 
rule-making." Global Constitutionalism 3 (2): 236-273. 
Rensmann, Thilo. 2012. Reform. Vol. I, in The Charter of the United Nations, A 
Commentary, Third Edition, edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg 
Nolte and Andreas Paulus, 25-70. Oxford University Press. 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. 1949. (International 
Court of Justice, April 11). http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/1835.pd. 
Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-1. 1954-1955. Repertory of the United 
Nations Practices, Articles 108 and 109 Section. New York: The UN Office of Legal 
Affairs (OLA). 
2000-2009. Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-10 (on Article 103). UN 
Office of Legal Affairs. Accessed August 5, 2013. 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art103/english/rep_supp10_vol6_art103_e_advan
ce.pdf. 
Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-2. 1955-1959. Repertory of the United 
Nations Practices, Articles 108 and 109 Section. New York: The UN Office of Legal 
Affairs (OLA). 
1959-1966. Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-3, New York: The UN 
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). 
1966-1969. Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-4, New York: The UN 
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). 
1970-1978. Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-5, Volume 5 (Amendments 
Section). UN Office of Legal Affairs. http://www.un.org/law/repertory/. 
1979-1984. Repertory of the United Nations Practices-Supplement-6 (on Article 103), UN 





Repertory Practices of the United Nations. 1945-1954. "Repertory of the United Nations 
Practices, Articles 108 and 109 Section." 
2004. "Report of the Secretary General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict 
and post-conflict societies." Official Documents System of UN. Accessed December 
06, 2014. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement. 
Request for Advisory Opinion By World Health Organization: Legality of the Use by a State 
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict. 1993. (International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
September 3). http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&code=anw&case=93&k=09&p3=0. 
Rodrik, Dani. 2011. The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and 
Democracy Can't Coexist. Oxford University Press. 
Rosenau, James. 1992. "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics." In Governance 
without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James Rosenau 
and Ernst-Otto Czempie. Cambridge University Press. 
Rosenfeld, Michel. 2014. "Is Global Constitutionalism Meaningful or Desirable?" EJIL 25 
(1): 177-199. 
Ruiter, Dick. 1993. Institutional Legal Facts: Legal Powers and their Effects. Springer. 
Russell, Ruth. 1958. A History of the United Nations: The Role of the United States 1940-
1945. Brookings Institution. 
S. Doc. 108-17 - The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and 




Sands, Phillippe, and Pierre Klein. 2009. Bowett's Law of International Institutions. 6th. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Sarooshi, Dan. 2007. International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers. 
OUP. 
Schabas, William. 2009. "An Introduction to the International Criminal Court." Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schachter, Oscar. 1994. "United Nations Law." American Journal of International Law 
(AJIL) 88 (1): 1-23. 
439 
 
Scheppele, Kim. 2011. "Global Security Law and the Challenge to Constitutionalism after 
9/11." Public Law 353-377. 
Schilling, Theodor. 2005. "Constitutionalization of General International Law²An Answer 
to Globalization? Some Structural Aspects." NYCU Forum Paper.  
Schlesinger, Stephen. 2003. ACT OF CREATION, The Founding of the United Nations:A 
Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and Their Quest 
for a Peaceful World. Boulder, Coloardo: Westview Press. 
Schmalenbach, Kresten. 2012. "Article 4, Non-retroactivity of the Present Convention." In 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, edited by Oliver Dorr and 
Kristen Schmalenbach, 81-89. Springer. 
Schrijver, Nico. 2010. "Future of the Charter of the United Nations." Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law. 
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/schrijver_10.pdf. 
Schutze, Robert. 2014. Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schwartzberg, Joseph. 2013. Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a 
Workable World. United Nations University Press. 
Schwebel, Stephen. 1994. Justice in International Law: Selected Writings. CUP. 
Schwelb, Egon. 1958. "Charter Review and Charter Amendment²Recent Developments." 
International Law and Comparative Law Quarterly 303-333. 
Schwelb, Egon. 1968. "Entry Into Force of the Amendment to Article 109 of the Charter of 
the United Nations." International and Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ) 17: 1009-
1013. 
Schwelb, Egon. 1966. "The 1963/1965 Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations: An 
addendum." American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 60 (2): 371-378. 
Schwindt, Constance. 2000. "Interpreting the United Nations Charter: From Treaty to World 
Constitution." U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 193 (6). 
Scott, Shirley. 2005. "The Failure of the UN to Hold a Charter Review Confernce in the 
1950s: The future in the Past?" Australia and New Zealand Law and History E-Jounal 
70-79. http://www.anzlhsejournal.auckland.ac.nz/pdfs_2005/Scott.pdf. 
2013. "Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)." Accessed March 5, 2013. 
2013. Security Council Report. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/. 
440 
 
2013. Security Council, The 1540 Committee. Accessed March 6, 2013. 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/index.shtml. 
Shannon, Vaughn. 2005. "Wendt's Violation of the Constructivist Project: Agency and Why a 
World State is Not Inevitable." European Journal of International Relations 11(4): 
581-587. 
Sharei, Mahmoud. 2010. Conflicting Norms in a World of Fragmented International Law and 
the Role of World Trade Organization: Constitutionalization or Linkage Facilitation? 
LLM Essay, University of Kent Law School, BSIS, 1-25 . 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2743077 .   
Sharei, Mahmoud. 2014. "Creation of a Global Parliament and the Fear of Veto." The 
Federalist Debate XXVII (1): 10-12. 
Sharei, Mahmoud. 2010. The Treaty on Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
Regime, and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons: Is there the "good faith" in a Legal 
Regime for Nuclear Disarmament? LLM Thesis, University of Kent Law School, 
BSIS, 1-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742475 . 
 Sievers, Loraine, and Sam Daws. 2014. The Procedure of the UN Security Council. 4th. 
Oxford University Press. 
Simma, Bruno, and Dirk Pulkowski. 2006. "Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained 
Regimes in Ineternational Law." European Journal of International Law 483-529. 
Simma, Bruno, ed. 1994. Charter of the United Nations: a commentary. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Simma, Bruno, H. Mosler, A. Randelzhofer, C. Tomuschat, and R. Worlfrum, . 2002. The 
Charter of the United Nations, a Commentary, Second Edition. 2nd. Vol. II. 2 vols. 
Oxford University Press. 
Simmons, Beth. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. 
CUP. 
Skard, Torild. 2008. "Getting Our History Right: How Were Equal Rights of Women and 
Men Included in the Charter of the United Nations?" The Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs: Forum for Development Studies 35 (1): 37-60. 
http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/GettingOurHistoryRight.pdf. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2009. "America's Edge: Power, in the Neworked Century." Foreign 
Affairs 88: 94-113. 
². 2004. The New World Order. Princeton University Press. 
441 
 
Sohn, Louis. 1995. Interpreting the Law. Vol. I, in United Nations Legal Order, edited by 
Oscar Schachter and Christopher Joyner, 169-230. ASIL, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role 
of the Organization. 2014. 2013 Report. Accessed November 04, 2014. 
http://www.un.org/law/chartercomm/. 
2012. "Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)." http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/president-
s-reports-and-memoranda/third-annual-report-2011-2012. 
Stahn, Carsten. 2003. "The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422." European 
Journal of International Law 14 (1): 85-104. 
1945. "Statute of International Court of Justice." UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf. 
Steiner, Henry, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman. 2007. International Human Rights in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals. 3rd. Oxford University Press. 
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2003. Globalization and its Discontents. W.W. Norton and Company. 
Stone Sweet, Alec. 2013. "The Structure of constitutional pluralism: Review of Nico Krisch, 
Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Post-National Law." 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 11 (2): 491-500. 
Strauss, and Andrew. 2007. "On the First Branch of Global Governance." Widener Law 
Review 13 (2): 347-359. 
Subcommittee on International Organizations. 1975. The Question of Charter Review. 
Congressional Report, 94th Congress, US House of Representatives, US Government 
Printing Office. Accessed November 1, 2014. 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015078698738;view=1up;seq=4. 
Sujit, Choudhry. 2006. In The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, edited by Sujit Choudhry. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Szasz, Paul. 2002. "The Security Council Starts Legislating." The American Journal of 
International Law 96 (4): 901-905. 
Tabor, Nathon. 2006. The Beast on the East River, the UN Threat to America's Sovereignty 
and Security. Nelson Current. 
Talmon, Stefan. 2005. "The Security Council as World Legislature." American Journal of 
International Law 99: 175-193. 
442 
 
Tanzi, Attila. 1995. "Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and the Law of the United Nations." EJIL 6 (1). 
Taylor, Paul, and A.J.R. Groom. 2000. The United Nations at the Millennium. London: 
Continuum. 
Thakur, Ramesh. 2006. The United Nations, Peace and Security. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union. 2013. Press Release No 93/13 - Kadi Case II. 
July 18. Accessed November 21, 2013. 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-07/cp130093en.pdf. 
2001-2013. The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF). Accessed February 28, 
2013. http://www.vcf.gov/. 
The US Congress. 2002. "Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and 
Interpretation - 2002 Edition -S. Doc. 108-17." US Government Printing Office 
(GPO). Accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-
2002/content-detail.html. 
Trachtman, Joel. 2008. The Economic Structure of International Law. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
². 2007. The International Economic Law Revolution and the Right to Regulate. Cameron 
May Ltd. 
Tsagourias, Nicholas. 2007. In Transnational Constitutionalism, International and European 
Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tzanakopoulos, Antonios. 2013. Kadi Showdown: Substantive Review of (UN) Sanctions by 
the ECJ. July 19. Accessed November 2013, 2013. http://www.ejiltalk.org/kadi-
showdown/. 
UDHR. 1948. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." UN Documents. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a6. 
Ugarte, Bruno . 2012. Enhancing Security Council Cooperation with the International 
Criminal Court. Accessed April 18, 2013. 
http://regnet.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Ugarte%206.2_0.pdf. 




Ulfstein, Geir. 2011. "Institutions and Competencies." In The Constitutionalization of 
International Law, edited by Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, 45-80. 
Oxford University Press. 
Ulfstein, Geir. 2011. "The International Judiciary." In The Constitutionalization of 
International Law, edited by Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, 126-152. 
Oxford University Press. 
2013. "UN News Centre." 81SDQHOSD\VRXWELOOLRQLQUHSDUDWLRQVIRU,UDT¶VLQYDVLon 
of Kuwait. January 24. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43990&Cr=Iraq&Cr1=#.USeLAWc
oart. 
2009. UN News Centre. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32057#.USFUK2coars. 
2012. "UN News Centre." UN panel pays out $1.3 billion in reparatLRQVIRU,UDT¶VLQYDVLRQ
of Kuwait. 26 July. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42564&Kw1=uncc&Kw2=&Kw3=
#.VU3J35PzmL0. 
UN Office of Public Information. 1947-1948. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York, 
London: United Nations Office of Public Information. 
2014. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Accessed December 1, 2014. 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx. 
1946-2015. UN Security Council Resolutions. Accessed December 10, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml. 
1990-2015. UN Security Council Sanctions Committees. January 8. Accessed 2016. 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information. 
UN Web Services Section, DPI. 2014. History of the Charter of the United Nations. Accessed 
March 2, 2014. https://www.un.org/en/aboutun/charter/history/declaration.shtml. 
1945. "UNCIO - Volume I: General." United Nations Conference on International 
Organizations. New York, London: United Nations Information Organisation. 
1945. "UNCIO - Volume II: General." United Nations Conference on International 
Organization. New York, London: United Nations Information Organisation. 
1945. "UNCIO - Volume III: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Comments and Proposed 
Amendments." United Nations Conference on International Organization . New 
York, London: United Nations Information Organisation. 
444 
 
1945. "UNCIO - Volume V: Delegation Chairmen, Steering Committee, Executive 
Committee." United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO). 
New York, London: United Nations Information Organisation. 
1945. "UNCIO - Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions." United Nations Conference 
on International Organization (UNCIO). New York, London: United Nations 
Information Organisation. 
1945. "UNCIO - Volume VII: Commission I, General Provisions." United Nations 
Conference on International Organization. New York, London: United Nations 
Information Organisation. 
1945. "UNCIO - Volume XI: Commission III, Security Council." United Nations Conference 
on International Organization. New York, London. 
UN-DESA & UNDP. 2013. UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development 
Agenda. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) & UNDP, 11. 
Accessed February 15, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/thinkpieces/24_thin
kpiece_global_governance.pdf. 
2015. "UNGA: Rules of procedure and comments." UN General Assembly. Accessed 
February 4, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/index.shtml. 
1945. "United Nations Committee of Jurists." United Nations Conference on International 
Organizations (UNCIO), San Francisco, 1945. London & New York: UN 
Information Organisation. 453-460. 
1991-2013. "United Nations Compensation Commission ." UNSC Compensation Commission 
(Iraq-Kuwait Conflict). Accessed February 23, 2013. http://www.uncc.ch/. 
2009. United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict. 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/factfindingmission.h
tm. 
1946-1947. United Nations Yearbook. New York, London: United Nations Office of Public 
Information. 
1955-1967. "United Nations Yearbook." UN Annual Yearbooks. http://unyearbook.un.org/. 
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. 1998. 




University of Wisconsin Digital Collection. 1950. "United States Department of State / 




UNRIC. 1946-2000. Various UN General Assembly Committee Reports and Meeting 
Summaries (United Nations Regional Information Center, for Western Europe 
(UNRIC)). 
2011. 'US Seeks Regime Change in Libya'. http://www.presstv.com/detail/185691.html. 
Vagts, Detlev. 2001. "Hegemonic International Law." American Journal of International Law 
95: 843-848. 
Vagts, Detlev. 2001. "Hegemonic International Law." American Journal of International Law 
(AJIL) 95: 843-848. 
Van Den Bossche, Peter. 2009. The Law and the Policy of the World Trade Organization, 
Text, cases, and Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62. 1963. 
(ECJ, February 5). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61962CJ0026&from=EN. 
Van Genugten, Willem, Kees Homan, and Nico Schrivjer. 2006. The United Nations of the 
Future: Globalization with a Human Face. KIT Publishers. 
Velásquez-Ruiz, Marco. 2011. "In the Name of International Peace and Security: Reflections 
on the United Nations Security Council´s Legislative Action." International Law, 
Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 18: 13-56. 
Verbeek, Bertjan. 2011. "Does Might Still Make Right? International Relations Theory and 
the Use of Internatinal Law Regarding the 2003 Iraq War." In Netherlands Yearbook 
of International Law 2011, Agora: The Case of Iraq: International Law and Politics, 
193-214. Springer. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex), concluded at Vienna, on 23 May 
1969. 1969. UN Treaty Collections. Accessed March 7, 2014. 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-
18232-English.pdf. 
Villiger, Mark. 2009. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
446 
 
Walker, Neil. 2010. Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Golbal Context. 
http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_1003.pdf?fileitem=5455875. 
². 2009. "Multilevel Constitutionalism: Looking Beyond the German Debate." LSE 'Europe 
in Question' Discussion Paper Series.  
Walker, Neil. 2009. "Reframing EU Constitutionalism." In Ruling the World?: 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey 
Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, 149-177. Cambridge University Press. 
Walker, Neil. 2001. "The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key." In EU and the 
WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, edited by Grainne De Burca and Joanne Scott, 
31-58. Hart Publishing. 
Weiler, J.H.H. 2004. "Geology of International Law ± Governance, Democracy and 
Legitimacy." Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Max-
Planck-Institut für ausländischesöffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht). Heidelberg 
Journal of International Law ( HJIL ). Accessed August 25, 2014. 
http://www.zaoerv.de/64_2004/64_2004_3_a_547_562.pdf. 
Weiler, J.H.H. 1991. "The Transformation of Europe." Yale Law Journal 100 (8): 2403-2483. 
Weiler, J.H.H. 2014. "Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and object and the 
dilemma of European legitimacy." Int. Journal of Constitutional Law 94-103. 
Weiss, Thomas. 2011. Thinking about Global Governance: Why People and Ideas Matter. 
Routledge. 
Weiss, Thomas. 2009. "What Happened to the Idea of World Government." International 
Studies Quarterly 53 (2): 253-271. 
². 2009. What is Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix it. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Weiss, Thomas, and Ramesh Thakur. 2010. Global Governance and the UN, an Unfinished 
Journey. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Weissner, Siegfried. 1994-1995. "American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law." 
St. Thomas Law Review 567-594. 
Wendt, Alexander. 2005. "Agency, Teleology and the World State: A Reply to Shannon." 
European Journal of International Relations 11 (4): 589-598. 
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics." International Organization 46 (2): 391-425. 
447 
 
Wendt, Alexander. 2003. "Why a World State is Inevitable." European Journal of 
International Relations 9 (4): 491-542. 
http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/9/4/491.full.pdf+html. 
White, Nigel, and Robert Cryer. 2009. "The ICC and the Security Council: An 
Uncomfortable Relationship." In The Legal Regime of the International Criminal 
Court, Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko, edited by Jose Doria, Hans-
Peter Gasser and Cherif Bassiouni. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Wilcox, Francis. 1945. "The Yalta Voting Formula." American Political Science Review 39 
(5): 943-956. 
Wilkinson, Rorden, ed. 2005. The Global Governance Reader. Oxon: Routledge. 
Witschel, Georg. 2012. Chapter XVIII Amendments. Vol. II, in The Charter of the United 
Nations, A Commentary, Third Edition, edited by Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus 
Khan Khan, Georg Nolte and Andreas Paulus, 2199-2242. Oxford University Press. 
Wittner, Lawrence. 2013. "Who's Afraid of World Government?" George Mason University - 
History News Network. Accessed November 26, 2014. 
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/119987. 
Wood, Michael. 2011. "The Law of Treaties and the UN Security Council: Some 
Reflections." In The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, by Enzo 
Cannizzaro. Oxford University Press. 
World Health Organisation: Request for Advisory Opinion. 1993. ICJ. September 3. 
Accessed February 26, 2015. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/10309.pdf. 
1991. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information (UN-DPI). 
1971. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information (UN-DPI). 
1967. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information (UN-DPI). 
1963. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information (UN-DPI). 
1961. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information (UN-DPI). 




1957. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Office of Public 
Information. 
1955. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: UN Office of Public Information. 
1948-1949. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York, London: UN Office of Public 
Information. 
1965. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: UN Department of Public Information 
(UN-DPI). 
1953. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Office of Public 
Information. 
2003. Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information (UN-DPI). 
Yunker, James. 2014. Beyond Global Governance: Prospects for Global Government. 
University Press of Amercia. 
Zacklin, Ralph. 1968-Reprint 2005. The Amendment of the Constitutive Instruments of the 
United Nations And Specialized Agencies. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Zayas, Alfred-Maurice. 2013. Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order. 
SG Transmittal, UNGA. Accessed January 30, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/284. 
Zolo, Danilo. 1998. "Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law." European 
Journal of International Law 9: 306-324. 
http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=1492&issue=48. 
Zumbansen, Peer. 2013. "Administrative Law's Global Dream: Navigating Regulatory Spaces 








Appendix 1     UN Charter Articles 108 and 109  
Charter of the United Nations 
                                        Appendix 1 :              UN Charter Articles 108 and 109                                                 P. 1 of 2                   
 
Skip to left navigation | Skip to content 
Welcome to the United Nations. It's your world. 
 
 
































Available for Purchase 
Click to Order 
 
CHAPTER XVIII: AMENDMENTS 
 
Article 108   
 
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have 
been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the 




1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present 
Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General 
Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations 
shall have one vote in the conference. 
 
2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take 
effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the 
Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council. 
 
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly 
following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be 
placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so 
decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members 
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The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Statute 
of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter. 
 
Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter were adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 
1963 and came into force on 31 August 1965. A further amendment to Article 61 was adopted by the General 
Assembly on 20 December 1971, and came into force on 24 September 1973. An amendment to Article 109, 
adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1965, came into force on 12 June 1968. 
 
The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. The 
amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine 
members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council. 
 
The amendment to Article 61, which entered into force on 31 August 1965, enlarged the membership of the 
Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. The subsequent amendment to that Article, which 
entered into force on 24 September 1973, further increased the membership of the Council from twenty-seven 
to fifty-four. 
 
The amendment to Article 109, which relates to the first paragraph of that Article, provides that a 
General Conference of Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at a date 
and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of 
any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council. Paragraph 3 of Article 109, which deals 
with the consideration of a possible review conference during the tenth regular session of the General 
Assembly, has been retained in its original form in its reference to a "vote, of any seven members of 
the Security Council", the paragraph having been acted upon in 1955 by the General Assembly, at its 
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